Et Tu LMS Batch II?

Sigma class frigate Tarik Ben Ziad of the Moroccan Navy. The ship is the Sigma 10513 design.

SHAH ALAM: During DSA 2022, the Defence Minister announced that the government will fund the build of three Littoral Mission Ships (LMS) Batch II equipped with more sophisticated mission systems. This means that the LMS Batch II will be a more capable warship than the gunboats of which the KD Keris class ships really are all about.

I reported previously, the first initial RFI for the LMS Batch II was for ships up to 75 meters long, just slightly longer than the Keris class (69 meters). The ships will be armed with a 57mm gun, two surface to surface missiles, very short range air defense missiles and twin 30mm guns.

A graphic on RMN future procurement published on the Defence Minister social media. As stated in the graphic, the pictures used are only meant as representative only and not actual equipment.

Last year, a number of shipyards received new specifications for the LMS Batch II which saw the length increased, now from 85 meter to 100 meters, a beam from 11 meters to 14 meters and a top speed of 28 knots.
BNS conceptual NGPV Batch 2 displayed at DSA 2018. The same design could readily be adapted for LMS Batch II project.

The main armament is similar to previous smaller design – a 57 mm main gun, two SSMs, a VL SAM or VSHORAD (Fitted For But Not Equipped) and twin 30mm guns (could be a CIWS type). And at DSA 2022, Gading Marine promptly displayed a Sigma 9113 corvette design while Hyundai Heavy Industries displayed a photo of a 90 meter corvette as well.
The Sigma 92 meter model at Gading Marine booth at DSA 2022.

Despite the announcement by the Defence Minister, it remained to be seen whether funding will be available as the government still need to pay for the elephant in the room. The LMS Batch II is supposed to be procured in two stages – three in RMK12 and another five in RMK13.
The LCS major equipment detailed. RMN graphic

Can the first three LMS Batch II be procured for some RM1 billion then? It is possible as that will be the cost of the hulls and other systems only including the CMS. What about the others then – the engines, radars, missiles and guns then? Based on the RFP put forward, industry sources told Malaysian Defence that the items may well be the ones already purchased for the LCS.
The latest generation MSI DS30 30mm gun complete with EO sight and remote operator console. Two similar system will be installed on each LCS.

It was because of this the rumours had started to gain traction that the only first two hulls of the LCS will be completed leaving the other equipment free to be used on the LMS Batch II. Though only four of the ships could be fitted with most of the items as the two of the LCS will still need the two 57mm guns and other equipment.
Sigmacorvette
Sigma 10513 corvette which was the preferred RMN choice for the LCS project

Will the government has RM6 billion to pay for the two LCS and three LMS Batch II then? Unlikely based on the amount of money allocated to RMN for the last two RMKs (around RM3 billion each). I guess we will have to wait and see then.

— Malaysian Defence

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About Marhalim Abas 1650 Articles
Shah Alam

62 Comments

  1. Can I know if only two LCS will be completed, what happened to other four? cancelled? If I’m not mistaken BNS already assembled the 5th LCS’s hull.

  2. But yeah right if the navy want another kedah sized ship why dont they continue building more kedahs instead..As for me the sweetspot for LMS are 70-80m with tonnage of 1000-1200 tonnes much like RSN’s LMV that will virtually replace all kasturis and laksamanas..57mm main gun,a ciws (low end also good enough), 2-4 ssm and manpads-like sam like mistral tetral/simbad/sadral

  3. Rock – ”LMS batch II evolved from OPV to corvette now?”

    It was never a ”OPV”; thus it never ”’evolved”. If one wants to go by designation based on size or displacement; they would fall in the ”corvette’ category.

  4. I smell a bailout. Or rather a bailout of a bailout. A bailoutception If you will.

    If not mistaken the navy had originally requested a Herakles radar for LCS but BNS pick smart-s MK2 instead. So if all the manhen after Zahid is to be believe. They wanted this ship according to how the navy wanted it. The first 2 LCS is almost completed so it isn’t possible to change much of it. but in theory if money is not an issues, then the remaining 4 hull could be upgun into a mini belharra for example. That’s also means there plenty of parts from the LCS that shouldn’t be in the LCS could be transferred to the LMS2 like the smart MK2 radar or the styler A35 for example.

    FFBNW SAM on the LCS2 is understandable. I doubt the 2 first LCS if completed would be equipped with one either. It’s logical to share similar missile to GAPU GBAD. Or rather hide the cost of RMN SAM into GAPU GBAD.

    Assuming the LMS2 contract is launch by year end, doubt construction could start before 2025. basically the bulk of LMS cost would be paid for in the next RMK. While money in this RMK would be use for the 2 first LCS.

    Technically, it is possible for the gov to pay 3 billion and get 2 LCS by 2025. The 1st 2 ship is almost completed, 1 of it had already been launch by DYMM PSB sultan, so it pending system, weapon installation & sea trial. As long as BNS take the 3 billion NOT as payment for work already completed & pay their debtor. but instead to utilize the 3 billion as working capital to compete all the ship and probably get more money in return if gov upgun the remaining 4 LCS.

    Why upgun? Well it back to the herakles radar mention before. The public is tired of cost overun & downgrading of ships throughout the decades. So why not sell it as an upgun program instead to justify the higher cost? Herakles or sea fire has longer detection range & ability to shoot aster 30. One should be able to capture the public imagination with it and makes it more palatable to them.

  5. If these ships enter service with a conventional layout rather than being designed for modular payloads; it solves the problem with regards to replacing some FACs or the Laksamanas [as per longstanding original plans] but it leaves one problem unresolved; the Mahamirus. They are aging and the current wire sweep/ROV combo lack what it takes for the future mine threat.

  6. No, the navy never asked for the Herakles. If they had chosen the Sigma 10513 as favoured by the RMN, it would have been the Smarts 3D as well

  7. 5Zaft – ”& downgrading of ships throughout the decades.”

    What ”downgrading” over the ”decades”? If you referring to the Kedahs the were never fully fitted out but not ”dowgraded” per see; neither were the LMS Batch 1s.

    5Zaft – ”Herakles or sea fire has longer detection range & ability to shoot aster 30.”

    Great so we can see over a certain distance but can’t engage what we see at that range. Has it occurred to you that there’s a reason the RMN never specified a need for a radar with longer range?

    5Zaft – ”It’s logical to share similar missile to GAPU GBAD”

    ”Logical” to do a lot of things but then GAPU’s system should be funded the same period as the RMN’s for the Batch 2s; unlikely. Also, commonality is great but what if the RMN goes for MICA but GAPU specifies a need for something else? Another issue is the RMN doesn’t have many choices with regards to a point defence system which can or has been integrated to various things it has ordered but GAPU has more choices; can be MICA; NASAAS, etc.

  8. Firdaus,

    “But yeah right if the navy want another kedah sized ship why dont they continue building more kedahs instead”

    More Kedah class cannot be built with the budget that we have. It is overdesigned in the way only the Germans know how to do. Even the sparsely equipped the Kedahs are costing 300 million dollars. While the much more bigger and better equipped Jose Rizal class Frigates costs 168 million dollars. So how much for a fully equipped Kedah? Just look at what Brazil has to pay for theirs, about 400 million dollars.
    https://www.malaysiandefence.com/meko-a100-corvette/

  9. 3000+ tonnes – Lcs
    2000+ tonnes – Lekius
    1500 – 2000 tonnes – kedahs
    1000+ tonnes – LMS Batch 2 ( maybe configured as corvette )
    Below 1000 tonnes – Lms Batch 1,FAC and other types of ships except MRSS,Auxiliary Ships

  10. Am I reading it right to say that TLDM were ‘persuaded’ to upsize their LMS requirements into corvette size, just so that BNS could win it and I am guessing it would be the Kedah class or an evolution of it?

  11. Im proposing Thales Mw08 radar as main radar for LMS batch 2 with scanter 2001 as navigation radar..While reserving Thales NS100 and Scanter 4001 for Kedah Upgrade..

  12. I’m proposing that irrespective of whether BNS or Dick Dastardly and Mutley construct them; they come on time; on spec and within budget; that the RMN has a major say in selecting the design; that it’s fully fitted out and that it has a high level of networking. Ideally it would also have an organic UAS capability.

  13. Fridaus,

    I think you are quite late to the game.

    The requirement for this “corvette-spec” LMS Batch 2 is probably dead (not required anymore), as officially the LCS Gowind program will be completed.
    https://www.malaysiandefence.com/cabinet-approved-resumption-of-lcs-project/

    The LMS Batch 2 requirement should return to be a small multi-purpose fast ship, rather than a stand-in for the LCS Gowind capability.

    There should also be zero plans for a Kedah upgrade. Just use the ships as OPV for the rest of its life.

    Rather than looking at each ship on its own, we should talk on the overall capability that RMN wants to project to the world, while taking into account the role of MMEA in the overall scheme of things.

    However fully armed those Kedahs, what can that bring to the fight when push comes to shove?

  14. @joe

    While I have no doubt that BNS would construct the LMS2. But would it really be another meko? The cheapest varient of meko the k130 afterall cost as much as the type 31. The general public ain’t going to be impressed by it.

  15. Just curious

    Since the LMS2 batch 1 would enter services around the time frame that Jebat & kasturi would in theory be withdraw from services. Would the radar,equipment & gun needed to complete the LMS2 be coming from those ship instead?

    Afterwards subsequent LMS2 batches would cannibalized equipment, radar & gun from the Kedah?

  16. Gonggok – “Rather than looking at each ship on its own, we should talk on the overall capability that RMN wants to project to the world”

    No ship or asset operating at a platform level; each operating as part of an integrated network; complementing each other to maximise strengths and mitigating limitations; in full coordination with sister services. That’s how I see it and that’s indeed the intention.

    Gonggok – However fully armed those Kedahs, what can that bring to the fight when push comes to shove?”

    Depending on the nature of the conflict. In general if fully armed they will only be suitable for secondary low threat roles such as escort duties and limited ASW but again it depends on overall circumstances and how well their use is integrated with other assets. The TRS-3Ds also provide a useful air capability especially if networked with other assets in able to contribute to.a common picture. The problem is that in a high intensity conflict, which we don’t plan for or structure the armed services for even even a LCS would be found wanting.

    The issue is that there is zero likelihood of follow on Kedahs and the 5/15 died a natural death years ago; as I’ve been pointing out.

  17. Unlikely as most of the equipment of those ships are almost obsolete especially the electronics. One may still use the guns but it will depend on whether it can be integrated on the new CMS which will used new standards. I think it will be better for RMN to get new equipment and weapons for the LMS Batch 2

  18. Right now before we even talk more about the future of LMS Batch 2, we need to take in all the latest situation.

    firstly, the latest LMS Batch 2 RFI requirement for a 100m fully armed corvette is done by RMN not knowing if they will even get some of its LCS Gowinds, if ever.

    Right now the situation is totally different when compared to when RMN sent out the revised RFI (or even when marhalim wrote this article). RMN is now assured by the government that they will finally get all of their LCS Gowinds.

    So now with RMN assured of their LCS Gowind, the next thing for the LMS is it still needed to be a corvette, or a new RFI would be released to return the LMS specification to mirror the original requirements of a modular multi role ship? Can RMN do away with no LMS but now with Gowinds and a new corvette?

    Azlan,

    “Depending on the nature of the conflict”

    To me if a warship can only at best protect itself and not be useful in attacking other ships, then it should not be there in the first place. The Kedahs even fully armed to its original specs (adding RAM missile and MM40 Exocet) is still a big lumbering ship. It can only do ASW by announcing its location to everyone in South china sea with its active sonar, and needs a ASW Helicopter to drop torpedoes. RMN needs to do some deep soul searching on what it wants to be in the future. It wants to be able to track submarines better with the Gowinds. Okay that is one part. What about other tasks? Can RMN pull a “Moskova” and sink an adversary flagship? What kind of assets RMN to operate that would be survivable when you don’t have the control of the air and the sea?

  19. Zaft – ”Afterwards subsequent LMS2 batches would cannibalized equipment, radar & gun from the Kedah?”

    – Can’t have a same class fitted with different systems; electronics and weapons now can we? That would be contrary to the RMN’s goal of reducing its logistical/support footprint. Not only that but a lot of the stuff on the Lekius are 1990’s vintage,

    – The Kedahs won’t be going anywhere soon; as such any suggestion of things from them being reused shouldn’t arise.

  20. @azlan

    IMHO rationalization is the method while the effective use of capital is the goal.
    rationalization for sake of rationalization doesn’t really achieve anything

    im just trying to get my head around how they going to achieve the relatively cheap cost of the LMS2 since a full fledge corvette like the baynunah, type 056 or k130 cost anywhere from rm500 mil to rm800 mil to rm1.2 billion. LMS2 meanwhile at RM 1 billion for 3 ship, comes down to just RM333 mil ish each. just slightly more then the price of LMS1 & tun fatimah.

  21. Because Lms batch 2 will not be a full fledge corvette..The best solution maybe go with fast attack type..70m+ and with 25+ knots speed..a 57mm/40mm gun, a basic ciws or rwcs, 2 machine gun and 2 ssm like tni al’s KCR 60s..Might aswell buy the KCR from them lol..Or Young Yongha/Gumdoksuri missile capable class from South Korea..With almost full korea’s radar,sensor and armaments..Another possible design maybe like Damen sigma 7311 fast attack

  22. @5zaft
    Ask you, does the general public actually knows the true cost of Kedah built including the delays and transition from PSC to BNS and restart? The rakyat don’t give a fucuk about the overall cost unless played up by some politician, only the initial project cost would gets some attention. The Kedahs, by now would be more economical to build as we own the rights now and it lacks the stealth superstructure features of modern naval vessels today (inc evolved Meko), but the point is it might still cost RM 400-600mil to built per ship not because it is expensive but because the project needs to be overinflated to pay the shortfall for LCS.

    Arguably, LMS2 could be another newer ship model but that would be costly for BNS to redo everything, buy the rights & whatnot, and would not be economical to serve their purpose which is to get money to complete LCS, plus the fact that LMS does not need high end design features like stealth hulls or reduced RCS or such. IMHO Kedahs are too big for TLDM role of LMS, ideally shd be 70-80mtr hull but now they are gonna get bigger ships which could be cumbersome to operate as LMS.

  23. The RM1 billion cost of the LMS Batch 2 was my guess, I have no idea what is the costing for them, really. And it was based on them getting some equipment already bought for the LCS. Since all six LCS is expected to be build, it is likely based on the current specifications, the LMS Batch 2 will cost some RM1 billion each. Which is why Gonggok advocated for a smaller ship

  24. Gonggok – ”To me if a warship can only at best protect itself and not be useful in attacking other ships, then it should not be there in the first place.”

    It depends on it’s role and the operational context…… Is it on a routine patrol; acting as an escort; performing MCM or ”attacking other ships”? Again; if you want to go on this narrative; even a LCS might be found wanting…. – put things into context.

    Gonggok – ”The Kedahs even fully armed to its original specs (adding RAM missile and MM40 Exocet) is still a big lumbering ship. It can only do ASW by announcing its location to everyone in South china sea with its active sonar, and needs a ASW Helicopter to drop torpedoes.”

    Everything which emits electronics and radio signals is a ‘ a big lumbering ship”; whether a 500 tonne FAC; a 1,200 tonne light frigate or a 5,000 frigate – not just a Kedah. On ASW; the primary means of engaging a contact as far away from the ship as possible remains the helo … The whole idea of ASW is to detect the contact as far away as possible from the mothership to prevent as far as possible the mother ship being engaged ; as it stands until ASW configured UASs start to enter service and become widely available; embarked ASW configured helos will be the primary means of performing ASW….

    Gonggok – ”RMN needs to do some deep soul searching on what it wants to be in the future.”

    The RMN has done a lot of ”soul searching” on the threats it’s likely to face; the threats it can realistically handle and the threats it can’t but ultimately the country’s threat calculus and threat perceptions are a political decision and again; we do not see ourselves involved in a high intensity protracted conflict…

    Gonggok – ”Can RMN pull a “Moskova” and sink an adversary flagship?”

    Can the RMN ”pull” a Hanit, Elait, Atlanctic Conveyor, Stark, Sheffield, etc, etc.
    etc. Depends on the operational context; i.e. the nature of the conflict; early warning; how alert the target is, who the opponent is; what asset is employed; the level of networking; etc, etc, etc. What happened with the Moskva is nothing new or a revelation.

    Gonggok – ” What kind of assets RMN to operate that would be survivable when you don’t have the control of the air and the sea?”

    Very true and you are stating what is plainly obvious but surely you’re not suggesting that the RMN base its force projection or structure on the certainty that an opponent will have full control of the ‘the air and the sea?” If we go on that basis; even converting the RMN to a surface fleet comprising entirely of CB-90s would be an issue…..

    gonggok – ”It can only do ASW by announcing its location to everyone in South china sea with its active sonar”

    There is such a thing as passive sonar and getting inputs from other assets.

  25. gonggok – ”firstly, the latest LMS Batch 2 RFI requirement for a 100m fully armed corvette is done by RMN not knowing if they will even get some of its LCS Gowinds, if ever.”

    No it’s far from certain ”it’s done” by the RMN. We don’t know yet. What we do know is that the RMN did some feasibility studies to cater for the possibility that the LCS programme would go even more ratshit than it is now and we know that proposals from yards offering designs with a conventional layout rather than one configured for modular payloads; as was originally planned; was made on this basis.

    gonggok – ”or a new RFI would be released to return the LMS specification to mirror the original requirements of a modular multi role ship?”

    That is indeed the case as far as I’ve been told but things are fluid and the politicians and bureaucrats have the final say and that final say is not based on RMN requirements per see.

    gonggok – ”RMN is now assured by the government that they will finally get all of their LCS Gowinds.”

    That is not the issue now. The issues/concerns are the timeframe and the final fit out.

    zaft – ”rationalization for sake of rationalization doesn’t really achieve anything”

    Yes and our longstanding disastrous self defeating politically driven defence policy has also failed to achieve anything beneficially tangible; resulting in an under equipped MAF and one whose actual capabilities don’t reflect all we’ve spent on it. Not only that but we are not getting the best value for what we spend. For that we have our politicians to thank …

  26. Joe – “but because the project needs to be overinflated to pay the shortfall for LCS.”

    Exactly the reason why the gov back then choose the gowind and why it failed miserably. The reason I suspect another bailout is simple.

    *At the very least, we need to show some effort & change some stuff rather than doing the same thing over & over again expecting different results

    *RMN future plan do not seem to indicate they are overinflating the cost of ship to cover the debt, in fact I’m not sure they can even afford the ship they going to build. Corvette & type 071 size MRSS ain’t going to be cheap.

    *Gov is short of fund but they need ship to operate off Borneo EEZ because 15% of their revenue is from there. They even suggest before that BHIC do national service & provide ship for free.

    *LTAT is a pencen fund, they can’t afford to do national service Nor that warship building turn to be a profitable venture for them. RMN & gov can in the future repeat the past by bypassing them in shipbuilding & maintenance contract.

    *Petronas who operate off Borneo EEZ need protection for it rig & fleet. They have money, have no stakeholders other than the gov, had financial muscle,capabilities & self interest and had in the past do national service of providing ship for free while having a successful yard. I say Petronas taking over BNS is a match made in heaven. It solves everyone problem.

    LTAT as gonggok suggested B4 should concentrate on NADI. turned it into a KAI clone or something and just license build whatever stuff lockmart got in stock. I mean lockmart has everything the AF would ever want from MALE to LCA to radar to heli to MRCA.

    Joe – “The Kedahs, by now would be more economical to build as we own the rights”

    I think the legacy meko unlike the meko patrol Corvette (k130) didn’t have the deck space or mission bay to installed containerized module that LMS as a concept need.

    LMS2 as a concept is more of a secondary combatants rather than Frontline combatants that the legacy meko is. Thus as said by gonggok it going to be over design & overpriced to construct nor to operate.

    I doubt that BNS has any kind of designing expertise & even if they do it probably more economical to just license build the meko patrol Corvette design. The meko petrol Corvette do fullfil the spefication set by RMN

    https://www.thyssenkrupp-marinesystems.com/en/products-services/surface-vessels/light-frigates

  27. Yesterday at the 88th Navy Day Parade, the RMN admiral urges the Government to give immediate approval this year for LMS batch 2.

    Now I am confused. Why does RMN need the LMS batch 2 to the latest RFI specification when the LCS Gowind is officially a go? The RFI specification for LMS Batch 2 assumes for those ships to reuse weapons bought for the LCS Gowind, which is now not possible as they are needed to complete all 6 Gowinds. I would want RMN to revise specification and resend a new RFI out for the LMS Batch 2 as soon as possible in the light of the latest LCS Gowind decision.

    Azlan,

    What you say here
    “as it stands until ASW configured UASs start to enter service and become widely available; embarked ASW configured helos will be the primary means of performing ASW”
    conflicts with what you say here
    “There is such a thing as passive sonar and getting inputs from other assets”
    The Kedahs are not FFBNW any passive sonar or even torpedo tubes. It in itself is a big juicy target for a submarine to sink. What other assets do we plan to detect subs? You can depend on things other than those flying in the air to detect submarines. You can use cheap small maneuverable boats to be paired up with your main ASW platform (which is for RMN is to be the Gowind). Something similar to this that Marhalim has posted before (seems this article was posted 7 years ago)
    https://www.malaysiandefence.com/asw-patrol-boat/
    A similar concept, but with the advantage of 7 years of technology advancement. Making it modular and be fitted to a revised LMS Batch 2 specification. A small low cost ASW module of thin line towed array sonar. Something like the SEA Kraitarray. Plus a single triple tube torpedo launcher. Operationally to deploy with the Gowind Frigate on ASW mission, consisting of 1 Gowind Frigate as the lead ship (with CAPTAS2 TAS and a ASW Helicopter) and two revised LMS Batch 2 with ASW module to sail near to the detected contact. A submarine would think twice to attack a small cheap ship as it would betray its location to the Gowind frigate.
    http://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2019/10/sea-completes-sea-trials-of-kraitsense-low-profile-passive-sonar-system/
    http://www.dsei.co.uk/__media/libraries/south-theatre/Chris-Tucker.pdf

    “The RMN has done a lot of ”soul searching” on the threats it’s likely to face”
    I really don’t think so. The 15 to 5 plan is so out of touch with reality. RMN cannot afford to operate a fleet that is more than double the size of the current fleet (which is now consists of 2 Submarines, 2 frigates, 8 corvettes, 14 FACs, 4 MCMV, 2 MPCSS and various small vessels). It does not even take into account even the existance of MMEA. I believe RMN needs a totally new plan that is grounded in reality, at the current manning and operational levels and making sure that we really have a fighting capability in a worse case scenario.

    “What happened with the Moskva is nothing new or a revelation”
    Yes it is nothing new. But that is not the point. The point is, can RMN right now or with its current plans do such a thing to an adversary that is much more powerful than us? Can fully armed Kedahs, or even the Gowinds pull a Moskova, Hanit, Elait, Atlanctic Conveyor, Stark, Sheffield, etc, etc on PLA Navy for example? If cannot, what are the things that must be done to make it happen? RMN future plans must have the things that can make it happen.

    “suggesting that the RMN base its force projection or structure on the certainty that an opponent will have full control of the ‘the air and the sea?”
    Absolutely yes.
    Because there is no way we can control the air and sea in an event of a full on conflict. We should plan our forces and should expect our situation to be like Ukraine against Russia, or Argentina against UK. We as a minor power going up against a substantially bigger power. We have to show that we are willing to fight ourselves before others are willing to help. What about lesser conflicts or misunderstandings with neighbors? Then that mission should be handled by a properly equipped MMEA, not as a main mission of the RMN.
    Which is why I really feel that RMN should start buying proper frigates and submarines, stop buying gold plated patrol boats, and leave peacetime patrolling to MMEA, and help MMEA to lobby for the budget that it deserves too. There is an ASEAN country that in my opinion got its naval and coast guard priority right, and we could learn from them.

  28. “Petronas who operate off Borneo EEZ need protection for it rig & fleet. They have money, have no stakeholders other than the gov, had financial muscle,capabilities & self interest and had in the past do national service of providing ship for free while having a successful yard. I say Petronas taking over BNS is a match made in heaven. It solves everyone problem.”

    There is a limit to how much Petronas can give and we already depend heavily on it for “national service” to keep the government running.

    Petronas already pays 5% of revenue as royalties each to state and federal governments on top of a 7% petroleum tax. There is an arrangement to supply TNB with gas for power generation at subsidized rates and Petronas keeps many contractors afloat. On top of that, in several recent years the government has asked Petronas to pay “special dividends” to cover government spending.

    Leaning on Petronas any more will reduce the funds it has for capital expenditure and affect production and income further down the line.

  29. Gonggok – “Now I am confused. Why does RMN need the LMS batch 2 to the latest RFI specification when the LCS Gowind is officially a go?”

    Because it was never planned as a replacement to the LCS in the first place? There’s plenty of other job navy need to do other then ASW. sigint, detection, surveillance, MCM, mineslaying & so on for example that the LCS can’t do. They are going to operate in contested water thus some self protection is needed.

    Gonggok “I would want RMN to revise specification and resend a new RFI out for the LMS Batch 2 as soon as possible in the light of the latest LCS Gowind decision”

    Birokrasi doesn’t work that way. A ‘new’ requirements required a new study & you going to wait 5 years just laying the groud works. MRSS project officially start last year & it won’t be until 2025 for the tenders to be floated.

    Gonggok – ” What kind of assets RMN to operate that would be survivable when you don’t have the control of the air and the sea?”

    Probably the wrong question. It should be what kind of asset RMN need & if she can’t do it alone, what partner can she bring in, what they going to do together to establish air & sea control over SCS.

    Eventually 15% of gov revenue, sizeable chunk of GDP, foreign exchange,FDI & high paying jobs dependent on MAF securing air sea control over the EEZ.

    Gonggok “Absolutely yes. Because there is no way we can control the air and sea in an event of a full on conflict”

    Actually we could and thus why it the goal as stated in the DWP. Though not by ourselves all alone. There’s plenty of nations that in their Best interest & even survival want to deny the Chinese air & sea control.There’s plenty of other nation interest at stake not just our own.

    I say self sufficiency but not self reliance is our defense strategy.

    Gonggok – “We as a minor power going up against a substantially bigger power”

    Like Ukraine, the answer is in the international community support from economic sanctions & then weapons shipments, economic support, food shipments, humanitarian aids, housing refugee, underwriting the debt & cost of running the state during war & so on. Would be better if you know how to operate the weapons being donated too.

    Ukrainian utilizing ex Soviet equipment is really a limiting point, imagine what they could do if they know how to operate high tech NATO stuff from day 1?

    Of course the better answer is to be Poland in the first place and enjoy the protections of a multinational power. Not purposefully poking a bear & Cutting a deal with the bear is also an option.

    Gonggok – “You can use cheap small maneuverable boats to be paired up with your main ASW platform”

    There’s plenty of FIC size USV with towed array taken from ASW heli entering the market now. Though you want a ship big enough to carry those in the 1st place. Even a 3000 tons ship struggle in the SCS during a bad day, whatmore a FIC or CB90 size ship.

    And uav like predator b can stay on the air for 24 hours. Can perform other function other than ASW. It can perform multi mission & modular as the popular kid says nowadays thus a very cost effective solution.

    Gonggok “Which is why I really feel that RMN should start buying proper frigates and submarines”

    SCS is an enclosed sea very similar to the Mediterranean. It around 1000km wide from Borneo to Vietnam well within striking distance of land & air assets.

    The Chinese fleet like Their island base are there to provide situational awareness on the ground & the strikes would be done mostly by missile & jet from the carrier,island base or the mainland.

    In our case rather than sovereign capabilities by putting ship at sea.we could make an arrangement to get Intel from the vietnamese, Indonesian & Philippines radar to have a good situational awareness.

    I say utilizing the LCA to do road landing like the swedish do with their Gripen is a pretty cost effective solution. A few more bayraktar too would be great. Off course do expect a beach landing as they do need to conduct SEAD operation. Which we could utilize to cry an invasion had happened.

    The point is to make the cost of war Soo high that war never happened in the first place but such asset can be use if a war do happened.

    Gonggok “the point is, can RMN right now or with its current plans do such a thing to an adversary that is much more powerful than us”

    I believe them Ukrainian got substantial amount of Intel from NATO.

    Gonggok “What about lesser conflicts or misunderstandings with neighbors?”

    In the current political climate all disagreement are going to get sweap under the carpet to present a unified front & solidarity.

    Gonggok – “stop buying gold plated patrol boats, and leave peacetime patrolling to MMEA”

    Military equipment need a certain kind of ‘hardnesses’ to it, you don’t want to get cought communication with unencrypted or worce civilian network while planning something won’t you?

    Gonggok “help MMEA to lobby for the budget that it deserves too”

    Westminster style birokrasi doesn’t work that way. Imagine that each service chief as a lawyer & are fighting for their clients (which is their department) & present a case to the judge (politicians & general public). Once the decision is made, they redrawn their plans and go around doing it again.

    There are no clear cut area of responsibility & plenty of grey area because monopoly = bad, competition create competency, reliability & most importantly plausible deniability.

    Not that our CG need it. I say they are doing pretty well with their narrative & thus political support. If anything it’s the navy we should be wary about. If any of ‘insight’ is true then I say unlike TD & AF they didn’t get what the nation expected of them & ask for stuff no one wants to finance while ignoring stuff people do want to finance.

    I say what the navy need is a type 31 kind of ship. Something cost effective, one u put further away from the mainland to provide situational awareness and Arial denial to enemy jet. In peacetime be utilize as a floating base for UAV,USV,UUV, FIC, heli for patrol which according to CG a far more cost effective solution then the oil rig they got now while at the same time babysitting the Chinese navy.

    Gonggok “There is an ASEAN country that in my opinion got its naval and coast guard priority right, and we could learn from them”

    Vietnam? Well Vietnam is in a tough spot really,they are within range of PLA land Forces & not really a governance system that compatible with western value and thus findlanization is the only option they got. But, hey Finland now wants to join NATO.

  30. Gonggok – Kedahs are not FFBNW any passive sonar or even torpedo tubes.”

    I’m aware of that. The conversation was based on the premise that follow Kedahs are fitted with; thus your comment about Kedahs using passive sonar..

    From you – “It can only do ASW by announcing its location to everyone in South china sea with its active sonar, and needs a ASW Helicopter to drop torpedoes”

    Gonggok – “It in itself is a big juicy target for a submarine to sink”

    Anything in the right circumstances is a big juicy target for a submarine to sink”…. Even a combatant fully fitted out with ASW being a prime role.

    Sorry but I’m not in the making generalised statements. I look at the overall circumstances ….

    Gonggok – “You can depend on things other than those flying in the air to detect submarines. You can use cheap small maneuverable boats to be paired”

    A lot of things can be done but as of 2022 the prime means available to a ship to engage subsurface contacts remains an embarked helo with the needed range, endurance and weight capacity.. We have not reached a stage where ASW configured UASs anything else can replace and embarked helo. Your “cheap small maneuverable boats”
    simply can’t offer the same capability as a helo. In certain conditions they can supplement bit not replace a helo – clearly apparent if outlook thing from an objective position rather than a position of reinforcing the narrative you want to adopt.

    Gonggok – “I really don’t think so. The 15 to 5 plan is so out of touch with reality”

    You “think so” but you don’t “know so”… Understand that the 5/15 has been approved by the Cabinet for implementation and that for political reasons the RMN has no choice but to maintain the facade of sticking to it. BTW it the 5/15 was “out of touch with reality” even before it conceived. As I pointed out years ago it was politically expedient and needed for that period.

    Gonggok – “Yes it is nothing new. But that is not the point.”

    If that’s not the point why even bring it up? Again: it depends on operational circumstance – who the opponent is, early warning, networking, coordination, etc, etc, etc.

    Gonggok – “Absolutely yes.
    Because there is no way we can control the air and sea in an event of a full on conflict.”

    You are shooting the wrong calibre. I did not say that air cover was not essential; merely that the service can conduct force planning and a future structure on the basis we won’t have air cover. On that basis we must as well have a surface fleet comprising only CB90s.

    Gonggok – “We should plan our forces and should expect our situation to be like Ukraine against Russia, or Argentina against UK”

    I know you’re gung ho about the Ukraine; just like how some soothsayers after Nargano Karabakh made the assumption that UASs were the answer to everything [whilst conveniently overlooking other factors] but the Ukrainian war doesn’t really teach us much which is new. What it does is reinforces certain things we long knew.

    As for the RMN; I know you have a penchant for boldly saying it should do this and that. Rest assured the service has a pretty good idea as to what it needs to do; what it can try to do and whAt it can realistically do in one with the types of conflicts it s like to face and in line with actual resources.

    Gonggok – Then that mission should be handled by a properly equipped MMEA, not as a main mission of the RMN”

    You trying to convince yourself or others because if it’s others it’s a widely agreed and understood fact.

    As I’ve said on multiple occasions; until such a time when the MMEA is,able to assume full responsibility for its assigned roles [it needs assets, manpower, funding and a adequate shore support infrastructure] the RMN is the only entity able to.assist – full atop/period.

    Gonggok – “Which is why I really feel that RMN should start buying proper frigates and submarines, stop buying gold plated patrol boats, and leave peacetime patrolling to MMEA”

    We have gone over this on multiple occasions time and time again….

    The RMN has no intention of buying anymore “-gunboats” – the intention is for fully fitted out LMSs; so put this cliche to rest. As for your “proper frigates” I have no idea what your personal definition is but for the RMN the LCSs are “proper” frigate sized combatants ..

    As for “leaving peacetime patrolling to the MMEA”; Don’t make it look like the RMN is reluctant to do away with the constabulary role and is reluctant for the MMEA to-fully assume its roles.

    Also has it not occurred to you – despite it being pointed out nitrous times – the MMEA is incapable.

  31. 5Zaft – ”Because it was never planned as a replacement to the LCS in the first place? ”

    No it wasn’t but some assumed it was….

    5Zaft – ”Vietnam?”

    Vietnam is in a different position to us; closer proximity to China; has fought China before; has loss sea to China;; had centuries of strife with China, etc. Not saying we can’t learn from Vietnam but we have to note it’s doing things in line with their requirements and needs.

    5Zaft – ”Imagine that each service chief as a lawyer & are fighting for their clients (which is their department)”

    Yes. We don’t live in clod cuckoo land. The idea that the RMN should ”lobby” for the MMEA [a non military entity] is laughable and displays a lack of understanding, Whether it’s in the U.S., in Chad or here; each service is in fierce competition to secure funding for itself.

    5Zaft – ”I believe them Ukrainian got substantial amount of Intel from NATO.”

    An established and widely reported fact.

    5Zaft – ”There’s plenty of FIC size USV with towed array taken from ASW heli entering the market now”

    Which can supplement other ASW units in certain operational conditions but not replace a helo; if it could navies would be doing so. In future ASW configured UASs will be more widely available.

    5Zaft – ”I say what the navy need is a type 31 kind of ship.”

    Understand that not only is cash an issue but the national strategic calculus is that we won’t be in a high intensity protracted conflict; hence lightly armed LCSs with little or no room for growth.

    5Zaft – ”Military equipment need a certain kind of ‘hardnesses’ to it, ”

    All this stuff about ”gold plated” is a nonsense cliche – it’s 2022 not 1980 anymore and a lot of what we specify are considered essentials in this day and age; not luxuries we can do without.

  32. Let’s make one thing crystal clear. If we are involved in ops against China it will be as part of a coalition and even that we will be operating on the periphery because we simply do not have the capabilities to contribute much and us getting actively involve on the front end can be a hindrance to others.

    In any war a much weaker side can inflict damage or score success against a much stronger side but those damage/successes tend to be isolated; not contributing much to the overall picture.

    As I keep mentioning we [like all miltaries] plan for a whole host of contingencies but we can only focus on a few and those are ones we feel are the most likeliest to be faced; against regional countries in limited non protracted and low intensity wars over unresolved overlapping claims. We do not place much emphasis on trouble with China for the simple and reasonable reason that the MAF is not structure or equipped to do so; does not have large stocks of consumables [yes yes others do but their threat calculus differs greatly] and the country lacks the resources and the tech base. We can use ”asymmetric” tactics [has become another cliche] but remember the Chinese too understand ”asymmetric” tactics and they too can utilse ‘asymmetric” tactics” – one can plan till the moon and back but ultimately the enemy also has a say …

    Some threats we can handle; some we can’t.. – period/full stop. Yes others are doing this and that and Finland did that and is doing this and so is Vietnam and yes there are similarities and lessons to be learnt [always are] and despite many observers making rushed and simplistic assumptions about the Ukraine war [which only reinforces certain lessons but does not teach us much which is new per see] there are also varying factors/dynamics at play.

    On the Ukraine the main lesson we learnt or were reminded of is that despite all the headlines and fan boyish assumptions; no one weapon dominates; none is a ”wunderwaffe” or a panacea and all [whether MBTs; IFVs, UASs or GBADs] have to be operated fully in conjunction with existing assets. Another reminder is that MBTs have to be operated as part of combined arms formations [we learnt this decades ago but it tends to be overlooked and forgotten and people draw the wrong conclusions which conveniently fit in with their line of reasoning and narrative].

  33. Azlan “No it wasn’t but some assumed it was”

    Ahh sending KDB darulsalam to do KD lekir jobs. What could go wrong.

    Azlan “Vietnam is in a different position to us; closer proximity to China; has fought China before; has loss sea to China;; had centuries of strife with China”

    Basically they are geographically the Finland , politically the Ukraine, economically the poland of ASEAN. Though spot to be in.

    Meanwhile we are next to the France & Germany of ASEAN, have military arrangements with the UK of ASEAN & thousand miles away from the Russia of ASEAN.

    Azlan “Whether it’s in the U.S., in Chad or here; each service is in fierce competition to secure funding for itself.”

    Probably more fierce over here, the communist insurgency period had allowed both military & law enforcement Gendarmerie capabilities that can lend each other strength to perform operation.

    Clear separation of duties while nice on paper and dangerous to the public or law enforcement personel in some country, work well over here. Thus why TD were given border guard duties.

    So Even if CG has enough ship, the navy warship would still be expected to perform constabulary duties while PDRM & CG are expected to help the military during war. Thus why asset rationalization also happen not just within MINDEF but between MINDEF & KDN as well.

    Azlan “Which can supplement other ASW units in certain operational conditions but not replace a helo”

    From RMN DCA booth it seem the favorite ASW helo is the wildcat. Outside of ASW, it can perform ASuW, Armed Reconnaissance, troops transport, probably even gunship & CAS duties.

    Azlan “the 5/15 has been approved by the Cabinet for implementation and that for political reasons the RMN has no choice but to maintain the facade of sticking to it”

    15 to 5 as a concept is sounds and easily reach by planning a single class of ship every RMK. Thus after 25 years we get 5 classes of ship.

    Azlan “the national strategic calculus is that we won’t be in a high intensity protracted conflict”

    Fair assessment of risk. IMHO we are Geographically the denmark while economically the Netherland of ASEAN.

    Like the Danes & ditch we really couldn’t afford over design capital ship like UK or France nor we should concentrate on limited sea denial with FAC like Finland or sweeden.

    Danish & dutch navies are self sufficient in having LPD,ASW,AAW & MCM ship on their own but not self reliance as in war scenario they support the RN operation as part of RN leads task group.

    Azlan “hence lightly armed LCSs with little or no room for growth”

    fortunately, the french had sunk money to build the LCS pro max version that’s is the belharra. Thus upgrading our LCS to a pro version is probably a possibility.

  34. Azlan,

    “Anything in the right circumstances is a big juicy target for a submarine to sink”…. Even a combatant fully fitted out with ASW being a prime role”

    You didn’t get what I am trying to show you.

    Cheap small revised LMS Batch 2 specification ships with cheap ASW towed array sonars and triple tube torpedo launchers will be the ships sailing near to the detected submarine, with the Gowind with CAPTAS 2 deployed sailing at a standoff distance of at least 20km away from it, which is the max range of most soviet-based torpedoes. Cheap small revised LMS Batch 2 specification ships should be much more maneuverable than the Kedah class ships. There are right now modern small ship designs that can take rough and heavy seas better than conventional designs.
    A small ship with towed array sonars are in the water 24 hours in a day listening to and chasing any underwater targets, unlike anything that is flying like ASW Helicopters.
    http://pictr.com/images/2022/04/29/BFGERI.png

    “If that’s not the point why even bring it up?”
    That it is nothing new is not the point. The point is, I repeat : can RMN right now or with its current plans do such a thing ( pull a Moskova, Hanit, Elait, Atlanctic Conveyor, Stark, Sheffield, etc, etc) to an adversary that is much more powerful than us? If cannot, we need to plan our future fleet so that we can.

    “the intention is for fully fitted out LMSs; so put this cliche to rest. As for your “proper frigates” I have no idea what your personal definition is but for the RMN the LCSs are “proper” frigate sized combatants”
    Those revised RFI for LMS Batch 2 is to cover LCS Gowind capability in case the Gowind project went bust, which now we know it will not. Yes LCS Gowinds are “proper” frigate sized combattants, but we need another class of Frigate, preferably larger than the Gowinds that can do more anti air and anti surface, while capable of carrying UAVs and USVs for stand-off intelligence and surveillance. Something like the Type 31e would be ideal. So 6x Gowinds and 4x Type 31e as the main RMN surface force. Supported by 24x cheap, small, fast, multi purpose LMS Batch 2. No fully armed corvettes, no OPVs. The main thing in RMN to pull a Moskova, Hanit, Elait, Atlantic Conveyor, Stark, Sheffield, etc, etc, would be by its underwater forces, and this is where the money should be spent.

    “Also has it not occurred to you – despite it being pointed out nitrous times – the MMEA is incapable”
    Also has it not occurred to you – despite it being pointed out nitrous times – the future of MMEA is not set in stone. Without overlapping tasks with RMN, without the RMN also requesting OPVs and FICs, with proper planning we can have a very capable MMEA even by 2030. With an allocation of less than 1 billion dollars to 2030 (500 mil each in RMK12 and RMK13), MMEA can easily achieve a fleet of 20 large OPVs consisting of
    – 2x Japanese OPV (paid for)
    – 6x DAMEN 1800 83m 1800 tonne OPV (3 paid for, 3 more for 60 million dollars each)
    – 6x Korean 115m 3000+ tonne OPV (around 65 million dollars each)
    – 6x Kedah class 91m 1850 tonne OPV passed on to MMEA

  35. gonggok – ”You didn’t get what I am trying to show you.”

    I think I did. The question is did you?

    Let’s look at what you said – ”Cheap small revised LMS Batch 2 specification ships with cheap ASW towed array sonars and triple tube torpedo launchers will be the ships sailing near to the detected submarine, with the Gowind with CAPTAS 2 deployed sailing at a standoff distance of at least 20km away from it, which is the max range of most soviet-based torpedoes.”

    This is fundamentally unsound as the whole purpose of ASW equipped LMSs are not to conduct ASW at the forefront per see with LCSs in the foreground; no . They are intended to perform ASW in certain operational conditions where a LCS is not needed or present.

    gonggok – ”A small ship with towed array sonars are in the water 24 hours in a day listening to and chasing any underwater targets, unlike anything that is flying like ASW Helicopters.”

    You are conflating things as you commonly do. You assume that things are so because they look sound to you and happen to fit in your narrative. Again – ”A small ship with towed array sonars are in the water 24 hours” is great and has utility and is a perfect complement to other existing assets but they do not do away with the need for other assets. It doesn’t work this way, Not as simplistic as you put it. Understand that the main means of detecting a target is via passive and active sonar [you previously spoke about Kedahs using active]; once a fix so to speak has been achieved; it’s the job of the helo to fly there and to establish a better fix in order to locate, track and engage the contact; as far away as possible from the ship. Until such a time when ASW configured UASs are available there is no substitute for a ASW configured helo when it comes to the operational flexibility it provides as part of a ship’s organic capability…..

    gonggok – ”an RMN right now or with its current plans do such a thing (pull a Moskova, Hanit, Elait, Atlanctic Conveyor, Stark, Sheffield”

    Again; it depends on the operational context …… Is the ship on full alert; who operates it; it is alone of part of a task group; how much early warning does it have; etc, etc. You are asking a question which can’t be answered…. On paper we have the ability to do certain things but in realty we don’t know because it all depends on the operational circumstances…

    gonggok – ”Also has it not occurred to you – despite it being pointed out nitrous times – the future of MMEA is not set in stone.”

    What has ”occurred” to me but fails to ”occur” to you is that the MMEA is not in a position to fully carry out its duties; as such the RMN is the only entity able to shore it up [unless of course you know of another entity in existence – please enlighten us]. As for your ”the future of MMEA is not set in stone” – so? What’s the point you’re tying to make – do you know? You, me and the future of the world is not set in stone; nothing is. So? Are we now basing on discussions on things being uncertain or not holy writ/set in stone?

    gonggok – ”Without overlapping tasks with RMN, without the RMN also requesting OPVs and FICs, with proper planning we can have a very capable MMEA even by 2030”

    Again [yet you talk about things ”occurring” to me] there is zero intention on the part of the RMN to get ”OPVs’ [you can spin this tale another 100 times and I’ll continue to refute you]. The 15/5 included Kedahs but those Kedahs were not intended to serve as ”OPVs” but were to have been fitted out to perform certain roles [you’ve asked me before what those roles were]; again [like what I told … multiple times- he also had an inability or unwillingness to grasp this] the follow on Kedahs were not intended to serve as ”OPVs’ per see – yet you’d mention ”despite it being pointed out nitrous times ” … Also as like much as you’d like to continue with your follow on Kedah narrative there is zero possibility; not even something the RMN is working or pushing on. Higher chance of Bhutan or Burundi operating F-35s.

    As for FICSs there are intended for specific niche roles in specific conditions as performed by the RMN; the idea that FICS are intruding on MMEA turf or are a duplication is ludicrous…

    gonggok – ”With an allocation of less than 1 billion dollars to 2030 (500 mil each in RMK12 and RMK13),”

    Yes yes I know you have a penchant for figures and for hypothetical ORBATS; I appreciate the effort but my discussions/points were centered on something else.

    Until the MMEA has sufficient manpower; assets, funding and a shore/support infrastructure [severely lacking at present] it is unable to carry out all it’s assigned to on paper – period/full stop. It’s not as if the RMN wants role duplication or is unwilling to totally wash its hand off the constabulary at sea business….

  36. @gonggok

    “With an allocation of less than 1 billion dollars to 2030 (500 mil each in RMK12 and RMK13), MMEA can easily achieve a fleet of 20 large OPVs consisting of
    – 2x Japanese OPV (paid for)
    – 6x DAMEN 1800 83m 1800 tonne OPV (3 paid for, 3 more for 60 million dollars each)
    – 6x Korean 115m 3000+ tonne OPV (around 65 million dollars each)
    – 6x Kedah class 91m 1850 tonne OPV passed on to MMEA”

    Long time lurker, just tried my luck on this comment section.

    Seriously one of the best ideas I have seen posted by a commenter here.

    You could have six large OPV, the korean ones for a total of just USD390 million? That is less than a price of a single Gowind! It is still less than 2 of the Kedah Class ships.

    So for an investment of just USD570 million (3 more DAMEN OPV, 6 Korean OPV), the government could have the MMEA equipped with its proper complement of 20 large OPVs by 2030. I cannot see why there are so many that sees a properly equipped MMEA as an impossible thing to happen.

    @ Azlan

    “As for FICSs there are intended for specific niche roles in specific conditions as performed by the RMN”

    Isn’t the navy FICS was bought with Ops Benteng budget? Could you tell me the difference in mission set of FICS operated by the navy and by the MMEA? Would be very interesting to know the difference.

  37. Amin – ”Seriously one of the best ideas I have seen posted by a commenter here.”

    A great idea indeed ; on paper. The reality is that the MMEA needs OPVs, it needs smaller ships, smaller craft, more air assets and more ground based surveillance assets but in addition to cash [procurement and operating costs] and manpower it also needs an adequate shore support infrastructure which is currently lacking; in order to support all the new assets.

    As it stands the MMEA faces a support/training because of the different various things operated [with little or no commonality]; it is short on resources and has a very limited shore support infrastructure.

    Amin – ”I cannot see why there are so many that sees a properly equipped MMEA as an impossible thing to happen.”

    Nobody here sees it as ”impossible”; what looks great on paper is however profoundly different with reality. Easy to make hypothetical ORBATS which looks logical and neat; just like on a spread sheet or a PowerPoint brief. Ultimately does the government have the will to commit to a certain level of sustained funding? That is the question and it remains unlikely….

    Amin – ”isn’t the navy FICS was bought with Ops Benteng budget?”

    They were ordered ostensibly as part of Ops Benteng which is a multi agency effort. Doesn’t mean they will only be utilised as part of Ops Benteng and nothing else or that Ops Benteng will be maintained indefinitely. The army issued a tender for mini UASs under Ops Benteng but they can also be used for roles apart from Ops Benteng.

    Gonggok – ”Could you tell me the difference in mission set of FICS operated by the navy and by the MMEA? Would be very interesting to know the difference.”

    The FICs are intended to replace the CB-90s which are used for coastal inshore surveillance; in support of PASKAL ops, as an organic transport means in the Spratlys, etc.

  38. @gonggok
    “6x Korean 115m 3000+ tonne OPV”
    What would MMEA do with a large frigate-sized OPV, that will probably be a juicy target for combatants? What would be its mission profile/purpose for MMEA possessing such large ships?

    “6x Kedah class 91m 1850 tonne OPV passed on to MMEA”
    And what would TLDM use then, considering LCS are still sometime away? A bunch of FICs to patrol SCS?

    @Amin
    “properly equipped MMEA as an impossible thing to happen”
    Imagine everyone returning back to the kampung house for Raya. Where to park all those cars? Will everyone balik kampung? Where to house all those family members? Is there enough resources to feed like 10 extended families? The same conundrum facing MMEA. They don’t have sufficient bases to dock all those large ships, they might not get sufficient pool of trainees, even then they do not have enough training facilities to house that many to train the thousands to man all of those ships, and they do not have the resources (man, material, funding, etc) to keep all those ships running so suddenly. MMEA will need time, years – decades, to build up sufficiently where it could run a large organisation efficiently.

  39. While 1 OPV for $60-70 mil sound nice. it’s comes at the opportunity cost of not having something else. For example letting go of 1 OPV could get you 10 Blackhawk, 2 LCA or 80% of 1 F35A or some other mundane stuff like UAV,USV, shore based radar, training, manpower, shore side infrastructure. Is it a good idea to forgoes all those other asset & capabilities just to operate more OPV?

    What’s the purpose of buying 6 3000 tons OPV + 3 more tun Fatimah when we already have 6 LCS & probably 3 LMS2? Is it To desolve the navy from constabulary duties? While nice on paper the Reality segregating it mean we would need 200% more ship / manpower/ shore support/ training etc etc to do more or less the same thing while again letting go of the opportunities cost to acquire something like LCA, Blackhawk & MRCA.

    IMHO gun only boat is only needed when the amount of ship needed for patrol > the amount of surface combatants needed.
    Some navy like RN & RAN let their navy do the ‘gunboating’ while some like USCG & JCG perform the function of a regular navy just for low intensity operation leaving their ‘real’ navy to do medium to high intensity operation. Which is more or less what I assume the difference between RMN & MMEA is.

    While we do need patrol ship but how much gunship of FAC & OPV size we need for patrol duties? As comparison, Australia which is an extremely big & rich country will only operate 23 surface fleet & 12 gun only OPV operated by RAN while 8 gun only FAC operated by their border force.

    RMN meanwhile operate a legacy fleet of about 8 ish surface combatants, 8 OPV (Kedah & gagah), 14 really old FAC, MMEA sometimes ago mentioned they needed 8 more OPV & 14 FAC.So all in all it does seem CG would took over all the gunboating activity from RMN eventually which would work with LMS2 to perform the limited sea denial activity of before. Leaving the LCS & other future RMN platform to do other stuff.

    While it tempting to take the short cut of empowering the CG to free navy from holding the fort for MMEA to bring about those future faster. It can’t solve the lack of asset & manpower thus capabilities of CG to perform it duties due to lack of fund. If we then pump money to CG but at the cost of public infrastructure, education & healthcare. we would never transition to upper income country. Withouts such transition we would stagnated economically which won’t allowed us more capable defense assets in the future.

    So rather than asking wherever or not gov is committed to increase MMEA budget. It more of where the gov can make cut or increase taxes to fund the mmea.

  40. The problem with the MMEA is of course the government which is not providing enough funds to fulfill its missions. Its gotten worse now its under the Home Ministry which is dominated by the police which attracts the largest funding and support.

  41. gonggok – ”Moskova, Hanit, Elait, Atlantic Conveyor, Stark, Sheffield, etc, etc, would be by its underwater forces, and this is where the money should be spent.”

    We have discussed this thoroughly on multiple occasions. As for  ”where the money should be spent” – has to be spent in various areas. 

    – It would be nice if the RMN was the only one operating subs but unfortunately others also do and fully understand the potential and weaknesses of subs.
    – If surface contact has a strong screen of surface escorts; airborne ASW escorts and perhaps other subs; how will our subs get close enough to perform a ”Moskova, Hanit, Elait, Atlantic Conveyor, Stark, Sheffield, etc, etc,? A more suitable example in this context would have been the Khukri and Cheonan though.
    – They can also resort to minelaying at specific areas to deny our subs the ability to move.
    – You will note that in WW2 at a certain point Kriegsmarine U-Boats were too busy evading detection and the ensuing destruction from allied surface groups and aircraft rather than being able to hunt targets. The same can happen in any future conflict; a side with material superiority being able to prevent a enemy sub from doing its job to the extent that its focus is on avoiding destruction.
    – Note also that potential opponents know we only have a pair and can calculate or estimate deployment cycles based on this.
    – They also know that we only have single base which has the shore support infrastructure to support both boats. Yes if it was up to you we’d have a few more subs by 2030 but my discussion is based on the present reality.
    – Ultimately; whether it’s operated by the RMN, Jamaican Defence Force or China; the ability of a sub to operate successfully depends on various factors ; surprise, skill, luck, quality of the opponent and the sub [like everything thing else] working in parallel with other assets. Various pieces have to come in place; not just the position that a sub is quiet, ”stealthy”/invisible and thus can do wonders where other assets can’t….

    I love subs and I think they offer a great capability and that we should and must have more but I realise that us [or anyone] being able to put them to good use is dependent on some many factors. Just because they are stealthy/invisible is no guarantee of anything – plenty of instances where a sub was easily detected due to prevailing operational circumstances. To me the pertinent question is how well we can integrate sub use with overall operations; i.e, a sub being alerted by a MPA [even in this day and age despite tech advances locating and tracking moving targets that don’t want to be found can be a major problem] ; a simultaneous attack by subs and air assets; communications in the face of disruption/jamming, etc. Also in this day and age no single weapon dominates or provides all the answers; it’s how that weapon is employed and in conjunction with what.

  42. 5Zaft – ”Basically they are geographically the Finland”

    It has centuries of strife with China; was occupied; fought a border war; lost reefs and ships to armed action and has a shared border.

    5Zaft – ”From RMN DCA booth it seem the favorite ASW helo is the wildcat”

    No it’s not but is probably all we can afford and the political favourite. This topic has been done to death here over the years but Wildcat [great design it is] does not have the range, endurance or lift capacity. It can carry one torp and a sonar or a sonar but no torps in order to have some range and endurance – we haven’t even factored on sonobuoys. ASW is time extensive and a helo may have to fly some distance to reach its target whilst carrying a sonar, torp and sonobuoys; to have enough fuel to loiter in the rea and to get back. Things will be greatly simplified when ASW configured UASs are widely available.

    5Zaft – ”15 to 5 as a concept is sounds and easily reach by planning a single class of ship every RMK”

    The 5/15 was the brainchild of a former RMN Chief and was  politically expedient and based on the premise that it was the only alternative given the uncertainty as to funding. The plan was to retire ships that were long overdue for replacement and use the costs savings from maintenance to partly fund new ships’ as well as achieving costs saving by cutting down to a bare minimum the different number of classes operated [each with little or no commonality].

    Within the RMN there were doubts whether the plan was what was needed and there were grave doubts whether it was even achievable. Like the CAP 55 it’s PR politically driven marketing but does contain sound elements.

    5Zaft – ”Like the Danes & ditch we really couldn’t afford over design capital ship like UK or France nor we should concentrate on limited sea denial with FAC like Finland or sweeden.”

    Within NATO each navy focused on specific areas; the Belgians MCM, the RN ASw, etc. Denmark’s operational requirements dictated that it didn’t need a large surface combatant. Sweden largely operated in confined waters as such FACs and corvettes fit in perfectly with its CONOPS/requirements in order to perform sea denial. I would like a 6,000 tonne ship with a 36 VLS cell; 16 SSMs; a CIWS and a embarked helo and UAS capability but this is unrealistic. Also bear in mind that wherever our ships are they are never more han a week or 10 days sailing time to the nearest base or port; so we only need so much range and endurance.

    5Zaft – ”Thus upgrading our LCS to a pro version is probably a possibility.”

    No it isn’t. Not worth the time and effort and the existing design has space/weight limitations.

    gonggok -= ” 6x Korean 115m 3000+ tonne OPV (around 65 million dollars each)”

    Some time again I had a chance to speak to an ex RMN chap who is now in the MMEA. He was a batchmate of a good friend of mine in the RMN. His opinion was that the MMEA does not need any OPV or anything else touching past the the 1.300 tonne mark and that most of the ships they need should actually be smaller.

    gonggok – ”– 6x Kedah class 91m 1850 tonne OPV passed on to MMEA”]]

    By the tinme the RMN is ready to hand them over they will be so aged and worn out that that the MMEA will be begging not to receive them. As it stands higher chance of Laos winning the World Cup in the next decade or the U.S. becoming the world’s largest pail oil producer rather than they going to the MMEA; the Kedahs have a vital role to play in the larger scheme of things ion RMN service.

  43. “gotten worse now its under the Home Ministry”
    Pretty much expected that to happen when its patronage was downgraded from being under the PM’s office (during Najib era) to Home Minister (under PH era). MMEA does have a rivalry with Polis Marin that is part of PDRM so of course they would get ‘bullied’ by the taikor with resources and budget prioritised somewhere else *ahem*. It doesn’t help that its OPV program too are facing delivery delays.
    Speaking of which, any updates on that end?

  44. As I mentioned before at the earliest by August, the ship is ready I am told but various administrative issues needed to be settled first. MMEA was under the PMO since it was established by Tun. It was moved to Home Ministry by PH Government for better coordination which invariably made it worse

  45. @marhalim

    Hopefully a short term Pain for long term gains and the budget crunch would incentives KDN to rationalize MMEA with polis marin & custom.

    If wiki to be believe it does seem MMEA original mission is to operate on the EEZ & the high sea. A mission that probably impossible now with all the warship sailing within the 1st island chain.

  46. That was the plan really as we copied the US Coast Guard mission. But the government squandered the planning by not moving ahead by putting all the marine enforcement in one basket

  47. 5zaft – ”wiki to be believe it does seem MMEA original mission is to operate on the EEZ & the high sea.”

    Never mind Wiki and whether it’s to be ”believed”; it’s commonly and widely known knowledge [has been for quite a while now] that the MMEA was supposed to assume various roles that were undertaken by various agencies – in the littorals, territorial waters, EEZ and along the periphery. One agency that was supposed to have stood down was the Marine Police but since that has been discussed widely here in the past I’ll leave it at that.

    BTW, the MMEA does not or ever had a requirement for ”Fast Attack Craft” [as you mentioned previously]. Why would it? The main role of ‘Fast Attack Craft’ is littoral/limited sea denial; including ”shoot/scoot” attacks. Those roles have nothing to do with the MMEA and even the RMN has long decided it does not want any more FACs due to inherent issues with them.

  48. Joe,

    “What would MMEA do with a large frigate-sized OPV, that will probably be a juicy target for combatants? What would be its mission profile/purpose for MMEA possessing such large ships?”

    The world is not at war 100% of the time. Our maritime areas are not at war right now. Most of foreign incursions of our EEZ is done by other Coast Guard ships.
    http://www.voanews.com/a/east-asia-pacific_why-chinas-coast-guard-spent-258-days-waters-claimed-malaysia/6177878.html

    Our overall maritime security needs to be prepared for 2 Scenarios

    1. Peacetime maritime enforcement, freedom of economic activity, freedom of navigation and upholding the rule of law based on UNCLOS. This is the main tasks of MMEA.

    2. Wartime operations, and deterrence in peacetime to prevent war. This is the main tasks of RMN.

    In the event of a war, if we are forced to go it alone, with no maritime and air superiority, most of surface ships would be an easy target for a much stronger and superior adversary naval and air force. Better to accept the fact and just plan that all of our OPVs will be consigned to be in port if there is an all out shooting war. But other than that, in normal peacetime operations, OPVs are needed to be on station at the peripheral of our Exclusive Economic Zones 24hours a day and 365 days in a year. An OPV build with this in mind (no wartime capability) will be much more cheaper to build and operate, freeing the budget for hardwares that can be much more capable in wartime situations (more RMN submarines for example). For example, the MMEA Tun Fatimah class 1800 tonne OPV is cheaper than RMN Keris Class 700 tonne LMS, while the MMEA NGPC that has the same performance as the LMS (24 knot top speed, 2000NM patrol range, 30mm RCWS gun), costs just a quarter of the LMS even with UAV included. The main mission profile/purpose for MMEA large OPVs are:

    1. Show of presence at the peripheral of Malaysian Exclusive Economic Zones. These areas are 200NM (370km) away from our coastlines. This is important to show that as a country we are controlling and enforcing our claimed EEZ area. This mission needs a ship with long endurance and good seakeeping in offshore conditions. If we are not there, the Chinese Coast Guard will be there.

    2. Enabling and protecting our sovereign rights to undertake economic activities in our Exclusive Economic Zone (Fishing, Oil and Gas exploration and extraction, etc.), and preventing other parties from doing the same. MMEA OPVs must be able to prevent other coast guard ships from harassing Malaysian fishing vessels and Malaysian Oil and Gas vessels and platforms.

    3. Ensuring the safety and freedom of navigation in our maritime areas. Preventing any piracy action. To be able to undertake any SAR mission that is required.

    “And what would TLDM use then, considering LCS are still sometime away?”
    It does not matter if the 6 Kedahs are operated by RMN or MMEA, it will still be patrolling to defend our country. But it does matter when RMN needs to commission those LCS Gowinds in the next 5 years. I don’t think RMN can quickly find and train additional 828 sailors within 5 years time to man the 6 Gowinds. It would be easier to train fresh people to operate a simpler OPV rather than to operate a complex Frigate. RMN transferring Kedah class sailors to the Gowinds would be a much better proposition. The Kedah class operating under MMEA does not need complex Combat Information Center (CIC) operations, or advanced 3D search radars, so these systems can just be mothballed or outright removed from the Kedah class ships, reducing required crew members.

    “They don’t have sufficient bases to dock all those large ships, they might not get sufficient pool of trainees, even then they do not have enough training facilities to house that many to train the thousands to man all of those ships”
    MMEA OPVs need to be out at sea, not parked at the dock. Most commercial vessels have no dedicated docking space too. Each OPV needs to be at least 250 days out at sea every year, so that on an allocated area there should be a MMEA OPV there every single day of the year. Most other Coast Guards, take the US Coast Guard for example, does not have many dedicated Naval Bases and uses a lot of civilian ports and marinas to park their vessels. Also dedicated coast guard OPVs does not need to have high number of sailors. Both ex. Japan Coast Guard OPVs have about 50+ sailors. The Tun Fatimah has a planned complement of 70 sailors (original DAMEN 1800 design needs just 46), and the Korean 3000 tonne OPV has 60. For 12 additional large OPVs, MMEA would need about 800 new crews, that is about 120 additional personnel every year until 2030. MMEA has build a dedicated acedemy to train new coastguardsmen, the 200 acre Akademi Maritim Sultan Ahmad Shah (AMSAS).

    Our current situation
    http://pbs.twimg.com/media/FRfLuKmaQAAZA75.jpg

    Would it be better if we have this large OPV instead?
    http://cdn.kbmaeil.com/news/photo/202103/870789_874861_3528.jpg
    http://img6.yna.co.kr/photo/yna/YH/2021/06/11/PYH2021061115250006200_P4.jpg

  49. gonggok – ”The world is not at war 100% of the time. ”

    Irrespective …. The MMEA does not have a requirement for a 3,000 tonne vessel for the simple reason that it’s operational requirements [regular period its ship stay at sea; the distance they have to sail to reach operating areas and the size of the EEZ and territorial waters] don’t call for a vessel with this displacement.

    gonggok – ”This mission needs a ship with long endurance and good seakeeping in offshore conditions. If we are not there, the Chinese Coast Guard will be there.”

    A 24/7 show of presence is essential yes and sea conditions in the SCS do not get as rough as say the North Atlantic but they do get very rough; nonetheless a vessel lighter than 3000 tonnes will suffice and actually does and there’s a reason why the MMEA has specified a need for a few OPVs in the slightly over 1,000 tonne displacement and many more smaller vessels but none with a 2-3000 displacement.

    gonggok – ”MMEA OPVs need to be out at sea, not parked at the dock. ”

    Yes and to be able to stay at sea they need proper docking facilities and a proper shore maintenance infrastructure. As it stands the MMEA doesn’t even have enough bases/pier space for what little it has. Not only that maintenance facilities are still an issue. You may think that a shore support infrastructure is not an issue for the MMEA but it is….

    gonggok – ”Most commercial vessels have no dedicated docking space too.”

    Apple to oranges comparison. Many commercial tankers/freighters undergo maintenance at various places; on a need basis.

    gonggok – ”Also dedicated coast guard OPVs does not need to have high number of sailors.”

    Not just the ”sailors”.. Officers are needed; shore support personnel; administrative personnel; extra sailors, etc, etc. All take time to recruit and to be trained. It’s not as if there is a large number of people joining the MMEA annually.

    gonggok – ”The Kedah class operating under MMEA does not need complex Combat Information Center (CIC) operations, or advanced 3D search radars, so these systems can just be mothballed or outright removed from the Kedah class ships, reducing required crew members.”

    Based on the assumption the MMEA wants the Kedahs [does it suit their CONOPS/it will certainly increase the support footprint] and assuming the RMN readily hands them over…. More chance of Elvis coming to life again. The RMN is short of hulls and won’t be out of this predicament anytime soon. If the time comes when it’s ready to handover the Kedahs; the class will be somewhat aged and overworked and the MMEA will be begging not to have them.

    gonggok – ”the 200 acre Akademi Maritim Sultan Ahmad Shah (AMSAS).”

    Part of it’s move to create a shore support infrastructure but find out how busy this 200 acre place is and how full intakes are….

  50. Azlan,

    “Some time again I had a chance to speak to an ex RMN chap who is now in the MMEA. He was a batchmate of a good friend of mine in the RMN. His opinion was that the MMEA does not need any OPV or anything else touching past the the 1.300 tonne mark and that most of the ships they need should actually be smaller”
    So he is content with tiny ships to push back huge Chinese Coast Guard ships that is harassing our oil and gas vessels in our EEZ?
    http://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/harasses-07082021182547.html
    Sorry but I highly disagree with that chap, even if he is supposed to be a MMEA guy.

    “By the tinme the RMN is ready to hand them (Kedah Class Ship) over they will be so aged and worn out that that the MMEA will be begging not to receive them”
    Kedah Class ships are still quite young. Oldest commissioned in 2006, youngest end of 2010. Even if they are passed to MMEA in 5 years time, say after all the Gowinds is commissioned, they all have just about 20 years of service. When Japan Coast Guard passed the OPV, JCG Erimo to MMEA in 2017, the ship was 26 years old, now over 30 years of service in both JCG and MMEA. Even US Coast Guard operates plenty of cutters (OPVs in their terminology) that are more than 50 years old. USCG Reliance-class cutter (14 in USCG service with 2 more donated to other countries and still in service) first commissioned in 1964. Coast Guard OPVs does not go “obsolete” like naval vessels because it is not fitted with complicated electronics warfare systems and weapons. All it needs are good comms and navigation radar and it is good to go out on a patrol.

    Overview of our claimed EEZ areas
    http://pictr.com/images/2022/05/10/BJfz4n.jpg

  51. I mean why not.Even the Phils already commisioned their first MRRV from japan and expecting another one soon.Their CG also already operated a proper CG PV in BRP Gabriela Silang whereas our equivalent KM Tun Fatimah still lamented in shipyard.Which is two years late already.Im all for it if our CG want to operate a bigger vessel but no need big number 2,3 are fine..Hyundai already offered to us the Tae Pyung Yang Class for MMEA.Sure enough we will never match CCG’s might but we need to show some kind of presence and resistance and our current CG vessel doesnt cut it.

  52. Azlan,

    On Malaysia (RMN, TDM, RMAF) to do the Moskova, Hanit, Elait, Atlantic Conveyor, Stark, Sheffield, etc, etc. From my point of view we need to do those to :
    1. Show of our intent and resolve to fight and defend for our country
    2. Prevent an amphibious landings on our shores.
    3. To do area denial to enemy surface vessels 100NM from our shores. Giving less range and more time to counter any land attack missile launched from frigates/destroyers.
    4. Morale boosting of our forces.
    5. More resources taken to mitigate our sneak attacks, less resources available to do attacks on us.

    Things that we can do to enable us to do such a thing is by :
    1. By RMN our underwater forces ie Submarines.
    2. By TDM to have shore launched anti ship missiles such as NSM
    3. By RMAF with MRCAs and UAVs.
    4. Dedicated manpower to track in real time every ship of interest around our EEZ with satellite imaging technology, even with commercial satellite constellations.
    On Submarines as a main priority for RMN.

    – “It would be nice if the RMN was the only one operating subs but unfortunately others also do and fully understand the potential and weaknesses of subs”
    When we compare the survivability and lethality of vessels, submarines hands down are much more survivable than any surface ships if we don’t have the control of our waters and airspace in wartime situation. There are plenty of new ways to kill surface ships, by UCAVs, Hypersonic Missiles, Ballistic anti ship missiles, Stealthy anti ship missiles (like NSM), real time tracking by satellites, etc. To kill a submarine, there is not much of a change for decades, still by sonar, torpedoes and depth charges.

    – “If surface contact has a strong screen of surface escorts; airborne ASW escorts and perhaps other subs; how will our subs get close enough to perform a ”Moskova, Hanit, Elait, Atlantic Conveyor, Stark, Sheffield, etc, etc,? A more suitable example in this context would have been the Khukri and Cheonan though.”
    Our submarines will be playing in our own backyard. During the Falklands War, even with all the resources available to the Royal Navy, they did not manage to destroy the lone operational Argentinian submarine, the ARA San Luis. For most of the war, the lone Argentine diesel submarine opposed the Royal Navy at sea. Not only did the San Luis return home unscratched by the more than two hundred antisubmarine munitions fired by British warships and helicopter, but it twice ambushed British antisubmarine frigates. Had the weapons functioned as intended, the British victory might have been bought at a much higher cost.

    – “They can also resort to minelaying at specific areas to deny our subs the ability to move”
    Mines will deny the use of the area for all vessels, even to the minelaying force. So There will be no targets of opportunity anyway in a minefield.

    – “You will note that in WW2 at a certain point Kriegsmarine U-Boats were too busy evading detection and the ensuing destruction from allied surface groups and aircraft rather than being able to hunt targets. The same can happen in any future conflict; a side with material superiority being able to prevent a enemy sub from doing its job to the extent that its focus is on avoiding destruction”
    Submarines in WW2 is not the same as submarines now. Just like WW2 Spitfires are not the same as F-35s. Submarines in WW2 are mainly surface going vessels that can submerge for a short time, probably 3 days at most on batteries before it needs to resurface. Modern diesel electric submarines, even without AIP, have weeks of endurance underwater. The Scorpene can go for 21 days submerged.

    – “Note also that potential opponents know we only have a pair and can calculate or estimate deployment cycles based on this”
    Which is exactly why we need to buy more and at least double the submarine fleet before 2030, and this can be done by not wasting money buying expensive patrol boats in the shape of LMS or more OPV for RMN.

    – “They also know that we only have single base which has the shore support infrastructure to support both boats. Yes if it was up to you we’d have a few more subs by 2030 but my discussion is based on the present reality”
    The present reality is we are wasting money on things that we can buy cheaper. It is still not too late and we can still change our plans for RMK12 and RMK13. MMEA just requires about 500 million dollars to get 9 more large OPVs (to have 20 in total by 2030 including Kedah class hand me downs), and with that the RMN budget would be freed to buy more Submarines. Why it is important that MMEA is given the full support by RMN to get the budget and ships that it needs.

  53. gonggok – ”So he is content with tiny ships to push back huge Chinese Coast Guard ships that is harassing our oil and gas vessels in our EEZ?”

    What a ludicrous statement …

    Navies/coast guards buy the ships they need based on operational requirements; not size. They don’t get a certain size merely because they face opposing ships of a certain size. We need a 24/7 presence in the area and the ability to at short notice reinforce what we have at sea; what we don’t need is ships of a certain size to ”push back [to quote you] anything… Going by your logic; what happens if the Chinese decide to deploy bigger ships in response to us deploying large ships? We then get even larger ships?

    In the real world for EEZ patrolling the MMEA has long decided it does not need anything that breaches the 1,200 tonne [give and take] mark; anything more than that is superfluous but would give bragging rights and enable fanboyish remarks but not more beyond that.

    gonggok – ”Sorry but I highly disagree with that chap, even if he is supposed to be a MMEA guy.”

    [1] He is a ”MMEA guy” ex RMN [2] Sorry but as someone who does what we discuss in the cyber world; for real and someone who knows far better the operational conditions the MMEA operates in and its requirements; I’ll take his views more seriously than I do yours …..

  54. gonggok – ”When we compare the survivability and lethality of vessels, submarines hands down are much more survivable than any surface ships”

    That is not a point of contention and it never was. You are assuming that subs will perform in reality as on paper but it depends on the operational context; it’s not as clear cut or simplistic as you make it.

    The ability of our subs to perform effectively depends on various criteria being met; i.e. how well we can operated them in conjunction with other assets. With only 2 subs we’ll be very selective as to where and how we’ll employed them; only in areas where there strengths can be maximised. You will note that the enemy will be doing everything he can to prevent our subs from effectively operating.

    gonggok – ”Submarines in WW2 is not the same as submarines now. Just like WW2 ”
    gonggok – ”Modern diesel electric submarines, even without AIP, have weeks of endurance underwater.”

    Thanks for the history lesson which I’m not surprised about. The key fact is that whether it’s WW2 or the 30 years war somethings have not changed. A sub’s Achilles hell is its battery supply and a good CO will also be conserving his power supply and will need a safe place to recharge. An opponent will take advantage of this. As for ”weeks of underwater” endurance you are quoting [as you normally do] paper figures. In reality if a sub is in combat and is using more battery than it would normally do; it has less than ”weeks”…

    gonggok – ” this can be done by not wasting money buying expensive patrol boats in the shape of LMS or more OPV for RMN.”

    Reality check. I know you have a tendency to repeat and insist on things which are not true but which conveniently fit in your narrative but the RMN has no intention of getting ”patrol boats”. None; any more than it has the intention of getting a carrier. The LMS Batch 2s no are supposed to be fully fitted out and can’t in anyway be termed ”patrol boats”. As for ”OPVS” the RMN had no intention of ”OPVs” – the follow on Kedahs were intended to be fitted out to perform various roles in support of other assets in certain operational scenarios; as such they were not intended to be ”OPVs” and the plan is as good at dead – dead as Elvis or the Dodo.

    gonggok – ”So There will be no targets of opportunity anyway in a minefield.”

    You are missing the point; mines are merely one of various ways that a enemy can deny us the ability to deploy our subs. A enemy who knows we only have 2; knows we only have a single base; one who can deploy strong surface and airborne ASW assets and one who knows the strengths and limitations of SSKs…

    gonngok – ”Our submarines will be playing in our own backyard. ”

    A ”backyard” which is relatively small and has been extensively mapped out by others. You will have noticed that foreign survey ships are not exactly a rare sight in some areas….

    Again; I love SSKs and think we should buy more but the hard reality is that we aren’t going to buy more in the short to medium term. The hash reality is that no single weapon dominates or is a panacea and none in a ”wunderwaffe”. To be able to be successfully operated a sub has to be deployed in ideal operational conditions and fully supported/integrated with other assets …..

    gonggok – ” Why it is important that MMEA is given the full support by RMN to get the budget and ships that it needs.”

    Reality check. The RMN has its hands full securing its own funding and is in fierce competition with its sister services. You really think the RMN has the time and energy to give ”full support” for the MMEA [a non MAF entity]? It will have pointed out that if the MMEA was properly funded it would have less to do and could focus on other issues and it would have made clear that inadequate funding for the MMEA means the RMN needs operational funds for certain things but not beyond that …

    gonggok – ”Not only did the San Luis return home unscratched by the more than two hundred antisubmarine munitions fired by British warships and helicopter”

    That is only part of the narrative; the other part is that the SSK did not hinder or prevent the RN from operating in the South Atlantic and from conducting landings at San Carlos … On the Falklands; it’s hailed aa a classic example of how hard ASW is, yes but what about the various other examples where subs did not perform as expected?

  55. gonggok – ”Our submarines will be playing in our own backyard. ”

    They can be ”playing” in your front porch while we’re at it but [again] if a surface group is screened by a strong ASW escort and has ASW airborne assets all hunting for it; no sub will be able to do its job; irrespective of whether a LA class; Scorpene or a Type 214 – it will be evading detection. . The enemy does not have to sink the sub but merely keep it from doing its job and like everything else the sub will attempt to have the element of surprise [may not have it] and in conditions where it has the advantage [not always].

  56. Azlan,

    In a scenario where there is an all out war against malaysia in south china sea. Where our allies will not intervene directly due to ecomomic reliance on China. Where we as a country that is attacked has no superiority over the sea and airspace.

    – What can fully armed or lets say very heavily armed to the teeth LMS or NGPV and even LCS Gowind can do in such a scenario? Can they held up against volleys of hypersonic missiles? Can they get near to Chinese naval ships to shoot their own anti-ship missiles?

    – Does spending billions on 18 fully armed LMS, 18 fully armed NGPV and 18 fully armed LCS Gowinds enable us to fight the Chinese Navy? Or do we put our money on 4 Scorpenes that will have much better chance to sink some Chinese ships without the need of dozens of fully armed LMS and NGPV. Saving money on cheap MMEA OPVs instead?

    – Which is more survivable and able to strike back at the enemy? 36 fully armed LMS and NGPV, or 4 Scorpene submarines?

    – How many billions to spend on fully armed 18 LMS Corvette and 12 NGPV Corvette? Just put it at very low end of 150 million dollars each, that is 4.5 billion dollars. How much to get 2 more Scorpenes and 12 more large OPVs for MMEA? 1.2billion for 2 scorpenes and 600 million for OPVs, that is just 1.8 billion dollars.

  57. gonggok – ”What can fully armed or lets say very heavily armed to the teeth LMS or NGPV and even LCS Gowind can do?”

    Even a 9,000 tonne combatant would not have a chance; secondly; even a sub [despite its inherent advantages might not have a chance if the PLAN has its own subs in the area and strong surface and air ASW teams looking for that sub – on a movie screen maybe but alas we’re talking about real life…

    As for the hypersonic threat; by your logic we shouldn’t get any thing that floats because of hypersonic missiles. As it stands there is no defence against the threat of hypersonic missiles which by their way are not yet in wide active service. Even a Burke would struggle against a hypersonic threat and here you are pointing out that lightly armed ships belonging to a small navy from a developing small economy has no chance – hardly an earth shattering revelation.

    gonggok – ”Which is more survivable and able to strike back at the enemy? ”

    I’ll leave the simplistic fanboyish claims to you. In the real world it depends on operational circumstances; the context. I know you’ve put SSKs on a pedestal; giving the mistaken/misleading impression that they will always succeed and will get through but the reality is different. There is no ”wunderwaffe” and no guarantee SSKs can perform as you assume they can because it depends wholly on the circumstances. Try and note that there are numerous historical and more contemporary examples of subs not being as effectively as hoped; yet you’d give the mistaken/misleading impression they an invincible and infallible.

    gonggok – ”How many billions to spend on fully armed 18 LMS Corvette and 12 NGPV Corvette? ”

    I’ll leave the apples to oranges comparisons; generalised statements and conflating things to you.

    I’ll merely say that different things are intended for different purposes; there is no better and never was and that we need a balance of everything …..

    gonggok – ” Does spending billions on 18 fully armed LMS, 18 fully armed NGPV and 18 fully armed LCS Gowinds enable us to fight the Chinese Navy?”

    I know this is hard for you to grasp but do try. The force structure we plan for is intended for a variety of contingencies and those contingencies do not include going against China. The PLAN is far larger; far better resourced; at a completely different stage of development and backed by a country which has a bigger population; economy and industrial base. I know you’re gaga about China and all gun ho [I can hear the chest thumping] but we do not plan for trouble with China; the MAF is not funded, equipped or structured for this eventuality and even if we adopt asymmetric  tactics [which you and … hyped about] we don’t have a chance – the Chinese also understand and can play the asymmetric game and they have far more resources; would be a massive overmatch.  No I’m not saying we should lay back and open our legs for them but we don’t have a chance in a conflict; not alone.

    gonggok – ”to sink some Chinese ships without the need of dozens of fully armed LMS and NGPV. Saving money on cheap MMEA OPVs instead?”

    Again; the LCSs, LMSs and NGOPVs are intended for our requirements in line with our resources driven by our threat requirements [I tried but can’t put it in a simpler way]- fantasy cloud cuckoo gaga land delusional thinking to suggest they are intended to ”to sink some Chinese ships”.. or that MMEA ships are ”better”.

    If we do get involved in a conflict chances are it will be with a neighbour over a longstanding unresolved overlapping claim. Note that things have become ”hot” at various times over the years with neighbours but not ”hot” per see with China. Yet people are all gaga about China and are under the persistent illusion we can actually deal with it [when even the likes of the U.S., Australia and Japan are worried].

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