Another KJA Programme Or Two

PARS 6X6 APC

SHAH ALAM: Another KJA Programme. In my earlier post on the MIFV/Adnan Upgrade I mentioned that the Army has another KJA – armoured vehicles – programme being planned for the near future. Its two actually as both are wheeled armoured vehicles – the High Mobility Protected Vehicles (HMAPV) and the 6X6.

PARS 6X6 APC

The current HMPV in service with the Army are the Deftech LipanBara while the 6X6 is of course the Condor. There is another HMPV in service with the Malaysian contingent in Lebanon – the IAG Guardian – but thats a different story all together .

A Lipan Bara likely from the Armour School in Port Dickson at the Merdeka 2019 rehersal day.

At this juncture,the Army has yet to finalise its plan and even though currently it’s a two KJA programme it could become one, once the dust is settled. However I was told that this had not been decided yet which may lead to a final decision to be made during RMK12 and implemented in RMK13.

Condors of 4 Armor during an exercise in February, 2019. Facebook

The long gestation period of the 6X6 (I first wrote about the indecision back in 2006) overlaps the decision to buy the 8X8. There is a school of thought that the Army should just buy the Gempita 6X6 to replace the Condors still in service with the three Armor regiments – 2 KAD, 3 KAD and 4 KAD. Both the 2 KAD and 3 KAD have already been equipped with the Gempita though likely with Support companies only. The 4 KAD based in Sarawak has yet to be equipped with any Gempita though.

Army

Gempita from 2 Armor at a recent parade. BTDM

However with many companies pushing their 6X6 to the Army and the new policy of open competition in Malaysian procurement it is likely that the Gempita and it smaller siblings 6X6 needs to fend off its other contenders.

Hanwa Tigon 6X6 APC

It is the same thing with the LipanBara. An open competition is the most likely outcome when and once the decision to buy new HMPV is approved and funded. Unless they decide to merge the 6X6 and HMPV programmes of course. Or simply buy the Gempita

— Malaysian Defence

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Shah Alam

95 Comments

  1. AAV-7 for a completely new dimensions in army’s capability?

    Reply
    Not unless the Amphibious Brigade becomes a reality

  2. Do we really need 6x6s to replace the condors in the cavalry regiment?

    For the Cavalry Regiments, I would prefer a mix of Gempita and J-LTVs. J-LTVs has high performance suspension for it to travel at high speed off-road. Why J-LTVs? It has high performance, high protection levels and low cost (less than USD350k each)

    For HMPV, I would like this to be the replacement for condors in APC role. The Lipanbara problem is that it cost about USD1.6 million each. I would like to see the HMPV to cost around USD0.5-0.8 million each. It must ideally carry 8 soldiers in addition to the vehicle crew.

    For cavalry regiments, it would ideally consist of
    24 gempita IFV30
    12 gempita LCT30
    4 gempita Command
    2 gempita ARV
    2 gempita Maintenance
    34 J-LTV (12 HWC, 6 VINTAQS, 12 GP, 4 ambulance)
    Making up 3 squadrons of Gempita, 1 Squadron of J-LTV fire support, 1 Squadron of J-LTV recce plus a Cavalry HQ.

    There will still be 4 cavalry regiments with gempita-JLTV combo, but 2nd KAD to be transferred to 5th Divison Sabah, its place in Negeri Sembilan ideally should be replaced by a 2nd MBT regiment.

    The HMPVs ideally should be enough for 5 battalions + 1 UN battalion. The 5 battalions is to be the 3 battalions of 7th Brigade, and 1 battalion each in 1st Division and 5th Division.

    IMO in RMK12 we should buy a 2nd batch of gempita, not for cavalry regiments, but mainly for 2 more mechanized infantry battalions so that we can have an all wheeled 4th Brigade Mechanized. What is the advantage of an all wheeled formation? Self-deploy capability and high maneuverability of the whole brigade without the need of low-loaders.

  3. @ dundun

    I would love to have a squadron of AAV-7 under an enlarged KAD Para Regiment. But that must be followed with the MRSS to be something like a LPD, not glorified tankers or container ships.

    I would like the KAD Para to have 2 squadrons plus ready stocks, 1 with AAV-7 (for amphibious operations), 1 more with ZBD-03s (for airborne operations).

    Each AAV-7 could carry 3 infantry sections, so 4 AAV-7 could carry 1 company of PARAs ashore from the MRSS.

  4. its more likely to be implement on RMK13….cant gempita filled the requirement??or go for Guardian ASV….

    would love to see what the new govt will be doing in new procurement..hope they true to their word on getting the army what they want rather than what the govt want…

  5. For HMPV, we could prolly look at the likes of Otokar Cobra or VBL or Komatsu LAV(considering Abe’s administration could make leeways in exporting such vehicle to Malaysia). These vehicles are dimensionally smaller than Lipanbara and could be a direct replacement to the long-serving ferret scout car

    Reply
    AFAIK the Ferret has been retired from service apart from a couple for ceremonial duties. It is likely these Ferrets are with 2 Armor. I haven’t seen them recently however.

  6. When you dont have a visible plan. Bean counters, politicians and the rakyat will ask why you need more armoured vehicles when you have bought the gempita 8×8?

    Why it is very important to clearly articulate your future plans, so that the rakyat, which actually pays for all that can understand the need for those items.

    I understand the need for HMPV. But the 6×6 i dont see the justification of the need for such vehicle instead of other cheaper alternatives.

    @ dundun

    The HMPV IMO is basically a requirement for an APC, the 6×6 requirement is i think to be a recce vehicle for the cavalry regiment. But IMO you dont need a 6×6 to do recce actually.

  7. On the cavalry regiment mounts.

    It is originally equipped with a mix of SIBMAS and Condors. SIBMAS as its main armoured vehicle with condor as its supporting element.

    Arguably we already have the Gempita 8×8 as a replacement of the SIBMAS, IMO all the IFV30 and LCT30 variants should be allocated to cavalry units. The condor role in cavalry units IMO can be assumed by JLTVs. It is comparatively small, has excellent off road ability even at high speed, MRAP-level of armoured protection and very high reliability levels. Transfer the VINGTAQS mast from gempita to the JLTV and you will have an agile recce vehicle for the army.

    http://img-s-msn-com.akamaized.net/tenant/amp/entityid/BBBedj5.img?h=630&w=1200&m=6&q=60&o=t&l=f&f=jpg&x=1048&y=607

  8. “I would love to have a squadron of AAV-7 under an enlarged KAD Para Regiment. But that must be followed with the MRSS to be something like a LPD, not glorified tankers or container ships.”

    I’m wondering what the point would be and would be very surprised if we have such a requirement at all.

    AAVs don’t have much purpose beyond an amphibious assault on a shore that is defended by a state adversary, which is an exercise that requires training, equipping and allocating more supporting units than we can ever hope to afford. Simply buying the AAVs alone would make them something of a white elephant.

    If we simply need some capability to land on an undefended shore in the absence of port infrastructure, then we don’t need the AAVs and supporting units.

  9. @ AM

    AAV-7 is not just useful against a state adversary. It can be also useful against non-state actors too.

    Can you name me a vehicle that can transport 21 troops direct from a ship miles offshore with its own power over high waves to the beach. Then travel hundreds of kilometers inland to the objective while protecting its occupants from small arms fire?

    http://www.armytimes.com/resizer/-Y0r4U6o7SunrDgwGGDIizwBVSc=/1200×0/filters:quality(100)/arc-anglerfish-arc2-prod-mco.s3.amazonaws.com/public/V5U6XNNSV5HYLPQMRHWKVNZ35Q.jpg

    All of our current IFVs cannot operate amphibiously in open seas, just rivers and lakes.

    I believe there is a use for AAV-7s to deploy our PARA units amphibiously. That is when we have our MRSS. A battalion of PARA can be landed ashore from a MRSS by a combination of AAV-7s, LCVTs and helicopters.

    Of course this is a niche capability to fully leverage the availability of MRSS vessel. At most we will need just a few dozen AAV-7 to be deployed on those MRSS.

  10. Advantage of a new contract would be possible cost savings and more suitable vehicle being chosen. IF that is, sound procurement procedures are followed.

    Disadvantage would be further delay and uncertainty factor of course.

    I would remind fellow readers of the sunk cost principle.

    @…
    It is unfeasible to properly train the same soldier for both para and marine ops. Well, special forces to some extent do that, but they make up a smaller proportion of most militaries.

    @…
    “transport 21 troops direct from a ship miles offshore with its own power over high waves to the beach. Then travel hundreds of kilometers inland to the objective”

    AAV7s have less than ideal land speed for use as inland APCs and would anyway be more useful, given limited numbers probably available, in ship to shore movement.

  11. “Can you name me a vehicle that can transport 21 troops direct from a ship miles offshore with its own power over high waves to the beach. Then travel hundreds of kilometers inland to the objective while protecting its occupants from small arms fire?”

    No other vehicle has these specific capabilities. But these are really only necessary where protection and firepower are needed during or shortly after landing. In a state threat context, the AAVs have a role to play (along with supporting air and naval elements) in establishing a beachhead so you can land non-amphibious combat vehicles and logistics elements by landing craft.

    In the context of non-state threats, there is considerably more tactical flexibility and several options are available before it becomes necessary to use AAVs, such as movement by road or helicopter, landing troops with assault craft or putting conventional vehicles ashore with landing craft.

    My complaint is that the AAVs are costly to maintain and even so, the amphibious capability and large passenger capacity come at the cost of reduced performance in other areas. Mobility, firepower, fighting arrangements and especially protection (as you noted, only against small arms) are lower than in conventional/non-amphibious armoured vehicles.

    If we are in a situation where we have to move “hundreds of km inland to the objective,” then this raises questions regarding the amphibious nature of the operation and whether we would do better by putting conventional vehicles ashore with landing craft.

  12. Off topic.

    For our acv-15, the adnans with 25mm sharpshooter turret variant, are they able to shoot while moving?

    If not, are there any upgrades for that?

  13. @ Chua

    French marines are both para and amphibious qualified. Currently all malaysian para soldiers are required to have swimming skills, and swimming tests with equipments are regularly done.

    @ AM

    What is your proof that AAVs are expensive to maintain? I am looking at a fleet of about 20 AAV-7s, for training and deployment aboard MRSS. Something with multiple users (3 in asean alone) and plentiful of spares should not be difficult or expensive to maintain.

    As for landing crafts, an LPD like the Makassar, can only carry 2 LCVTs. That can at most carry 2 IFVs each at a time. So how many trips just to put a company ashore? As i said the AAVs are to be used in concert with all the other transports, like landing crafts and helicopters to put soldiers ashore from the MRSS.

  14. AM – “If we are in a situation where we have to move “hundreds of km inland to the objective”

    Highly unlikely in our context. In such a scenario the main problem would be in keeping the troops supplied and ensuring lines of communications are not disrupted. Any such operation would also be highly dependent on having the needed air assets.

    If indeed the objective was “hundreds of km away” it would be case of a “bridge too far” in that due to the distance, many problems world be encountered and troops would be better off being deployed by air.

  15. The “hundreds of kms away” is what the AAV-7 is capable of (which is proven in Iraq when it drove right up to Baghdad).

    I did not say that is exactly what we need to do.

    @ chua

    The AAV-7 actually has a higher top speed than our Adnans.

  16. BTW lets get back to discuss about the KJA HMPV and 6×6 shall we? Looks like most mil fb pages out there are talking about this post.

  17. Should just go for Gempita 6×6..btw..i was thinking using Adnan with BMP-3 turret for Scorpion and Stromer replacement..is it viable?

  18. @ Praxis

    First you need to ask, what would the supposed scorpion and stormer replacement be used for? Still for the PARA brigade? For what kind of tasks? Why do you need the BMP-3 turret for?

  19. ….. – “The “hundreds of kms away” is what the AAV-7 is capable of (which is proven in Iraq when it drove right up to Baghdad”

    In that situation the Yanks had full command of the skies, had secure flanks, as well as largely secure lines of communications that were not threatened. Of course the AAV-7 is “capable”. Under the right operational conditions a M113 or a BRDM would be capable.

    …. – “I did not say that is exactly what we need to do.”

    Indeed you didn’t. I just pointed out the difficulties in embarking on such a venture.

  20. Pracxis,

    Why a BMP turret? What kind of weapon do you have in mind that isn’t already fitted to Adnan?

    The Cockerill was selected at a time when we desired a fire support platform but couldn’t afford a 105mm armed one. The result was a Scorpion that was overloaded and one that couldn’t fire on uneven ground due to the possibility of toppling. The army has no requirement for anymore 90mms.

    Nihd,

    Sharpshooter is fully stabilised.

  21. AM – “My complaint is that the AAVs are costly to maintain and even so, the amphibious capability and large passenger capacity come at the cost of reduced performance in other areas. Mobility, firepower, fighting arrangements and especially protection”

    The one lost at Nasariyah comes to mind.

    Just like how maintaining jump qualified units is resource intensive (each para needs several jumps a year to maintain currency and “x” number of aircraft sorties will be needed); maintaining a fleet of amphibious IFVs is also resource intensive in that several beach landings will have to be performed over a certain period to maintain the skill.

    Not only that but each vehicle will have to be throughly checked regularly to ensure watertight integrity and after every beach landing each vehicle will have to be thoroughly washed to prevent corrosion. So in that sense it’s resource intensive in that is requires more checks/maintenance – compared to other vehicles – due to the unique capability offered.

    You’re right, we don’t have such a requirement. Whilst having such vehicles does indeed have utility, in our scheme of things its something that’s not a priority; something we can do without. In the unlikely chance we ever decided to go for an amphib IFV. I would like something smaller and with a much lower profile Its smaller lift capacity for me would be a penalty worth incurring.

  22. It 90mm sucked when used on scorpion I can guarantee you it gonna suck when used on adnan as well. We could put 90mm cockerill on Gempita but I don’t think current administration is keen on the idea

    There’s a low-priority development being undertaken by stride on local-made light tank afaik so we could see how it goes

  23. @…
    “French marines are both para and amphibious qualified. Currently all malaysian para soldiers are required to have swimming skills, and swimming tests with equipments are regularly done.”

    Are you sure? The word “Marine” in French Troupes de Marine refers to “Colonial” troops which is the heritage of those units.

    Swimming skills =/= Amphibious operations qualified

  24. If we’re looking for recce vehicle then the likes of Otokar Cobra and VBL makes even more sense than any 6×6

  25. @ azlan

    If we do acquire the AAV-7s, the logical numbers would be just about 20. If the MRSS requirement is not changed, a single MRSS could probably loaded with 12 AAV-7 plus other vehicles. Basically we should aim to be able to deploy 1 MRSS with 1 battalion of soldiers and support equipment, with the AAV-7 as one of the equipment on board to support the deployment.

    http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-bzkLFqyQTuM/XQd0pzUSKwI/AAAAAAAAGhU/AkTpL_YGMdwuJ0YnNH1jDV_lun4YpFL-gCLcBGAs/s1600/42641363_821033924733933_1350694706954108928_n.jpg

    With basically just a squadron worth of AAV-7 and manpower, trainings would be a small scale affair. Similar to regular river crossing trainings of mechanized troops, beach training for AAV-7 should be quite similar, so not something that would cost much more than what we already did for our regular mechanized forces.

    What I am saying is, without having AAV-7, it would need many trips of the landing craft and helicopters to transfer 1 battalion of troops and equipment from the MRSS offshore to the beach. With AAV-7s, we could probably land a whole battalion just with 1 trip of all the AAV-7, landing craft and Helicopters on board a MRSS. Yes we can live without the AAV-7, but having them would greatly enhance the amphibious capability of our troops.

    If we do need a dedicated amphibious IFV, the numbers would be small, and scratch building one will not be a good use of available resources. Basically there is only a handful of vehicles available in this role
    – AAV-7 (used usa, new south korea)
    – FNSS ZAHA
    – BAE SuperAV
    As this is not a top priority item, just get some EDA from USA to have the option of a marinized amphibious IFV to bring our troops from ship to shore.

    @ chua

    Does that prevent France from deploying its troops on their Mistral LPDs? Do France set up exclusively amphibious troops for their 3 large LPDs?

    @ dundun

    I was a big fan of the VBL and Cobra too. Both of them are basically armoured version of the Humvee.

    That was before J-LTV came into the picture. Read more about the J-LTV. How much better it is compared to the armoured humvee. How much more capable it is to drive off-road. Look at youtubes of J-LTV testing and driving off-road and you will understand why I like that vehicle. Not to mention it is probably cheaper than the VBL and Cobra at less than USD350k each.

  26. Rather than APCs or IFVs, we need more tanks. We do have APCs and IFVs albeit old but we have not much in tanks. Tanks need to be armed with the 125mm to standardize with our existing PT-91s Pendekar. The market is has VT-4, Al-Khalid, T84s, T90s, T72B3, and even light tanks like VT-5.

    There are too many infantry divisions in Malaysia to be honest. We need to mechanise and more armors. Setting up new infantry unit during contingency is relatively easy and we can do that with our reserves but mechanise, armors and artillery unit is a different thing. Thats where our active units need to focus on.

  27. Wan – “Rather than APCs or IFVs, we need more tanks”

    Not only funding but threat perceptions play a part. The army has on paper plans for another regiment’s worth of MBTs but nothing beyond that. We don’t foresee ourselves being in a full blown state on state conflict with our immediate neighbours.

    The RTA has long operated MBTs because of the Vietnamese factor in the 1970’s/80’s and lately because of the possibility of trouble with Myanmar The Sings operate MBTs because their plans call for combined arms units to operate beyond their border.

    We in the other hand have less clearly defined threats when it comes to state on state conflicts and as you know; resources are extremely tight.

    Wan – “There are too many infantry divisions in Malaysia to be honest. We need to mechanise and more armors”

    Think. If we can’t even afford to equip what we have now with the basis in the form of body armour, NVGs. etc and when even units like Gerak Khas and 10 Para have long unfulfilled shopping lists comprising basic items; how on earth do we do what you suggest?

  28. Dundun – “90mm sucked when used on scorpion I can guarantee you it gonna suck when used on adnan as well”

    The problem was not with the actual gun but the fact that we took a fast and nimble platform and turned it into a slow and lumbering one by fitting it with something it was never originally designed to take. We did the same with the Sibmas in that it became a slow, big and lightly protected platform.

    To be fair however the Cockerill – never mind that it wasn’t fitted to a stabilised turret – was sufficient for the type of threats expected to be encountered during this period – South African 90mms on Ratels (Sibmas) and Elands did well against Angolan and Cuban targets.

    Up to the mid 1990’s the only means of dealing with bunkers or AFVs were the Gustavs operated by the Support Company’s and (as a desperate measure) Bangalore torps and satchel charges operated by engineers. There were also a small number of RCLs operated by only a single unit. Compare that to the present where there are LAWs, RPGs. Gustavs MGLs, AGLs and ATGWs; as well as vehicle mounted auto cannons to deal with IFVs and bunkers.

    As such there is much lesser need for a 90mm armed platform compared to the past. It’s for the same reason I see no need for a 105mm armed platform. Superfluous. Both can’t take out a MBT and there are various (whether infantry operated or vehicle mounted) other existing means of dealing with IFVs or to provide direct fire support.

  29. @…
    >”Does that prevent France from deploying its troops on their Mistral LPDs?”

    No it doesn’t, but it doesn’t follow either that a sailor sitting on an LPD is a Marine infantryman. Or that an army infantryman is forbidden to sit on an aircraft.

    >”Do France set up exclusively amphibious troops for their 3 large LPDs?”

    Yes, 9th Marine Brigade.

  30. If we want to “marinise” one of our infantry battalions, I would prefer it to be organised for patrol and response to intrusion/insurgency scenarios in inshore and riverine environments and stationed in the 5th Div or ESSCOM area. That would mean operating with combat boats like the Mark V or CB90 rather than AAVs (although given the distances and infrastructure in ESSCOM, deployment by helicopter will in some cases be the only realistic option for a timely response.)

    Not only are an amphibious assault-type unit something we have no requirement for, we won’t be using the unit where we currently need it most if we put it under 10th Para in Melaka.

    Chua – “Are you sure? The word “Marine” in French Troupes de Marine refers to “Colonial” troops which is the heritage of those units.”

    Correct. Aside from the SF regiment and the 9th brigade, are simply army units that carry the name for historical reasons.

    Azlan “Up to the mid 1990’s the only means of dealing with bunkers or AFVs were the Gustavs operated by the Support Company’s and (as a desperate measure) Bangalore torps and satchel charges operated by engineers … There were also a small number of RCLs operated by only a single unit.”

    By “RCLs” were you referring to the M40s? I had the impression we got them in the PERISTA era, ie in the 80s. Exactly how small a number did we buy and which unit received them?

  31. Off topic –

    Marhalim, I could not get past the spam filter on the article on the GGK tragedy, so I will post my comment here:

    I take a lot of issue with statements like this. What exactly was the guy trying to say? Of course training with live ammo is necessary, but does he mean to include the kind that involves shooting at each other? If he meant yes, it’s a flat out lie and if he meant no, it’s a naughty equivocation to put it nicely.

    https://www.nst.com.my/news/nation/2019/09/519760/training-live-ammunition-prerequisite-combat-training

    He’s just one step short of blaming the victim, which is what came to pass at LIMA twelve years ago. What was even more sad in that case, was blame being cast by someone actually in uniform.

  32. @azlan,

    “why BMP-3 turret?”

    my opinion
    – use on our ADNAN hull because of “standardization” and commonality of hull and IF the replacement of Scorpions and Stromers are needed i think it might be quite a cheapest option(?) because it is reported that there are numbers of M113 fitted with these system.
    -BMP-3 100mm + 30mm we would get 2 in 1 firepower. (Thats the concept and purpose of Emirate’s Rabdan IFV,so i think it can be done on ADNAN,as a fire support ifv intead of war taxi (?)

  33. @ praxcis

    As i have asked before, what do you need to use the 100mm gun for? To kill IFVs? For fire support? As azlan has said, we have plenty of other things we can use for fire support. To kill IFVs, rapid fire capability of 30mm cannons are better than slow 100mm guns. There isnt many IFVs that will not be penetrated by 30mm shells.

    Currently all scorpions and stormers are used in the 10 PARA brigade. Will the replacement also to be used in 10 PARA?

  34. French have no tracked IFV because they have a long history in believing in speed over armour. Their doctrine revolves around rapid thrusts to get inside the enemy OODA (so to speak), flank, penetrate, and keep going, and that’s what they need fast wheels and fast tanks for.

    There are certain criticisms. Like for example, how do they maintain their own supply lines, and can they really apply such a technique with no heavy forces to breakthrough and create a gap for exploitation.

  35. @…
    French doctrine is about fast paced, enveloping movement to surprise, neutralise, and cut-off escape for enemy combatant. They prioritise mobility above all. This is why they see no need for heavier, better protected vehicles. You can see this in their Leclerc MBT being ~10tonnes lighter than most contemporary Western MBTs (Abrams, Leo2, Challenger2).

  36. AM,

    Indeed we bought them them during PERISTA and operated them until the late 1990’s. We bought about less than 10 and they were first operated by the Support Company of a RMR unit. Later they were transferred to another RMR unit and became part of 10 Para. We had the standard HE, HEAT and smoke rounds.

    Pracxis – “so i think it can be done on ADNAN,as a fire support ifv intead of war taxi (?)”

    Not all the Adnans are “war taxis”. Look at how they’re equipped. They come in a variety of configurations so they can conduct various roles in line with the unit’s role as a mechanised combined arms formation: i.e. the Bushmaster to deal with IFVs, the 12.7mms and 40mm grenades to deal with enemy infantry or lay down suppressive fire; the 81mms to provide fire support. etc.

  37. Chua – “Their doctrine revolves around rapid thrusts to get inside the enemy OODA (so to speak), flank, penetrate, and keep going”

    This is not French doctrine per see but the very basics of manoeuvre warfare: whether practised by the Brits, Yanks, French, Germans, Israelis, Russians or anyone else.

    The whole idea of penetration at an operational level by armoured formations without paying unnecessary attention to flank protection was first talked about by British theorists in the 1930’s and was picked up and applied by German officers; with opposition from old school officers who felt – with justification – that it was a very risky undertaking.

    Applying mass at the critical point, hitting unit boundaries, maintaining speed and momentum; etc, was especially well suited for the Germans due to them practicing mission command or “Auftragstaktik” which places a lot of decision making and initiative in the hands of junior officers and also necessitates the need for very well trained people.

    In the 1930’s the Soviets came out with the idea of deep penetration, well beyond the enemy’s operational depth. They were only able to successfully apply this in practice in the later part of the war and this idea also governed the use of Cold War VDV units; in the manner they were to be employed and how they were equipped.

    A while you ago you asked about books I would recommend –

    “Monty’s Functional Doctrine: Combined Arms Doctrine in British 21st Army Group in Northwest Europe, 1944–45”

    “On Flexibility: Recovery from Technological and Doctrinal Surprise on the Battlefield”

    “Transforming Command: The Pursuit of Mission Command in the U.S., British, and Israeli Armies@

  38. “French have no tracked IFV because they have a long history in believing in speed over armour. ”

    I believe it’s also because most of their deployments are to Africa, where there is no opposition that necessitates having heavier armour. Lighter vehicles are easier to transport and support logistically.

    Also French deployments to Africa aren’t as long as US or UK operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, so the local opposition does not have time to react and evolve by acquiring heavier weapons and emplacing ever bigger bombs.

  39. Chua – “French have no tracked IFV because they have a long history in believing in speed over armour”

    They used to have something based on a AMX 30 chassis called the VCI. Coming back to the present, is the reason they don’t have a need for a tracked IFV due to the reason you’ve stated?

    They have a tracked SPH called the AuF1. Granted this a SPH and is not expected to come under direct fire but nonetheless
    would have been used to support fast moving organic armoured elements had a war broken out in Central Europe and would perform the same role in the event of troubles with Russia.

    Chua – “and that’s what they need fast wheels and fast tanks for”

    A lot of what they operate; from the AMX 10 to VBL to Sagaie to Caesar is also (not solely) due to the need to have a light footprint for a traditional role the French have : rapid intervention/deployment to Africa. This also is part of the reason why they’ve seen fit to maintain the army and Foreign Legion jump units they have.

  40. @Azlan

    I understand that the French doctrine is even more lightweight and mobile than what other armies practice. That is to say, with even more emphasis on speed and flexibility, and this shows in their training, procurement and hardware design. E.g. wheels vs tracks.

    I don’t recall thanking you for your previous list, but THANK YOU, it was great. Thank you again for the above, I think I will really enjoy the Monty one.

    Where do you find these recommended readings? Top notch quality.

  41. As Joe points out, look at the Leclerc. And before Leclerc, the AMX30 also was light and fast. Both VCI and AuF1 are based on AMX30, which as noted, have given way to wheeled vehicles.

  42. “They used to have something based on a AMX 30 chassis called the VCI.”

    I believe that’s the AMX-VCI based on the AMX-13, not AMX-30.

  43. As you guys have explained the virtues of the french way of armoured fighting, lets get back to our KJA discussion.

    So what kind of thinking that our army currently has for its armoured formations? What is its goal when it considered the gempita? What role that it looks for with the 6×6 KJA?

    There can be the heavily armoured way, there can be a lighter armoured way. But IMO what we must look at is not at expeditionary, offensive type of armies, but to look at countries that have national defence as its main mission, like switzerland, sweden, finland and the like.

  44. … – “As you guys have explained the virtues of the french way of armoured fighting”

    Actually, I’m not convinced anyone has done so. What certain people have done is to claim that the way the French do certain things is because they have a unique way of going about things: which I disagree.

    …. – “There can be the heavily armoured way, there can be a lighter armoured way”

    So very true and the plain fact is that whether it’s armies in the Asia Pacific region, in the Middle East or elsewhere; the current trend for many is to go for increased protection with the penalties that come with it judged to be penalties well with incurring in order to have that extra survivability.

    … – “What is its goal when it considered the gempita? What role that it looks for with the 6×6 KJA”

    Simple, it wanted a new generation IFV than offered a leap in capabilities compared to the Condor. Something with better protection and mobility; which could be air deployable, have some level of amphib capability and could comfortably accommodate an infantry section. The selected design would also a be common basis for a number of variants to conduct various roles; both when operating independently or alongside other units.

    With the 6×6 I suspect it desires something somewhat cheaper than a AV-8 but something offering near comparable mobility, protection and adaptability. My guess is that for certain roles, in certain conditions; the army desires a slightly smaller vehicle

    …. – “to look at countries that have national defence as its main mission, like switzerland, sweden, finland and the like”

    Having a military whose primary role is national defence” or self defence doesn’t necessarily mean it doesn’t also have an offensive role or the means to
    conduct offensive type ops: which can lead to military or political objectives gained and in which one doesn’t tie one down and hand over the initiative to the enemy; which would occur if one adopted actually defensive approach.

    I believe we only beed to look closer to home as well as engage in some serous soul searching and to look at ourselves in the mirror: in order to figure out what kind of force structure we need as well as one we can realistically sustain.

    The key difference between us and the likes of Sweden, Switzerland and Finland is not only do they have voters with a more acute sense of understanding as to the importance of defence but those countries also have better defined external threats which better enable the to budget and plan accordingly. We do not have a clearly defined external threat that would us to focus our resources on and one that would force the government to ditch its current approach which is to spend minimally on defence and only when extra funds are available.

  45. IMO the HMPV and 6×6 is to actually replace most of the Condors in the army. But there are 2 distinct use of the condors before. 1st is the use of condors by the mechanized battalions, 2nd is the use of condors in the cavalry regiments.

    For the 1st use, actually right now all of the mechanized battalions condors have been replaced with MIFV, Adnan and gempita. Probably HMPV will be used to mechanize further infantry battalions cost effectively.

    For the 2nd use, condors are still being used in the cavalry regiments, some alongside the gempitas, some on its own like with 4 KAD. The gempitas with the cavalry regiments are basically taking over the task of the SIBMAS, as its main IFV. Is a 6×6 really required to replace the tasks of condors in the cavalry regiment? A 6×6 while not as big as a 8×8, is still a large and cumbersome vehicle. Then there is the cost of such 6×6 IFV. I am in the opinion that a vehicle to complement the gempita in cavalry regiments should have a totally different capability than the gempita. It should be smaller, faster, nimbler than the gempita. It should be ideal for recce under armour. Why IMO something like the J-LTV would be ideal.

  46. @…
    Hardly can be compared with those countries. Switzerland is steadfastly neutral hence their purely defensive doctrine tho their military products are one of the best in the world. They also have geography to their advantage in the Alps as a natural bulwark against external threats.

    Sweden OTOH is part of NATO hence they have a ‘big brother’ looking out for them and defensive doctrine is pretty much tied to NATO’s. Though not at the offensive front, they are involved in Afghanistan as part of NATO.

    Finland is another that benefited from advantageous geography in that much terrain is uninhabited and deep in snow during winter, even Soviet Russia found it a difficult country to fully conquer. Like us, they played both Western & Russian hardware but lately geared towards Western stuff. In terms of defensive doctrine, it would still be asymmetrical warfare against the Russian Bear that had invaded them. They still relying on conscription, so with sheer numbers & geography advantages, they are well adept at territorial defence tactics.

    Though all 3 are defensive as a whole, they consider Russia/countries with Russian hardware as their most likely antagonist and seek to counter it in their own way (either thru superior weapon tech, NATO, or asymmetric tactics).

    What about us? Unfortunately MY is split in two with each have their unique geographical features. What may work best in Peninsular might not be as effective in East MY. The same threat perception in Peninsular might not be a strong factor at East MY. My take? We should setup separate Army Commands and each have their own threat perception, strategies to counter, and own mix of manpower & hardware to fulfill their respective strategies.

  47. @AM

    french with its doctrine and fancy vehicles…they lost in almost every modern wars..that includes the WW2 actually if not because of the allies..and to add some cream,they lost to bare footed vietnamese..but yeah,people would continue to buy Lois Vuitton not because of their qualities i guess..its because of the brands and “made in france” lable..hehe

  48. @Azlan
    >”We do not have a clearly defined external threat that would us to focus our resources on and one that would force the government to ditch its current approach which is to spend minimally on defence and only when extra funds are available”

    Maybe we do, but we just don’t care.

    >”What certain people have done is to claim that the way the French do certain things is because they have a unique way of going about things: which I disagree.”

    No worries.

  49. Other differences with Sweden, Switzerland and Finland is that all 3 countries relied heavily on a conscription based system: at which could be rapidly mobilised to augment standing, regular forces. There is also the factor of history; all 3 countries at one time or another in the past were either at war or were actually occupied by a stronger neighbouring power or faced the real possibility of actual invasion.

    Sure there are aspects from all 3 countries, as well as from others, that can be taken by us to fit our specific requirements; whether Finland’s system to track its littorals, the reliance the Swiss place on geography to slow down an attacker or the long-standing plans the Swedes have to put all national assets on a war footing in sync with military efforts (all of which we to some extent do already) but we need the core basics in place.

    We need a total revamp of our procurement policy which is heavily driven by political imperatives (with terrible consequences for the MAF); including placing the needs of the local industry first before that of the end user (which is why the recent statement by the Deputy Defence Minister was important). Our politicians need to awake from their slumber and start adopting a more serious and holistic approach towards defence (nobody’s asking for the health and education budget to be slashed with funds diverted towards defence). Certain statements (some downright ludicrous and preposterous) made by those in power fail to raise confidence and also make us laughing stocks to international observers.

    We also need various doctrines to be formulated based out our specific operating conditions as well a our strengths and weaknesses. There’s been much talk of doctrine here over the months and people assume that because having a doctrine is essential, that we actually have one. One can have SOPs and various plans and contingencies in place to govern how various things are done in time of conflict; without actually having a doctrine per see in place.

  50. Azlan

    Prolly against the T-34, of which were used
    extensively by angolan and cuban forces. Once they started fielding T-55s and even T-62s they had to bring in their own tank.

    I guess you can say that the saffers did well against angolan and cuban forces was more due to their better trained crews and tactics than 90mm gun itself. It was more like they did well DESPITE using a 90mm gun and not because of it

    Speaking of which, I think I have a picture of the bush wars that showed massive spoils of war (soviet bloc weapon of many kind) captured by the saffers. I’ll see if I can find it

  51. @ azlan

    ” Our politicians need to awake from their slumber and start adopting a more serious and holistic approach towards defence ”

    Hopefully there will be some good news in the form of the DWP in just a few weeks.

  52. Dundun,

    The Cubans were actually tactically proficient as a whole and gave the South Africans a very hard time. When it came down to individual training the South Africans has the edge but as far as initiative, good tactics, good planning and unit cohesion; the Cubans weren’t bad.

    In one of the books I have is a pic of a Ratel riddled like sieve by auto cannon fire – unsurprising. Like with the case of the 90’s against T-54s/55s what was surprising or unexpected were Syrian T-72s penetrated frontally by 105mm fire – that’s wasn’t supposed to have happened.

    …..

    I’m not expecting too much from the White Paper. It’s overdue and needed sure but what it will
    give is an outline of things we intend to do and things that concern us. What goes inside the White Paper and what doesn’t will be politics by itself.

    Chua – “Maybe we do, but we just don’t care.”

    And if we don’t care it’s also because history and geo politics plays a vital part. Unlike Europe which has WW1 and WW2 still in its collective memory we don’t have something similar. Unlike Europe or other places that have clearly defined national threats; we don’t. It’s a combination of factors that explains our approach or attitude towards defence.

  53. Chua,

    No problem. Some are recommended by others, some I came across and decide to buy. Some are a pleasure to read but some are tedious 🙁 Some I have to read more than once before I can start to understand what the author is saying 🙁

  54. …. – “It should be smaller, faster, nimbler than the gempita

    ….. – “should be ideal for recce under armour”

    I’m of the opinion that we need a much smaller vehicle to act as a dedicated recce platform. Not one with a surveillance/observation role (I.e. the AV-8 and Vinteqs) but as a dedicated recce platform. Given that we probably follow the British system in which one conducts recce whilst avoiding trouble as opposed to fighting to garner intelligence; the vehicle would be lightly armed.

    Whether it should be wheeled or tracked I have no idea but it should be much smaller than even a 6×6 – something similar in size and profile to Fennek or a BMP. Of course there would also be other means of conducting recce such as scramblers (with muffled engines) and 4x4s.

  55. Dundun – “Speaking of which, I think I have a picture of the bush wars that showed massive spoils of war (soviet bloc weapon of many kind)”

    There are several such photos. If it’s heavy hardware it’s probably Angolan (the Cubans had a better track record of not abandoning stuff) but throughout their war the Rhodesians also captured several large caches; mostly comprising non heavy stuff, in Rhodesia itself or in neighbouring countries.

  56. @JunTao
    That is quite simplistic and condensing about French post-WW2 military history. Much of their losses were in their colonies fighting to gain freedom, hence their soldiers are somewhat half-heartedly fighting a highly motivated enemy, plus the fact their country was only recently liberated so they understand well about being conquered and oppressed.

    The Viet Cong OTOH were well masters at guerrilla warfare and I don’t think the French colonial forces could stand a chance of winning when the same VCs could defeat the entire might of US military later on. It wasn’t their tactics nor ‘fancy vehicles’ that let them down, many factors were at their disadvantage.

    In limited combat against Islamist terror at Africa, they had been quite successful.

  57. @Neb
    Not as a direct member but it has an alliance with NATO through its membership in Partnership for Peace and Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. They also took part in NATO-led bombing of Libya, NATO intervention in Kosovo, and in Afghanistan under NATO. They are pretty much in any NATO interventions but as 2ndary elements.

  58. @joe
    >”entire might of US military”

    Only about 20% at peak. They were still mainly focused on Germany and other secondary theaters.

    >”Much of their losses were in their colonies fighting to gain freedom, hence their soldiers are somewhat half-heartedly fighting a highly motivated enemy”

    Some of the French, yes; others were less motivated. Even after the shame of Dien Bien Phu, when the French tried their best to hold on to Morocco, they got really mixed results.

    I don’t think anyone can say they didn’t fight well, as they did. There are some criticisms of their leadership and strategy.

    Personally I think a big part of the problem is that they didn’t get enough strong local support and they couldn’t properly secure the borders.

  59. @Chua
    Even then, they had to turn on drafting. Not something they would simply do unless desperate for manpower. They already had the technological and firepower resources advantage. History tells us that often even superior militaries will fall to highly motivated insurgents if the right conditions persist.

  60. Jun Tao – “french with its doctrine and fancy vehicles…they lost in almost every modern wars..that includes the WW2 actually if not because of the allies..and to add some cream,they lost to bare footed vietnamese”

    Funny, I’ve read several books on the French Indochina war over the years and there are actually few references to main line Vietnamese troops/guerrillas being ‘bare footed”. Similarly people often talk about the Americans being defeated by pyjama clad guerrillas with rubber sandals but by 1975 most of those guerrillas were dead (killed in Tet 1968) and it was regular forces with MBTs, APCs and heavy artillery (organised into divisions) that later entered Saigon.

    You need to look at things in the proper context before coming up with inaccurate and simplistic assessments. The war in Indochina and later Algeria was at a time when post war France was bankrupt but needed to do things to maintain its status as a world power. Granted the French only faced the Vietnamese up north (in
    Tonkin and Annam) unlike the
    Americans who later faced them throughout South Vietnam; as well as Laos and Cambodia but unlike the Americans the French has to do things on a shoe string. Resources – despite massive amounts of U.S. aid – was always a problem and so was politics at home where the bulk of the population was war weary and there was an active and influential
    French communist party. Things of course became somewhat complicated for the when China fell to the communists in 1949.

    If you want to pass judgments on France you must as well be objective and do the same with the U.S. and U.K – both won their wars and in Iraq, Libya and Afghanistan but (to use a cliche) “lost the peace” in that both utterly failed to secure their postwar political objectives. The result is that the countries were left a mess with tragic consequences for the locals and the region as a whole.

    In my view the only recent “good war” (another cliche) the Americans fought and where they obtained their political objectives was Bosnia and Kosovo. Despite all the talk and the good intentions of the UN, EU and Muslim world: ultimately it took American military and diplomatic might (with opposition from the Russians and minimal help from the indecisive Europeans) to force the Bosnian Serbs and Serbs to the negotiation table. Has that not happened, many more civilians would have died in Bosnia and Kosovo.

  61. Derp. Why did I say Morocco, when I meant Algeria?

    @joe
    >”History tells us that often even superior militaries will fall to highly motivated insurgents if the right conditions persist.”

    Usually, the “right conditions” consist in major part of a porous land border with antagonistic neighbouring countries sponsoring the insurgency, and failure on the part of the “superior military” to do something about that. It’s hard to eliminate mosquitoes if your neighbour is actively breeding them and you can’t touch him.

    Which is why certain countries fighting insurgencies today – unlike French in Algeria, or Rhodesians in Africa, or Americans in anywhere – will not hesitate to attack insurgents who think they can safely hide across the border in a “safe” country.

  62. Speaking about shoestring, the french are so depleted in resource they had to use M24 chaffee (ww2 surplus from america)as fixed gun and had to make do with beef tallow for gun lubrication

  63. @Chua
    “attack insurgents who …hide across the border”
    Which can quickly escalate to an international incident as shown by 2012 Turk F4 shootdown by Syria. Controlling a porous border is a very touch n go situations.

  64. For anyone interested in the French Indochina War these are essential readings.

    “Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and the Making of America’s Vietnam” (Logevall)

    “A War of Logistics: Parachutes and Porters in Indochina, 1945–1954” (Shredder)

    “The Last Valley: Dien Bien Phu and the French Defeat in Vietnam” (Windrow)

    “Last Refections On A War” (Fall)

    Chua,

    The Rohdesians mounted a number of very successful raids on neighbouring countries who were providing refuge to guerrilla groups they were fighting. Even the Brits at one point seriously contemplated crossing into the Irish Republic. The Americans may not have invaded North Vietnam for fears of drawing the Chinese and Soviets in but they did take certain measures to discourage the North Vietnamese and they did invade Cambodia to disrupt North Vietnamese supply areas.

    Securing a border sounds easy on paper but it takes a lot on men to secure a short border; let alone a very long porous one and there are serious political ramifications.
    The Americans not only had the border with North Vietnam to deal with not also the very lung borders with Laos and Cambodia.

    On insurgents; we often hear of Malaya but it’s not commonly know that the Filipinos in the 1950’s faced a very serious threat in the form of the “Huks”. Gradually with the proper political reforms, right tactics by the military and American assistance and advice (notably from Landsdale) the Huks were defeated.

  65. off topic

    just doing some research on Rejimen Sempadan.

    Why is there a rejimen sempadan battalion in Bera, Pahang (the Batallion ke-11 Rejimen Sempadan)

    Reply
    I have no idea really, it could be there for administrative purpose only.

  66. @ azlan

    ” I’m of the opinion that we need a much smaller vehicle to act as a dedicated recce platform. Not one with a surveillance/observation role (I.e. the AV-8 and Vinteqs) but as a dedicated recce platform. Given that we probably follow the British system in which one conducts recce whilst avoiding trouble as opposed to fighting to garner intelligence; the vehicle would be lightly armed ”

    Well for the armoured recce, I am specifically thinking about the Cavalry Regiment, as this is one of the tasks a Cavalry Regiment does, which it does with the Ferret previously.

    Small armoured 4x4s would be ideal for recce task. Fennek is designed specifically for that, while others such as Otokar Cobra or even Pars 4×4 would be suited for the task. I looked to the J-LTV mainly because of the low cost of the vehicle (less than USD350k each), high protection levels, superb off-road ability and high reliability (I heard one of the complaints of British Army on the Iveco LMV is its high tendency to break down, hence why it is being retired). The potential for the J-LTV to be adapted to other roles (such as fire support vehicle) would commonize a few different requirement to the common J-LTV platform.

    I am thinking of each Cavalry Regiment to have
    3x Gempita Squadron
    1x J-LTV fire support Squadron with 12 J-LTV heavy weapons carrier
    1x J-LTV recce Squadron with 6 J-LTV utility plus 6 J-LTV with VINGTAQs mast.

    BTW interesting note on the Ferret scout car
    http://hazaldn.files.wordpress.com/2009/02/kereta-perisai.jpg

  67. I have to ask : why do we even need a Border Regiment?

    We have several battalions of what used to be the ‘Police Field Force’; now the ‘PGA’. Why can’t these units safeguard our borders?
    Was the idea behind the Border Regiment a poltical one that came from the government or was it actually proposed by the army?

  68. @Azlan

    Yes there were a couple of Rhodesian raids, some very high profile, but it seems to be too little too late. I dunno, just my opinion =D

  69. @Azlan

    Yes there were a couple of cross-border Rhodesian raids, some very high profile, but it seems to be too little too late. I dunno, just my opinion =D

    To be fair, there are more than just a few factors. And you’re very right about the vast border. Same problem in Algeria.

  70. Chua,

    The Rhodesians did what they could do but they were over stretched. Very. They ran things on a shoe string at one point the only country that was friendly was South Africa. At a later stage they were haemorrhaging; isolated internationally, non performing economy, about 3,000 whites migrating monthly, war weary population, etc, another case of winning on the battlefield but losing politically.

    BTW it was them who perfected the use of Alo 3 gunships (the Portuguese were the first) and their “brushstroke” camo heavily – indirectly – influenced ours (I was very lucky to obtain an original short sleeve example some years ago).

    If you are interested in Africa –

    The SADF In The Border War (Scholtz)
    The Rhodesian War (Moorcraft/McLaughlin)

  71. News from mat sabu visit to australia.

    Australia and malaysia to form a defence industrial working group.

    For starters it would involve the F/A-18 Hornet sustainment.

    Hopefully later it can involve with local assembly of the bushmaster. I believe the bushmaster is a cost-effective type for the HMPV requirement. Its cost said to be just 1/3rd of the lipanbara.

    Other possible areas could be subcontracts of modules for future australian navy opvs and frigates.

  72. @Azlan

    True, true.

    Thanks for the recommendations. I’ve read a couple of Rhodesian biographies too. Fire Force is so fascinating.

  73. @…
    We already have a wheeled mine resistant personnel mover in the AV-8. Do we need yet another?

    From his visit I hope he could wrangle some used F-18s plus spares.

  74. @ joe

    Because we don’t have enough. We barely have 1 brigade worth of infantry vehicles, not to mention needing some more for our forces in sabah and sarawak.

    Bushmaster cost AU$500k. Lipanbara costs USD1.6million. USD225million (which is less cost than the contract for Gempita turrets) will get us 450 Bushmasters. That is enough for 5 infantry battalions with a few more to spare.

    http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/81/Bushmaster_AWM_21-11-09.JPG

  75. @…
    You might be right but if TDM sees no need for more than 1 mech brigade of IFVs, it would be because they have other vehicles for troop transport (though not as highly survivable as the IFVs).

  76. @ joe

    The new army 4nextg – PELAN PEMBANGUNAN STRATEGIK ARMY 4NEXTG INI DIBANGUNKAN SECARA HOLISTIK UNTUK MEMBOLEHKAN TENTERA DARAT BERUPAYA BEROPERASI DI DUA (2) WILAYAH SECARA SERENTAK.

    If that is the case, we need at least a few mechanized infantry battalions too in east malaysia. Also pre-positioned assets so units from west malaysia can quickly mobilize to east malaysia without needing to bring over their equipments.

    That is in addition to the longstanding plan to transform 3rd division into an armoured division.

  77. @…
    Yeah, I remember this was mentioned by the then Army chief that his intention was to have the East MY forces mirrored by those in Peninsular. You can say its their wishlist and I also agree on that, adding further to have separate Army Commands for both sides having their own force composition and hardware requirements.

    However this basically meant doubling what TDM have currently, what the politicians can stomach is another story and if money is not forthcoming, the emphasis of modernisation would still be in Peninsular and East MY will have to make do with whatever excess leftover (Condors, Gempita).

    I get that army generals would need to get political with the bean counters and not just tell them; “hey we need 500 AV-8s”, right of the bat.
    They would likely say; “we need 500 but we are going to cost save and just go for 250 today”.
    Next time when budget is there; “we going to get just 150, we save cost by getting less than the last buy”.
    And then next round where budget opens; “we going to get just 100. Again less than last buy”.

    How successful this can be carried out is dependent on budget vs timeline and sad to say such convoluted purchasing is also prevalent in the private industries.

  78. @ joe

    What we need now is the overall big picture of our defence on why we need X numbers of gempita. Why unlike what you think, the DWP is very important element in explaining the above.

    @ mohd hazwan

    There are some items we should buy from china for political goodwill and for the actual performance of the stuff itself. The chinese humvee is IMO not one of them. Not to say that they are bad, but there are better stuff right now. Each dongfeng EQ2050 humvee costs about USD140k. Armoured versions about USD250k. Spend a little bit more you can get J-LTV for USD350k.

    http://www.goldenspring.org/UploadFiles/2010624164136653.jpg

  79. On the eastern field army HQ

    We dont actually need to mirror everything we have in semenanjung to sabah and sarawak. One thing we need to take into consideration is not to upset the status quo of military units on borneo island.

    TNI-AD has 2 KODAM (Komando Daerah Militer, which is equivalent to a division) in kalimantan. KODAM VI has 7 infantry battalions, 1 mechanized battalion, 1 cavalry, 1 artillery, 1 Air defence artillery and 1 engineers. KODAM XII has 5 infantry battalions, 1 mechanized battalion, 1 cavalry, 1 artillery and 1 engineers.

    The mechanized battalion is mainly equipped with Anoas. The cavalry with a mix of AMX-13, scorpion, saladin, ferret and anoas. Artillery with 105mm towed howitzers, with 1 battery of 155mm planned in the future.

    Any of our future plans for sabah and sarawak should IMO not be very different to what is fielded by TNI-AD in kalimantan.

  80. On the eastern field army HQ

    We dont actually need to mirror everything we have in semenanjung to sabah and sarawak. One thing we need to take into consideration is not to upset the status quo of military units on borneo island.

    TNI-AD has 2 KODAM (Komando Daerah Militer, which is equivalent to a division) in kalimantan. KODAM VI has 7 infantry battalions, 1 mechanized battalion, 1 cavalry, 1 artillery, 1 Air defence artillery and 1 engineers. KODAM XII has 5 infantry battalions, 1 mechanized battalion, 1 cavalry, 1 artillery and 1 engineers.

    The mechanized battalion is mainly equipped with Anoas. The cavalry with a mix of AMX-13, scorpion, saladin, ferret and anoas. Artillery with 105mm towed howitzers, with 1 battery of 155mm planned in the future.

    Any of our future plans for sabah and sarawak should IMO not be very different to what is fielded by TNI-AD in kalimantan.


  81. Agreed. We shall not buy ships and fighters as we are gonna be facing them in the disputed SCS with those assets. Their reliability will come in doubts.

    Their tanks, light armor vehicles, and artillery however is a different story tough. If we want numbers, that is a way. But may have to forgo a bit on quality.

    JLTVs from US. Good luck on those. I see more hope for more VAMTACS or LIPANBARA or GUARDIANS though.

  82. “There are some items we should buy from china for political goodwill and for the actual performance of the stuff itself.”

    Buying a few things from China will not make the Chinese modify their behaviour towards us and will not help us achieve any of our objectives.

    It will however send the message that we not only tolerate what the Chinese are doing to us, but also take it gladly.

  83. @…
    I have seen some DWP with very detailed explanation on the strategies of the future which adversaries could glean much advantage with knowing that. I have seen others that is cryptic in a lot of things. I have seen how DWP could have devastating effects on the local defence industries. How would our DWP turn out? I don’t know, but I am the type to err on caution.

    For me, something like 15-to-5 or 4nextg is sufficient for the public to be kept aware of what’s going to happen without too much info given to other parties. To each their own PoV, I guess.

    As for Chinese stuff, its cheap to buy but overall cost often is much higher than expected and ismore headaches to work with.

  84. Hazwan – “Might as well go for Chinese AFV/IFV/ Humvees. Dirt cheap”

    A few years ago a local company did tie up with Norinco to offer us AFVs. If indeed we went down this route various modifications would have had to be performed to meet the army’s requirements; if that had happened those AFVs might not have been “dirt cheap”… There is also the question of how much the taxpayer would have had to fork out if we decided on local assembly and ToTs.

  85. @ AM

    Buying chinese hardware will not send the wrong message to china. Our leaders self-defeating statements does.

    Actually buying chinese hardware and engaging military working level relations can create closer relations to china and enabling us to implicitly tell we are ok with china while explicitly stand firm on issues such as south china sea. What is sad is actually tun is the one that quickly asserted our claim on the EEZ and put our troops on reefs and islands like layang2, pulau perak and sipadan. Now he is the one who puts out self-defeating statements regarding the south china sea.

  86. @…
    “Now he is the one who puts out self-defeating statements regarding the south china sea.”

    There is only so much you can do when your own military and defence industry is crippled over decades of neglect and economic abuse, plus you’re actually economically dependent on your enemy, and there’s no alternative because you dislike dealing with everyone else.

    Reply
    He was the one who put the system in place

  87. @Marhalim

    Oh yes I know. I just didn’t want to point out… since I felt my point was hard enough to swallow as it is.

    Certainly we are prisoners of our own device.

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