2021 Budget, Defence and Internal Security Allocations

GGK SOV Vamtac during a demonstration held during the visit of the current PTD to Kem Iskandar on Nov 4, 2020. BTDM picture

SHAH ALAM: 2021 Budget. The Defence Ministry got an allocation of RM15.86 billion, an increase of some RM200 million compared to last year’s one in the just announced 2021 budget. The Home Ministry for the second year running was allocated around RM1 billion more with a RM16.852 billion allocation.

The combined allocation for both the defence and internal securiy allocations are RM32.7 billion or 10.1 per cent from the RM322.5 billion 2021 budget, the highest since Merdeka.

Army and GOF joint patrol in ESSCOM AOR. Note the GK-M1 weapon carriers. The left one is fitted with a 12.7mm machine gun while the other is fitted with an automatic grenade launcher.

Finance Minister Tengku Zafrul Aziz in his budget speech did not touch too much on the security sub-sector apart from announcing the allocation for both though he did rounded up the figures to the nearest number (Defence RM16 billion and Home RM18 billion, for the actual figures see above).

This is of course better than the shadow play in the 2020 budget presentation.

A Super Lynx being put on board the A400M. RMAF

He also said to ensure the Armed Forces maintained a high readiness the maintenance allocation had been increased to RM2.3 billion this year compared to RM2 billion the previous year. This of course goes to the Operational Expenditure (OE) and Development Expenditure (DE) budget. I guess we have to wait for the question and answer sessions to get a better explanation on this issue.

KD Lekiu CMS crew conducting a live firing exercise off Langkawi under OP Benteng. KD Lekiu FB

OE and DE
Despite the increase in the overall allocation, the OE budget of RM11.3 billion for Defence is a slight decrease from last year one of RM12.496 billion. The DE budget saw an increase of almost RM2 billion – RM4.505 billion compared to last year figure of RM3.083 billion. This is likely the figure quoted by the Finance Minister in his speech.

Baracuda

Inside the cabin of a PDRM Baracuda armoured car. PDRM

The detailed DE allocation for the Army is RM1.122 billion, most of it for equipment RM1.02 billion while the rest is for construction. The RMN is getting RM1.193 billion, the majority of it for equipment, RM1.148 billion, the rest for construction and RMAF is getting RM1.49 billion, again the bulk is for equipment, RM1.478 billion.

Leonardo AW139

MMEA Leonardo AW139 landing onboard a ship. APMM

Internal Security
As for the Home Ministry, the OE is RM13.693 billion down from last year’s figure of RM13.839 billion. The DE for the ministry for 2021 is higher at RM3.158 billion compared to RM3.088 billion, last year.

A sailor from KD Pahang firing the 30mm Breda Mauser gun located on top of the helicopter hangar aft. The gun can be fired manually from the mount or remotely from the combat information centre.

The police is getting the bulk of the DE allocation for the ministry, totalling some RM1.6 billion. The allocation include funds for the Air Wing (RM10 million) and aircraft (RM3.84 million)

PDRM Super King Air 350 on finals at Subang airport. The aircraft ids fitted an unknown type of ISR equipment. Note the radome under the belly.

APMM meanwhile is getting RM378 million most of it is likely to pay for the ships its getting or has gotten.

To be updated.

— Malaysian Defence

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88 Comments

  1. More DE for home ministry means more allocation to buy new things for Police and MMEA. Which is good.

    What i am afraid is that the operating expenditure for MMEA is not increased, when currently they are operating on a shoestring budget.

    The DE for defence ministry is a bit more than USD1 billion. Which is affordable to continue for each year for the whole of RMK12 2021-2025. If the defence ministry can get USD5 billion in DE for RMK12, and RMK13 virtually all of my plans that i wrote here before can be executed.

  2. AF got the highest DE allocation this time, followed by Navy and Army. Hopefully it will translate to UAS project and radar replacement. I dont think LCA is ready for next year.

  3. on MMEA DE budget

    it is actually lower than last year

    2020 RM414 million

    2021 RM378 million

    Not a good sign.

    BTW Overall there is not a significant increase from 2020. The 2020 allocation for security sector is RM32.5 billion from a total expenditure of RM297 billion. Percentage wise 2021 security sector budget is actually lower than 2020.

    On the defence ministry DE. Interestingly TUDM is getting the highest percentage of the DE budget for 2020. The 2021 TUDM DE budget is like 500% increase compared to 2020 (RM383 million vs RM1.49 billion). In the past few years it was TLDM that gets the most budget. Still the budget for TLDM for 2021 is actually bigger than for 2020.

  4. Having ‘x’ amount to spend is one thing; us putting the cash to good use getting what suits our requirements rather than what politics dictate we should buy is a very different thing. That’s what I’m worried about.

    How the government in the coming months handles the MPA and UAS programme will be indicative of how it intends to handle things or whether it will simply continue with past practices.

  5. ” How the government in the coming months handles the MPA and UAS programme will be indicative of how it intends to handle things or whether it will simply continue with past practices ”

    I am hoping that common sense prevails, and TUDM goes for a homogeneous fleet of CN-235MPAs. I am also hoping that the cost effective and proven Bayraktar TB2 will be the UAV choosen.

    Early next year the RMK12 plan will be unveiled, and we can quickly decide on our LCA LIFT programme too.

    Also surely there is some budget in there to get half a dozen EC225LP used helicopters to add to the EC725 fleet.

  6. Does Bayraktar participate in RMAF tendering? I thought only Anka as the only Turkey participant?

    Reply
    I have no idea, if they took part in the briefing and they feel they can win the tender they could take part.

  7. off topic

    The Philippines has confirmed that they are getting Mil Mi-17 for their airforce heavyilift helicopter requirement. The total cost is said to be around USD235 million. In total Philippines will buy 16 Mi-17, with the russian government throwing in one Mi-17 VIP helicopter for free (for a total of 17 helicopters)

    This will add to the 16 S-70i blackhawk already ordered by Philippines airforce for USD240 million. Ironically Mi-17 sling load capacity is around the same as the blackhawk, around 4 tons, but Mi-17 has better hot and high performance, with bigger cabin and rear ramp for carrying more soldiers. The heavylift helicopter project was supposed to get chinook sized helicopters.

    So in the near future Philippines airforce will have 33 brand new helicopters in the shape of S-70i blackhawks and Mi-17 hip helicopters for a total spend of around USD480 million.

  8. on the airforce 2021 Development Expenditure budget

    RM1.49 billion is around USD354.7 million.

    https://www.malaysiandefence.com/options-for-rmaf-cap-55/

    IMO more than enough to award the UAV project. The intent is just for 3 units, but we can afford 12, looking at Ukraine buy of 12 Bayraktar TB2 for USD69 million.

    I calculated that it would cost around USD40 million + trade in of our current beechcrafts to PTDI to have another 3 more CN-235 converted into MPAs plus adding more systems like ESM, etc for all 6 CN-235s.

    That is still just 30% of the allocated budget. The rest we can really use for downpayment of our LCA/LIFT project, and hopefully it would be around 50 airframes in all to afford 2 operational and 1 LIFT/OCU squadrons.

    What we can do is to have a big government to government contract with south korea, with the koreans agreeing to have 100% offset of the contract amount to invest in malaysian industries. Korean electronic companies need to get out of china, and malaysian companies such as silterra needs work. An example of how defence can actually spur civilian economy if we put our thoughts on it.

  9. Mi-17 have hot and high capability? If so why did China ditched their Mi-17s in favor of S-70 (and its domestic derivative) for use in Tibet? It’s far easier to get spares for Mi-17 compared to S-70 especially after the tiannamen square incident and yet they are still being use in that part of China until Z20 came out

    Even in Nepal and india both countries would rather use lighter helicopters (cheetak, Ecureuil) for operation near the himalayas

  10. …. – “ An example of how defence can actually spur civilian economy if we put our thoughts on it.”

    Quite a few programmes actually have been intended to ‘spur the civilian economy’. Us ‘putting our thoughts on it’ is was the determining factor in various things ordered over the years; unfortunately it didn’t work out as well as we intended.

  11. Like all of us I’m waiting eagerly to see which UAS is selected.
    ‘Proven” is highly subjective. What it really constitutes can mean different things. A lot of things are ‘proven’ : what matters is determining by ourselves (without totally believing the OEM) how it was really ‘proven’ and under what operational circumstances.

    What we have to do is not only look at technical specs (as outlined in promotional literature which is intended to impress) but also get a firm figure as to how much it will cost to operate for the duration of its projected service period (including rising costs as it gets older), costs of spares, how many hours of flying time before structural checks are required; etc.

    Non scripted trials under conditions specified by us; not intended to benefit the local agent and not taking for granted anything the OEM says; will have to be performed in order to fully determine whether ‘x’ or ‘Y’ UAS is truly suitable for our needs and is really ‘cost effective’.

    What needs to end is the practice of the local industry dictating (against the wishes of the end user) what should be ordered; under the guise of ‘national
    interests’ (read – the company’s interests) with the government going along with it. We have a long history of this; to the detriment of the end user and tax payer.

  12. Dundun,

    It’s the prerogative of Uncle Sam as to who it wants to nail under CAATSA. At times it may be under its national interests to do nothing; depending on who the ‘offender’ is.

  13. @ azlan

    ” ‘Proven” is highly subjective ”

    I am talking specifically about TB2. It is all over youtube and twitter nowadays, its probably the uav that needs the least amount of advertising and explaining from its OEM right now. Other uav contenders for TUDM does not even compare to the TB2 (performance and price wise) right now.

  14. As for me for 2021 I just want to see RMN’s MUH and RMAF need for extra helos to be addressed. Nuri’s retirement really came at the worst possible time

  15. With TDM getting RM 1Bil, it should be used to prioritise getting their Nuri replacement chopper.

    With TLDM getting RM 1.14Bil, I would’ve preferred it be used for the medium lift utility chopper but now I think should be used to restart LCS. Let the utility chopper be allocated for RMK 13 instead.

    Off Topic
    The Luftwaffe has decided to go for more Typhoons rather than switch to F-35s. A new batch of 38 fighters was approved to purchase. I guess the Germans would rather wait for Euro 5th gen fighter to fruition.

    Reply
    No lah, like us they also play the national interest card. Why buy a foreign product when they have their own product. Without additional Typhoons the German Airbus factory making them might have to shut down. During this troubled times it’s good to have the national interest card to play and they got the budget to do it and their card is really good. We on the other hand played a very bad hand with our version of national interest

  16. … – “I am talking specifically about TB2”

    I’m well aware of what you were referring to……

    My comments were on things in general. ‘Proven” is very subjective; depends under what operational conditions.

    What I wrote and I what context was pretty self explanatory. I’m not referring to the TB2 in particular. You think it’s ‘proven’ and ‘cost effective’ based on its operational record; fine. I’m not disputing this.

    Whether something is indeed ‘proven’ or ‘cost effective’ is something a potential customer can only really determine during trials which are performed non scripted, under local conditions and without the OEM and local partner having any say (sounds obvious doesn’t it but we don’t always do it)….

    On top of procurement costs and the fact that something has been deployed in an actual war zone; very pertinent factors will include determining “technical specs (as outlined in promotional literature which is intended to impress but can slightly differ in actual conditions) but also get a firm figure as to how much it will cost to operate for the duration of its projected service period (including rising costs as it gets older), costs of spares, how many hours of flying time before structural checks are required; etc.’.

    Only then will we ‘fully determine whether ‘x’ or ‘Y’ UAS is truly suitable and cost effective for our needs; in our context.

  17. “During this troubled times it’s good to have the national interest card to play”
    And that is the problem with Malaysia. We never seem to sustain our economy long enough or with big enough growth for us to wean off “national interest” spurred growth.

    Fully agreed, they, like so many other richer First World countries, could suffer inefficiencies of prioritising local industries because they simply could afford it unlike us. And unlike us, they got better luck on the poker table.

    Reply
    Luck is what you make of it

  18. In my opinion, based on the budget presented there is likely hood that the LCS will be continued for at least 2 ships, while the fate of remaining 4 will be up in the air. I am just basing the assumption the need to spur the local economy before targeted fiscal consolidation expected by 2023.

  19. @ kamal

    IMO it should be all 6 or not at all. Aiming for just 2 completed gowinds will be very bad for TLDM in the long term.

    If we cannot agree to, or have enough money for completing all 6, then we need a plan B to immediately build 6 new frigates at less cost than completing all 6 gowinds, and transfer all the paid for equipment of the gowinds into the new frigates.

  20. to add

    With reduced OE, IMO it is prudent for TUDM to get equipments that we can afford to regularly operate. Our new MPA, UAV, LCA, AEW&C must have affordable operating costs for them to be fully utilized.

  21. nato satcom,

    Really remains to be seen. The actual money can be allocated in the budget but requirements: driven by politics and other things; can change.

    For the RMAF the reality is it has to indefinitely make do with what if has. Even if the LCA programme proceeds as planned; it will be for an insufficient number of airframes; which means the Hawks have to soldier on indefinitely with only minimal upgrades: to replace time expired stuff.

    We base our threat assessments on the basis that although the unexpected can happen; chances of a full blown war is slim; that our small numbers of MKMs, Hornets, Hawks and LCAs are adequate for our needs. Of course if we’re wrong and we face a state of war; our small numbers of MKMs and Hornets will make it very challenging for us to maintain ‘x’ number of sorties over a given period (lets not even get into attritional losses).

    The RMAF’s operating budget must take into account that operating costs for everything; from fighters to transports to helis; has risen. Aircraft are more complex/sophisticated; more avionics, computers, etc, all requiring test support equipment and a higher level of skilled maintenance/support personnel.

  22. @ azlan

    ” Even if the LCA programme proceeds as planned; it will be for an insufficient number of airframes ”

    This is what we should not do in the future. Buying something just for a token amount. Why we need to look at everything holistically. For example getting 2 very expensive new MPA will affect the budget for LCAs. Which is why i would prefer to concentrate fully on converting 6 CN-235 into the best MPA we can afford instead, so that we could have a homogeneous fleet of MPA with affordable operating costs and more budget for other things. My proposal, from the budget of Usd1.6 billion in per RMK for RMK12 and RMK13, could afford us around 52 FA/TA-50. IMO we need that number to have sufficient airframes for both operational squadrons (2 squadron each in east and west malaysia) and the LIFT/OCU squadron. This to enable TUDM to have standing QRA missions in both Labuan and Kuantan to cover both east and west malaysia.

    One thing to prepare for war, another is to be able to fulfill all the tasks required during peacetime. Frankly TUDM cannot even fully fulfil its peacetime commitments right now, so that should be the priority for the next 10 years.

  23. back on the malaysian 2021 budget.

    Lets compare with our neighbours.

    Malaysian defence 2021 budget (increase compared to 2020)
    – total RM15.86 billion or USD3.85 billion
    – Development expenditure RM4.505 billion or USD1.09 billion

    Philippines defence 2021 budget (increase compared to 2020)
    – total PHP209.1 billion or USD4.25 billion
    – Development expenditure PHP33 billion or USD690 million

    Thailand defence 2021 budget (decrease compared to 2020)
    – total THB213.7 billion or USD6.59 billion
    – Development expenditure breakdown not available.

    Indonesia defence 2021 budget (increase compared to 2020)
    – total IDR136.99 trillion or USD9.2 billion
    – Development expenditure IDR42.6 trillion or USD3 billion.

  24. … – “. TUDM cannot even fully fulfil its peacetime commitments right now, so that should be the priority for the next 10 years”

    It can and it does …

    It is able to; unless faced with a situation where for an extended period its required to generate and maintain ‘x’ number of sorties.

    … – “One thing to prepare for war, another is to be able to fulfill all the tasks required during peacetime”

    Yes this is something I’ve been harping on and pointing out. We prepare for a wide range of contingencies but we only focus on the contingencies most likely to be faced and the ones we can realistically handle.

  25. @ azlan

    ” It can and it does ”

    I dont think so. A few examples.

    We once had only 1 continuous standing QRA mission with MiG-29s. We did not have one now since the MiGs are retired. We had unresponsive airliners, and bombers flying into our airspaces without us able to scramble any fighters to shadow them. Not to mention no standing QRA mission for east malaysia.

    We now does not have enough medium lift helicopter resources since the Nuris were abruptly retired without any official plans. The whole malaysian armed forces just have 12 operational medium lift helicopters now. Which is why TLDM looks to have its own multi purpose helicopters to be rented.

  26. ….

    Think about it ..

    The discussion was about the RMAF ’s ability to meet its current peacetime commitments was it not?

    I say it again : “It is able to; unless faced with a situation where for an extended period its required to generate and maintain ‘x’ number of sorties”

    We only have a single QRA but it’s not as if we have a high occurrence of aircraft (military or otherwise) straying into our airspace…. Yes East Malaysia does not have a standing QRA but occurrences of foreign straying into our airspace there is low and although they are not officially placed on 15, 5 or 10 minute alerts; there always Sabah based Hawks on operational readiness …

    In case you mention it; no it’s not an ideal requirement and yes, yes East Malaysia needs a QRA but the discussion was on the RMAF meeting its currant peacetime commitments.

    Even before the Nuris were retired; the RMN was looking for.a medium capability as far back as a few years ago ….. – I was told this as far back as 2016 and I have mentioned this before here. Limited lift capacity with what it has is a major issue when it comes to lifting PASKAL teams and other service specific tasks.

    Even before the Nuris were retired they couldn’t always be there when needed on short notice; such as to lift PASKAL teams – as has occurred before and is why the RMN has for years wanted a medium lift capability. The retiring of the Nuris enabled it to easier seek the green light for this requirement.

    Yes there is a shortage of helis in the MAF but (as pointed out) unless the situation abruptly changes with regards to the operational tempo; we can and do manage.

    For one there is a much lesser need to move troops around compared to the past and the scenarios we face with regards to disaster relief and mercy flights are manageable with the limited assets we have. A mere 2 Cougars (thanks to proper planning and hardwork by the engineering/support crews) were able to handle the role of delivering supplies to interior areas of western Sarawak during the MCO). On top of that the limited number of MMEA and BONBA helis does take some level of strain of the MAF …

    No it’s not an ideal situation; yes we do need helis sooner rather than later and yes you have your solution with pre owned airframes but we have to put things in perspective : unless something happens which requires us to maintain/generate a much higher tempo; we can and do cope.

  27. …. – “We once had only 1 continuous standing QRA mission with MiG-29s”

    At times it was shared with the Hornets ….

    … – “ We did not have one now since the MiGs are retired”

    That is an assumption…..

    Contrary to the impression some may have; QRAs are something we take very seriously. Even when serviceability rates are low and with our small numbers; a 24 hour all year round QRA is something we always maintain despite it being very resource intensive and a huge strain …

  28. @ azlan

    ” but the discussion was on the RMAF meeting its currant peacetime commitments ”

    QRA is a peacetime commitment, no different than our sea and land patrols.

    No fighters scrambled to check on MH370. No fighters scrambled when there is a bomb scare of the scoot airbus just a few miles off kuantan AFB. No fighters scrambled when chinese bombers armed with anti ship missiles overflew our oil platforms. Is that what you mean by taking QRA seriously?

    http://mobile.twitter.com/rupprechtdeino/status/1239462912646959104?lang=en

    If we take our QRA seriously, TUDM need to list down how many successful QRA scrambles, how many planes we intercepted and how many training scambles we had in the past 5 years.

  29. … – “QRA is a peacetime commitment, no different than our sea and land patrols”

    Quite obviously: which is why we spoke about QRAs in a discussion about peacetime commitments ….

    If QRAs were not a commitment it wouldn’t have been part of the discussion now would it… Also nothing said (which was pretty concise) indicated it wasn’t ….

    … – “No fighters scrambled to check on MH370”

    I was expecting you to bring that up.

    Beyond saying that the reason fighters were send up was not because there was no QRA (they was); I will not comment more in the issue for the reason that I don’t know all the facts behind the incident .

    I’ll repeat : it was various factors which led to a QRA being launched; not because there wasn’t a QRA; there was ….

    …. – “ fighters scrambled when chinese bombers armed with anti ship missiles overflew our oil platforms. Is that what you mean by taking QRA seriously”

    Like I said : we do what we can in line with what we have. Doesn’t mean we don’t take things seriously as you’d like us to believe. Doesn’t mean there is no future need for a QRA in East Malaysia ….

    Also, even if there was a QRA there; we wouldn’t have been able to intercept those bombers unless there happened to be fighters in the air, near the area.
    A plane flying along the common air boundary merely has to make a slight detour to be in our airforce within minutes or less.

    … – “If we take our QRA seriously, TUDM need to list down how many successful QRA scrambles”

    And because it doesn’t; you’ve reached the conclusion it doesn’t take the issue ‘seriously’? By the same token; all the other countries which also don’t release figures; also don’t take the issue “seriously”?

    The launching of QRAs is actually a rare occurrence as incidents of staying rarely occur but it’s not unheard of – we have launched in the past (although you’d make the bizarre connection that we don’t take it seriously because we don’t publicise it – it could well also be a government, not an RMAF, decision) and the retirement of the Fulcrums did not result in us abandoning QRAs …

  30. The very reason for a QRA mission is to intercept every unknown or unresponsive aircrafts in our airspace.

    Had we intercepted the MH370, we could have forced it to land and saved hundreds of lives, or at least had known where it crashed instead of a mystery right now.

    It is clear that we don’t have a 24/7 standing QRA alert over our airspace for quite sometime now. Clearly none over east malaysia. Is that considered can fulfill all TUDM peacetime missions?

    Other examples.

    We cannot find ORKIM HARMONY when it was hijacked. It was found by AP-3C orion of RAAF Butterworth detachment.

    http://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2015/06/19/orkim-harmony-rm21mil-cargo/

    We cannot deploy any EC-725 for SAR in the latest Dayang Topaz incident. As is for the 2017 sabah tourist boat incident. Both times brunei shell S-92 SAR helicopter came to the rescue.

    http://www.borneotoday.net/two-brunei-assets-join-search-and-rescue-for-missing-tourists-crew/

    http://borneobulletin.com.bn/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/page-3-D_27052019.jpg

  31. I have listed before what the basic capability and operational outcome that the airforce should be capable of.

    IMO the operational outcome for RMAF CAP55 Phase 1 2021-2030 should be:

    1. Fighters – To have 24h QRA capability for both west and east Malaysia. Clear CAS, Strike, Maritime Strike and Air Superiority capability goals.

    2. C4ISR air – Information superiority and sharing from the air; of the air, marine and ground domain. Ability to jam and degrade enemy radar and communication ability. A subset of this capability would be MPA, UAS, AEW&C and EA. For MPA we should be able to find a small-boat sized target anywhere in Malaysian EEZ within 24 hours. For UAS, we should be able to deploy 2x 24/7/365 continuous orbits of MALE UAV. For AEW&C and EA we should be able to deploy this within a reasonable amount of early notice.

    3. C4ISR ground – clear 24h information picture of Malaysian airspace. Seamless connection with civilian ATC system. Able to deploy QRA to intercept unidentified flying objects in Malaysian airspace and EEZ.

    4. Helicopter – CSAR and SF capability. Most (not all) transport duties and VIP helicopters passed to Army PUTD.

    5. Transport – Strong airbridge between east and west Malaysia, ability to support deployment and sustainment of PARA forces.

  32. … – “Had we intercepted the MH370”

    That is not the issue and is a topic for another discussion. The discussion was on QRAs; not various cock ups made that night.

    The discussion was in QRAs. The fact that a QRA was not launched that night is not because there was no QRA (as you inaccurately claim) but due to other issues ..

    … – “It is clear that we don’t have a 24/7 standing QRA alert over our airspace for quite sometime now”

    To you maybe but in reality we do have a 24 hour QRA in West Malaysia. It was never abandoned after the Fulcrums retired; as you claim….

    What we’ve never had was a standing QRA capability in East Malaysia which is profoundly different from claiming : ““It is clear that we don’t have a 24/7 standing QRA alert over our airspace for quite sometime now”

    … – “. Is that considered can fulfill all TUDM peacetime missions”

    The examples you mention only highlights the fact that the RMAF is short of assets – something obvious which all of us are aware of. It doesn’t (even though you think it does); highlight the fact that the RMAF can’t meet its peacetime obligations. For one; those were isolated cases; secondly what about the various tasks/roles which the RMAF is able to handle despite being overstretched and underfunded?

    Again : short of any unexpected incidents which would require the RMAF to maintain and sustain a higher tempo indefinitely; it can (even though it struggles – to be expected) to meet current peacetime obligations; whether QRAs; mercy flights, disaster relief, supporting other agencies, etc, etc.

    Has it occurred to you that even if the RMAF had all the assets it needed; that there would still be specific occasions when it would struggle or face difficulties due to various factors?

  33. @ azlan

    ” Has it occurred to you that even if the RMAF had all the assets it needed; that there would still be specific occasions when it would struggle or face difficulties due to various factors? ”

    Then we should have heard successful QRA intercepts and SAR rescues by TUDM recently.

    IMO only transports with A400M and Hercules are something the airforce can commit to regularly. others missions the airforce can barely fulfil their commitments

  34. @FIRDAUS
    Something that I constantly urged our ATM to go for, commonise our chopper needs to use Blackhawks and go for the civvie S-70i spec off the shelf. With G-to-G deal, we could probably get half a dozen within a year of signing the contract. TDM needs a medium lifter and a gunship role, TLDM needs a medium lifter and a ASW role. The Blackhawk platform fills them all.

    Reply
    If its S70i it will be around 18 months actually

  35. … – “Most (not all) transport duties and VIP helicopters passed to Army PUTD”

    This has already happened given there is in general; much lesser need to airlift troops compared to the past. Granted if there’s a need the RMAF will have to step in given the army has lost its Nuris and that f it happens: only 2-3 helis will be leased.

    It helps a lot that the MMEA and BOMBA helis are able to help out for disaster relief and mercy flights; as well as the army and navy also helping out in these areas.

    .. – “VIP helicopters passed to Army PUTD”

    What is the rationale behind handing over this role to the army? Do the RMAF crews be transferred to the army as well?

    This move will not go down well with the army which has its hands full as it is maintaining a cadre of trained personnel in the event a Nuri replacement arrives and is short of manpower and other resources as it is.

  36. @ azlan

    ” much lesser need to airlift troops compared to the past ”

    So no airmobile helicopter capability from the sea or land for us.
    ______________________________________________________

    ” What is the rationale behind handing over this role to the army? ”

    my rationale?

    1) If the nuri replacement in PUTD is to be blackhawks (used) like I proposed, it is better for the 2 remaining whitehawks to be also under PUTD. So TUDM has all EC725/EC225LP fleet. Easier for maintenance and for pilots and crews. So PUTD pilots and crews could rotate between operational and VIP blackhawk units still with same skill sets.

    2) Army already has a full brigade dedicated to public functions or “istiadat” in the form of 12 Briged Istiadat. A dedicated PUTD VIP helicopter squadron could be established under this brigade. Easier for budgetary and operational allocations.

    3) IMO the army has a better grasp of the full VIP protocols needed for such operation. It also has much more bigger human resources to support VIP helicopter detachments (soldiers on the ground already waiting for the helicopter etc.) all over the country. For example the US Marine One always has marines waiting on the ground to receive the president, wherever it is.

    http://s.hdnux.com/photos/47/27/05/10318203/5/920×920.jpg

    https://www.malaysiandefence.com/briefings-for-mpa-and-uas-tenders/#comment-435933

  37. … – “So no airmobile helicopter capability from the sea or land for us”

    You says that : not me.

    I merely said pointed out that compared to the past; there is less operational need to regularly air lift troops around. Thus there is one less regular need the RMAF needs to attend to on a regular basis. This was in the context (if you noticed) on the RMAF’s actual peacetime commitments as they stand …

    Didn’t imply there will never be such a need in the future or that as you succinctly put it : “no airmobile helicopter capability from the sea or land for us”

    … – “my rationale”

    Yes; it was intended at you as it was a genuine question in response to something you had posted. Thank you for the explanation.

  38. …. – “Then we should have heard successful QRA intercepts and SAR rescues by TUDM”

    Using that line of reasoning you’ve come to the conclusion that we’re unable to? What if there were not actual QRA or SAR tastings “recently”?

    For years we never acknowledged live missile firings by the RMAF – doesn’t mean we didn’t do it. The RMN and MMEA doesn’t announce every single interception at sea.

    A lot of air arms (not necessarily of their own decision release figures on QRAs. Note that the ones that do are only a different footing than us and do it more regularly.

    In case you mention it; I’m not suggesting we don’t release info; merely that it might be a government decision and just because we do doesn’t mean we lack the ability …

  39. … – “detachments (soldiers on the ground already waiting for the helicopter etc.) all over the country”

    Not all flights require a guard of honour upon departure and arrival. If it’s just a routine flight from Point A to B; the Agong will be accompanied or greeted by the Istana staff, state government people and his military aide de camp.

    The Blackhawks are intended for use by the Agong or PM; although both hardly use them. Other rotary assets are intended use by other VIPs as well. The Blackhawks in the past were not popular with VIPs because of the lack of standing head space.

    … – “2) Army already has a full brigade dedicated to public functions or “istiadat”

    Ceremonial functions are one of its responsibilities; it is not “dedicated”
    as despite its ceremonial role it also has other roles (u.e. the British Household Division). The only unit which is really considered to be “dedicated” is the “ceremonial battery.

  40. … – “ how many training scambles we had in the past 5 years”

    Pilots on QRA are required to carry out mock intercepts as part of their training. Also in addition to routine mock QRA launches; similar ones are routinely conducted during exercises.

    A few years ago the RMAF invited the press for a briefing; Marhalim was there and he uploaded the video. There was also a Majalah 3 episode showing a SOC and the officer in charge explaining how the decision to launch a QRA is made.l

    QRAs were maintained even after the Fulcrums were retired; other types of aircraft apart from Fulcrums are/were also assigned and the RMAF (despite limited numbers of airframes) always makes it an absolute priority to maintain a QRA even if it means that other things are affected as a result of having limited airframes.

    Hopefully in the coming years there will also be a standing QRA in East Malaysia. At present there are Hawks which although are not in QRA have to maintain a certain level of readiness.

  41. Still there is someone that does not know the difference between civilian helicopter and commercial sale of a military spec aircraft even after i explained so many times.

    S-70i has never been a civilian approved helicopter under FAA or EASA. All blackhawks operated by civilians are either government owned (police etc.) or operated under FAA restricted category, which is basically anything goes but cannot carry passengers.

    S-70i can never be used for carrying people to oil platforms, or carry VIP paying passengers.

    http://pzlmielec.pl/en/offer/products/sikorsky-s70i/general-description/

    A new S-70i costs USD15 million, while used S-70A-9 from Australia could be had for basically nothing if you ask them nicely. Australia has 27 S-70A-9 blackhawks for grabs out of a total of 34 (5 already allocated for museums, 2 allocated for Fire service).

    South Korea also is retiring 103 of their relatively young Blackhawks due to the want to support the Surion programme (If you want your local defence sector to grow, that is what you do, buy local products even if it is expensive and less capable. What? No open tender i hear someone say?) . Surion is basically a locally manufactured eurocopter puma. Something we can ask for (the UH-60P Blackhawks) if we are to buy the FA-50, KFX etc.

    http://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2020/10/09/south-korea-to-replace-black-hawks-with-homemade-surion-helos-says-lawmaker/

  42. ” QRAs were maintained even after the Fulcrums were retired ”

    The QRA shed in kuantan has been quiet for quite sometime now.

  43. … – “The QRA shed in kuantan has been quiet for quite sometime now.”

    It should be quiet given that the Fulcrums are retired …..

    The thing is (as I mentioned before – in case you noticed) other aircraft now rotate the QRA (to compensate for the retirement of the Fulcrums) role; in places such as Kuantan and Gong Kedak which are not as “quiet” as Kuantan given there are actual fighters there as opposed to fighters which were in Kuantan but have been retired ………..

  44. on the budget

    http://www.nst.com.my/business/2020/11/639841/petronas-pay-extra-rm10bil-dividend-ocbc-bank-expects-2021-payout-cut-nearly

    If GLC like Petronas can give out extra (in the billions) to help the government budget, why not others like Boustead? Transferring those nearly zero book value EC225LP to TUDM would not bankrupt Boustead, but will help TUDM cause immensely.

    This arrangement is not new or has no precedences. Petronas has paid for weapons for PASKAL, paid for PL Sharifah Rodziah and PL Tun Azizan. MISC has paid for BM5 and BM6. So it has been done before.

  45. Marhalim,

    A couple of army and RMAF jump related questions.

    Army. Apart from jump instructors, assistance jump instructors and riggers (we have a total of 7 grades wings), Gerak Khas and 10
    Para (the unit now runs its own jump courses) people; are there any other people who quality and wear wings? In the past there were plans for all newly inducted officers to quality for their basic wings but this wasn’t practical and was dropped. In the British army people who earned their basic wings but didn’t attend the Para Regiment’s P Company wore a different type of wings; same with RN people who are jump qualified (SPAGs) but who are not part of any unit or who did not attend the RM Commando course.

    RMAF

    The first jump instructors were sent to Australia and New Zealand for training in the 1970’s and it was then who ran jump courses for Gerak Khas until the unit had its own instructors. When we first stated jump training for units which later became part of 10 Para, in 1986, training was conducted by mixed RMAF and Gerak Khas instructors. At present does the RMAF still maintain jump instructors or are jump instructors only to be found in PASKAU?

  46. On UAVs

    There has been a new upgrade to the TB2. On the pictures below, some of the TB2s has a noticeable dorsal bulge housing BLOS SATCOM.

    http://pbs.twimg.com/media/EmcwGSMXcAEpnz-?format=jpg&name=large

    On TB2 use in the recent nagorno-karabakh conflict. It’s safe to say that Azerbaijan’s tremendous success would never have been possible without the Bayraktar TB2, destroying:

    – 119 AFVs (of which 90 T-72s)
    – 132 artillery pieces
    – 61 MRLs
    – 15 SAM systems (including S-300 systems)
    – 9 radars/jammers
    – 143 trucks
    – Countless infantry
    – Spotting targets

    Imagine if the number destroyed was malaysian forces. Basically the TB2 has single handedly managed in nagorno-karabakh to obliterate the equivalent of all malaysian MBT, artillery and MRL numbers. This is the future that we will have to adept to.

    If this can happen to land forces, something similar can happen to surface naval forces too. Why I am not at all keen on traditional corvettes for wartime missions.

  47. … – “ Why I am not at all keen on traditional corvettes for wartime missions”

    Depends on whet type of “wartime missions” doesn’t it? Whether it’s a “corvette”, “FAC” or “destroyer” nothing should be placed in a situation which it’s not prepared for or where it has to punch above its weight. It depends also if the corvette is operating alongside better prepared/equipped ships.

    Even a frigate or a destroyer: if not suitably equipped or if taken by surprise; would be just as vulnerable as a corvette if faced with certain threats including UAS swarms carrying ordnance or “suicide” ones with HE payloads.

    Azeri use of UAS (various types) was impressive and successful against an opponent ill equipped to face the threat. They were also suited for the nature of the conflict; a largely “positionalist” conflict; troops moving but not – largely – with speed over vast distances; making it easier to locate and engage targets. The fact that both did not fully deploy airpower also contributed.

    ‘Suicide” UASs have been used by the Israelis for years; were first employed by non state actors a few years ago and the Ukraine saw the first mass use of UASs in a tactical/operational manner by both sides but what was also impressive was the way someone was able to plan and coordinate a ‘swarm” attack on ARAMCO’s facilities in Saudi. Together with various examples, including the recent Azeri one; it’s a frightening indicator of things to come.

  48. @ azlan

    ” it’s a frightening indicator of things to come ”

    We can choose to become the next Azerbaijan, or we can choose to become the next Armenia. Our call.

    We can waste our budget buying expensive MPA, 6×6 IFV, glorified patrol boats for LMS and brand new transport helicopters; or we can spend prudently on those and set aside serious money to develop our UAV capability.

    We must take the UAV issue very seriously, both in utilising it and also ways to counter it.

    We need to think about equipping every section with an anti-uav gun, like we do equipping them with RPG-7s.
    http://photo2.tinhte.vn/data/attachment-files/2019/11/4836722_DroneGun_MkIII.jpg

    We need to embrace the use of UAVs more widely.

    We need to embrace the use of jammers.

    We need to beef up GAPU to be able to tackle (detect and destroy) high flying MALE UAVs

    We could try to experiment using PC-7 MkII with missiles such as TY-20 to shoot down MALE Drones
    http://pbs.twimg.com/media/CbV-v3EW8AAReom.jpg

    To equip our ships with low cost multi role missiles that can shoot down drones such as the CM-501GA
    http://5b0988e595225.cdn.sohucs.com/images/20181112/105b4d3df2014e6580e4e1b5693baa6a.jpeg

  49. Hopefully we can discuss about RMK12 and RMK13 in detail too. Single year budget is not enough to plan ahead, just enough to buy things that has been planned previously.

    IMO we need to maintain at least USD1 billion of development expenditure annually for the next 10 years to do a proper long term plan. With the 2021 DE allocation of USD1.09, it should be an achievable aim.

    For MMEA, the DE is lower in 2021 than previous. We need to maintain at least USD100 million per year in DE, and also increase the OE budget. If we need to lower our OE, things like having sail patrol ships for MMEA (that can patrol at lower cost compared to using fully engine drive) need to be seriously looked at.

    http://i.pinimg.com/originals/4f/70/63/4f7063f8e358d36b69194bc36bd25879.jpg

    http://media.apnarm.net.au/media/images/2012/11/29/SUP271112NADWARRIOR1_t1880.JPG

    http://www.popsci.com/resizer/g9UG3Qo_vKOS4I9vHXoXR50Hwf4=/1034×1553/arc-anglerfish-arc2-prod-bonnier.s3.amazonaws.com/public/W7SBZLB5B3C524UBCACKCKFJZU.jpg

    http://www.popsci.com/resizer/FQ9hdyWQJwiQzT5jX2lpa6cPMkw=/1034×688/arc-anglerfish-arc2-prod-bonnier.s3.amazonaws.com/public/EBH6AAIZTLUK3YSQJ4EK55DLXA.jpg

  50. … – “We need to beef up GAPU to be able to tackle (detect and destroy) high flying MALE UAVs”

    We have the means “detect high flying” (TRS-3D, Giraffe, Skyguard, etc) UASs but we don’t have the means to destroy them if they’re operating at certain ranges.

    The problem is with very low flying UASs; ones with a low RCS and a low IR signature which makes it problematic for certain types of missiles to lock on.

    … – “We need to think about equipping every section with an anti-uav gun”

    “Every section” realistically is an overkill. We can and should start with equipping units with an anti UAS capability; as a battalion level asset which is distributed further down when needed. Another thing we can do is establish a “anti UAS” school; comprised of a trained cadre which can train other units.

    The army does take the UAS issue very seriously; not too long ago GAPU announced that it was looking at experimenting with a variety of ways to deal with the threat by soft and hard kill means.

    What we ”should” do on paper and what we actually “can” do in actual reality depends on budgetary factors. Countering UASs (the importance we fully realise) is only one of the various things our resource strapped peacetime footing army has to deal with.

    … – “We need to embrace the use of UAVs more widely”

    I have no idea about the “embrace” but we’re quite obviously late in the game. Non state actors had a more comprehensive UAS capability until the MAF got its first organic capability thanks to the U. S. taxpayer.

  51. P.S.

    As we progressively induct UASs into service and acquire tertiary capabilities; we need to raise a “UAV Command” to operate our MALES. This ensues our systems are controlled by people who understand the way they should be operated, that no single service hogs the capability and that those who need the capability get in on time with no bureaucratic inter service issues.

  52. @ azlan

    I like the way this discussion is going…

    ” but we don’t have the means to destroy them if they’re operating at certain ranges ”
    This can be mitigated by a few methods. One is using our LCAs to shoot them down. Why we need the LCAs in numbers. Another is getting medium ranged SAMs like the MICA NG.
    _____________________

    ” The problem is with very low flying UASs; ones with a low RCS and a low IR signature which makes it problematic for certain types of missiles to lock on ”

    This can be countered with a combination of AAGs and jammers.
    _________________________

    ” “Every section” realistically is an overkill ”

    Not really IMO. We can see in nagorno-karabakh even small sections of soldiers are being targeted by loitering missiles. The ability to jam those loitering missiles, which needs to be controlled right to its impact is a matter of life and death. Jammers such as the Dronegun MkIII is just a little bit bigger than a pistol. One of those per section? That is only about 36 per battalion. I really think we can afford it. We should have section level jammers like the Dronegun MkIII, also battalion and brigade level high powered jammers and ESM like the Aselsan Ihtar and Aselsan ground jammer system REDET II
    http://pbs.twimg.com/media/Ed1v_mKWsAIY2_i.jpg:large
    __________________________

    ” What we ”should” do on paper and what we actually “can” do in actual reality depends on budgetary factors ”

    We can set aside budget for this if we can prioritize. Why i prefer JLTVs instead of 6×6 IFVs. Why I suggested used Blackhawks to replace the Nuris.
    ___________________________

    What we do in regards to UAVs in the next 10 years is really critical IMO. We need to really set up our forces to use and be proficient all the UAV and counter UAV techs there is.

  53. A lot of what occurred in Nagarno Karabakh was enabled by specific operational circumstances; i.e. one side enjoying an overmatch in certain areas; both sides not employing their full resources; one side lacking the physical means to counter certain capabilities possessed by the opposing side; a largely positionalist war with both sides largely unable to conduct rapid manoeuvre (making it more conducive for UASs), etc.

    The conflict offers interesting insights in the innovative and effective use of certain weapons/tactics; indicative of how warfare as we know it is evolving but really offers nothing new in that a lot of what was used has been seen in various other conflicts; irrespective of whether on a different scale and in different operational circumstances.

    Personally when it comes to UASs: Libya (both sides employing them in mass and both having armed systems), Ukraine (the ability of the Russians to create a strike/recce ability comprising UASs, arty and MLRSs), Syria (the use of “swarms” and the Israeli use of “suicide” systems); plus the innovative use of commercial UASs by non state actors for target spotting and surveillance) in Syria, Iraq and Libya is interesting.

    We have yet however to see the employment of UASs in a full scale war between peer or near peer opponents utilising all their resources including airpower and EW/cyber in a conflict in which rapid and high tempo manoeuvre is the norm.

    Needless to say numbers matter. Like aircraft UASs will be lost due to technical reasons, weather, enemy action (Libya is a good example); they are a national asset requiring lots of investment but we have to be prepared to lose them. We have to resist the initial tendency to view them as we do with manned platforms; as often inevitably sub consciously happens.

  54. @ azlan

    ” We have yet however to see the employment of UASs in a full scale war between peer or near peer opponents ”

    True, but in any future potential conflicts that can involve malaysia, what i foresee it is either we are going against a much bigger adversary (not peer we are inferior) or against non-state actors (not peer we are superior)
    _______________________________________

    ” We have to resist the initial tendency to view them as we do with manned platforms; as often inevitably sub consciously happens ”

    We need to treat small UAVs as something with low shelf life and need to be constantly renewed/replaced, like our RHIB fleet. On the other hand, for our MALE UAVs, we need to treat part of the fleet (probably 30%) as training and attrition spares. We cannot just get numbers only enough for operational missions. Why in my plan for UAVs, I put 12 units of UAV, with 2x operational orbits (24 hour overwatch mission) with 4 UAVs each, and 4 more as attrition spares, training and servicing rotations.

  55. … – “One of those per section? That is only about 36 per battalion. I really think we can afford”

    It’s not a question of whether we can afford it but a question of whether we should distribute jammers at section level and whether sections can be given a level of protection with jammers operated at a slightly higher level; whilst ensuring that sections and larger units which comprise are adequately protected.

    It’s not a question of need but a question of how the capability cab be be deployed; ensuring those who need it get it.

    … – “We can set aside budget for this if we can prioritize. Why i prefer JLTVs instead of 6×6 IFVs. Why I suggested used Blackhawks”

    … – “We can set aside budget for this if we can prioritizel”

    Yes you have proposed various things; so have others. You can go on and on about UASs but you’re really preaching to the already converted. We realise the vital need; ultimately the need to counter UASs is a need we fully recognise (whether “life and death” – applies to other things also) but the level of resources we put into it has to be seen in relation with the need to also focus on other areas.

    “Prioritisation” is great and sounds simple but the issue is we have to “prioritise” on various things; unlike others we do not face just one or a couple of clear and present threats.

    You want to make a strong case for dealing with UASs based on recent events in the Caucasus; another can make a equally strong case for various other things due to events elsewhere. Someone else in turn can point out another area we should “put aside” the budget for and “prioritise”. It never ends and nobody is right or wrong; this is not a spreadsheet or a PO sheet where everything is laid out so nicely with clear black/white distinctions.

    A devil’s advocate can also ask ;: how do we decide on allocating resources when it comes to theses/challenges (whatever they are) we actually face at present in relation to those we might face in the future, based in the actual likelihood? No easy answers.

  56. .. – “Why i prefer JLTVs instead of 6×6 IFVs. Why I suggested used Blackhawks to replace the Nuris”

    A “JLTV” is great and I think we should get it but ultimately it’s not a “IFV”. It can do some of the things a “IFV” can but then the army would have to tweak it’s requirement.

    Even if the end user agreed to aged pre owned Blackhawks the government might not agree. As for the reasoning; sounds great on paper but the end user would have long term concerns with regards to age related issues inherent when aircraft (irrespective of whether still having lots of hours left) namely maintenance and resulting costs issues as it ages further in the coming years. Lots of things to consider; not just the fact that something cheap with lots of like left is available ….

    … – “is either we are going against a much bigger adversary (not peer we are inferior) or against non-state actors (not peer we are superior)”

    In a state on state conflict we’d probably be tied in with other countries (playing a secondary or peripheral role) and even then it would probably be a localised one confined to specific border or disputed areas rather than a full scale full drawn one.

    Against non state actors it’s become a cliche to state so but based on actual geo political conditions the non sate actors we will continue to face will be low threat ones motivated by monetary factors rather than political or ideological.

    …. – “We need to treat small UAVs as something with low shelf life and need to be constantly renewed/replaced”

    We need to adopt the mindset that although all UASs are national assets requiring great investment; we can’t equate them with manned platforms. We can and will lose them (for whether reasons) and that’s something unavoidable; they are “expendable” in an operational
    sense but not really in an overall context.

    We also have to bear in mind that as they become more capable; they also become expensive to run; requiring greater resources to also maintain.

  57. @ azlan

    ” No easy answers ”

    Yes, no easy answers. Which is why we need to lay down all the challenges that we need to confront, and put a priority on each of them, from high to low.

  58. @ azlan

    ” A “JLTV” is great and I think we should get it but ultimately it’s not a “IFV” ”

    JLTV is used as IFV by US Army replacing their armoured humvees. Our requirement is actually a replacement of condors in our cavalry regiments. The mission is more for armed recce than say a mechanised infantry unit. As a recce vehicle, a small nimble but highly armoured vehicle such as JLTV should be a good fit for KAD cavalry regiments. Also the cost of a single 6×6 IFV probably could buy 8-10 JLTVs.
    ______________________________

    ” Lots of things to consider; not just the fact that something cheap with lots of like left is available …. ”

    yes lots to consider. my consideration for used blackhawks:

    1) plenty of Blackhawks. no issue of replacement or spares. If any airframe kaput, then can just get more free or very cheap airframes from other countries.

    2) to replace the Blackhawks with advanced FVL (future vertical lift) such as Bell Valor around 2035. So to be used for about 20-25 years only.
    https://www.malaysiandefence.com/rmn-to-wet-lease-two-helicopters/#comment-430526
    _______________________

  59. … “) plenty of Blackhawks. no issue of replacement or spares”

    Spares is not the issue but issues inherent with getting aged airframes. As they age as a general accepted rule they become more maintenance intensive.

    Getting them sound great but it goes beyond then being cheap and available. There is a reason why we’ve turned down various offers in the past. We have to factor in all aspects related to long term sustainability; not just the positive ones.

    … “JLTV is used as IFV by US Army replacing their armoured humvees”

    A “tactical high mobility”vehicle replacing a 4×4 “multi purpose vehicle”. Again, in our context I see a need for it but not necessarily as a Condor replacement. Just like how I don’t see an immediate need for follow on AV-8s if they don’t fulfil the army’s needs at this juncture.

  60. The only way we can make it work would be to get ‘x’ operational airframes (the number has to commensurate with the end user’s manpower and infrastructure realities), ‘x’ number of airframes for cannibalisation, spares to last at least 2-3 years and a full training/assistance package from the previous end user or someone else.

    On top of that the government has to commit to providing a fixed amount to cover operating/maintenance costs (unexpected costs – relating to age or other issues – have to be factored in); as well as providing a firm and realistic indication as to how long these helicopters are to be operated.

  61. Just got to see the breakdown of the RM4.5 billlion Development Expenditure.

    Not good 🙁

    Looks like some creative accounting now has the maintenance and upgrade budget moved from OE into DE, inflating the DE numbers.

    This is the rough breakdown

    1) New asset acquisition RM1.6 billion

    2) existing asset maintenance RM2.3 billion

    3) 1000 units of armed forces housing RM0.5 billion (That is RM500K house for 1k soldier. All got bungalow sized house or what?)

    So the actual DE amount is just RM1.6 billion or USD0.38 billion. What can you get for that? Please someone confirm that this info is wrong.

  62. @…
    >”JLTV is used as IFV by US Army replacing their armoured humvees”

    It is used as an APC. Neither the Humvee nor the JLTV is classed by the US Army as an “IFV”, only the Bradley and Stryker qualify.

  63. @ chua

    if you see the JLTV as an APC, then APC it is.

    Right now we need to see the context of where is this 6×6 IFV is supposed to be deployed in the army.

    The 6×6 IFV as envisaged by the army is a vehicle that is going to replace the Condors that is remaining in all of the Kor Armor Diraja cavalry regiments. Right now all KAD cavalry (except 5 KAD Nucleus Sabah with Lipanbara) still operating Condors, with 1KAD, 2KAD, 3KAD still has condors alongside the new Gempita AFT30 and LCT30.

    That is a requirement of around 160-200 6×6 IFV.

    The question is, can we afford another type of hyper expensive IFVs, another round of R&D, another round of ToT money? Would that same money be better used to buy more Gempita instead for mechanised infantry battalions? Isn’t the smaller, nimbler JLTV much more suited to a cavalry regiment mission, doing recce and giving a very different set of capabilities to augment the Gempita capabilites? Each JLTV costs USD350k, which is less than a quarter of the price of the lipanbara (USD1.66 million). You could probably buy 200 JLTV for 10-15% of the money needed to get the same amount of 6×6 IFV.

  64. @ chua

    If it is a matter of roles and capabilities, please elaborate what roles and capabilities that is needed for the army kor armor diraja cavalry regiment condor replacement should be.

  65. On the Internal security budget.

    IMO this is a “catch all” for quite a number of departments. Polis, MMEA, Penjara, Imigresen, JPN, ROS etc.

    For the DE, only RM1.98 billion is for Polis and MMEA. Another RM1.18 billion is for others.

    Still the situation in our prisons needs improvement. There is still budgets that can be saved to get important items. Things like fancy camouflage uniforms for Penjara and Imigresen for example, is superfluous for their jobs.

  66. @…
    >”please elaborate what roles and capabilities that is needed for the army kor armor diraja cavalry regiment condor replacement should be”

    If the Army requested an IFV, then they should get an armoured vehicle armed with an automatic cannon.

    If the Army requested an APC, then they should get a vehicle armed with anything from a machine-gun to nothing at all.

    The Army needs to be clear what are its requirements, so we can evaluate if the eventual product fulfills the original requirements or not.

  67. @ chua

    ” The Army needs to be clear what are its requirements, so we can evaluate if the eventual product fulfills the original requirements or not ”

    Yes, of course we need to hear from the army, on the exact requirements for these 6×6 IFV. But you can deduct what the requirement is by where the vehicles need to operate in (the Kor Armor Diraja cavalry regiments, to be operated alongside Gempita AFV30 and LCT30 versions).

    In the end, is spending this X amount of budget for replacement of an existing capability (200+ 6×6 IFV) much more better than getting 2 more Mechanised battalion with AV8 Gempita IFV25 version (added capability) which affords us to create 1 wheeled mechanised brigade and 1 tracked armoured brigade (from just 1 mixed mechanised brigade now)?

  68. @…
    To be honest, I can’t assume.

    Looking at how others manage similar requirements, the Australian army’s requirement for an APC to support its Boxers certainly would not be fulfilled by JLTV.

    The British army had a requirement of light cavalry vehicles for which JLTV was bid. At the same time however for a similar role to provide support to Warrior, they are disregarding JLTV and requesting Boxer. And yet again they are procuring Ajax to screen their heavy armour formations.

    The French are deploying both Jaguar, an IFV, and Griffon, an APC, in the same cavalry screening role. The difference naturally being the perceived threat for which each unit will address.

    In summary, since I don’t know what the requirements TDM are looking for for their Condor replacement, I’m not assuming. It could be TDM may want a hi-lo mix and might go for a combination of JLTVs (or some other kind of MRAP) plus some other IFV, maybe the 6×6 Pars.

  69. @ chua

    The “hi” in the mix is already there. It is the Gempita AFV30 and LCT30s. The search is for the “lo” in the mix, now provided by the condors.

  70. Chua – “It is used as an APC”

    It was originally intended to deal with threats posed by mines and IEDs in Iraq and Afghanistan. It’s superior mobility level compares to the Humvee was also a major plus point.

    It’s a “high mobility tactical vehicle” as described by its OEM. One can call it what one likes however; just like how turret mounted ATGWs can lead to a IFV being called a “tank killer” which can also be applied to a ATGW mounted on a 4×4 soft skin. Some will say that an unprotected 4×4 with limited mobility isn’t really a “tank killer”.

    Similarly a 1,000 tonne vessel with a modest sensor fit and only guns can be called a “OPV” but so can a similarity sized vessel armed with missiles and a high end sensor suite. We can go further and say in that the line between a “OPV”, “corvette” and and frigate can also be blurred and depends entirely in the end user.

    Chua – “. The difference naturally being the perceived threat for which each unit will address”

    Indeed. The Brits are more focused on a continental threat involving Russia. Protection is paramount and weight is a penalty worth incurring. The French still see the need for vehicles with a lighter footprint for the expeditionary role in Africa.

  71. @…
    >”The “hi” in the mix is already there. It is the Gempita”

    Like I said, I’m not assuming.

    Offtopic, a couple of sources report that JLTV unit cost has risen to USD 700k for the basic model, net of further army-specific equipment such as radios.

    @Azlan
    It is also partly in the doctrine of employment of the JLTV that shows what it is. The British are acquiring it to replace unarmoured landrovers, but indicated that it could be a replacement for anything from MRAPs up to light infantry squad APCs. Similarly, the Americans are acquiring it to haul personnel and heavy weapons like TOW.

    What they are NOT acquiring it for, is to fulfill the roles of assault vehicle, that is to support troops in combat while under fire. And that is what sets it apart from being an IFV.

  72. @ chua

    JLTV cost from 2019 Lithuania puts each at USD341.6k, as this is a DSCA announcement, that is on the high side of the cost, including Baseline Integration Kits; Ballistic Kits Armor; Explosive Formed Protection Kit; Shot Detection Boomerang Kits; Shot Detection, Boomerang III; GPS Stand Alone kits; Network Switch – 8 port; M153 Common Remote Weapon Stations (CROWS); CROWS Baseline v2 Integration Kit; MK-93 Weapons Mounts; M2 QCB .50 CAL Machine Guns; M230 TAC-FLIR Systems; Opaque Armor (windows); Basic Issue Item Kits; Winch Kits; Flat Tow Kits; Run-Flat Kits; Spare Tire Kits; Combat Bumper Kits; Duramax Turbo Engine with Allison 6 speed automatic transmission and 4×4 TAK-4i Independent suspension systems; personnel training and training equipment; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistical and program support.

    http://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/lithuania-joint-light-tactical-vehicles

    That is a fully equipped JLTV model (not a basic one), with gunshot detector, RCWS, radios, guns, FLIR, the works basically.

    That is just RM1.43 million in 2020 money. Compare to RM7 million for each lipanbara, that does not have gunshot detector, RCWS…

    There is just no other armoured vehicle, with MRAP level of armour, with high level of equipment, anyone can supply or we can buy for just RM1.43 million each. If Lipanbara is already RM7 million, a 6×6 IFV will not come anywhere near that price.
    _________________________________

    ” What they are NOT acquiring it for, is to fulfill the roles of assault vehicle, that is to support troops in combat while under fire ”

    Something not right with that statement.

  73. @…
    Lithuania is being actively supported as part of NATO’s Baltic States intervention, so it’s hard to say.

    Meanwhile, there’s this:

    “It was announced earlier that Montenegro signed a US$36.17 million contract for the procurement of 67 JLTVs of which 55 are in the basic configuration, eight in anti-tank configuration, and the remaining four in medical and command configurations.”

    Stay tuned. I believe there will be “sudden” changes in the JLTV figure, at least to partners which are not being assisted.

    – – – – – –
    >”Something not right”

    Care to elaborate?

  74. @ chua

    That sale is much more older than the lithuanian one. Even the UK sale is around USD370k per vehicle. Anyhow even if it is USD700k, it is still way cheaper than any equivalent and even many more inferior armoured vehicles.

    ” Care to elaborate? ”

    US military own words

    Mission

    • Army and Marine Commanders employ units equipped with
    JLTV as a tactical-wheeled vehicle to support all types of
    military operations. Airborne, air assault, amphibious, light,
    Stryker, and heavy forces use JLTVs as reconnaissance,
    maneuver, and maneuver sustainment platforms. Air Force
    units intend to employ JLTVs for security and special
    operations.

    • Small ground combat units will employ JLTV in combat
    patrols, raids, long-range reconnaissance, and convoy escort.

  75. can anyone tell me why the defence spending is still a necessary activity during the pandemic? i need 4 reasons if can. despite giving the big allocation to the ministry in needy such as ministry in health. big allocation in what i mean is there is a rise of RM0.3 billion than the last year of RM2 billion only.

    asked for explanation in details as i am a kid who still learning.
    thank you in advance!

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