Gifted US Radar at Labuan Operational

AN/TPS-77 long range air surveillance radar. Lockheed Martin.

SHAH ALAM: Deputy Defence Minister Adly Zahari on January 27 confirmed that the Lockheed Martin TP-77 long range air surveillance radar gifted by the US located in Labuan, is now operational. He said the radar arrived in December.

Adly was speaking to reporters at Labuan airbase after visiting Sabah and Labuan over the last few days. He also made a short visit to the Pulau Layang-layang – Stesen LIMA – in the South China Sea. You can read the report here.

Due to the current situation, it is unlikely that the Defence Ministry and government will issue any more information about the gifted US radar. Adly himself only said a few words on the radar at the event. That said RMAF and the Defence Ministry has always been reluctant to talk about radars and similar capabilities.

The radome at Bukit Kubong, Labuan which is operated by RMAF Skuadron 340. RMAF

Anyhow as reported previously,

Defence Minister DSU Mohamad Hasan told Parliament on March 16 that the Lockheed Martin TPS-77 long range surveillance radar will be commissioned in Labuan by year end. He said it would replace the Alenia radar which has been decommissioned as it is no longer mission capable. The radar will be placed at Bukit Kubong, Labuan, the site where the Alenia used to be operated by Skuadron 340.

The TPS-77 radar is gifted by the US to Malaysia under the Building Partner Capacity programme.

Another report on the gifted radar.

Lockheed Martin has been awarded a firm contract from the US government to supply a long range air surveillance radar including support and training for the RMAF. The radar is likely the one to be gifted to Malaysia by the US as reported previously. Although the announcement did not mention the type, it did say it cost some US$25 million (RM104 million) and expected to be completed by Sept. 30, 2025.

Meanwhile, China continues its intrusive patrols in Malaysian, Vietnam and Indonesia EEZ in the South China Sea.

–Malaysian Defence

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31 Comments

  1. Whatever it is

    Intrusion by China coast guard should be primarily responded by our own coast guard (APMM) and not our navy (TLDM)

    The current predicament of the lack of hulls in the water to respond to China Coast Guard should be answered with prioritizing new ships for APMM, not putting billions for TLDM to get a corvette that is neither here or there in regards of its armament and capability (over armed for a mere OPV, but under armed to cover gowind mission capability).

    Getting corvettes for the LMS requirement is in my opinion not an answer to both China Coast guard and the delay to the Gowind frigate project.

    To respond to China Coast Guard >>> get more OPVs for APMM

    To settle the Gowind project delay >>> make the hard decision by hook or by crook to concentrate completing the gowinds once and for all, and complete all 6 ships.

  2. Hulubalang “Intrusion by China coast guard should be primarily responded by our own coast guard (APMM) and not our navy (TLDM)”.

    most transnational crime are done by non state actors happens nearer to coast and your proposal not only would overtask the navy with law enforcement duty but asking them to do so on an overpriced Ship to do such task and equip with effector that specialises in denying threat from the sea that have a low risk of ever happening

    Meanwhile the CG which supposed to be law enforcement first organisation is out there in deep water in an under arms ships responding to threats at sea by a state actors?

    I think you got priorities backwards.

  3. … – “ Intrusion by China coast guard should be primarily responded by our own coast guard (APMM) and not our navy (TLDM)”

    Indeed bobodu said otherwise and until the MMEA is able there is no other entity which can fill in the gap except the RMN] I’m assuming there is no deep state secret navy] and even if the MMEA had 30 OPVs the RMN would still have a role to play in safeguarding the EEZ.

    … – “ Getting corvettes for the LMS requirement is in my opinion not an answer to both China Coast guard and the delay to the Gowind frigate project.”

    No it isn’t and wasn’t meant to be… That’s the pertinent point you left out. You have a knack for perpetually and pedantically regurgitating stuff so I’ll oblige : again; the LMS is intended to perform certain roles in certain operational conditions as part of the RMN’s low/high end mix. Same thing with the RMAF going for LCAs which are not intended to go against MRCAs anymore than the LMSs are intended to go up against much better armed opponents or the AV-9s going against a Leo 2 or Winnie the Pooh gotong IP against King Kong. Also, even if all the LCSs were delivered on time the plain fact is that the RMN would still want LMSs. This has not stopped you however from claiming there is a connection.

    There is place for eveythimg; all working in tandem as part of the right mix. Notwithstanding your “opinion” and simplistic conflating the RMN has openly and uneqoivocally stated why it needs LMSs.

  4. zaft – ”most transnational crime are done by non state actors happens nearer to coast and your proposal not only would overtask the navy with law enforcement duty but asking them to do so on an overpriced Ship to do such task and equip with effector that specialises in denying threat from the sea that have a low risk of ever happening”

    Do you understand what he’s saying and has been saying for a long time?

  5. Does not matter. When China choose to implement anti access and area denial, nothing we can do about it.

  6. Hasnan – “ Does not matter. When China choose to ”

    Make the distinction between war and peacetime scenarious. The issue was about peacetime challengers.

    If war breaks out it’s not written in stone that we’ll be involved. We and other ASEAN claimants might be on the sidelines leaving China, the U.S and others to partake in the fun. A war in the SCS doesnt necessarily result in China making a grab for our claims: it will be focused on the major powers.

  7. We need a well equipped RMN and MMEA to performe a variety of roles; both supplementing each other. There is no such thing as something being better than another or being more needed.

    The MMEA is the main agency when it comes to certain peacetime thrests bit it’s backed by the RMN which incidently will also always have a peacetime tasking alongslde the RMN.

    The LMS is not being being bought due to LCS delays or to specifically deal with Chinese intrusions and this notion should be finally put to rest. .

  8. Arrived in Dec and commissioned before that month ended, looks like the existing weather dome could be reused and no need to spend extra money for a new one. Good thing we saved some money.

    The standard TPS-77 is a tall unit when setup so me thinks we gotten the more compact TPS-77 MRR version.

  9. The main reason for the use of Coast Guard is not to escalate any incidents to become wars. Coast Guard, as a policing force, does not have the image of being capable of escalating incidents into wars.

    A reason why China is using Coast Guard (and transferring corvettes and frigates to coast guard) to intimidate and harass neighboring countries. Operating in the grey zone area just below the threshold of war.

    https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/12/world/asia/china-coast-guard.html

    @ azlan

    ” the LMS is intended to perform certain roles in certain operational conditions as part of the RMN’s low/high end mix ”

    The original LMS requirement is… The current LMS B2 Corvette is not…

    The original LMS requirement is for a multi-role ship that could cover the roles of the current FAC (patrol and maritime enforcement), MCMV (minehunting), Hydrographic Survey, Fast transport vessel (Sri Gaya class FTV). In the end the ship they ended getting is a fairly conventional 68m patrol boat made in China.

    Now the LMS B2 Corvette requirement was written partly to be a backup plan if the Gowind is cancelled (which is now proceeding and the builder bailed out). The LMS B2 Corvette requirement was written so that all the hardware and weapons already bought for the gowind (57mm bofors, missiles etc.) could be transferred and used on the LMS B2 Corvette.
    https://pictr.com/images/2022/03/31/BThWXZ.jpg
    So LMS B2 is not the “low” multipurpose platform that it was originally planned before. Currently with the weapons originally planned to be transferred to LMS B2 no longer available and going to be used to complete the Gowinds, do we really still have a need for LMS B2 Corvette? Or should we reset the LMS requirement again, to fulfil the original multipurpose platform requirement to cover missions of the current FAC (patrol and maritime enforcement), MCMV (minehunting), Hydrographic Survey, Fast transport vessel (Sri Gaya class FTV)? If TLDM still want to push for LMS B2 Corvette, what ships would do the missions of MCMV (minehunting), Hydrographic Survey, Fast transport vessel (Sri Gaya class FTV)?

    Also one of the supposed “low” mission for the original LMS requirement is maritime enforcement, patrol and show of presence. Those are APMM missions, and TLDM should not create and operate a ship specifically to primarily do those missions.
    https://www.malaysiandefence.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/wp-1490251194874.jpg

  10. Azlan “If war breaks out it’s not written in stone that we’ll be involved. We and other ASEAN claimants might be on the sidelines leaving China, the U.S and others to partake in the fun.”

    If hulubalang have his way then MAF won’t even have the capability to join in the fun.

    Hulubalang” A reason why China is using Coast Guard (and transferring corvettes and frigates to coast guard) to intimidate and harass neighboring countries. Operating in the grey zone area just below the threshold of war”

    Beijing does so because they can’t afford a war as they are dependence on SCS & SOM for export & import of energy & food input.

    and neighbouring state continued on pretending that their maritime militia & CG as civilians is the best thing Beijing could ever ask for as it would enable & emboldened them to continue to partake in more greyzone activities.

    Meanwhile USN ‘correctly’ identify their militia & CG as military combatants & would be treated as such which really up the stake for them to partake in more greyzone activities.

    “So LMS B2 is not the “low” multipurpose platform that it was originally planned before.”.

    Duh! As times progressed so would threats perception and thus a change in plan to keep up with the times. By that logic PH navy OPV & RAN ‘corvette’ are a replacement of Jose rizal and hunter class. What is likely true however is the original underarms PH navy OPV & Arafura programme are being upgunned to keep up with the times.

  11. “LMS B2 Corvette requirement” is where the 18(-6) NGPV supposed to be positioned being in between size of LCS & LMS. With the Plan evolved and expecting more Kedahs no longer seem viable, TLDM appears to have combined both ship classes into a singular ship type. Whether this platform chosen will still be flexible enough & easily reconfigured to do those LMS-focused roles is a question TLDM will need to decide since its their decision to go with this route.

    Despite its Made in China tag its design looks to have taken the modular design as its core, and if ori LMS are to be revived, me thinks a locally designed 700ton ship can be done by mimicking the Keris in layout (maybe with fixed installations as permanent roles instead).

  12. The Navy wants its missiles. Wants its Anti-Air, its Anti-Ship, Anti-Submarine, wants new ships to replace old ships, and wants bigger ships. For all intent and purpose, LMS 2 is a missile ship just as LCS is a missile ship. They differ in terms of size and number of missiles but are otherwise meant as RMN’s main combatants. As compared to LMS1 and all the refits plus the smaller ships that have their missiles removed, which are basically patrol ships, some should be called patrol boats. There will be need for LMS1 class (tonnage) ships (e.g. Minesweeper, hydrography, SAR, patrol). But it would be better to ignore the nomenclature and go back to calling the ships based on size and equipment, which determines their area of operation or responsibility, and their role. Can read DWP pages 48 to 51 to see what type of ships are LMS and what ship types are meant to be the main fighting force.

  13. @ joe

    If you follow closely the 15 to 5, and all the discussions here, the last NGPV requirement by TLDM in 2018 before nothing more is talked about the NGPV is this
    https://www.malaysiandefence.com/bns-ngpv-concept-dsa-2018-shorts/
    Super stripped down Kedah class armed with guns-only. This probably forgotten about when you realise that a specifically designed and built OPV like the DAMEN OPV1800 can do the same mission and probably cost 1/3rd of a super stripped down Meko 100 that is proposed by BNS.

    The TLDM 15 to 5 plan did not take into account the existence of APMM and its own Pelan Perancangan Strategik Maritim Malaysia 2040 (PPSMM 2040). From Parliment files :
    ” Berdasarkan PPSMM 2040, APMM menyasarkan 116 kapal ronda yakni 20 buah
    bersaiz besar dan 96 buah bersaiz sederhana, 228 bot bersaiz 20 meter ke
    bawah ”
    That 20 large OPV requirement by APMM will perform the exact mission that the 18 NGPV listed in 15 to 5. So the NGPV requirement by TLDM is basically redundant and should probably be dropped altogether.

    Back to your question.

    So to answer your question, no. The LMS Batch 2 Corvette is not really supposed to replace NGPV requirement, which is more of the want for a pure OPV. LMS Batch 2 requirement is rewritten to become a traditional corvette as a fallback option (reusing all the weapons already bought for LCS) if LCS Gowind program is cancelled (which at that point of time, a very real possibility).

  14. @ darthzaft

    ” If hulubalang have his way then MAF won’t even have the capability to join in the fun ”

    If I have my way, my priority for TLDM has always been to have 6x Scorpene to the Scorpene Evolved spec above all else, which is more than able to take the fight to the enemy and fight alongside friendly navies compared to easily detected and sunk LMS Corvettes.

    https://www.malaysiandefence.com/pac-report-on-lcs-october-9-2023/#comment-879277

    https://pbs.twimg.com/media/F8tFa6KbgAEkcfq.jpg

  15. @Hulubalang
    which is more than able to take the fight to the enemy and fight alongside friendly navies compared to easily detected and sunk LMS Corvettes.

    By that logic The LMS2 would be as easy to sink as the LMV, mogami, independent class, PHN OPV.

    Also If a country want to be part of an alliance or partnership or secret relationship then they have to prioritise interoperability & interchangeability with some degrees of expeditionary capability as being in an alliance or partnership is a two way streets as no one would want to be in a relationship with a country who wants to receive help but unable to provide help.

    Thus asset wise. one need to have a typical cookie cutter asset acquisition policies and not some super creative out of the box acquisition strategies. Because super creative out of the box asset don’t do well on the interchangeability part.

  16. @ darthzaft

    ” no one would want to be in a relationship with a country who wants to receive help but unable to provide help ”

    This is my 2040 fleet as per link above >>>>

    TLDM 2040 Fleet
    6x Scorpene SSK
    4x Arrowhead 140 Frigate
    6x Gowind Frigate
    24x LMS-X Damen FCS5009
    30x FIC
    2x Fleet Tanker
    2x Fast RORO
    3x OSV vessel – as auxillary ship, MCM mothership, SF support, SUB support, UAS support, pipeline security/surveillance.
    1x Sub Rescue (leased)
    8x SH-60J ASW
    8x AW139 MUH
    RQ-21 Blackjack UAV
    MQ-27 Scaneagle UAV

    with LMS-X spec of :
    https://pbs.twimg.com/media/F8IncFcaEAAJytG.jpg
    which is much cheaper but has more speed, range, anti ship missiles than the LMS B2 Corvette.

    Is that a fleet (that have more submarine, larger frigates and 3x the number of LMS compared to TLDM current plans) that as you put it “unable to provide help” ????

    24x LMS-X would have a total of 288x 150km anti ship missiles…

    8x LMS B2 will only have 32x anti ship missiles…

    Is 288 anti ship missiles distributed all over malaysian maritime zone on a small fast ship is less able to help compared to just 32 anti ship missiles?

    Interchangability
    – Scorpenes would probably be the main submarine for Indonesia and Philippines too
    – Arrowhead 140 compatibility with UK Navy, SG navy and Indonesian Navy (all using Arrowhead 140 variants)

    Anyway… if my plan (complete with timeline, budget, intended mission capability) is KO and don’t have the “capability to join the fun” as you say it, please present your ideal plan that is OK and better.

  17. Read the 15to5 Strategy Document. Not the 1 pager infographics or press releases or what other people say. As in do some real reading. Its not long at around 100 pages. It’s free and downloadable. Can find answers to many of of the speculations, assumptions, hypotheticals in the strategy document.

  18. Hulubalang have you read the document?

    The Navy clasified their ships into combat, patrol, support, and submarine. This suggests the way to look at LMS2 is based on the expected role rather than nomenclature used. LMS has a specific meaning in the document and LMS2 doesnt fit that meaning. LMS2 is based on discussions will have SSM installed, but not the SAM, making the LMS2 a combat ship.

    There is a section on diplomacy which would provide context as to why they are not looking at LMS-X or TRIFIC type ships.

    There is also the use of the word Task Group, suggesting the intent is to be able to assemble ships into a fighting force similar in concept with the Army’s mechanised brigade. A Task Group that has anti air, anti ship, anti submarine, and resupply ships as the Navy’s main fighting force.

    The document also uses the term LHD for the 3 MRSS although the 3 heli requirement suggests a LPD.

    The roles assigned to the MRSS and the inclusion of landing crafts and the use of the term ship to shore suggests amphibious is beyond lift. In fact the document was so specific as to say a landing craft that can move 1 PT-91 or 80 10th Para soldiers on assault missions.

    So yes, answers are in the document.

    As for the rest, right or wrong, results will speak for itself. If Army gets its 4 Blackhawks on inflated VIP costs, I am wrong. If not, who knows why VIP Blackhawk costs were used.

    That still doesnt distract from the point on reading RMN’s 15to5 Strategy Document to get answers.

  19. @ Kel

    Which DWP are you talking about?

    This is the latest copy of DWP
    https://www.mod.gov.my/images/mindef/article/kpp/DWP-3rd-Edition-02112020.pdf

    I cannot find any mention of LHD, PT-91, task group or landing crafts in the DWP

    DWP was written about 5 years ago, and many of the concepts and current scenarios has changed since then.

    LMS B2 Corvette was not planned when the DWP was written, which is why it does not fit into the DWP narrative.

    While you ask others to read, clearly you don’t read what others are explaining. https://pbs.twimg.com/media/F8IncFcaEAAJytG.jpg

    My LMS-X concept follows the original need for a multi-role ship as written in DWP and 15to5 (weapons are modular and can be removed to do HADR or SAR operations), but added the requirement for the LMS-X to be able to sail, operate and fight together (that means having same or more speed, range and endurance) with the Gowind Frigates.

    The DWP has writings of what remains of the want to follow superpower nations doctrine of conventional “expeditionary” and attacking style of war when our military should not do such a thing. Our military should be a force that prioritizes defence of our territory, which can be done without the need to do any amphibious operations (by having same military capability on both East and West Malaysia, “Keupayaan untuk Beroperasi Serentak di Dua Wilayah” which is also explicitly stated in DWP).

    As it is even in Tentera Darat “Army 4 next G” plans, there is no mention of the need to create any amphibious capability.

    Another example of what is planned does not translate into real world
    15to5 decommissioning / phase out plan. Only 2 ships (KD Mutiara and KD Hang Tuah) actually retired, and KD Hang Tuah actually is still kept in commissioned status with a CO assigned to the ship.
    https://pbs.twimg.com/media/GFKV5wXaIAACBqe.jpg
    All other ships in the phase out list is actually still going to be used, done refit/OP/ rehull and to be used for decades to come. Actually rather than phased out, extra 2 old PC was taken back from APMM after decommissioned and recomissioned into TLDM!

  20. …. – “If I have my way, my priority for TLDM has always been to have 6x Scorpene to the Scorpene Evolved spec above all else, which is more than able to take the fight to the enemy and fight alongside friendly navies compared to easily detected and sunk LMS Corvettes”

    – We don’t have the manpower to sustain 6 boats; neither do we have the shore support infrastructure. Would take us years to do so. Note have Vietnam struggled initially with jus 6 Kilos and BTW the RSN has conscripts.
    – On the “easily sunk” simplistic nonsense ; even a Tico would be “easily sunk” in certain conditions and your much vaunted subs which you seem to think are a panacea would be “easily sunk” if deployed against an enemy which has a qualitative and numerical edge and if employed wrongly. Look up the lessons of WW1/2 and more recent examples of the limitations and vulnerabilities of subs.
    – Ultimately despite the temptation of making direct and spurious comparisons and convoluting things; there is no such nonsense as something being better then another. Various things are needed in the right mix; all complementing each other.
    – Not every wartime operational scenario would call for subs and in peacetime [yes navies do have peacetime roles and utility] surface ships often than not would have more utility than subs. One can’t have a “presence” with subs the way one can with surface ships and navies certainly don’t require their subs to surface in the vicinity of foreign forces – as you once proposed – because this foolishly and needlessly throws away a major advantage subs have; being unseen.

  21. In the event that the LCSs were cancelled, reduced in number or remained indefinitely unresolved the RMN looked at options. One such option was to channel stuff originally intended for the LCSs towards the LMS Batch 2s. It doesn’t go beyond that but this has not stopped individuals from peddling the tosh that the Batch 2s are intended as a fall back option or that it assumed a greater sense of urgency due to the LCSs going rstshit. Even if all the LCSs had been delivered on time the RMN would still have a need for LMSs and has had that need for years now.

    The notion that the LMSs aren’t survivable is utter generalist nonsense at best. Depends on the context; a high intensity no holds bared fight against an opponent who enjoy a massive overmatch? A low intensity one against opponents who have similar capabilities and skill sets? Also, it’s not 1511 anymore; the LMSs like everything else are not intended to operate on their own but alongside other assets and are not expected to be placed in a operational situation where they have too ouch above their weight category. Anymore than a LCA is intended to go up against a Rafale.

    Placed in the wrong situation even a sub would be easily sunk. A sub as has been pointed out on inordinate number of occasions I’d neither invincible or a panacea and would smears be deployed in situations which are advantageous to it as far as possible.

    Do I like subs and do I think we need more; yes. The issue is that we need various things and as it stands we can’t even afford to adequately sustain what little we have; let alone 6 subs which are inherently resource intensive. Even stretched over longer period; gaining the resources needed for 6 subs is hard to put it mildly. There’s a reason the RMN sees a long term need for a force of 4 and not 5 or 6 or 8 subs. Unlike individuals who bade their reasonings on what looks great on paper; the RMN fully understands what it can and can’t do based on the resources or has and the resources it’s likely to get in the coming years.

    Another issue is that the RMN is a small all volunteer force. The fall out rates for aspiring submariners is high and retention rates are low. Subs also tend to be more effective when operating in tandem with other assets and certainly not in situations where opponents have control of the skies and have their own subs and surface units in the area.

  22. Hulubalang “The DWP has writings of what remains of the want to follow superpower nations doctrine of conventional “expeditionary” and attacking style of war when our military should not do such a thing. Our military should be a force that prioritizes defence of our territory,”

    Except for the fact that we do Not sit next door to a giant and there is a buffer state between us and them nor the giant show any interest in denying our existence.

    What the giant want is to dominated and turn the surrounding states into a satellite clients state not going around invading them like it’s the 16th century. And the reason it’s not a reality yet is because of a ‘conventional’ expeditionary super power still able to operate from here.

    All littoral state surrounding the giant have to do is to support the conventional expeditionary super power to maintain a present here and it just make sense to adopt their doctrine to better coordinate with them.

    Doing what you want is exactly what China want and thanks God our planners have the brain power not to do exactly that.

  23. … – ”DWP has writings of what remains of the want to follow superpower nations doctrine of conventional “expeditionary” and attacking style of war when our military should not do such a thing. Our military should be a force that prioritizes defence of our territory, which can be done without the need to do any amphibious operations (by having same military capability on both East and West Malaysia, “Keupayaan untuk Beroperasi Serentak di Dua Wilayah” which is also explicitly stated in DWP).”

    I’m glad you’ve acknowledged we don’t have an expeditionary capability; exactly we we don’t need oilers and tankers. On the rare occasions our ships venture far; cheaper to have them conduct refueling stops rather than have an oiler tag along. We can’t cate for every possibility. We need tankers, oilers and hospital ships like we do a hole in the head.

    On defending our interests; we need a mix of various things; all working as one. Depends on the threat; the context – who we fighting and under what operational circumstances? At times we would have to conduct asymmetric tactics but at times we can’t or won’t and the response would be more ”conventional’. The enemy also has a vote. Ultimately one has to factor in that despite all we can do on paper and despite all the nationalistic hubris; the MAF is not equipped, structured or funded for a long drawn industrial scale conflict. Neither is the country; we lack the population base; the industrial base and other key essentials.

  24. I’m not sure why the interpretation of DWP suggests offensive minded military planning when deterrence is actually all over the document. Perhaps it’s the focus on headlines by others rather than reading the actual document itself. It’s not a long document at around 60 pages of words, big fonts, generous margins, lots of illustrations. Same with the RMN’s 15to5 plan where there is a proper 100 pager Strategy Document that provides context on RMN’s planning and the reasons for the plans. It is quite well written with assistance from BNM, Khazanah and the US DoD. The 15to5 strategy document includes RMN’s plan for the MRSS which will provide context on the amphibious capabilities MAF was seeking, the classification of ships by combat, patrol, support, and submarine (not by LCS, LMS, NGPV that seems to have become the basis for the general public’s thinking), to be able to form a Task Group (which sounds similar to an Army Mechanised Brigade), a core fighting force of 12 LCS type ships, 4 submarines and 3 MRSS supported by 2 types of patrol ships – all based on the concentric defense areas or zones as presented in the DWP. So just to help out, Defence White Paper 2019, Chapter 3: Defence Strategy, pages 34 to 41. If long paragraphs are not the fancy of the day, then Figure 3.2 page 40 is a nice summary using the traditional 3 pillars approach.

  25. kel – ”I’m not sure why the interpretation of DWP suggests offensive minded military planning when deterrence is actually all over the document. P”

    You’re not ”sure” of various things it would seem; including the ”people” you have a penchant of referring to.

    Nothing in it suggests ”offensive minded military planning” and you have to bear in mind that just because one may have a defensive strategy; doesn’t mean one does not undertake ops which can be described as ”offensive : active defence. One can have an ”offensive” op with tactical or operational level objectives; as part of an overall national defensive strategy.

    Ultimately the White Paper was political in nature and didn’t tell us much of what we already knew. In fact it left unanswered questions and was ambiguous in some aspects. Prior to it’s release many enthusiasts/fan boys/trolls were overly excited [as they were with the 5/15 and CAP 55]; like it was going to be the best thing since the invention of sliced bread. It was a good start nonetheless but needs substance and ultimately the government has to put money where its mouth is.

    kel – ”If long paragraphs are not the fancy of the day,”

    They are to you it would seem …

  26. Azlan “Neither is the country; we lack the population base; the industrial base and other key essentials.”

    Most importantly we lack food. our economy are export oriented. 70% of economy relies on human capital rather than resource extraction. Thus even if MAF is equipped, structured or funded for a long drawn industrial scale conflict The people would be under heavy pressure to raise the white flag long before MAF finished using all their ammunition.

    Not to mention we are under not at risk of being involved in attritional conflicts

  27. zaft – ”The people would be under heavy pressure to raise the white flag long before MAF finished using all their ammunition.”

    We have shared borders with various countries; thus food might be less of an issue than you think. We’re not exactly the British isles under a U-Boat blockade. Our Achilles Heel is the economy. Who’s our largest importer of goods and also the 2nd largest FDI here?

    zaft – ”Not to mention we are under not at risk of being involved in attritional conflicts”

    Really Nostradamus? Prior to 2013 who would have guessed that non state actors would land in Sabah and would require a concentrated military response? Prior to February 2022 not many would guess the Russian army would fumble in the Ukraine and be stuck in an industrial level meatgrinder?

    You think of that before assuming ”we are under not at risk of being involved in attritional conflicts”…

  28. There is also the government’s official National Defence Policy (NDP) (google National Defence Policy from Malaysia and it should appear on top of the search results). Read the National Defence Policy (a 2010 document), then read the DWP (a 2019 document), then read the RMN 15to5 Strategy Document (a pre DWP document). They are all related or constructed based on a common thread. It is not as political as it is made out to be. The plans are tempered or adjusted to the dollars and cents issues and policies of the government of the day (e.g., foreign policy, industrial policy, financial policy) but it makes sense in the context of the NDP. The DWP’s Navy component is only an executive summary of the full 15to5 Strategy Document – Google from Malaysia “15to5 strategy document” and it should appear on top of the search result. For example, Page 55 of the 15to5 Strategy Document is where one gets a sense of the amphibious capabilities MAF wants (or at least what RMN thought MAF wants). Ships are also not classified according to design (i.e., LCS, NGPV, LMS nomenclature) as seems to be the practice today. Instead, it is classified by purpose or mission – Combat, Patrol, Support, Submarine (page 44). Which allows one to understand whether LMS2 should be part of the LMS classification, or is it a Combat or Patrol ship? DWP doesn’t include those concepts or understanding which may lead commentators and the general public to think everything makes no sense when it does. Unfortunately, there are no similar public documents for RMAF’s CAP55 or Army’s 4NextG – but in so far as user side decision making is concerned, the CAP55 is on track and consistent as per the DWP. Suppose we want a political side to the discussion, there is the Tindakan Pembangunan Bumiputra 2030 (TBP2030), a 2021 document – can be downloaded – that has a section on Defence and Security. Those interested read the policies advocated and consider how it will affect defence planning and MAF’s interests… There are many such politically orientated considerations leading to DWP reading like a politically “gimped” document, but the core is there if one reads beyond that 1 document.

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