New FCR for KD Perak

A close up of Kedah class bridge. Note the EADS 3-D radar (top) and Rheinmetall Contraves TMX/EO FCR with electro-optic fire director and thermal imager (below the mast) taken by Malaysian Defence in 2002 when she was undergoing final fitting out at PSC-NDSB.

SHAH ALAM: The Defence Ministry has issued a tender for the supply, delivery, installation, testing and commissioning of a fire control radar (FCR) KD Perak pennant number 173, the third ship of the Kedah class.

The tender was published on October 10 and closes on November 11, according to the notice on the Eperolehan website. According to the tender publication, the RMN estimates that the cost of the FCR and services (installation, testing and commissioning) at RM15 million.

KD Perak launched back in 2007. RMN

Work to install the FCR will be conducted at the Kota Kinabalu naval base or other location as specified by the RMN. It is interesting to note that KD Kedah pennant number 171 is the only ship without the FCR after it was taken off during her last refit.
KD Kedah as seen in January 2021. Note the missing FCR on top of her bridge. RMN.

Based on the specifications listed below, the new FCR should also be equipped with an electro-optical turret apart from the radar just like the Rheinmetall TMX/EO FCR currently fitted onboard
the Kedah class. It must be noted that the MK 2 version of the FCR had been selected for installation on the LCS.
Sailors on board KD Perak preparing to leave Kota Kinabalu naval base for an exercise, recently. Note the FCR on top of the bridge. RMN

The specifications for the new FCR (edited for brevity):

To supply, deliver, install, integrate, test and commission new Fire Control Radar (FCR) for KD PERAK.
Justifications. The current FCR, TMX/EO by Rheinmetall has been installed onboard since year 2006. Spare part required for maintenance are costly and longer lead time due to system aging.
76 mm Super Rapid Gun Mount (SRGM) Medium Range Gun OTO MELARA installed onboard has limited firing operational through Target Designation Sight (TDS) and without FCR for CMS. As a means of
identification, ship crews unable to verify the targets beyond visibility.
The new FCR shall enable the ship to identify and engage surface and air targets effectively. It shall also able to acquire, track and deliver target track data for track assignment to available weapon control systems.
Quantity Required. One (1) complete system.
The system shall be able to function as new FCR and
configured for the following tasks:
Primary task. Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW), Naval Gunfire Support
(NGS) and Surveillance.
Supporting task. Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) and situational awareness.
The complete system shall consist of but not limited to
following items: Tracker Mount. Processing Unit. Man Aloft Switch. Data
Communication. Operating System. Special Tools.
Mandatory. The complete system shall consist of but not limited to
following items: Tracker Mount Radar Frequency: X-Band (Nato I/J –
band). Frequency Modulated Continuous Wave (FMCW). Channels of
Frequencies: Multi Frequency Tracking Range: At least 30 km. Azimuth
Coverage: 360o continuous rotation. Elevation Coverage: -22o to +80o.
Modern solid-state technology. It shall be fitted with existing platform.
Electro – Optics Tracking Range: At least 20 km High-Definition Camera
TV (Daylight colour Observation, Surveillance and Track Tracking).
Focusing mode (Auto and Manual) and shall be able to control by CMS
console. Provided with continuous optical zoom lens and digital zooming
capabilities. Modern solid-state technology. Tracking Capability for
surface and air target shall hold and track contact for firing purpose.
Laser Range Finder Laser Safety Class: Not more than Class 2 (Eye
Safe). Mode: Auto and Manual for target tracking. Target Range: At least
15 km.
High-Definition Infrared (IR) Tracker Camera (Night Vision, Thermal
Imaging and Track Tracking) Output: Digital.
Equipped with contrast, brightness and autofocus control capabilities.
Wave length not less than 3 to 5 µm spectral band.
Type: Cooled detector.
Range Detection: At least 20 km with minimum target size 5 m2.
Resolution: At least 640 x 512 pixels.
Tracking Capability: Shall hold and track contact for firing purpose.
Detection, Recognition Identification: It shall comply with STANAG 4347
(NATO Standardization Agreement: Definition of Nominal Static Range
Performance for Thermal Imaging Systems).
High-Definition Camera TV (Daylight Observation, Surveillance and
Track Tracking) Focusing mode (Auto and Manual) and shall be able to
control by CMS console.
Provided with continuous optical zoom lens and digital zooming
capabilities.
Tracking Capability: Shall hold and track contact for firing purpose.
Range Detection: At least 20 km with minimum target size 5 m2.
Able to send data and video to CMS.
Able to provide analysis and processing of video stream generated by TV
and IR Camera.
Able to provide video processing functionality that supports the various
surveillance and engagement function.
Able to interface with existing CMS and controlled by CMS console.
Able to interface with existing Inertial Navigation System.
Able to interface with existing Meteorological System.

Based on the above it is likely that once the new FCR has been selected and installed successfully the RMN will issue another tender to supply the same equipment for the other five ships or at least a variation order to supply another one for Kedah, at least.

KD Perak personnel manning the CIC. RMN

The specifications also does not bode well for earlier proposals to upgrade the firepower of the Kedah-class with missiles, surface to surface or surface to air. I stand to be corrected of course.

— Malaysian Defence.

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About Marhalim Abas 2185 Articles
Shah Alam

73 Comments

  1. Its okay.

    Just let the kedahs be pure OPVs. After TLDM get their LCS Gowinds, the Kedahs is best passed on to APMM.

    The Kedah and the DAMEN 1800 OPV of APMM is almost similar in size to each other.

    If taking UNCLOS Law into consideration, the ideal response to China Coast Guard encroachment into Zon Maritim Malaysia is using APMM coast guard ships. So the Kedahs is better painted white rather than stay in grey.

    The exact playbook now being played by china, transferring many PLAN frigates and corvettes to the chinese coast guard.
    https://pbs.twimg.com/media/FLzZnQ0VUAEtwQi.jpg

  2. …. – “Just let the kedahs be pure OPVs”

    Ok but what pray tell actually constitutes a “pure OPV”? One which has a 3D radar; two directors; an”obstacle avoidance sonar”; help landing system; plus a list of other things normally not find on nocturnal other “OPVs”. Also, if the RMN actually is able to stand the class at a later date; in your book will the class still be a “pure OPV” or will be be a “light frigate”?

    … – “ the Kedahs is best passed on to APMM”

    Sounds great on paper [like many things{ in actual reality the MMEA would say “no thank you”. If you ask why; I’ll again point that that operating costs will be an issue; the MMEA already has a huge footprint on account of the hodgepodge of stuff operated and that by the time the RMN is willing to hand over the class it will be somewhat aged..

    Also, even after the RMN gets the LCS the reality is that it will not be in a position to hand the Kedahs to anyone; for the simple reason that the service needs a certain number of hulls.

  3. …. – “ taking UNCLOS Law into consideration, the ideal response to China Coast Guard encroachment into Zon Maritim Malaysia is using APMM coast guard ships. So the Kedahs is better painted white rather than stay in grey”

    “So” the government should commit to ensuring the MMEA has a certain level of sustained funding to progressively add to the number of assets it needs; as well as expanding/improving the shore support infrastructure needed to absorb all these new assets and increasing the operational budget.

  4. https://www.malaysiandefence.com/lcs-cost-is-higher/#comment-878265

    For our day to day peacetime maritime security, we need to empower APMM to take this up as its primary task.

    This is TLDM 2023 allocation
    2023 OE – RM1.531 billion
    2023 DE – RM1.7009 billion

    APMM 2023 allocation
    2023 OE – RM0.6231 billion
    2023 DE – RM0.719 billion

    IMO a APMM OE of around RM1.2 billion, and DE 0f RM0.8 billion would be good to fulfil its operational obligations and to have its needed fleet of 20 large OPVs even by 2030. RM0.8 billion DE annually 2024-2030 (7 years) is about RM5.6 billion. Even if only half of DE is to buy OPVs, that is about USD600 million available. That is enough to buy 10-12 more brand new large OPVs by 2030. Add that to getting used OSVs, additional used OPVs from Japan etc. the target for 20 large OPV can be met by 2030.

    Current APMM large OPV fleet
    2 Ex Musytari OPV
    2 Ex japan OPV
    3 DAMEN 1800 OPV

    Selected new OPV costs

    DAMEN 1800 OPV (83m) – USD61 mil
    Vikram class OPV India (97m) – USD30 mil
    Tae Pyung Yang Class OPV Korea (115m) – USD55 mil (latest ship pennant no. 3016 cost)

  5. Marhalim,
    With the expected delay of the LCS build or perhaps the project entirely go south, does it still make sense to “upgrade the firepower” of some of the Kedahs? What would it take for the Navy to convince PMX to take on this route? Personally, with no definitive answer from the current fiasco, I would see the LCS as a backup build for the Navy and the LMS Batch 2 and up arm of some of the Kedahs as a priority.

  6. I think the RMN with its experience with the Kedah class clearly do not think its viable to upgrade the ship’s firepower. Otherwise it would have done so back in 2019.

  7. There should be a surplus fcr since lcs has been reduce to 5. The fcr for the 6th ship can be transfer to kd kedah.

  8. Ed – ”With the expected delay of the LCS build or perhaps the project entirely go south”

    I fail to see how it might ”go south”. There’s just too much invested in it; hard cash and politics.

    Ed – ”the LMS Batch 2 and up arm of some of the Kedahs as a priority.”

    I’d like to see how the LS Batch 2s are equipped. A 57mm instead of a 30mm? At least 4 ASNS rather than 2? A integrated V-SHORADS mount instead of a VLS? A VLS with a ridiculously small number of actual loads?

    We also have to take into consideration that the RMN has a number of things which will be in need of replacement in the near future on account of support issues. The fact that we acquired 3 AW139s but in turn had to place into storage a pair of Lynxs is telling.

  9. @ azlan

    “are former marikhs still in service?”

    KM Banggi personnel is still active on FB, although the ship itself is currently in Shin Yang Shipyard in Miri since June 2022
    https://pbs.twimg.com/media/F8M1kIWbkAAyFiu.jpg

    KM Langkawi is now in GOM Shipyard Setiawan since June 2023

    You can track most of APMM ship whereabouts with AIS. BTW on AIS the DAMEN 1800 OPV name is set as KM Tun Fatimah.
    .
    .
    .
    For like a decade here, i have been fairly consistant with my opinion on what would be the best solution for malaysian maritime security picture.

    – a leaner TLDM (smaller than that is originally planned in 15 to 5) that is focused on combat capability and deterrence, with submarines as its primary tip of the spear.

    – a better equipped and funded APMM as the primary service to handle day to day maritime security during peacetime.

    And that is stil my opinion the best path forward that we can undertake.
    .
    .
    .
    A new tweet by MINDEF. ATM akan distruktur semula sebagai sebuah angkatan masa depan? What will that mean? Will it remain just a jumble of bombastic words or will it have a clear achievable new masterplan complete with allocated budget?
    https://twitter.com/MINDEFMalaysia/status/1711982330787901520
    .
    .
    ,
    I have no idea why i cannot reply to ppl talking to me in the PAC report topic.

  10. Hulubalang – “ taking UNCLOS Law into consideration, the ideal response to China Coast Guard encroachment into Zon Maritim Malaysia is using APMM coast guard ship.

    While our CG like that of our neighbours are established in the 2000s on the request of Japan in hope to manage what then would be potential conflicts with PRC along these countries SLC grey. It’s doesn’t seem to be working as PRC doesn’t really wanna it the flashpoint to remains grey & established the world largest navy as well as having their CG sit under military supervision.

  11. … – “For like a decade here, i have been fairly consistant with my opinion on what would be the best solution for malaysian maritime security picture”

    Indeed. Kudos to you.

  12. … – “a leaner TLDM (smaller than that is originally planned in 15 to 5) that is focused on combat capability and deterrence, with submarines as its primary tip of the spear.”

    Great but in actuality one should never take for granted that our subs will always be able to do what you’d expect or what they get can do on paper: irrespective of what looks great on paper..

    Again; others have subs; not only much more but they fully understand their limitations; they can negate the effectiveness of our subs by deploying strong air and surface ASW units in addition to having their own subs in the area and as shown in various wars one only has to deny subs the ability to perform to the extent that they’re focused on evading detection rather than performing their jobs. Last but not least subs don’t work in a vacuum; they need to operate with other assets.

    In short whilst I see the value of subs; I will not assume they’ll always be able to do what we hope they can or will be a
    “primary tip of the spear” [to quote you] for reasons I’ve alluded to here and in other posts over the years…

  13. …..- “ Will it remain just a jumble of bombastic words or will it have a clear achievable new masterplan complete with allocated budget?”

    That is what the RMN hopes will happen. In actual reality it’s all dependent on the government; a government like previous ones which don’t look at defence as a priority and will continue the policy of “buying a bit but hardly enough of anything”; as well as indulging in politically driven hubris.

    The armed services can plan till Kingdom Come but it all depends on the government as you very well know …

  14. @ Ed Liew

    I was once a proponent of the Kedah OPV to be fully armed, but not anymore.

    When you think about survivability, ability to fight back, it is just a matter of when a ship such as Kedah class would be sunk.

    we can simplify scenarios to 2
    – war
    – peacetime

    For a Kedah class OPV, in a war even if fully armed it would be a relatively big lightly armed ship, with limited self defence suite. It does have a big role in malaysian maritime security, just that it is for peacetime coast guard type of duties. For this type of operations, its current armament is more than enough. Which is why IMO preferably the Kedah class should be in white, not grey.

    Even the PLAN is now transferring many Frigates and corvettes to its coast guard, for example recently nearly 2 dozen of the relatively new Type 056 Corvette.
    https://pbs.twimg.com/media/F8Npw5kbcAA5bCf.jpg

  15. Zaft – “While our CG like that of our neighbours are established in the 2000s on the request of Japan”

    It was planned in the 1990’s and was not “due to the request of Japan” which supported and welcomed its creation but did not request it per see.

    In the 1990’s when the MMEA was first planned the RMN voices concerns as to whether there was actual funding: as it turns out the RMN was right. Decades later the MMEA is still under resourced and the RMN has to fill in the gap.

  16. ….

    Should we get more subs? Yes but manpower has to be expended and the shore support infrastructure in improved and expanded beyond Sepanggar. Subs are resource extensive. The RMN is a small all volunteer under resourced navy.

    I will not put anything on a pedestal or treat anything like a panacea. They may be “invisible” and be more survivable but like anything else subs must be utilised effectively and in the right operational conditions – “measure of efficiency” versus 0measure of success”.

    People like to cite the Falklands and how the world’s premiere ASW navy found it so hard to detect a pair of subs. Yes but often overlooked is that the area was a large one and that the Argentine subs faced huge problems detecting the Task Force and getting into the right position. I could go on with more examples; which are there if one wants to look in order to gain an objective picture.

  17. Marhalim,
    Good to know as I thought it would be the quickest way to add surface combatants for the Navy.
    Azlan,
    Perhaps I was looking at the LCS build as a further gamble politicians are willing to take for we don’t exactly know when and how many of the ships will be built.
    The LMS Batch 2 requirements have gone public since the last DSA2022 and the tight budget for the first 3 ships as reported by Marhalim last year does not leave the Navy with a difficult choice.
    From what I gather, the Lynx, at least one of them, have not been operational for many years. The old Lynx parts are said to be hard to come by and carry a high price tag. Same as the AF B200T, the then government neglected to fund for their repair leaving some good assets going to waste. To prolong the service life of the four Super Lynx, the government can always allocate funds for more Tanom, which I heard they hope to have eight in total.

  18. Ed – ”From what I gather, the Lynx, at least one of them, have not been operational for many years.”

    At last a couple of years. I could go on but this is a public forum. Ultimately it stands that we simply can’t adequately afford to sustain what little we have; never mind a possible 6 sub fleet in the future or other things.

    Ed – ”The old Lynx parts are said to be hard to come by and carry a high price tag. ”

    In this day and age nothing is cheap; especially for a military that has a penny pinching budget and antipathetic politicians to deal with.

  19. Why waste this kedah class as a opv since this ship can add some heavy punch weapons such as SSM, SAM n torpedo… Even the LCS is operational i think the navy still need this ship as missile armed patrol corvettes…

  20. … – ”When you think about survivability, ability to fight back, it is just a matter of when a ship such as Kedah class would be sunk.”

    This is a silly blanket nonsensical statement because the Kedah isn’t intended to be placed in an extremely non permissive environment; anymore than one would place LCAs against MRCAs; pit a weltherweight fighter against a heavy weight one or have a JLTV go against a
    T-84.

    By your logic we shouldn’t get LCAs because they would be severely disadvantaged against MRCAs with better SA on account of longer range sensors; as well as having longer range AAMs and we shouldn’t get MMEA OPVs because they would be sunk by naval frigates. A non fevere min would point out that only a nutter would pit LCAs against MRCAs and MMEA OPVs against frigates.

    … – ”For a Kedah class OPV, in a war even if fully armed it would be a relatively big lightly armed ship, with limited self defence suite”

    I depends on the type of war….. Yes … what type of war? In the wrong circumstances even an Arleigh or a Type 45 would be found wanting.

    … – ” Which is why IMO preferably the Kedah class should be in white, not grey.”

    The problem is the MMEA would not touch them with a barge pole; the RMN doesn’t have the luxury of handing anything over and the MMEA lacks the funds to sustain the Kedahs and the needed shore support infrastructure.

    … – ”For this type of operations, its current armament is more than enough. ”

    You conveniently left out the part where from Day One the Kedahs were always intended to have wartime duties as well. It’s not for fun that they have space for a RAM mount and 4 ASMS and despite their ”NGPV” designation have a 3D radar; 2 directors; a fairly hign end CMS; a helo landing system and a host of other things which aren’t normally encountered on ”OPVs”. Same reason the Marikhs had a fairly decent radar; ESM and a high end man gun in the form of the 100mm Compact which was the gold standard for its day.

  21. … – ”we can simplify scenarios to 2
    – war
    – peacetime”

    That’s you looking a things in absolutes. As a diligent online researcher and highly earnest proliferator of links surely you’d be aware of the fact that there are different types of wars/conflicts. Quite obviously; contrary to your blanket assertions/ claims; there is a place for everything.

  22. I believe currently for our submarine infrastructure, sustainment-wise our infrastructure is actually underutilized in support of just 2 submarines. Yes to have 6 submarines, we would need to expand our support infrastructure, but by not much. We can look at Singapore and Vietnam infrastructure as benchmark. So expanding Sepanggar is quite enough, while any operations far from Sepanggar will have OSVs acting as submarine tenders to support refueling/battery charging, torpedo reloads, crew exchange etc.
    https://www.navalnews.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/U.S.-Navy-SSBN-USS-Maryland-conducts-full-at-sea-Crew-Exchange-1.jpg

    As for operating areas, at the main area would be the deepwater areas around Gugusan Semarang Peninjau and the chokepoint near Banggi island (one of the lanes for Chinese Aircraft Carrier to go from Pacific Ocean to South China Sea and vice versa). Other secondary areas would be Andaman sea north of Langkawi.

    https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-O4LHQTs8_YI/XRCO5BQ1ZuI/AAAAAAAAEIs/YTaHwwQTY6Mr7DnsyeHgNEr2EkApEO9RwCLcBGAs/s1600/Pelayaran%2Bkapal%2Binduk%2Bchina.jpg

    Other than that, the water depth is probably too shallow for submarine operations.

    As for manpower, retiring Laksamana corvettes, FACs, passing Kedah class to APMM etc will free up more than enough manpower to operate just 4 more submarines. Each sub will need just 31 crew, so even with 2 crews per sub, that is even less than the manpower needed for 1 Kedah class OPV.

  23. … – ”I believe currently for our submarine infrastructure, sustainment-wise our infrastructure is actually underutilized in support of just 2 submarines”

    Lets put things in perspective; the shore infrastructure one would need for one or a pair of boats might be sufficient for 3-4 but in your wish list you’ve arbitrarily come up with a 6 figure. Not only that but as alluded to; we need not only to expand the shore support infrastructure in Sepanggar but also to another base. The USN has tenders because it operates far from its shores in an expeditionary role and it projects power; we don’t. Just like how we don’t need oilers and a tender can never be a substitute for a shore support infrastructure.

    … -”Yes to have 6 submarines, we would need to expand our support infrastructure, but by not much.”

    So you confidently say but not from what I’ve heard from those who actually are in a position to know. A reminder [again] manpower is an issue; especially for people who need to be trained in niche roles and who require time on the job so to speak to acquire a certain level of experience and proficiency. Remember the conversation we had on Gerak Khas some years ago; it only inducts a limited number of people annually and can’t just expand at short notice without making a trade off in quality. Why do you think the Brits have always kept the SAS and SBS small despite high operational tempos?

    … – ”We can look at Singapore and Vietnam infrastructure as benchmark. ‘

    – Apples to oranges comparison. The RSN is better resourced and has conscripts. Not only that but Changi actually has more berthing space compared to Sepanggar and the Sings got into the game way before us.

    – The Vietnamese navy is much larger and even then took awhile to get things set up for its 6 Kilos.

    … – ”As for manpower, retiring Laksamana corvettes, FACs, passing Kedah class to APMM ”

    You again overlook 3 very pertinent points.

    -The MMEA does not want to add to its already large support/training infrastructure.
    – The MMEA would say no ”thank you” to these ships; it doesn’t need the hassle/headache.
    – The RMN will not be in a position to handover anything for quite a while more.

    … – ” Each sub will need just 31 crew, so even with 2 crews per sub, that is even less than the manpower needed for 1 Kedah class OPV.”

    Your penchant for numbers and how great they look on paper; like on a intended to impress PowerPoint brief; aside; if we look at the present arrangement; just to sustain a mere pair of boats; everyone from the torp man; to the cook; to admin officers; to the Admiral in charge of the whole set up; comprises a few hundred souls. A few hundred souls from a navy which is about 15,000 strong; relies entirely on volunteers and is under resourced. On top of that recruitment numbers have remained the same for quite a while now.

    … – ”Other than that, the water depth is probably too shallow for submarine operations.”

    Glad you’ve mentioned it because those ”pens” you were on about are great but to leave those pens boats have to keep on the surface for a whole before they can submerged. Also; as pointed out in the past; in quite a few areas boats can be clearly spotted from the air because of the shallow depth.

    Far – ”Why waste this kedah class as a opv since this ship can add some heavy punch weapons such as SSM, SAM n torpedo…”

    Which part about cash being limited and the RMN wanting to focus on the LCS and LMS did you miss or do not fathom?

  24. 1 Scorpene submarine costs approx US$450m or around RM2.0b. Buying 1 submarine equals buying 2.5 LMS2. Buying 2 scorpene equals 5 LMS2. A submarine cannot enforce EEZ nor can it maintain presence. It cannot escort a fleet nor be used as a transport. A submarine does not do anti-air warfare. A submarine is a submarine hunter first, ship hunter second. A submariner cannot easily transfer its skillset to a surface ship, nor can someone trained to operate a surface ship easily transfer to a submarine. Why would RMN buy submarines at a time they don’t have enough ships to patrol, and don’t have enough ships with SAM and SSM missiles? Unless the submarines are meant to operate on the surface 80% of the time?

  25. The armed services can plan till Kingdom Come but it all depends on the government as you very well know …(Azlan)
    I like the above 👆. It’s frustrating but perhaps another huge jolt like the Lahad Datu’ incursion will make this and future governments aware that Malaysia is vulnerable.
    At the very least, we should face up to it and go down fighting. And not see Defense Purchases as just another way to make milk more public funds@money for the family trust (wink! wink!).

  26. “Kedah isn’t intended to be placed in an extremely non permissive environment”
    Yes, which is why it should be operated by the coast guard.

    “would place LCAs against MRCAs”
    Actually for point defence LCA needs to go against MRCAs, which it is capable actually. Can a Kedah go up against Frigates? Exactly why Kedahs should remain as OPVs.

    “By your logic”
    Typical Azlan, extrapolating what others say. Carry on.

    “depends on the type of war”
    Remind me again what is the current issue in south china sea? Against which naval force? So no need to prepare for this but still prepare just to fight among ASEAN neighbours only like in the 80s?

    “The problem is the MMEA would not touch them with a barge pole”
    Says you.
    APMM wants 20 large OPVs. Give them the needed allocations, or even pass the original allocation for running the Kedahs by TLDM to APMM, they surely can operate them.

    “You conveniently left out the part where from Day One the Kedahs were always intended to have wartime duties as well”
    You also conveniently left out that those wartime duties requirement was set in the early 90s. Our maritime security outlook 30 years ago are vastly different from our maritime security challenges from now till 2030. In the early 90s the Chinese navy were barely a brown water force when Indian navy has already operating multiple aircraft carriers with Harrier jump jets. China coast guard is nonexistent. Our main challenges in the spratlys was the vietnamese. Biggest reclaimed outpost in the Spartlys was TLDM Layang2. GPS was only available to USA, computers still use 1.44mb floppy discs, google and iphone not even designed yet. 40km MM38 Exocets was state of the art (only a few navies have OTHT capability then). There is no hypersonic anti ship missiles. No AIS or geospatial satellites that can track ships at sea in real time. Do you really think that a large lumbering OPV with 4 Exocets and a single RAM Launcher (that we still probably cannot afford as the RAM is one of the most expensive CIWS system out there costing 25-30 million dollars per launcher) is useful to undertake wartime duties in south china sea against the chinese naval forces?

    “Quite obviously; contrary to your blanket assertions/ claims; there is a place for everything”
    I prefer to talk within the malaysian maritime security context.

    “Lets put things in perspective; the shore infrastructure one would need for one or a pair of boats might be sufficient for 3-4 but in your wish list you’ve arbitrarily come up with a 6 figure”
    Many other navies have figured that 6 is the ideal number for SSK/SSN fleet. Australia, UK, Vietnam have 6 SSK/SSN for example. Having 6 would ensure at least 2 will be available at sea for patrol at all times. I believe our current infra can cater for 4 boats, so we need to expand it like 30% more to run 6 boats.

    “A reminder [again] manpower is an issue”
    A reminder again my plan for 6 subs is not to magically have it tomorrow, but for the 3rd sub by 2030 (that is 7years from now), 4th by 2035 (12 years from now) and 5+6th by 2040 (17 years from now). That is plenty of time to prepare. In comparison vietnam went from zero to 6 subs in just a few years.

    Manpower number – Australian submarine service authorised strength is 500 persons to run their current 6 ship collins SSK fleet.
    https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/10/australias-submarine-force-a-threat-to-china-or-not/

    “You again overlook 3 very pertinent points”
    Those are just your opinion, not facts cast in stone.

    “Glad you’ve mentioned it because those ”pens” you were on about are great but to leave those pens boats have to keep on the surface for a whole before they can submerged”
    There is a reason why they choose Sepanggar. It is a natural deepwater bay. In less than 1km out from the sub pier the depth is already more than 20m and descends rapidly straight to the sub playground in Gugusan Semarang Peninjau. You can also go in/out in low light conditions (dawn/dusk) to minimise detection.
    https://pbs.twimg.com/media/F8QSlU8aMAAQfbD.jpg

  27. @ kel

    “Why would RMN buy submarines at a time they don’t have enough ships to patrol, and don’t have enough ships with SAM and SSM missiles?”

    – enough ships to patrol should be left to APMM to manage. The budget requested to buy 3x LMS Batch 2 corvettes could buy APMM 10x DAMEN 1800 OPV.

    – corvettes lightly armed with SAM and SSM will be very venerable in future wartime scenario. Submarines would be more survivable and more capable to undertake counter strikes to the adversary. For peacetime maritime patrols, presence missions, countering the Chinese Coast Guard, it is better, cheaper to use OPVs rather than LMS Batch 2.

    – IMO overall it is cheaper and gives much more overall maritime security capability by having purely peacetime patrol capable OPV with APMM, and restructuring TLDM to be a smaller leaner service with well armed submarine and frigates.

    https://www.malaysiandefence.com/pac-report-on-lcs-october-9-2023/#comment-879277

  28. …. – “Yes, which is why it should be operated by the coast guard”

    Aba.,

    … – “Many other navies have figured that 6 is the ideal number for SSK/SSN fleet”

    They was never the issue. The issue was your idea we could have a fleet of 6 without taking him into consideration that the TMN is a small all volunteer under resourced navy which can betray sustain what little it has.

    … – “Says you”

    Says you actually. You who are the king or assumptions; who ignores the key facts that the MMEA already has immense issues on account of the hodgepodge fleet it has and the fact that the RMN will not be in a position to handover anything soon.

    BTW have you actually asked any MMEA people or are your conclusions limited to Google searches and voices in your head telling you that you’ve got it all figured out?

    … – “There is a reason why they choose Sepanggar. It is a natural deepwater bay”

    Yes but it totally defeats the purpose of having pens. What’s the point of having pens when a sub still have to leave the pen on surface and is fully visible?

    …. – “Yes, which is why it should be operated by the coast guard”

    Absolute bullocks. There is a place for everything; either by their own or in conjunction with other assets.

    — – “Remind me again what is the current issue in south china sea?”

    I’ll “remind” you that there are various types of wars; barring in a intensity and duration and that – I know you’re all gaga about China – bit the RMN’s force structure is not driven by Chiba in mind; that even if war breaks out it’s not given we’ll be involved and even if we gut a 20 destroyers and 10 subs we simply can go against the PLAN.

    …. – “Submarines would be more survivable and more capable to undertake counter strikes to the adversary”

    That’s you assuming because subs will not be more survivable in certain conditions and even if they are survivable but are too bust avoiding detection then they can’t do their job. Look up the experience from WW1/2.

    … – “Submarines would be more survivable and more capable to undertake counter strikes to the adversary”

    So? We have a few hundred people for our 2 subs and despite your reluctance to accept it; manpower is a legit issue in the MAF. I know that apples to oranges comparisons is your thing but learn to look at the context and factor in the nuances.Noe you’ve mentioned the RAN; prior to that the RSN and Vietnamese navy; what next?

    … – “typical Azlan, extrapolating what others say. Carry on.”

    “Typical …”. Going around in circles and unable to accept anything not in line with his narrative..

    Yes I will “carry on” thank you.,

    … – “Many other navies have figured that 6 is the ideal number for SSK/SSN fleet”

    They was never the issue. The issue was your idea we could have a fleet of 6 without taking him into consideration that the TMN is a small all volunteer under resourced navy which can betray sustain what little it has.

    … – “Says you”

    Says you actually. You who are the king or assumptions; who ignores the key facts that the MMEA already has immense issues on account of the hodgepodge fleet it has and the fact that the RMN will not be in a position to handover anything soon.

    … – “Can a Kedah go up against Frigates? Exactly why Kedahs should remain as OPVs”

    It is not intended to go up against a frigate and not Ben if it was armed with missiles it would still be classified as a “OPV if one wishes. Also, I know you’re are fixated about the his “OPV” thing are unwilling to accept simple facts but the Kedahs from Day One were always expected to have a secondary combat role and that’s why they have a 3D radar, a high end CMS, 2 directors and other things.

    Your statement about the LCS is spurious [like other things you conjure up] but did it not occur to you that LCAs are only a intended to go up against MRCAs as a last ditch unavoidable resort and even then possibly with other assets?

    … – “You also conveniently left out that those wartime duties requirement was set in the early”

    You’ve “conveniently” left out that fact that whether in te 1990’s or 2000’s the Kedahs and LMSs are ships which have a secondary or supporting role and that fir anything resulting something heavier; the LCSs enter the scene. You also “conveniently” overlooked that like everything else the Kedahs and LMSs are intended to operate alongside other assets.

    By your twisted and self serving logic we shouldn’t get LCAs.

    … – “There is a reason why they choose Sepanggar. It is a natural deepwater bay”

    Yes but it totally defeats the purpose of having pens. What’s the point of having pens when a sub still have to leave the pen on surface and is fully visible.

  29. Kel – “Why would RMN buy submarines at a time they don’t have enough ships to patrol, and don’t have enough ships with SAM and SSM missiles? ”

    He’s under the illusion that because subs are apparently more “survivable” we should focus on them. According to his line of reasoning because subs are a “invisible” so to speak; they’ll always be able to succeed where other “visible” assets are unable to. Measure of efficiency versus measure of success.

    He overlooks the the fact that subs aren’t always more “survivable” and that others have subs too; they understand the limitations of subs and can resort to various measures to nullify the effectiveness of our subs : strong air and surface ASW units, mines, etc, etc.,

    He also overlooks the fact that operating a fleet of 6 will be basil a lot of resources. Resources a small all volunteer navy simply doesn’t have. According to his apples to oranges comparison however; because other navies can; we can too.

    Kel – “Unless the submarines are meant to operate on the surface 80% of the time”

    Well, some years ago under a different guise he did in all seriousness suggest that our subs surface in close vicinity to intruding Chinese ships to warn them and show we’re there and watching.

    I love subs and I think we should get more but I won’t put them on a pedestal, assume they’re a panacea or go on about them in a fan boyish manner. I also take note that to be effective subs like all assets have to be placed in the right context and operate alongside other assets.

  30. … – “Do you really think that a large lumbering OPV with 4 Exocets and a single RAM Launcher (that we still probably cannot afford as the RAM is one of the most expensive CIWS system out there costing 25-30 million dollars per launcher) is useful to undertake wartime duties in south china sea against the chinese naval forces”

    Since you missed it again, I’ll explain again in simple unequivocal English.

    – RAM is intended to provide a means of self defence for the class; not to enable to go up against the PLAN [all this is pretty obvious but apparently not to you]. By the same token MICA on the LCS is also to provide a self defence capability. If we intended to go up against China we wouldn’t have bought a point defence system but an area defence one.
    – We could have a ship with a 300 ASTER 30 cell but we still wouldn’t be able to go up against the PLAN; not unless you believes in lala land fantasy. Even the likes of the USN and JMSDF worries about the PLAN and here we are talking about a small all volunteer under resourced navy from a small country with a small population and economy.
    – I know you have facts flowing out of your ears but most of our asset procurement is capability not threat driven and the RMN’s force structure is not driven with China in mind.
    – There are threats we can handle and those we can’t.

    But like you said : “carry on” …

  31. …. – “this but still prepare just to fight among ASEAN neighbours only like in the 80s”

    That’s you being silly. Who is “prepare to fight” anyone? Since you missed it; we don’t plan to fights anyone but like other counties there is still lingering concern about unresolved overlapping claims. I know you’re all gaga about a China [which is a major concern] but the last time the MAF went on alert it wasn’t due to China. It also wasn’t the Chinese who rammed our Ship; pointed weapons at our ship and helicopter and acknowledged that it was close to opening fire has our ship not changed course.

    No, in case you or any other enlightened souls goes off tangent; I’m not suggesting that the main threat is from our neighbours or that we should be prepared for war with them.

  32. Taib – “I like the above 👆. It’s frustrating

    It is because despite the assumptions of some; the MAF does plan ahead and has alternate or contingency plans to present to the decision makers. The problem is when the politicians still are not responsive and can’t commit to anything.

    Take the RMN. The FACs should have been upgraded in the late 1990’s and retired by the mid 2000’s. Instead we resorted to the highly unusual step of rehullung them; for want of any alternatives. The RMAF presented a sound plan; after the acquisition of MKMs in 2002 it would have progressively acquired basic trainers, LIFTs, a Nuri replacement and other things; leading to MRCAs. The politicians were undecided and shifted priorities. We got a bit of certain stuff but other things were postponed indefinitely and look at where we are now.

  33. … -“For peacetime maritime patrols, presence missions, countering the Chinese Coast Guard, it is better, cheaper to use OPVs rather than LMS Batch 2.”

    I know you have a habit of repeating things which are in line with your personal narrative; even if they have been explained to you and would have occurred to you had you had indulged In objective research but the simple plain fact if the RMN is not getting fully fitted out LMSs for the primary purpose of dealing with intrusions. That’s not the primary purpose of the LMS; anymore than it’s the primary purpose of the LCAs to be part of a future strategic level air campaign or for Humpty Dumpty to have an altercation with the likes of Godzilla.

    The LMSs however – like all assets operated globally – will have certain peacetime roles but their primary wartime role is to conduct specific roles which do not require a LCS.
    Doesn’t mean we are intend on employing them in a major Jutland or Leyte Gulf like battle off the Bintulu coast against the PLAN’s South Sea Fleet.

  34. Suppose the Navy gets 2 new submarines by 2035 for USD900m or RM4.1b. Which means there is no money for 8 LMS2. In peacetime will the 4 submarines be surfacing, flying the Malaysia flag and radioing ships telling them they are intruding on Malaysia’s territory? In wartime, will the submarines be focusing on sinking enemy ships or other submarines? While RMN’s submarines are busy firing their 50km range Blackshark torpedos on ships, enemy submarines will be firing their own torpedos on RMN’s submarines – we can’t be assuming the enemy did not bring their own submarines. I would have thought for anti-ship, a 150km+ NSM missile is better than a 50km torpedo. At a minimum, a barrage of 72 SSM (5LCSx8 + 8LMS2x4) would thin out the anti-air cover, making it easier for RMAF to engage with their own 100km+ range anti-ship missiles. Even if no hits, depleting the AAW cover should force the enemy fleet to withdraw and rearm, instead of moving without air cover into hostile territory. I guess I don’t see how a picket line of submarines busy aiming at surface ships while being hunted by enemy submarines is cost-effective. Perhaps in the future when there are enough surface combatants. At this stage, hard to justify.

  35. Kel – “we can’t be assuming the enemy did not bring their own submarines”

    Yes. We can’t assume anything – period/full stop.

    We can’t assume an enemy won’t have his own subs in the area; won’t have surface and air ASW units in the area; won’t lay dense minefields and won’t have UUVs. With only a pair of subs we”ll be very careful as to how we employ them; in a situation as advantageous to them as possible. Also if a conflict does break out in the area I won’t assume that by default our subs might even be there given that other subs might be there and a “blue on blue” might arise.

    KeI – “would have thought for anti-ship, a 150km+ NSM missile is better than a 50km torpedo.

    Two very different things.

    – A ship armed with a NSM is less visible than a sub armed with a heavy weight torp.
    – A ASM might damage a ship but a heavy weight torp will break the keel of a ship.

    Kel – “don’t see how a picket line of submarines busy aiming at surface ships while being hunted by enemy submarines is cost-effective”

    – The experience of WW1/2 clearly shows that one doesn’t necessarily have to destroy a sub but to prevent it from doing what it has to do.
    – All the new tech aside a problem for subs still remains finding the target. Some navies have networked assets and satellites to work with their subs: we don’t. The Falklands is often cited as an example of how challenging ASW is by proponents of subs. What’s not often realised is that the Argentine sub had a very hard time detecting and tracking the Task Force and getting into position.

    Kel – “easier for RMAF to engage with their own 100km+ range anti-ship missiles”

    Just because a missile might have a on paper range of “X” KM doesn’t mean that shots will actually be able to be undertaken at long range; for a variety of factors.

    Kel – “At this stage, hard to justify”

    Even if we had enough ship LCS it would be hard to justify given we are at peace and have an indifferent attitude to defence. Another issue is resources. Subs are inherently resource extensive to sustain; much more so than surface ships. To actually be able to sustain a fleet of 6 will require a bigger budget and expanded shore support/training facilities. Handing over ships to the MMEA – ships it doesn’t want or need – to free up crews for subs just doesn’t cut it. The RMN is an all volunteer financially challenged navy. Getting the needed trained and experienced manpower and ensuring that they gain and maintain a certain level of proficiency is extremely challenging; even for Tier 1 navies.

    Paragraphs makes it easier for others to digest.

  36. – dealing with chinese coast guard intrusions. That does not need TLDM. Budget requested for 3x LMS Batch 2 can be reallocated to buy 10x DAMEN 1800 OPV.

    ” like all assets operated globally – will have certain peacetime roles but their primary wartime role is to conduct specific roles which do not require a LCS ”
    Please remind PLAN of that important fact. Seems they did not get your memo because they have transferred nearly 2 dozen of their new Type 056 Corvettes to Chinese Coast Guard, and built bigger frigates as replacements.
    https://pbs.twimg.com/media/F8Npw5kbcAA5bCf.jpg

    @ Kel

    In peacetime – you don’t even need LMS Batch 2.

    Buying cheaper, longer ranged OPVs will be much more operationally useful.

    Get subs for TLDM together with more OPVs for APMM will be much more useful than getting LMS Batch 2.

  37. … – “Please remind PLAN of that important fact. Seems they did not get your memo because they have transferred nearly 2 dozen of their new Type 056 Corvettes to Chinese Coast Guard”

    If you need to resort to sarcasm then please do try to use it properly and in the right context.

  38. Ships dont get build by a click of a button or overnight… World at peace so we dont need ships is another example of narratives that lead to underspending in defence. The LMS2 and LCS can patrol during peacetime and fight during wars. An OPV can patrol during peacetime and only patrol during wars. If we dont spend during peace, there will be nothing during wars. Keep up the we are at peace narrative and nothing including new subs will be bought.

  39. Kel – ““Ships dont get build by a click of a button or overnight”

    What? I was under the mistaken impression we had the industrial capacity to churn them out as fast as the Yanks churned our Liberty ships in WW2.

    Kel – “example of narratives that lead to underspending in defence- “

    Mind my French but bollocks. Since when does prescribed policy become affected by a discussion in the virtual world?

    Kel – “The LMS2 and LCS can patrol during peacetime and fight during wars”

    To keep it short and avoid any pendanticism and obfuscation even if the MMEA had 60 OPVs the RMN like all navies would still have peacetime taskings but this is different however to others propagating the hogwash that the primary purpose of the Batch 2s is to deal with EEZ intrusions.

    Kel – “ Keep up the we are at peace narrative and nothing including new subs will be bought”

    Did you get of the wrong side of the bed this morning or are there other innate issues? Perhaps take time to read and understand what others meant before resorting to coy comments.

    Like it or not the political leadership of this country does not prioritise defence; together with that and the fact that we are in a peacetime situation and are not in a state of tensions with our neighbours [despite the odd flare up over the years due to unresolved overlapping claims]; defence will continue to not be a priority. This is a fact despite whatever you coding and you would know it if you researched or asked around.

    If you feel you can make a change and you see things more clearly than others and understand things better; do write to the Defence Minister, the MAF HQ and your local MP. Get them to make the needed deep rooted changes which are needed. You were taking about “narratives” weren’t you?

  40. … – “For peacetime maritime patrols, presence missions, countering the Chinese Coast Guard, it is better, cheaper to use OPVs rather than LMS Batch 2”

    You are apparently confused between the RMN’s budget and the MMEA’s budget; both different entities or you’re indulging in conflation again.

    You also pedantically insist that the primary role of the LMS is to deal with EEZ intrusions. Why not insist the world is flat whilst you are it? If you’re going to go insist certain things to others it behooves you to get right.

    The RMN has openly stated [around in he time the 5/15 was unveiled] that that the Batch 2s are intended to perform certain wartime roles which can be performed at a fraction of the cost compared to a LCS. Since you’re a proliferator of links; kindly provide a link which indicates the RMN getting the Batch 2s to serve primarily as an “OPV” or to deal with ships intruding into the EEZ.

    As for the idea of handing over RMN ships; the MMEA intends on reducing its logistical/support footprint and even if by some miracle the RMN was in a position to handover assets like the Kedahs and Laksamanas [both will be much older when ready to be handed over] the MMEA would politely decline. Of course all this never occurred to you did it now.

    Look at the hodgepodge of things operated; many aged and high maintenance. The MMEA has also been “bitten” once so to speak; handed over various assets which the RMN was happy to get rid of and which were troublesome to sustain. The MMEA by the way initially declined the Marikhs which the RMN was only to glad to get my rid of.

    Back to the Kedahs and Laksamanas; both are inherently more expensive to run than anything the MMEA operates and the Laksamanas are known for the poor seakeeeping [originally designed for ops in the restricted Persian Gulf. Or will you say that just because the Chinese Coast Guard has no issues with former PLAN assets that it will be automatically the same for the much smaller and much less funded MMEA?

  41. Suppose the government buys in the idea of its peacetime, 18 OPVs are good enough and a cost efficient strategy to maintain territorial integrity. When conflict breaks out, do we use the 18 OPVs as battering rams? Since no warships with offensive weaponry were build during peacetime.

  42. “When conflict breaks out”
    That is the big question. What is the risk perception that a conflict WILL actually happen and with whom.
    And what kind of conflict are we going to face. Will it just be a ramming encounter? Or ships taking potshots at each other, possibly damaging but nothing serious? Will we ‘send the Navy’ if an MMEA ship inadvertently got sunk? Or will it be a sudden all out war where a superpower will have planned to take out our main air, sea, land combatants in the initial phase?

    If in that worst case scenario, will 18 fully armed LCS be any different from 18 lightly armed OPVs? Even so, if the adversary’s intention is total destruction of the Malaysian people ala Nanking, you’d better hope our TLDM boys have the guts to sacrifice themselves to buy us civvies a little more time to escape, and not as some proposed they should run away to Aussie to ‘regroup and preserve MY military strength for counter offensive with a big Western power support’.

    Like it or not, we can only get the military defence that which we can afford, and if the politicians decided it should spend minimally then the blame goes to them and the rakyats who voted them into Govt.

  43. Kel – “Suppose the government buys in the idea of its peacetime”

    The question is what do you “buy in” as you seem to misunderstand what has been pointed out you. Procurement has to be registered and approved by MNDEF before its forwarded to the Finance Ministry and PM’s office EPU for approval to await funding.

    Everything is heavily scrutinised and the services have to justify everything. People who have been involved tell me that the common things routinely heard are “why do you need 4; can’t you make do with 2”; you’ve gone so long without it why is it a priority now”; “scale back your demands because times are and we aren’t likely to be at war soon”; etc.

    So yes; despite your denials or ignorance; the government has a very antipathetic view on defence and it has traditionally wanted to spend the bare minimum in order to have a minimal deterrent capability against the type of threats it foresees. Perhaps do your research or ask around.

    Kel – “When conflict breaks out, do we use the 18 OPVs as battering rams?”

    No we use them to blast heavy metal from their tannoys and we preach love and copulation. Whilst we’re at it we can give them [whoever they are] a short history lesson on the early Viking raids on the British isles or about the Ottoman siege of Vienna.

    Also, what type of “conflict”? A short one which remains limited or a drawn out one on an industrialised scale? Or are you clumping everything into one?

    Kel – ““Since no warships with offensive weaponry”

    Do you know even know what “offensive weaponry” means?

    When does a sub cross the line from “defensive”to “offensive”? When does a salvo of MM-40s cease being “defensive” and before “offensive”? How does one even try to answer the questions you’ve asked? Do you believe the world is flat and that same gender marriages should be legalised?

  44. @ kel

    I am for more OPVs for APMM -AND- more submarines for TLDM, instead of the 8 LMS Batch 2.

    For the budget of 8 LMS Batch 2, you can buy 7 large OPV and 2 Scorpenes by 2030 with the same amount of money.

    That able to give us by 2030 a total of
    18 OPVS (7x new, 2x Ex Jpn, 2x Ex Musytari, 3x DAMEN 1800, 6x Kedah)
    4 Subs (2 current + 2 new)

    @ Joe

    “18 fully armed LCS be any different from 18 lightly armed OPVs”

    We would be fortunate if we could complete all 6 Gowind LCS…

    @ azlan

    ” If you need to resort to sarcasm then please do try to use it properly and in the right context ”
    It is IMO in the right context. PLAN are now transferring many of its 056 Corvette and even 054 Frigates to the Chinese Coast Guard, as it feels that they are not capable enough for wartime missions.
    https://pbs.twimg.com/media/DXDRAeLXcAAm4I8.jpg
    The same reasoning for me to pass the Kedah Class to APMM, and not to continue with the USD 180 million each LMS Batch 2.

    ” Since you’re a proliferator of links; kindly provide a link which indicates the RMN getting the Batch 2s to serve primarily as an “OPV” or to deal with ships intruding into the EEZ ”
    Nope, that is not TLDM view, and I did not say so. It is my personal view is that the LMS batch 2 corvette at USD 180 million each is too expensive for peacetime missions, but too lightly armed to have a meaningful contribution in a wartime mission (the same thinking currently by PLAN too).

    Which brings me to the LMS-X, something cheap that costs around USD 30 million, smaller (55m), faster (30 knots), longer ranged (5000-8000 nm range), smaller crew (15-24 person), more heavily armed (at least 12x Cakir low cost AShM/SSM instead of just 4). Operational concept of LMS-X is to be a loyal wingman to frigates during wartime (1 frigate to 2-4 LMS-X) and able to operate independently offshore for patrol in peacetime.

  45. @hulubalang
    “We would be fortunate if we could complete all 6 Gowind LCS…”
    Five or six or even 18 is immaterial in the grander scope of things if we pick a fight with a superpower….

    Your 7 large OPV and 2 Scorpenes (+2 existing) would do squat against 3 (and coming more!) carrier battlegroups with escorts and long ranged bombers with standoff weapons.

  46. Im not sure anyone advocates being able to defeat a global power. The keyword is deterrence. To quote the DWP, under Pillar 1 of the National Defence Strategy – Dissuading all forms of external intrusion or conflicts. One only needs to make it too costly to take action to achieve deterrence – enemy wins but at a heavy cost to ensure conflict is not the default course of action. 18 OPVs and a picket line of submarines do not achieve that. The other consideration is, OPVs are not suited for operations at the edge of the Extended areas or in the Forward areas (neither does LMS-X). Being able to operate in forward areas is important to suppor Malaysia’s national startegy. If unsure what national strategy and the areas mean, refer the DWP. 18 OPVs should be MMEA’s contribution to the National Defence Strategy, not RMN. Lastly, the government is willing to spend to buy 5xLCS and 3xLMS2, ship types that the Navy actually wants. What seems to be the issue that more OPVs, ships the Navy does not want, is preferable to 8 warships?

  47. “Your 7 large OPV and 2 Scorpenes (+2 existing) would do squat against 3 (and coming more!) carrier battlegroups with escorts and long ranged bombers with standoff weapons”

    The 7 OPV are peacetime mission capable only, and it is fine as that is what it is supposed to do.

    Those 2 Submarines (+2 existing) will be much more survivable compared to 8 LMS Batch 2 corvettes (that can be continuously tracked with satellites) against carrier battlegroups with escorts and long ranged bombers with standoff weapons. What can long ranged bombers with standoff weapons do to subs? Get the latest Scorpene with LIB that has a submerged endurance of 78 days.
    https://pbs.twimg.com/media/F8U7nsnbsAAnnV5.jpg

    Those 4 subs will give much more wartime mission capability than 8 of the LMS batch 2 Corvettes can ever give.

  48. @Kel
    “The keyword is deterrence.”
    Deterrence, yes. But against whom? No regional nation’s military (except perhaps SG) can effectively deter China. Our deterrence policy had always been vis a vis our regional neighbours and thus our defence buys had always been to keep in step with them while updating our mission capabilities. But our minimalistic provision have recently been underwhelmed by their respective refreshes to their armed forces and this reflects in our puny <1%-of-GDP-defence-budget.

    @hulubalang
    "Those 2 Submarines (+2 existing) will be much more survivable"
    If they keep their distance and not engage them, yes they will be more survivable but what's the point then.

    "What can long ranged bombers with standoff weapons do to subs?"
    Destroy the C&C that would give them orders to sail? Destroy their pens whilst still in it, also denying any resupply & repair to them?
    Subs may stay under for 78 days but will the crew have food, water & munitions for 78 days?
    Your 4 subs will give as much wartime mission capability as 8 LMS2 Corvettes can do when faced against a superpower carrier battlegroups. Basically squat.

  49. “would do squat against 3 (and coming more!) carrier battlegroups with escorts”

    Correct. The idea that we can square off against the likes of China is fanboyish fantasy; it’s not as if we’re the only ones who can practice asymmetric warfare and just because a particular asset is more “survivable” on paper doesn’t mean it will be in practice.

    With regards to the LCS; even if we had 30 the plain fact remains that it’s not intended to operate in a highly non permissive environment. With only a 16 cell VLS; the cells would be emptied fast in a highly non permissive environment. Also, MICA is a point defence system; not as if it’s an area defence one.

    “would do squat against 3 (and coming more!) carrier battlegroups with escorts”

    Not to mention the possibility that an opponent might also have his subs in the area and might have laid mines; well as having to underwater sensors and UUVs in the area. He also only has to deny our subs the ability to operate effectively rather than physically destroy them – the key lesson from WW1/2.

    Subs do not provide a “silver bullet” element; do not operate in a vacuum; shouldn’t be placed on a pedestal and like everything else should be employed in the right operational context and work in tandem with other assets.

    Another issue is that the RMN will be very selective in deploying it’s boats; only in situations which are advantages to them. As far as the Spratlys go it’s not given that we’ll be involved should a conflict break out and even if we were; it’s not given there we’d deploy our subs their given the threat leave less and the fact that quite a few subs from various other countries might be there.

  50. Kel – “Im not sure anyone advocates being able to defeat a global power”

    Perhaps take a look at the discussion here and elsewhere. Someone is fixated with China; seeks to think China drives the RMN’s force structure and is under the illusion that with “survivable” assets and with asymmetric tactics we can deter China or make it think twice.

    Missing from the narrative is that even the likes of the USN and JMSDF worry about the PLAN and that [can’t say this enough] China has a much larger economy and population; spends much more on defence and has a large tech/industrial base.

    Kel – “ OPVs are not suited for operations at the edge of the Extended areas or in the Forward areas”

    An incorrect statement – look it up. You can have a 1000 tonne pB or a 3000 tonne one with excellent seakeeping and other capabilities. Nothing is written in stone. The RMN has OPVs fitted with a 3D radar and other things not normally encountered on OPVs [I won’t use “…’s “proper OPV” term] because they have a wartime role too. The USCG has large cutters which also can be called OPVs. And no it’s got nothing to do with “nomenclature” in case you pedantically mention it again. It has to do with common sense and practicality. What’s an OPV in one navy could be a “frigate” in another.

    Also, pray tell what does “edge of the Extended areas or in the Forward areas” even mean? This reminds me of “FEBA” an army term used in the 1970’s/80’s. Do you really mean the periphery of the EEZ?

    BTW paragraphs makes it easier for others and displays consideration. Not hard if you put your mind to it. Nobody’s too old to learn.

  51. @ joe

    “Subs may stay under for 78 days but will the crew have food, water & munitions for 78 days”
    Do you think Naval Group is stupid enough to design a sub that can stay underwater for 78 days (from a total of 80 days on operation) but not enough food, water & munitions for that?
    Mission endurance
    Scorpene Evolved LIB = 80 days
    Scorpene + AIP = 50+21 days
    Scorpene = 50 days

    ” Your 4 subs will give as much wartime mission capability as 8 LMS2 Corvettes can do when faced against a superpower carrier battlegroups. Basically squat ”

    So your reasoning
    4x subs = zero wartime mission capability
    8x LMS Batch 2 Corvettes = zero wartime mission capability
    So what is our navy function in wartime anyway?? Might as well disband the navy and just have a Coast Guard.

    This defeatist thinking…

    You don’t hear :

    – Vietnam saying we cannot defeat USA because they are the superpower of the world
    – Finland saying it is impossible to defend against Russia because they are more powerful than us
    – Ukraine saying it is impossible to fight back against Russia as they have nukes and we don’t
    – Palestinian saying we just give up defending our land because Israel is much more powerful than us.

    Even The Philipppines are really preparing to push back on China, planning to buy multiple batteries of Brahmos costal anti-ship missile batteries, and prioritizing on submarines. Vietnam has prepared its whole military for years to push back china, why its navy main combattant is the 6 Kilo submarines, and most large surface vessel are not with the Vietnamese Navy, but with Vietnam Coast Guard, which is bigger than its Navy. Indonesian navy recently reiterated its priority to get 12 submarines.

  52. We have to keep with the goal or basically the intent provided by the “commander”. There is the requirement that the MAF also advance national strategy. But solely from a national defence perspective, Pillar 1 of the National Defence Strategy – Dissuading all forms of external intrusion or conflicts. The key word is dissuade. The deterrence we seek is to dissuade someone from considering intrusion and conflicts as a course of action. If we fail to dissuade, then it implies we have not achieved deterrence. The goal isn’t to fight and win. But to make it costly enough that fight is not the default action. For simplicity purposes we measure cost solely in terms of an engagement using the force concentration rules / concepts. That is the attacking force must achieve numerical superiority over the defending force. In earlier days its measured in terms of manpower (e.g., soldiers). Today it’s more like “firepower” or a measure of force. For simplicity purposes, let’s assume both sides have the exact same ships. All things being equal, the side with more ships should win. But win can only be achieved at a certain force concentration level, for example success requires a 2 to 1 advantage. The attacking force will need two times more ship than the defending force to achieve victory in an engagement (e.g., if a defender has 5 ships, the attacker needs 10 ships). Therefore, as long as the defender prevents the attacker from achieving the 2 to 1 advantage, the attacker will not take action. As long as Malaysia has enough force or power to prevent the adversary from achieving numerical advantage, it will dissuade the enemy from using conflict. One could swap the example of 2 to 1 ship advantage with the number of missiles, number of jets, or number of something. It’s just at this stage, the LCS and LMS2, is in my view needed to tackle the issue of fleet attrition. The Navy is losing ships faster than it can replace. At the rate things are going the youngest Kedah class would be 19 years old by 2029, while the oldest ship would be 23 years old.

  53. @hulubalang
    “but not enough food, water & munitions for that?”
    Just because the machine can doesnt mean the human can do as well.

    “So what is our navy function in wartime anyway??”
    Against a superpower? Nothing.

    “Might as well disband the navy and just have a Coast Guard.”
    That will be alright if our neighbours also disband their navies and turn to CG.

    -Vietnam had China & Soviet support
    -Finland had Nazi Germany support (they still barely hung on tho)
    -Ukraine have the Western powers support (otherwise theyd have lost)
    -Palestine… err how are they doing against Israeli land grabs, again?

  54. Kel / “As long as Malaysia has enough force or power to prevent the adversary from achieving numerical advantage

    No. It’s not only about “force” but being able to generate the “force” over a period and sustain it.

    Kel – “The Navy is losing ships faster than it can replace”

    Not really true. It’s not being able to maintain the workout it needs and to replace what it needs on time but it’s not losing ships faster then they can be replaced. Look it up; apart from some ships here and there; nothing much has been retired.

    Paragraphs make it easier. Was taught at primary school.

  55. @ Joe Against a superpower? Nothing

    With us & only us alone. No.

    @ Kel As long as Malaysia has enough force or power to prevent the adversary from achieving numerical advantage, it will dissuade the enemy from using conflict.

    PLAN maybe the world largest navy but JMSDF have 1/2 their numbers of fleet while ROKN have 1/3, RAN,RMF,PHN,RSN would *eventually have 1/10 of their fleet.

    While PLAN can probably wipe the floor on any individual actors they would be very dissuaded to not take them on if them neighbors were to gang up with one another. Thus For as long as PRCs neighbors can collectively match the PLAN numbers, the balance of power is achieved.

    Kel “The key word is dissuade. The deterrence we seek is to dissuade someone from considering intrusion and conflicts as a course of action. If we fail to dissuade, then it implies we have not achieved deterrence. The goal isn’t to fight and win.”

    Technically the goal is to have it both way. both to dissuaded & to fight & win.

    Hulubalang “Budget requested for 3x LMS Batch 2 can be reallocated to buy 10x DAMEN 1800 OPV.”

    You can’t just transfer RMN budget to MMEA nor neither RMN nor MMEA want anymore OPV. MMEA is busy with Thier mothership & NGPV afterall.

    Hulubalang “Those 2 Submarines (+2 existing) will be much more survivable compared to 8 LMS Batch 2 corvettes (that can be continuously tracked with satellites) against carrier battlegroups with escorts and long ranged bombers with standoff weapons. What can long ranged bombers with standoff weapons do to subs?”

    Yeah, I don’t think RMN would be involved in Any Pasific campaign if war were to broke out. Neither the LMS,LCS even the Scorpene are designed for open ocean operations. A lot of European navies too won’t be involved as they don’t have the ships & subs for that environment.

    Seems Our navies like that of our neighbours & lots of NATO navies are designed for regional defense to operate within a *confines sea be it north, Mediterranean or SC seas.

    Technically there’s not much elements of suprise one can pull within a confined sea & the navy (unlike in open ocean) does not operate alone as they can called upon their AF,army heck even internal security organisation.

  56. Zaft – “As long as Malaysia has enough force or power to prevent the adversary from achieving numerical advantage”

    – Who is numerically inferior to us – Tonga?
    – What is the enemy has a qualitative edge?
    – What if we have a military only equipped and structured ufor short limited type conflicts as opposed to a drawn out industrial scale one?
    – Do we have the resources to sustain things for a protracted period?
    What about a economic issues?

    Ponder …

    Zaft – “MMEA is busy with Thier mothership & NGPV”

    – Contrary to the ignorant and persistent denials some have, the MMEA is pretty much stretched out with what it has. It isn’t a lack large entity which is flushed with resources to begin with.
    – It does not want to be placed in a position – again – where it is forced to accept RMN cast offs. As it is the MMEA has a hodgepodge of various different things; logistical/support nightmare.

    Zaft – “Seems Our navies like that of our neighbours & lots of NATO navies are designed for regional defense to operate within a *confines sea be it north, Mediterranean or SC seas

    That’s a very tall statement to make. Our navy and other navies with the key exception of the RSN are not designed to operate and sustain themselves in a highly non permissive scenario.

    As for NATO navies; whether smaller ones like Portugal’s or Belgium; they are all intended to operate within the NATO structure; all leveraging of each’s others capabilities and contributing.

    Zaft – “Yeah, I don’t think RMN would be involved in Any Pasific campaign if war were to broke out”

    Unless our interests were directly threatened; i.e. access to sea lanes denied, etc, it’s not given we’ll be involved.

    Zaft – “confined sea & the navy (unlike in open ocean) does not operate alone as they can called upon their AF,army heck even internal security organisation”

    It’s 2023 not 1511. Nothing should operate alone.

  57. @ joe

    “Just because the machine can doesnt mean the human can do as well”

    Do you think a submarine designed for 80 days mission is not designed to have enough food for 80 days??

    https://pbs.twimg.com/media/F8tFa6KbgAEkcfq.jpg

    “That will be alright if our neighbours also disband”
    Most of the neighbourhood are upgrading their defence to prepare for the chinese threat.
    Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, Singapore…

    But malaysia? we have no hope against china… self defeatist. might as well just hand over our EEZ, oil platforms, islands on a golden platter to china.

    @ Kel

    “But to make it costly enough that fight is not the default action”

    So,
    A) fight with 4 submarine
    B) fight with 8 LMS Batch 2 corvette

    Which one is much more difficult for the enemy to eliminate, and would give a higher cost to the enemy? Which one is more difficult to track? Which one is more survivable? Which one have a better chance to give a second strike capabiity?

    China as the attacker has like 10 to 1 advantage. You also cannot compare 1 LMS Corvette to 1 Chinese Frigate that is 3-4x larger. Which is why we need to go the sub route.
    https://pbs.twimg.com/media/Eont6gPUcAAJYRn.jpg

    @ azlan

    “Our navy and other navies with the key exception of the RSN are not designed to operate and sustain themselves in a highly non permissive scenario”

    Then, it is time to shape up TLDM to be a force that could operate in a non permissive scenario. Frigates operating along with allies, submarine operating on our own holding the line until support arrives from likeminded nations.

    I would like to see
    1) smaller, leaner TLDM with armed Frigates, Submarines able to do wartime missions and scenarios.
    2) bigger adequately funded APMM to do the day to day tasks of maritime security in peacetime and other than war scenarios.

  58. … – “Then, it is time to shape up TLDM to be a force that could operate in a non permissive scenario”

    You make it sound like the RMN is the inhibiting factor and not the politicians. You also overlook the part where the RMN’s force structure is driven by not only funding but policy as set by the policy makers – remember, force structure is determined not just by funding but by the type of threats one foresees.

    It’s also not just the RMN but the whole MAF and it’s not just for he hardware but a host of other things as well.

    … – “China as the attacker has like 10 to 1 advantage”

    And submarines …

    … – “This defeatist thinking…”

    It’s actually realistic sobered thinking rather then fevered minded fan boyish thinking. Are you incapable of objective analysis?

    The examples you gave BTW are highly selective; self serving and were not looked at in totality.

    – Yes Finland fought but ultimately it had to sue for peace and cede part of its territory.
    – The Philippines is a US. Treaty ally. BTW it’s been pointed out that without a recce strike complex the Filipinos will be unable to fully utilise Brahmos.
    – Vietnam was colonised for almost a thousand years by the Chinese and how they view China is totally different to us.
    Vietnamese also benefited from huge external support. BTW strict ROEs by the the U.S. and Vietnam’s land borders with Cambodia and Laos played a bit part.

    Also, who said we should not “fight” or defend ourselves?
    Pointing out limitations we have to highlight your delusions and saying we should not fight are two different things. Instead of attacking the argument you keep peddling fantasy. If you really think we can square of with China; you believe in Father Christmas.

    Simple question. Unless your subs have a super silent propulsion drive like Clancy’s “Red October” what will they do if confronted by an opponent who has more subs, UUVs, mines and surface and air ASW units? Does the CO tell his men not to be “defeatist” because sheer willpower and nationalistic chest thumping will overcome eveything?

    Or are you under the delusion of that subs are a silver bullet panacea; the ultimate means to an end? A one size fits all solution? “Wonderweapon”?

    … – “8x LMS Batch 2 Corvettes = zero wartime mission capability”

    You missed the part where the fully fitted out Batch 2s are intended to have a wartime utility. Please don’t peddle untruths. By your logic the LCSs will also have “zero” utility if they come up against heavier units and by your logic we should not get LCAs because it a engagement against MRCAs they will be severely disadvantaged.

    … – “Which one is more difficult to track? Which one is more survivable

    Yes, yes. But what happens when conditions are not conducive to subs? You keep missing that part. Need examples where subs were unable to perform?

    There is a need/place for everything. A mix of various things are needed; none operate in a vacuum or is “better” per see or is a panacea. Depends also on requirements, preferences, order of priorities, etc.

    An objective sobered non fevered analysis would indicate that nothing should operate unsupported; nothing should be intentionally placed in a operational context where its forced to punch above its weight category and that blanket generalised comparisons are silly.

    Implying something is “better” is silly conflation. Like saying a GPMG is better then a LMG or a broom better than a mop. What if the there’s a need for a naval show of presence or for a civilian ship to bwe escorted; send a sub? When a LCS has operate alongside another asset and there is no other LCS around; send a sub?

    On the Vietnamese navy. It is a larger navy and has more manpower; it decided to focus on subs at the expense of a surface fleet and why it gets ate mostly threat driven. BTW years ago reports and indicated the a few of the newly delivered Kilos were laid at pier on account of crew issues

  59. I count 8xLMS2 based on current floated specification as 4xSSM per ship which translates to 32xSSM strikes. Assuming NSM, it is striking at 150+km. Assuming the standard 2xSAM per SSM missile, one would have thinned out 64 SAM rounds. Now add on to it 5xLCS at 8xSSM, that’s another 40 NSM strikes and another 80 SAM rounds expanded by the enemy. At the same time 8xLMS2 and 5xLCS is able to provide some form of airspace denial with their own SAM. Assuming a standard CVBG of 1 AD cruiser and 2 destroyers, exhausting 144 SAM shots is around two thirds of SAM cover. Even if its 3 CVBG, the erosion of air cover and aispace denial generated by our own SAM missiles is better achieved using surface combatants. But more importantly for 99% of the ships existence, it would be enforcing the country’s territorial claims, particpating in joint patrols, joining multi country exercises, assisting with disaster relief and recovery, supporting allies and partners, providing troop and equipment transportation, conducting search and rescue, undertaking evacuvation missions, etc, things that strengthened the country’s national interests. Now that I’ve presented my side of the equation, how would the 4 submarines achieve the same effect?

  60. @hulubalang
    “not designed to have enough food for 80 days??”
    Honestly? Nope. A nuke SSN can stay indefinitely underwater as long as it has enough reactor fuel and nothing breaks down but that doesnt mean the crew inside can stay in forever.

    “Most of the neighbourhood”
    Stands no chance to take on China despite their defence upgrade splurges. Dont forget China is also spending a lot more on military stuff.

    “hand over our EEZ, oil platforms, islands”
    Thanks to a certain someone, we would sooner give them to Indonesia but then that will be their problem then eh? Realistically its more likely one of our neighbours will start a tiff with China. What then, should we intervene militarily?

    “time to shape up TLDM to be a force”
    That is going to be expensive, very very expensive indeed.

  61. @ azlan

    Its my take on what i feel how we can have a better more capable navy than the original 15 to 5 plan (or even the LMS Batch 2 plan), but still within the current budgetary limits.

    ” But what happens when conditions are not conducive to subs? ”
    Tell me, is that exact same conditions conducive to LMS batch 2 corvettes? If Japanese navy in 1941 can sink the repulse & prince of wales, in 2025 with all the ISR&T resources and advanced anti-ship missiles, i don’t think the LMS batch 2 could survive and still be afloat even within the 1st 24 hours of hostility.

    @ kel

    all the peacetime missions can be done by OPVs.

    Do realise that all anti-ship missiles, hypersonic or whatnot, is actually useless against a submarine? The weapon in use to sink submarines is usually a 324mm lightweight torpedo with around 10-15km range. That is the main weapon to sink subs since like 80 years now, no other fancy weapons that can be used unlike killing surface ships. Finding a quiet diesel electric submarine will need massive amounts of resources, ASW helicopters, ASW aircraft, ASW frigates, to find just a single submarine. I can find a surface ship with a geospatial satellite account from my handphone. It would be very hard to find something like the Scorpene Evolved that could be continuously underwater for up to 78 days. If 1 sub manage to sink a carrier, even if that sub is lost, it is a bigger lost to the aggressor. There is a bigger chance of 1 sub doing that, compared to 8 LMS Batch 2.

    @ joe

    “That is going to be expensive, very very expensive indeed”
    It does not have to be. We can have a force something like the Singaporean is planning for, with current levels of expenditure. This is what i can come out with in my freetime:
    https://www.malaysiandefence.com/pac-report-on-lcs-october-9-2023/#comment-879277

  62. @Hulubalang
    “We can have a force something like the Singaporean is planning for”
    We simply do not have the same spending power and >1% GDP defence budget that SG forces gets. And SG arent just focusing on subsurface combatants with a fleet of surface ships outmatched its land mass when compared to other Asean nations. To maybe stand on par with SG level we’d have to have at least multiyear 3% GDP defence budget and 3X the currency strength that we are today, baring which then we’d have to allocated 9% of defence budget for like 10 years just to reach its current levels.

  63. @ joe

    Something similar ≠ exactly the same

    We don’t need exact amphibious capabilities of Singapore navy.

    What we can be similar to is the frigate and submarine capability.

    Singapore plans to have 6 submarines and 12 frigates (6 formidable + 6 MRCV)

    My plan is for 6 submarines and 10 frigates (6 gowind + 4 arrowhead140) + 24 LMS-X loyal wingman to frigates.

    Indonesia on the other hand is now redoubling efforts to have a minimum of 12 submarines in its fleet

  64. @Hulubalang
    “similar to is the frigate and submarine capability.”
    Even currently we simply dont have that. Our LCS is clearly outmatched by their Formidable, 16 VLS vs 32 VLS. 8 SSM vs up to 24 SSM. Their policy is for a more bluer ocean strategy whilst we focus on littoral defence. Totally different strategy. Indonesia is an archipelago.

  65. “Even currently we simply dont have that”

    Of course, that is why my plan is to change that…

    The plan is to change our current predicament, as 15 to 5 plan -in my opinion- is now out of touch with our current and near future defence challenges. I don’t say that what i plan is bulletproof, but at least it will have a much larger, and earlier (by 2040) effect than the original 15 to 5 plan can give out.

    https://www.malaysiandefence.com/pac-report-on-lcs-october-9-2023/#comment-879277

  66. @hulubalang
    All plans has pros and cons, including yours and TLDM 15to5, to which the latter is the official one as accepted & stomached by all parties (and all subsequent Governments) like it or not. A change of policy will upset such a balance and will be hard to get all round buyoff again.

    Still I appreciate your efforts to present one rather than being a shooter and shotdown every other ideas but not proposing his own.

    I see yours as being more warfooting and focusing on subsurface combat. Unfortunately reality dictates that TLDM simply cannot be a BOMBA and just waiting for the shooting to start to get into action (not dissing the BOMBA yea!). TLDM too must have a peacetime patrol & support function and thus equipped for such role which later can be converted into wartime function. Such is the case with LMS1 & 2.

    Mine would be to remain 15to5 but keeping it flexible with the LMS2 sized to Kedah or corvettes with a fully fitted out configuration but during peacetime role, they are to storage the SSM and majority SAM, torps, etc. The Keris class will be re-role for MCMV replacing the 4units Mahamirus. The LMS2 corvettes will together with Kedahs replace all the legacy boats and form the bulk of fleet.

  67. TLDM needs to be primarily focusing on war footing as it is a military force. Current TLDM 15to5 plan is too long (to 2050), while my plan is to be completed by 2040.

    Our primary peacetime maritime security force should be APMM. APMM own Pelan Perancangan Strategik Maritim Malaysia 2040 (PPSMM 2040) lays out a need for 20 large OPVs. Malaysia does not need a total of 48 large OPVs (20x APMM PPSMM 2040 and 18x TLDM 15to5).

    TLDM can have peacetime patrol support with frigates, LMS-X and OSVs. The LMS-X with all its modular missiles removed could carry up to 6 containers for HADR.
    https://www.navalnews.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/TRIFIC.jpg
    The LMS-X high speed and large fuel tanks also means it can arrive at most places in ASEAN to do HADR mission within 24 hours.

    Unlike just 4x SSM requirement on LMS Batch 2, my LMS-X is to carry at least 12x SSM (low cost 150km ranged Roketsan Cakir) and 24x HELLFIRE MMR on 2x TEU container flatrack modules. This is to enable “distributed lethality” of missiles spread on a fleet of 24 small ships, unlike just 8 ships of LMS Batch 2. That could be a total of 288x SSM, versus just 32x SSM for LMS Batch 2.

    BTW Keris class is too small to carry MCM modules. This is what the Royal Navy bought (yes a second hand OSV) to undertake MCM missions
    https://zbiam.pl/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/rfa-stirling-castle-mothership.jpg

  68. Singapore is simply staying many steps ahead of the region. In fact their fleet plans are not seen as in response to Malaysia, despite what Malaysians would like to think… instead it is in response to Indonesia’s substantial expansion of its Navy. If Indonesia didnt expand their Navy so rapidly, Singapore wouldnt be pursuing their own expansion so rapidly. Singapore’s deterrence is to always maintain that force concentration advantage versus any other country in the region so others wont ever consider conflict. But they dont do it with a I want to fight and win mindset because that mondset leads to different assumptions. Also the core of RSN is not submersible, but surface. Same with China, Japan, US, Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, Thailand, India, UK, Germany, France, Brazil, Russia, etc. The only country that I can say where submersibles are the core is North Korea. So make what you will of the idea of submarines anchoring a fleet. Its actually easier to deter a submarine from attacking then it is to deter a ship. A submarine will not attack if there is a heavy ASW net, unless its a suicide mission. Lastly, modern submarines are firstly designed to hunt other submarines not ships.

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