Remember Me Part 2

82 Comments

1. Why didn’t Little birds come with Hellfires? It could pack a punch if we add them

2. Just 2 years worth of spares for MKM is too little in the context of the world events right now.

   MINDEF needs to bring out its contingency budget right now to buy all the spares it can from India, China, even from other users such as Algeria, Vietnam, Kazakhstan. At least 5-6 years worth of spares, especially those that are difficult to procure.

   Also now is the right time to revisit the Indian MiG-29N to MKM spareparts barter deal. RMAF needs all the spares that we can.

3. Because we didn’t buy them

4. Shahren,
   From the Parliament Hansard, “…Saya rasa mencukupi menggunakan MD Helicopters ini untuk melihat kepada
   ancaman-ancaman yang terpaksa kita hadapi untuk memastikan Sabah ini selamat.
   Selamat daripada segi mereka yang mengintai Sabah, mereka yang menyeludup
   manusia, barangan larangan dan dadah ke Sabah dan Sarawak. Jadi ia memang
   menepati keperluan dan saya rasa light attack aircraft yang ada persenjataannya
   yang tersendiri iaitu Gatling gun 7.62mm, heavy machine gun 12.7mm dan rocket
   launcher 70mm. Ini semua menunjukkan bahawa kita telah – the end users iaitu
   tentera darat telah memikirkan sedalam-dalamnya keperluan mereka dan
   alhamdulillah, keenam-enam unit sudah sampai ke tanah air kita.”
   The minister highlighted that those MDs are well configured to handle smuggling activities. Hellfire is overkill and as Marhalim put it “because we didn’t buy them” 😅

5. Malaysia has a minimalist approach to defence, expecting to play the Damsel in Distress in times of need. The MDs are equipped for Hellfires and hopefully these will be donated by our friends if needed. Brilliant policy for a weak country in my cynical opinion.

6. Thank you Marhalim for posting the entire transcript. It sheds a lot of light on the issues at hand. May I give my comment point by point to his statement.

   8. Despite the pressure on us to follow and condemn Russia, we steadfastly maintain our neutrality and by exhorting the world to go thru proper channels via UN to sanction Russia is the right way. Unilateral actions by the West is just as bad as unilateral action by Russia to invade.

   9. It is telling our trade with 3rd biggest power is so low, this might be our soft way of telling off Russia about their role & responsibility for MH17.

   10. H2O statement contradicts ATSC CEO statement that our MKMs can be selfsufficiently serviced without Russian involvement. We still need their parts and as I said, cannot trust the local players words.

   11&12. After we ran down the 2 year stocks of parts then what? It seems we are trying to get REM parts from China & India but what about quality, function, & warranty? Our MKMs are as rojak as can be, so if mix in these REM parts, how they function is questionable.

   13. His statement does indicate they are no longer looking towards Russia to supply equipment & weapons systems unlike PM4 era. That is a good thing in a way.

   29&32. Truly LOL! Setting up another ministerial taskforce just to study in detail (not even making the said decision!). And don’t expect any movement until the study is complete, meaning further delays to LCS completion.

   33&34. Shifting blame onto cikus rather than taking it himself. Brilliant.

   35. Audit firm can only find out what comes in, goes out and what is missing. They cannot find what is NOT given, the extra funding that was for topup to the real project budget.

   38. MINDEF still doing FAT test, so actually the choppers haven’t yet delivered to TDM. Only after FAT passed, can we said the choppers were delivered.

   38. Interestingly, arrival in Port Klang indicates they were shipped by sea rather than airflown in as cargo. Too bad no Antanovs.

   39&40. Heartening to know MINDEF acknowledge there is lateness and LAD penalties will be brought to the local agent, rather than sweeping under the carpet as usual. The local players must understand the gravity of supplying ATM is no cakewalk and easy money, they need to do the legwork or else get penalties.

   42. H2O put on record the choppers are for TDM requirements so those who disputes it, I hope they have proof on that. But 6 units, 3 here & 3 there, I doubt they have any significant increase in TDM firepower as he said.

7. Why is the gov not serious about our defense and sovereignty… Not enough fighter jets ..no worries not enough navy ships..no worries .. it’s like a sinking feel when thinking about our nation capabilities.. at least we should have minimum capabilities to defend

8. @gonggok
   Why would other active users sell us their spares? We aren’t going to be paying them in gold or oil, and will Russia even allows 3rd party sales?

   @Tom Tom
   No way will other nations be donating munitions unless we’re in a situation like Ukraine. Even them, prior to the invasion did not not get all those weapons that is flowing in until Russia troops have marched past their borders. If we have a need for Hellfires, we will buy them but to date there is no requirements.

   It comes to me the eerie similarities with current conflict and the Russia-Mujahedeen war; with Ukraine now the proxy battlefield of today, the West are flushing down weapons to the fighters, Russia being bogged down by protracted battles, a leader trying to hold onto his Cold War idealism. But will history repeats itself, with the West regretting arming the Mujahedeens who later turned these weapons onto their makers? Ukrainians are not the Taliban but whos to stop them selling Javelins & Stingers to terrorists when they need money to rebuild?

9. Our MKMs are as rojak as can be, so if mix in these REM parts”

   Parts for the engine, landing gear, gear box, engine nozzles, radar, etc, are all Russian. The other components are Western and can be easily sourced as long as they are still in production.

   , I doubt they have any significant increase in TDM firepower as he said”

   If one has nothing then gets 3 it’s indeed an increase in firepower. Whether it’s sufficient depends on the threat.

   . Only after FAT passed, can we said the choppers were delivered.”

   They are “delivered” per see but have not reached IOC yet.

10. Trade tbe mkm to ukraine for US to supply us the superhornet…yeah rite

11. “Ukrainians are not the Taliban but whos to stop them selling Javelins & Stingers to terrorists when they need money to rebuild”

    Look at things in the proper light. The Ukraine is anxious to portray a good image as part of its policy to further integrate itself with the West via EU and NATO membership. Why on earth would seek stuff to terrorists?

    Higher chance of sone of the thousands of volunteers – some with far right leanings – trying to obtain weapons for nefarious purposes.

12. Guna – “at least we should have minimum capabilities to defend”

    This has long been our policy; having a minimum [based on the resources we have and the threat calculus] to deal with the type of threats likely to be encountered. Those threats were based on the assumption that we’d never be in a full blown war with anyone but might be in brief period of tension or conflict over long unresolved overlapping claims [not only over the Spratlys].

    Times have changed; we have to raise the level of minimum deterrence needed to cope with the changing geo political environment but a question arises;should procurement and force structure be capability or threat driven? Our defence planners have a very good idea and understanding as to what we should and shouldn’t do; plus the urgency; same can’t be said of the politicians.

13. Again, the MKMs are a very specialised version of the Flanker, it will take months for them to learn how to fly them

14. No lah, they are distributing it to the Ukrainian Army

15. From what we see in Ukraine, good thing our military planners don’t believe in tanks and attack helos.

    The learning we get now is to invest in air defence, atgms and drones. Not so expensive to procure and maintain. We should also get some veru speedy 4×4 to move our SF and Elite teams all over the place, rather than slow 6×6.

16. “The other components are Western and can be easily sourced”
    I am not too worried on the Western parts and never did mention about China or India helping us on that. If we start to replace Russian components with REM from those countries, the performance or even functionality is questionable. Our rojak will be even worse off if Sukhoi doesn’t want to help us when we use nonapproved parts.

    “They are “delivered” per see”
    Dealing with Mindef business, nothing is considered “delivered” until they are signed off, and nothing is signed off until it passed FAT.

17. Some of the volunteers have been seen equipped with Western supplied stuff. Makes sense as many are ex military and are familiarity with various stuff which has been supplied.

18. Remember in past years when I called many times here for more ATGMs to be purchased? See how useful they are in Ukraine, especially top-attack weapons. RPG7s are useful but not in the anti-tank role, not any more.

    Now hear this: the Su-30MKMs are irrelevant. Ukraine is doing fine without them. The RuAF can take the sky but the battle is won on the ground, an air campaign with high collateral damage would be unacceptable in public eyes, and SAMs and MANPADs can contest the skies effectively against our expected peer opponents.

    What the Ukrainians are investing in – and we should too – is the infantry battalion, the basic building block of an army, and particularly useful in defence and urban terrain. (I’ve also said this before.) Bring our infantry equipment up to scratch with optics, NVGs, 40mm grenade launchers, RPGs for anti-structure and soft vehicles, and NLAWs for close in antitank work. Body armour and secure radios if possible, and miniature drones at platoon level at least. And training training TRAINING. Everybody from the Paras to the PGA must know how to conduct ambushes and use an optic, machine-gun, RPG, NLAW and maybe Igla correctly.

    This will be a better and longer-lasting investment with better bang for buck than a fleet of fighters or a brigade of battle tanks.

    Finally… Russia has just convincingly shown the world what CORRUPTION can do to even the most well-equipped army. If you truly have an interest in defending the nation, you won’t accomplish much sitting on your arse making up fantasy fleets. Vote out CORRUPTION, then we can get things done. If not, not even the power of 10 tank divisions will succeed.

19. They want the tanks and attack choppers lah, they just cannot afford it

20. They actually want to be US, UK, Aussie army lah, they just cannot afford it.

    The recent army day demo even did a full on armoured brigade amphibious assault gimmick in front of all the foreign defence attaches, when the fact is that we have zero ships that can land our pendekar, adnan and gempita on the beach.

21. Chua – See how useful they are in Ukraine, especially top-attack weapons. RPG7s are useful but not in the anti-tank role, not any more”

    Something fundamentally wrong with this statement. ATGWs have always been useful but like everything they are not a panacea and have to be deployed in the proper manner in conjunction with other assets. On RPGs they are useful but in the right circumstances – in restricted or at close ranges or both – on the certain parts of certain tanks one can achieve penetration with a RPG: especially with tandem warheads. As such saying that RPGs have zero utility against armour is not true per see.

    “Everybody from the Paras to the PGA must know how to conduct ambushes and use an optic, machine-gun, RPG, NLAW and maybe Igla correctly.”

    Really? Well, no doubt you’re an acknowledged practitioner but rest assured that units have a pretty good idea as to how to employ their respectice weapons an effective manner as part of combined arms tactics.

    “Now hear this: the Su-30MKMs are irrelevant. Ukraine is doing fine without them”

    Now you “hear this”…You are making a generalised simplistic statement. There are reasons unique to the Ukraine why air power has not been deployed effectively; this is because of institutional, doctrinal and other issues. The war in the Ukraine has just started; like how others made presumptuous statements supposedly Kearny from Nargano Karabakh; some have done the same with the Ukraine without looking on the context and the various operational factors. If another conflict breaks out next year and a few ships are sunk by ASMs; are people going say we shouldnt buy ships, only ASMs?

    ” SAMs and MANPADs can contest the skies effectively against our expected peer opponents”

    Only if part of a layered and networked GBAD and supported by a strong air arm. As you’ll no doubt be aware any GBAD can be degraded and neutralised if not used in conjunction with effective air cover.

22. One cannot surmised anything from a demonstration meant for national TV

23. It is a demonstration for the TV and in front of dozens of foreign defence attaches.

    and what did we show?

    An armoured amphibious assault (pendekar, adnan and gempita landed on the beach by “kapal induk” as what the Emcee announced) that in real life we clearly cannot execute.

24. gonggok – we have zero ships that can land our pendekar, adnan and gempita on the beach”

    Even if we had the amphibs do we have enough assets to escort them and assets to neutralise whatever defences there are inland? I would go further bad ask if we’d actually have a need to land armour on a beachhead?

    Also a lot of demos and firepowe denonsttations are for PR purposes; for the media, defence attaches and student of the Staff College and Defence College.

25. “they are distributing it to the Ukrainian Army”
    Many of those posing pictured with Javelins & Stingers are looking more irregular troops than a properly attired soldier. Even then a professional soldier wouldn’t be taking photos with their hardware and posting on social media. I am leaning towards those are volunteer fighters and not from the army.

    Aside that, those proponents spamming ATGMs should take heed that APS systems are rapidly maturing to a dependably reliable level in the battlefield. Israel’s Trophy APS has reached to such a level that no Merkavas was damaged with dozens of successful interceptions in IDF latest incursion. What might work against an army unaccustomed to guerilla warfare would pale against a conventional force that is prepared for such tactics.

26. Isn’t this just a case of prioritisation? There’s the LCS, LCA, UAS, MPA, Army Condor replacements, Amphibious/LST ship, Nuri replacements, etc. programs. There is only a fixed amount of monies available. So why does everyone say we need to buy all tomorrow? So what ends up happening is, buy a little bit of everything, which aggregated together, is still a little bit of everything. Too little of something merely gives the armed forces enough to learn how to operate and show off in a demonstration. Limited numbers mean the armed forces won’t be able to integrate the assets into their Order of Battle. It would be a better discussion if people just determine for a limited amount of money, how would they spent it rather than we should buy everything.
    For example:
    18 LCA vs 2 LCS
    3 or 5 UAVs vs 18 LCA
    3 or 5 UAVs vs 5 Medium Lift Helicopters
    2 LCS vs 2 Amphibious / LST ships
    36 LCA vs 2 LCS + 3 UAV + 2 LST
    20 UAVs vs 2 LCS
    10 LMS vs 2 LCS
    3 Long Range SAM batteries vs 2 LCS
    3 Long Range SAM batteries vs 10 LMS
    12 HM225M vs 2 LCS

    My top 3 priorities would be 1) LCA, 2) LMS, 3) Nuri Replacement. Only because the LCA can be used to cover air, sea, and land. LMS because more ships means more coverage (2 LCS vs 10 LMS?). Nuri replacement because its long overdue (3 Malaysian plans?), high HM225 usage means wear and tear of existing helicopters would be bad long term. More helicopters is essential for disaster relief (the annual Malaysian floods and contribution to foreign humanitarian operations).

    If we’re really tight on funds, it would be 1) LCA, 2) MPA, 3) UAS. LCA is the same reasoning, can cover air, land, sea. MPA because it can cover some of the LMS coverage gaps and can cover all maritime zones faster. UAS in large quantities has been proven to be a substantial force multiplier at a fraction of the purchase and sustainment cost of manned fighter jets.

27. “posing pictured with Javelins & Stingers are looking more irregular troops than a properly attired soldier”

    Weapons are going to the army, National Guard and paramilitary units. Units such as the Azov Battalion which contains individuals with far right leanings. As such the biggest danger is such individuals getting hands on various types of weapons rather than the Ukrainians selling them to terrorists. The Ukraine has little to gain by doing so.

    “Even then a professional soldier wouldn’t be taking photos with their hardware and posting on social media. I am leaning towards those are volunteer fighters and not from the army”

    In in this,day and age of social media; posting photos is good for moral and to send to friends and family. We had ank a d bRut troops in Iraq and Afghanistan doing became – they were not irregulars. As for “properly attired” many of the troops have been in combat for 3 weeks and we’d hardly expect them to look like they’ve returned from.a parade ground.

    “proponents spamming ATGMs should take heed that APS systems are rapidly maturing to a dependably reliable level in the battlefield”

    As I said; ways will be found to counter or neutralise them. Just how over the last century and in recent times tanks found ways of countering AT rifles, AT guns, AT mines, ATGWs, top attack mortar rounds, aircraft with AT weapons, etc. Nobody is suggesting that APAs do not change the overall calculus; merely that there is a counter to everything.

    Kel – So why does everyone say we need to buy all tomorrow”

    Who is saying that? Buying based on prioritisation is great on paper but what happens when one has the situation faced here? When delays aftervdelays are made and when the armed services can’t plan or cater accordingly be cause there is no timeline the politicians can commit to and when as a,result of constant delays capabilities atrophy? Also, if the politicians had followed through all those years with the plans presented by threatened services thwre would not be such a long shopping list.

28. AFAIK, the Gripen was not offered for the tender, so technically, it shouldn’t be in the list of aircraft under consideration. It will be another thorn in RMAF side, if they breakup the 36 aircraft into two totally different types.

29. Gripen was first offered as a F-5 replacement then as a MRCA when the requirement arose about a decade ago.

30. kel – high HM225 usage means wear and tear of existing helicopters would be bad long term”

    What high usage rate? Gone are the days when helis has to do 3-4 or more sorties a day in support of the army and other things. Today, high usage rates will only be at certain times for limited durations. Also, mercy flights now are shared with the RMN, MMEA and BOMBA; depending on the circumstances.

31. And it was rejected for the MRCA, first as a lease offer and then together with the Saab Eyeriye. As I had posted before, the Typhoon and Rafale were selected as the preferred solution for the MRCA. The Rafale was then sole selected but the then government suddenly got cold feet and didn’t signed the contract.

32. kel – If we’re really tight on funds, it would be 1) LCA, 2) MPA, 3) UAS”

    That is indeed the priority. The problem is that what we’re buying is long overdue; too little and over too long a period.

    Karl.- “MPA because it can cover some of the LMS coverage gaps”

    Because they can operate at further ranges than surface assets and they can have a “closer” look at stuff of interest but they should be able to talk in real time or near real time with surface assets as well as subs.

    kel – UAS in large quantities has been proven to be a substantial force multiplier at a fraction of the purchase”

    Indeed but if used in full conjunction with other assets and if right C3 setup is there. Will RMAF UASs be able to talk to MMEA ships or even to RMN ships? If a RMAF UAS detects a surface contact contact how long will it take for the nearest RMN asset be informed and under what mechanism?

33. Gonggok,
    As per the TDM HUT 89 event, I went and tried my luck spot by the beach. A lot of the visual shown on TV was pre-edited footage and mix into the actual scenes. At least there was no Kasturi, Mahawangsa or even the Sukhoi in PD on both the days when I was there. As Azlan said, it’s PR work.
    Realism is the tide level was lower if compared to the Hari ATM event held in the same place. We can see the assault boat have a tough time manoeuvring as they reach the “rocky” beach before the Para needs to hoop off and walk further in the water.
    From the show, given the lack of medium-lift helos in all the three branches, the army definitely can do with their own medium-lift helo. Not the civilian lease but military specs as they rely on the AF for fast rope, airdrop RHIB and sling load of 105mm gun. Of course, there are many more priorities before the consideration of medium-lift helos.

34. At one point the then Defence Minister was so memorised by Typhoon he publicly stated that it was the best/most capable [or something to that effect] platform and that other procurement programmes might effected due to Typhoon. Then came Rafale and Dassault offer for local assembly…

35. Question from a katak di bawah tempurung. Even without MANPAD, how safe it is for a MD530 or A109 to fly low and fast into a hostile area? ie. can a M16 bring down a MD530 or A109?

36. Yup both are not equipped with armoured windows. BTW someone will chipped in saying an Apache also had to make an emergency landing after it was hit by an Iraqi villager armed with 303 rifle during the Gulf War. Yes sometimes one get lucky in war

37. He didn’t have any say on the deal, it was the then PM had decided on the Rafale

38. Mat Bon -Even without MANPAD, how safe it is for a MD530 or A109 to fly low and fast into a hostile area?”

    Depends also if the troops have a window of opportunity. You can hear a heli approaching but due to vegetation or buildings; might only be able to see, aim and shoot at it for a very brief moment.

39. Ed Liew,

    I have also written a similar observation as you did, but was not approved.

    I am fully aware that it was all a PR stunt. But we are showing a PR stunt of things we cannot execute (armoured amphibious assault), and also show what kind of priority we have been doing for our training.

    Our exercises are always attack, attack and attack. We rarely do exercises to prioritize on doing defend. For example instead of doing amphibious assault exercise, we have never done a large scale anti-amphibious beach defence exercise (like vietnam regularly does).

    Back to the demo, my observations.
    – yes we lack the numbers of medium lift helicopters to execute all the things that was shown. PUTD needs a replacement for nuri too, and this needs to be closely coordinated with RMAF so that no duplication is done.
    – we also lack the LST and LPD to land our armoured units onto the beach. What the MC announced about pendekar, adnan and gempita landed on the beach by “kapal induk”, that ship simply does not exist. We need not practice what we cannot execute (amphibious assault).
    – There is also a lack of UAV ISR assets shown. All ISR done purely by Mk1 eyeball of GGK and Pathfinder operators. Tentera darat does not have any long endurance UAV assets, anything similar to scaneagles RMN has for example.
    – Calling in fires. Do we train for JTAC levels of operator competency? Calling in fires still through voice massage? Do we have secure whatssapp like system to call in fires?
    – we are doing this stunt in front of all the foreign defence attaches. What kind of message that we want to send to these foreign defence attaches?

40. Ganggok,
    What you say is correct, the VO script was a bit over but like Marhalim put it, that was just a demonstration. Logistic wise, I would say that location is not perfect for a lot of things except to keep the public away. I went there for the ATM and TDM events hoping they will deploy the two Powercraft Marine 15m fast assault crafts for the demo but it did not happen. I can only guess that the seabed is just too rocky for something that big.
    On the other hand, things that are not made known does not mean it’s not there. The ongoing exercises by all the branches of MAF we don’t know details on and those things that you mentioned might just be happening. From experience, I would say they always do their best to keep things wrapped up and out of public knowledge.
    Perhaps that’s just how things are with the military.

41. Problem with LCS is all 6 hull has been cut. And this is a suspicious move because they trying to force the gov should the project is delayed. Im not sure the cost of those steel. The equipment and weapon system already purchased like the Bofors 57mm naval gun, NSM, Radar & Sensors. It is best to minimize the losses by reducing the number of hulls. A fully equipped 2 units are better than ill equipped 6. As for the weapons the remaining 4 can be installed elsewhere like NSM can be fitted with Kedah NGPV. Yes i know wiring is different but we can modify.

42. “This whole “tanks are obsolete” scenario is predicated upon allowing your enemy to entirely dictate the terms of engagement and simply enduring longer than them with a ‘death by a thousand pin-pricks’ strategy to wear them down over time.
    There has,been a lot of talk and assumptions on defence as opposed to offence and the paragraphs above says a lot. Let’s put things in perspective and separate the popular and convenient assumptions from the facts. Going on the defence certainly is an option for the weaker side but is predicated on various key criterion being met; namely having adequate reserves to relocate from one other to the next; adequate stocks of ammo and other key consumables; the enemy doing as one expects or hopes; pre planted forward back fall back positions, etc. It must also be noted that entirely going on the defence may lead to tactical or even operational level victories but rarely strategic. This is not to say however that going on the defence has no utility; it does but it must also incorporate a maneuverist aspect rather the largely positional. It is also not a panacea.

    On the attackers part he has the initiative as he can attack where he chooses – he is proactive rather that reactive. He can choose to have a numerical superiority at the point of contat to overwhelm the defence. Note that conventional wisdom has it that the attacker must have a 3 to 1 numerical advantage but only
    if the defender is repositioned or firmly in fixed defensive positions. There is also the question of how mobile the defender is to react to fast changing situations.

    Ultimately both have pros and cons but by large going entirely on the defensive rarely leads to the strategic results desired [if someone brings Finland I’d gladly discuss it and also bring up Findalisation]. Also, contrary to popular misconception a defensive approach can and must also incorporate a maneuverist element.

43. The idea that we focus mainly on the offence is simply untrue. One can have a defensive strategy but also a maneuverist approach; attacks of limited scope and intent at a,tactical or even operational level in line with a defensive strategy. Adopting a defensive strategy doesn’t mean one adopts a totally positionalist approach. The army and defence planners are fully aware of the need not to play to an opponent’s strengths and to maximise whatever advantages we have.

    As for non voice means to call in and adjust arty the means to do it are the BMSs [on an AV-8 variant] and other gear at battery and regimental level including the ballistic computers we have. Even the older Thales AS2000 FCS which we employ with the G-5s has this function. There is the means and has been for a while now.

    The pertinent arty related questions should ask whether we have FDCs and if the Royal Artillery Corps has any immediate plans to get a UAS capability in theform of mini/small UASs [even off the shelf ones] and to make changes in organisation.

44. “The Ukraine has little to gain by doing so.” Not the Government or the military, but the various fighting militias and irregulars. Unlike the regular army, there is little to no oversight on their conducts and accountability of weapon usages. The issue of weapons proliferation after war ended is not uncommon nor strange. Those pics posted by US Forces have been vetted prior to posting in order to sanitise any elements that is unfavourble. This unlike the freewheeling postings by Ukrainian fighters, some like that celebrity tennis player, are also splashed on mainstream news. Looking at their mishmash and disjointed gear & clothing, they certainly looked even more hodgepodge than a regular special ops team that just came back from weeks long mission. It is the passing on of high impact weapons in their hands from these irregulars when the war is over that worries the most.

45. “ways will be found to counter or neutralise them”
    As will ways in evolving APS systems to handle such counters. Richer nations with deeper military and R&D pockets will strive to keep their shield on the stronger edge now that they have the advantage. Trophy has shown its efficacy on the battlefield and at the moment it is the benchmark to beat.

46. “Trophy has shown its efficacy on the battlefield and at the moment it is the benchmark to beat”

    It is and APSs have certainly changed the calculus but not permanently.

    To cope with infantry the barbed wire was used; to cope with barbed wire and fixed defences tanks used; to cope with the tank AT rifles and arty firing on open sights were used; the list goes on and on. Humans innovate and no single weapon or piece of gear has ever permanently remained dominant on its own or failed to see a counter measure.

47. “Not the Government or the military, but the various fighting militias and irregulars”

    Well if you had specifically made that clear from the onset it would have done away with the need for a lot of typing..

    This was you first comment on the issue – “Ukrainians are not the Taliban but whos to stop them selling Javelins & Stingers to terrorists when they need money to rebuild?” Gives a totally different impression as to the point you were driving at.

48. Last week our CBRNe unit did a simulation training activity at one of the MRT line with their Royal Canadian counterparts. Are such public location trainings a regular thing? Im wondering if we have done mock events where massed people are involved in emergency scenarios onboard public transports ie terrorist gas/dirty bomb attack on trains/ buses/ stations during peak period. Or where terrorist releasing toxic/ poison gas into Govt building ventilation.

49. Yes such training have been conducted in public locations in the past

50. Azlan,

    “The pertinent arty related questions should ask whether we have FDCs”
    Yes of course we do. It is attached to every Division. The 10 Para and Briged Artilleri Roket have their own independent FDC too.

    “if the Royal Artillery Corps has any immediate plans to get a UAS capability in theform of mini/small UASs [even off the shelf ones]”
    No publicly noted plans, but something that should be a high priority for RAD. The UAS must have similar range to our artillery pieces, a small operating footprint, and a long endurance. Something with similar performance to the scaneagle. Small handheld quadcopters does not have the performance needed. Following UK Army practices, all UAVs should be under The Royal Artillery Regiment.

    Another would be the recapitalisation of our Counter Artillery/Weapon Locating Radar, and getting some short range Counter Mortar Radar, and passive artillery sound ranging system too. The current number of Saab ARTHUR Weapon Locating Radar is too small (just 2 units). Need to have some in both West and East Malaysia. A counter artillery radar version of the Groundmaster 200 4D AESA radar (the Groundmaster 200 MM/C) that we are already using would be a good choice. Norway bought 5x Groundmaster 200 MM/C (plus 3x option) for just 94 million dollars. A single ARTHUR or other weapon locating radars cost more than that. Smaller Mortar Locating Radars should also be bought. Something like the AN/TPQ-49. It can detect mortar or artillery fire to about 10km range, and also have a mode to detect small and slow UAVs. Passive artillery sound ranging system should be looked at too. Systems such as Leonardo HALO (Hostile Artillery LOcating system) is currently used by British Army, US Marines, Korean army and others. HALO has a range about 15km, but it is totally passive system (no electronic emissions) unlike a radar.

51. gonggok – “is attached to every Division”

    Should be attached to every regiment as FDCs are the ink between the gun line and the C2 element.

    gonggok – all UAVs should be under The Royal Artillery Regiment”

    With the exceptions of mini UASs operated by infantry units; Gerak Khas and the intel battalions. By the way things are going MBTs will have an integral mini UAV in the coming years.

    As stated in previous discussions over the years I would like to see changes in organisation; this remains largely unchanged for decades. Smaller batteries which are easier to deploy and command and because of certain institutional and doctrinal changes can deliver rounds faster and more accurately.

52. “Gives a totally different impression as to the point you were driving at.”
    Read again what I said. I said ‘Ukrainians’ not ‘Ukraine’. The same like you and are do not represent our country in any official Governmental manner but which our actions could be diametrically opposed their official stance. Goes back to the individual Ukrainians, and every others who were involved in fighting throughout all wars since time immemorial. Some might keep them which makes easier to retrieve, some might pass on the weapons to interest groups, some will sell them, some might become mercenaries. All which are undoubtedly opposing the legitimate Ukraine Govt stance, but can they enforce it post-war? I doubt it as it never happened in previous wars ever.

53. gonggok – Briged Artilleri Roket have their own independent FDC too.”

    You sure about this?

    gonggok – Small handheld quadcopters does not have the performance needed”

    We need something in numbers as UASs Will be lost to enemy action or other reasons but we can’t by something in the category of Scaneagle in numbers for distribution to arty regiments; that’s the problem. We get smaller off the shelf systems [whether quadcopters or otherwise]; we can buy them in numbers but they lack range and endurance.

54. Hardly any need to “read again”. Once was more than enough believe me..
    I’ll stand by what I said in that the initial impression of “Ukrainians” was the state or state authorised entities per see…

55. gonggok,

    Another arty related issue concerns the SPHs. The Artillery Directorate has decided on a wheeled platform [for various known and already widely discussed factors]. Preference was/is Caeser but given that there are already systems on offer [apart from Israeli ones] in which the actual gun is in an unmanned turret with a loading system and the crew is a protected cab; I’m inclined going down this route rather than having all the crew exposed out in the open. I for one am absolutely convinced we should never buy another towed 155mm piece.

56. Azlan

    “You sure about this?”
    yes, attached to Markas Briged Artileri Roket.

    “we can’t by something in the category of Scaneagle”
    There are military off the shelf UAVs that has the same performance as the scaneagle but costs so much less. The 12 scaneagle costs 19.3 million dollars (to the US taxpayers). You can get probably 6 dozen UAV and 18 ground controllers of the UAV pictured below for the same price.

    http://pictr.com/images/2022/03/23/BQUE8r.md.jpg

57. Azlan,

    “I would like to see changes in organisation”

    British Royal Artillery has been through continuous changes in the past 5-10years.

    The 105mm L118 regiments have changed from 4 batteries of howitzers, to only 2 batteries per regiment, with another 2 batteries converted to “TAC” (tactical) batteries. The TAC battery is like a FO/FDC combo that can quickly call for fire from a single L118 battery. So it is geared for smaller, rapid fire support, instead of large scale maneuvers.

    As for Rejimen Artileri DiRaja, currently they are embarking on adding more regiments in east Malaysia. 8RAD recently stood up in Sarawak, with L5 pack howitzers handed down from 1RAD PARA. It is reported that 3 more regiments to be stand up in Sabah. Probably 1x 155mm, 1x air defence, 1x ASTROS? CO of Briged Artileri Roket recently did a courtesy call to 5 Division CO.

    Still I have not seen any attempts to improve situational awareness and fire directions. No plans yet for UAVs for RAD, no plans to be able to strike at time sensitive and dynamic targets, rather than onto stationary targets. No plans to add more weapon locating radars or to add passive artillery sound ranging system. Also no plans to add more EW/ESM systems (but this should be under Kor Risik) to track and detect adversary electronic emissions, to locate command nodes to be eliminated by artillery fires.

    What about converting some of the 105mm regiments to use loitering munitions? What changes to to C2 to accommodate this new type of weapon?

    Recently all 120mm mortars mounted on adnan and gempita are now under RAD bti control. Should we add towed 120mm mortars to supplement the 105mm howitzers? Would the smaller, lighter towed 120mm mortar (500kg) actually be a better fire support weapon for PARA brigade compared to the bulkier LG1 105mm howitzer (1520kg)? Could we ask for free US EDA of recently retired US Marines M327 120mm rifled mortars (also known as MO-120-RT, 66 available, same model of mortar installed in our adnan and gempita) along with tons of mortar rounds?

    We also have fully paid for lots of NSM missiles, but with no ships (yet) to put them on. Why not put them on trucks to stand up an anti-ship regiment for RAD?

    Polish NSM truck
    http://pictr.com/images/2022/03/23/BQlERn.md.jpg

    Aussie NSM on Bushmaster MRAP
    http://pictr.com/images/2022/03/23/BQlHrB.md.jpg

58. An automated wheeled SPH does not meet the requirements, though it has happened before the chosen equipment doesn’t really meet the requirements.

59. Azlan,

    “Another arty related issue concerns the SPHs”

    “the actual gun is in an unmanned turret with a loading system and the crew is a protected cab; I’m inclined going down this route rather than having all the crew exposed out in the open”
    The BAE Systems Archer is probably the one you are talking about. Its fully automated, and Sweden is going all out (72 units) of the archer (with the gun itself salvaged from retired FH77 howitzers). But like you say, it depends on the particular situation. Sweden, although a very large country, has all its land borders with strong allies (Norway and Finland). It expects any attack to come from the sea. Very cold weather also means a fully automated system is preferable. But having a fully automated system also has its downsides. Any malfunctions are much more difficult to solve. Semi auto systems can still function fully manual if the semi auto system breaks down. Norway was supposed to buy the Archer, but choose to get the Korean K9 instead. What made the Norwegians change their mind?

    “I for one am absolutely convinced we should never buy another towed 155mm piece”
    Yes in many accounts 155mm SPH are way better than towed 155mm howitzers. But they cost a lot, not just buying them, but also maintaining them. As it is right now, a big country such as Malaysia having just one 155mm regiment is underwhelming. If we go for 155mm SPH, but in token numbers because of the cost, might as well get more towed 155mm for the same amount of money.

60. Gonggok – Yes in many accounts 155mm SPH are way better than towed 155mm howitzers”

    Faster to and easier to move around, relocate and lay. As for maintenance prime movers of towed guns also have to be maintained.

    gonggok – “well get more towed 155mm for the same amount of money”

    But are less survivable and far less mobile. Offering far less operational flexibility.

    gonggok – But having a fully automated system also has its downsides”

    The main advantage is that less crew are needed and they are not out in the open fully exposed.

61. gonggok – “a big country such as Malaysia having just one 155mm regiment is underwhelming”

    It’s pathetic and a sign of how seriously we take defence. A 5 division army with some 40 line battalions with just a single 155mm regiment. We have about 110 Model 56s, which are extremely short range [a throwback to our internal.security days] and useful for only close fire support – not for interdiction or counter fire because of a lack of range. They are also not very durable construction wise.

62. The USMC is cutting its MBTs and reducing its Artillery forces in favour of more mobile, prevision weapons and drones. So its not inconceivable that the era of big tanks and heavy guns is over. Obviously it hasn’t, but the point is, don’t be rigid about force structures. The USMC thinks heavy equipment is unsuitable in a maritime environment – interestingly Malaysia’s main security threats are maritime in nature. The USMC seeks to support and augment the USN’s ability in the Pacific, instead of operating as an independent fighting force – so it deploys solutions like NMESIS. The USN wants to use drones to resupply ships, will be using UAVs to refuel, and will use drones for combat missions. Considering the big picture, its clear how the US is structuring its forces in the Pacific. Can Malaysia adopt some of the principles? Or let’s stick with traditional doctrine – big guns, and even bigger guns, gun lines, broad front, tank on tank, etc. Its once again, given limited amount of funds, what is the best way to use the monies. Buy a bit of everything or adopt a min-max approach?

63. kel – ”So its not inconceivable that the era of big tanks ”

    Post 1973 the same claim was made due to ATGWs. Post Nargano Karabakh the same claim was made due to armed UASs. no doubt if a conflict occurs next year in say Africa and one side loses a few frigates; some will claim that the day of the frigate is over and that we should invest mainly n ASMS…

    kel – ”Can Malaysia adopt some of the principles? ”

    We can adopt what fits our context; in line with the threat calculus and actual resources.

    Both were presumptuous and untrue. Tanks operate as part of combined arms formations; in conjunction with other asset. That is what enables effectiveness.

    kel – ”don’t be rigid about force structures”

    Force structures/organisational patterns need to evolve; to be played with and worked on at different periods.

    kel – ” interestingly Malaysia’s main security threats are maritime in nature.”

    They are but the key difference is that we don’t see the need for a expeditionary capability or to project power beyond our periphery. The USMC caters for the need to project multi domain power in the littorals as part of a Joint force against a peer adversary; we don’t.

    kel – ”Or let’s stick with traditional doctrine – big guns, and even bigger guns, gun lines, broad front, tank on tank”

    First of all do we have a doctrine per see? Don’t assume we do.

    Our force structure and organisation is based on the premise that we won’t be in a high intensity protracted fight with a state actor; thus our army consists mostly of motorised combat units together with a small mechanised element. We need a strong maneuverist element with a proper mix of direct and indirect support backed by an effective logistics and ISR capability. Our strategy is largely a defensive one with a maneuverist and other approaches incorporated.

64. @Kel
    As the President’s mailed fist in global diplomacy, the USMC is naturally geared towards offensive doctrine and therefore their core, the Marine Expeditionary Force, has now decided that speed, surprise and mobility ranks above other attributes. Anything that might slow down the blitzkrieg punch of an MEF, ie heavy tanks & arty, is now considered a liability to their doctrine today. With the wound down of Iraq & Afghanistan operations, USMC are no longer required to operate hundreds of miles inland and thus can refocus on their core functions: amphib operations, take & hold shorelines and surrounding areas in preparation to land the more conventional US Army forces.

    This as compared to our Forces which are defensive in doctrine, there is little to compare between us and USMC since both are operating on different principles and therefore would be equipped differently to suit each own postures. As the defender, we need to ‘tank’ attacks so conventional heavies still has their roles with us. No doubt there are things we could learn from them, moreso if our MRSS would get LPD capability, but we shouldn’t be following their footsteps so closely.

65. Azlan,

    “we don’t see the need for a expeditionary capability”
    From my observation, we clearly do not have an expeditionary capability, but we regularly do large scale exercises of it (including the recent 89th army anniversary do). Yes we should have no need for an expeditionary capability, but our actions does not tally. We recently went as far as seriously contemplating on raising a Marines Corps.

    “Our strategy is largely a defensive one with a maneuverist and other approaches incorporated”
    I really wish that this is true, but what the army planned, what the army practice are mostly offensive actions based on Conventional Warfare doctrines. We never seriously practice a large scale defensive exercise, for example large scale exercise defending a town, or a large scale exercise to thwart an amphibious landing.

    Rather than denying what is happening currently, lets talk about what can be done to really have a defensive-centric strategy.

66. Kel – ”Buy a bit of everything or adopt a min-max approach?”

    Depends on the threat calculus. Who do we see ourselves in conflict with; how likely and under what operational circumstances? A limited localised border war or something on a larger magnitude? Should procurement be threat or capability based?

    kel – ”USN wants to use drones to resupply ships, will be using UAVs to refuel, and will use drones for combat missions.”

    A sign of the times. We are already seeing the first use of ASW configured UASs to supplement manned assets and in the coming years it’s not inconceivable we’ll see mini systems integral to AFVs to provide over watch.

67. Copying USMC doesn’t mean offensive expeditionary force. It merely means, recognising the South China Sea separates East and West Malaysia, and given more forces will be deployed to East Malaysia, the country’s forces need to be expeditionary, to quickly redeploy from East to West and West to East. There is no land route from Johor to Tawau. Air is also limited. But sea is always doable with the right ships.

68. kel – ”It merely means, recognising the South China Sea separates East and West Malaysia,”

    We’ve recognised this since 1963… Why do you think we have the number of Charlies we do and why over the years the priority placed on gear which can be air flown?

    kel – ”There is no land route from Johor to Tawau.”You’ve made your point but it’s hardly a revelation. 

    kel – ”the country’s forces need to be expeditionary, to quickly redeploy from East to West and West to East.

    ”There is profound difference between amphib/air movement and amphib/air assault – one is administrative and the other is operational. If it’s amphib movement you are referring to; is to a beachfront without any facilities or a port with all the facilities? Having an ”expeditionary” capability also necessitates the need to be able to logistically sustain units and having units which can be  rapidly deployed doesn’t mean they are ”expeditionary” per see…. kel – ”But sea is always doable with the right ships.”

    Not just the ”right ships”. In times of actual war you’d also need key enablers for those ships to do what they’re supposed to. 

69. @gonggok
    “what the army practice are mostly offensive actions”
    What you see is merely a preplanned PR exercise meant for the media, so of course showing an offensive maneuver is more exciting for the guests and for the media to write home about. Just as the individual do not represent the Government or the state, offensive exercises for PR are just one facet of their training but does not represent the whole of their abilities.

    @Kel
    “quickly redeploy from East to West and West to East”
    Unlikely we need an expeditionary force do to so. The TDM brasses has decided to mirror Western Command to their Eastern Command counterparts and decided that each will have their own organic force structure & equipment, Eastern mirrored closely to Western. Each are expected to hold their own against specific threats and if redeployment are needed, it would be thru various options, both military & civvies. Landings would largely be carried out at friendly held ports, docks & airports/airbase. Where docking facilities are unavailable the MRSS would, if they comes with LPD capability, step in to support the logistics.

70. gonggok – ”our actions does not tally. We recently went as far as seriously contemplating on raising a Marines Corps.”

    First understand that a marine unit doesn’t necessarily have an expeditionary role. We looked at a marine type unit to perform various roles in a littoral setting within our operating environment in line with operational requirements.

    gonggok – ” really wish that this is true, but what the army planned, what the army practice are mostly offensive actions based on Conventional Warfare doctrines.”

    We have gone through this on multiple occasions. What you’re saying is simply untrue. When you see a squadron of Adnans attackin;g how do you know that it’s not a localised attack as part of an overall defensive approach? As also pointed out doesn’t mean that if one adopts a defensive strategy that one also adopts a totally positionalist approach… Also, armies rarely achieve the desired results by totally going on the defensive; to achieve results also requires going on the attack [the Finns which you’re fond of mentioning; also did offensives when required as part of their defensive strategy].

    The ”Conventional Warfare doctrines” are actually combined arms tactics; a vital way of doing things and which make the key difference both on the offense and defence.

71. Kel,

    Even if we have South China Sea separating East and West Malaysia, we still have no reason to have a Marine Corps.

    To be frank, the only countries that really needs a Marine Corps in south east asia are Indonesia and The Philippines.

    Even Australia does not have a Marine Corps.

    Malaysian forces does not need to be expeditionary in order to defend both East and West Malaysia.

    Malaysian army 1st and 5th Division in Sabah and Sarawak, along with PGA Brigades should be able to defend from any initial attacks, as is the 3 Divisions in semenanjung should be able to take initial attacks on its own. Which is why the army wants to be able to undertake operations on both east and west malaysia simultaneously.

    Rapid reinforcement of those forces already on the ground would be the job of 10 PARA.

    Prepositioned Stocks of weapons and vehicles should be available (especially in east malaysia) so that any initial follow up reinforcements such as from the mechanized brigade does not need to bring along heavy equipments.

    A sea bridge for further reinforcements can be done through buying or having long term charter of fast RORO ships (like UK with the point class sealift RORO), so we don’t really need a LPD for the job. Cheaper too, and frees the budget for RMN to buy things that can really bite back, such as subs and frigates.

72. gonggok – ”What about converting some of the 105mm regiments to use loitering munitions?”

    Arty and armed UASs are fundamentally different. One can supplement but not replace the other. Both also have pros and cons. Arty rounds can’t be jammed and can fire observed or unobserved. UASs need a recce/strike complex [so do arty to a lesser extent] to be effective; are detectable by radar/ESM and are slow defenceless targets and need permissive air space to operate in. We should get UASs no doubt there but focus on ISR ones first and also continue looking at a counter UAS capability.

    gonggok – ” What changes to to C2 to accommodate this new type of weapon?”

    Insitituitiomal changes and to the mindset to adapt to a new way of doing things. In this case not only having the physical means to detect, track, ID and hit targets in time sensitive scenarios in all whether conditions while doing it jointly with no or little duplication but also adapting to a new way of doing business.

    gonggoj – ”Recently all 120mm mortars mounted on adnan and gempita are now under RAD’

    As far as I know they were infantry weapons [even if IFV mounted] under the purview of the Infantry Directorate. Yes we should get more but the at the very least must be mounted [not towed] on a soft skin; for obvious reasons

73. gonggok – ”(including the recent 89th army anniversary do). ”

    A PR driven exercise in which things are scripted and timing is limited; the intention being to showcase in a dramatic manner capabilities which are not actually representative of how things would actually be done. Profoundly different from an actual field exercise.

    You can point out all the missing/flawed elements but again; it’s a scripted time constrained PR exercise. BTW foreign attaches understand this fully because their armies do the same thing.

74. gonggok – ”To be frank, the only countries that really needs a Marine Corps in south east asia are Indonesia and The Philippines.”

    ”To be frank” it depends on what ones personal definition pf ‘marines” s and what particular countries see such units as performing. In the Philippines the PMC is traditionally seen more as a strategic reserve which can be rapidly deployed – over the past few decades it has been involved in ops all over the archipelago but almost never in a littoral setting.

    If we look beyond the region we can can see the various and different was ”marine” units were raised for and are employed. The Royal Marines has an expeditionary tasking traditionally focused on northern Norway. It’s a ”marine” unit but a light commando type unit. Then we have the Turkish marines and the Soviet/Russian Naval Infantry’ performing slightly different roles. Over here we were never ”serious” in raising a marine unit; it was something mentioned by a former Defence Minister following Lahad Dato but the idea never got traction; we don’t need a ”marine” unit per see but one trained to operate in a littoral environment. The most prudent thing to do would be to convert an existing para unit to one trained to be deployed and to operate at sea. Doesn’t have to be a ”marine” unit per see or a newly raised unit.

    gonggok – ”so we don’t really need a LPD for the job.”

    We have been utilsing commercial means for a long time; the first batch of AV-8s sent to Sabah went on a commercial ship; cheaper and more practical to use than the Saktis.
    If however we were faced with a requirement to land men and stuff on a beach as opposed to a port; then a LST or LPD would be more ideal.

75. Azlan,

    “When you see a squadron of Adnans attackin;g how do you know that it’s not a localised attack as part of an overall defensive approach?”
    How do i know? Because since the end of the insurgency, all of tentera darat large scale exercise involved only practices of offensive maneuvers. We have never actually done any large scale exercises where we are the defending forces against an enemy doing the offensive. Even once where we did a major urban machanized exercise, tentera darat forces are the one attacking the urban area, with the enemy holding out in the town. We are always exercising to be the offensive party, we have not done a dedicated exercise where we are the defensive party. Even all the recent urban training centers we build, are mainly to train being on the offensive, breaking in and clearing rooms. Not an urban training center where you train to fight from inside the building, how to break walls to move from room to room, how to shoot stealthily from inside rooms, how to block stairs, how to shoot rpgs, atgms from confined spaces. If i am wrong, please enlighten me on which major exercise did we practice defensive operations.

    “the Finns which you’re fond of mentioning; also did offensives when required as part of their defensive strategy”
    Read more about how Finland operates. Most of their large scale exercises are to train for artillery fire (practicing searching for enemy formations and striking them with artillery fire), and troops in small units protecting their designated areas. Most movements are for them to go to their designated areas that they are going to defend. Malaysian army exercises are mostly closely based on US or British army way of offensive warfare.
    http://maavoimat.fi/en/exercises
    Finnish local defence exercises summarised in a nutshell. Local defence exercises are organised in the Finnish Army twice a year (in the spring and in the autumn) over the entire territory of Finland.
    – Local units incorporate reservists who know their own region well. The tasks of the local units include, among others,
    Mobilisation of troops, surveillance of areas and protection of key targets
    – Versatile combat missions, such as counter-special forces operations
    – Supporting other units and local supply and maintenance
    – Supporting other authorities
    The exercises’ aims include, among others,
    – Sharing the given situation picture with other authorities and forming a common situation picture
    – Conducting command and control, information transmission and interoperability measures between authorities
    – Operating in multi-authority situations as well as coordinated C3 activities, information transmission and reporting procedures therein
    – Exercising service personnel as well as training conscripts and reservists in local defence tasks
    – Generating readiness and defence capability as well as conducting training on a local level

    “the intention being to showcase in a dramatic manner capabilities which are not actually representative of how things would actually be done”
    We are showcasing a full-on armoured amphibious offensive, something we cannot possibly executive in real life. If showcasing what we cannot do is the norm with imaginary tank landing ships, might as well show we can shoot down ballistic missiles with imaginary SAMs, or kill enemy tanks with imaginary attack helicopters.

76. Marhalim,

    Are the beds on the Handalan wooden or metal?

77. Which beds?

78. gonggok -“Read more about how Finland operates;

    The point I was making is that the Finns in the Winter War adopted a defensive strategy but also incorporated an attack element as part of that strategy. I will read more but you should too about warfare in general including combined arms and about offensive and defensive ops.

    gonggok – “We are showcasing a full-on armoured amphibious offensive, something we cannot possibly”

    Incorrect. We are not showcasing a full-on armoured amphibious offensive”
    [another assumption] but the capability to land a small number of AFVs in support of troops. Which we can do to limited extent in a low threat setting. Since the 1970’s we have had a limited ability to move things from.ship to beach.
    Also its a “demonstration”.. Also, we conduct air drops. Do we have the capability to escort the transports and neutralise enemy GBADs? Or to resupply units on the ground in the face of enemy opposition? By your logic we shouldn’t do such exercises.

    gonggok – ” show we can shoot down ballistic missiles with imaginary SAMs,”

    Silly comparison. We don’t have the meand to shoot down ballistic missiles but we have the – limited – means to deploy AFVs by sea; that’s the difference.

    Again, exercises can be actual ones or can be ones for PR purposes which are intended to dramatic but are not actually representative of they way it would actually be done for real.

79. gonggok – “all of tentera darat large scale exercise involved only practices of offensive maneuvers”

    ”All”? That’s presumptuous and speculative. Again. One can adopt an overall defensive strategy but still incorporate an element of maneuver. You seem to have a problem grasping this. Adopting a positionlist approach accomplishes nothing as that provides all the initiative to the attacker. Most of the exercises we have are based on the premise that we are attacking an opponent who has already attacked and the attacks we launch are localised attacks to regain tactical or operational advantages part of a defensive strategy.

    Our planners are highly aware of our limitations and the need to avoid playing to the strengths of a more powerful opponent. I can say more but this is an open forum and you seem to be better informed. Of course if you’re  confident enough to suggest that you’ve got it all figured out and that planners and those who spend years doing this for a living have got it wrong; then it puts paid to things.

    Pros and cons to attacking and defending. Not as clear cut as you make. Armies who are on the defence also attack when there is a need [Warfare 101] – it’s not WW1 or anymore. Armies; have been attacking for centuries; done correctly it can mitigate overall weaknesses in other areas….

    “The attacker can choose the location of the fight and concentrate disproportionate forces against that point. Inferior forces will mean that your 1 defender won’t realize his full potential, so instead of engaging 5 he might be engaging only 2-3. Superiority in air and artillery can change the equation.” BTW the attacker only needs a 3 to 1 advantage if the defender is pre positioned and the defender needs adequate reserves to be able to rapidly shifted. 

80. gonggok – ”please enlighten me on which major exercise did we practice defensive operations”

    “You are already enlightened” so it would seem. By having brief/cursory looks at exercises you come up with narratives and insist they are correct.

    Since you asked I will – again – point out that quite a number of urban exercises we carry out by ourselves, bilaterally and as part of the FPDA  [you want the names of the exercises just ask] see us both defending and also attacking . You have this deeply ingrained impression that we only attack and that attacking has no place in an overall defensive strategy. Going by your logic we should only train to defend but what if we have to attack to retake a street or building? What if a position has been taken and it has to be retaken fast before the enemy can fortify it? 

    gonggok – “closely based on US or British army way of offensive warfare”
    Nonsense. ”closely” you claim? A  lot of the basics of combined arms maneuver warfare are standard and hardly unique to anyone. We”ve long adopted a Western way of doing various things with but not an offensive doctrine per see. Show me one example of an  American or Brit “way of warfare” we have adopted and I’ll show your assumption is flawed.  What we have adopted is an approach based on the capabilities we have, the limitations we face, our terrain and our threat perceptions against threats we are most likely to face.

81. Azlan,

    Handalan beds are metal. Seeing those russian trucks in Ukraine becoming claymore mines launching sharp wood splinters in every direction eh?

    ” Since the 1970’s we have had a limited ability to move things from.ship to beach. ”
    We had, in past tense. Now we don’t, especially putting our Pendekars, Adnans and Gempita to the beach. We don’t have LSTs anymore after KD Sri Inderapura burned down in 2009. With MPCSS at best we can land troops on the beach with aluminium sampans.

    ” Do we have the capability to escort the transports and neutralise enemy GBADs? Or to resupply units on the ground in the face of enemy opposition? ”
    Unlike landing tanks on the beach, yes we do have the ability to escort our transports and neutralise enemy GBADS. And we recently did an exercise (eks stallion pack 1/22) in resupplying 10PARA by air. RMAF can do SEAD with KH-31 anti-radiation missiles, and RMAF has dedicated quite some resources to catalog the electronic order of battle of the region.

    ” Again. One can adopt an overall defensive strategy but still incorporate an element of maneuver. You seem to have a problem grasping this. ”
    If one adopts an overall defensive strategy, then overall you should train for defensive operations like 70% and maneuvers like 30%. Defensive exercises are difficult to do secretly because to defend you need to practice together with the police, bomba, and the people of the area to be defended, to create barriers for the adversary etc. In wars more than 50% of casualties are caused by indirect fires, but we still don’t have enough long range fires (a trait of our insurgency force structure that ended more than 30 years ago), and the inability to do precision strike of time sensitive targets with our fires.

    ” Most of the exercises we have are based on the premise that we are attacking an opponent who has already attacked ”
    Yes, we have never practiced defending and repulsing an attack.

    ” BTW the attacker only needs a 3 to 1 advantage if the defender is pre positioned ”
    Only needs 3 to 1 advantage? The 3:1 rule of combat states that in order that for the attacker to win the battle, his forces should be at least three times the force of the defender. So the 3:1 ratio is 3 attacker to 1 defender. If we commit a brigade on the pre positioned defensive operation, the adversary/attacker will need to commit a division strength to attack our position. Yet another reason for us to train for defensive operations.

82. gonggok – “Seeing those russian trucks in Ukraine;

    No. Seeing pics posted in a forum of lorries in Iraq actually.

    gonggok – “If one adopts an overall defensive strategy, then overall you should train for defensive operations like 70% and maneuvers like 30”

    Do you actually have the actual percentages to indicate the actual ratio? Also in the 1970’s the threat calculus was wholly different and we didn’t by have the ability to maneuver much.

    gonggok – “3:1 rule of combat states that in order that for the attacker to win the battle, his forces should be at least three timees”

    That largely applies if an attacker is attacking an opponent who is pre positioned. If its a moving, meeting enhagement that ratio does not apply per see.

    gonggok – “Yet another reason for us to train for defensive operations;

    Since you didn’t get it the last few times; we do practice defensive ops but not on their own/isolation per see. Defensive ops are always tied in with an element of maneuver.

    gonggok – Defensive exercises are difficult to do secretly because to defend you need to practice together with the police, bomba, and the people of the area”

    That may be so but I wasn’t talking about a coordinated military/civil approach. My discussion was centered on an overall defensive strategy at a military level. If you want to cherry pick then we can also question if we have stockpiled all the ammo and other key consumables for a protracted conflict. No… Do we have practice mass evacuations or have shelters in public buildings? No because The threat calculus is such.

    gonggok – “Yes, we have never practiced defending and repulsing an attack”

    Nonsense and another assumption.

    From the 1980’s onwards when we started focusing on external security and started buying stuff under PERISTA we routinely conducted exercises doing exactly what you confidently [but in correctly]claim we “never” do; Setiakawan, Halilintar and others.
    In more recent times multiple exercises, such as Perkasa, we conduct are based on the vpremise that we are attacking to rapidly regain territory. As stated previously we plan for various scenarios and contrary to the impression and assumption you have the army and planners have a pretty good idea as to what to do.

    gonggok – “RMAF has dedicated quite some resources to catalog the electronic order of battle of the region”

    How do you come up with such sensationalist and sweeping statements?No doubt you’ll give me a sales pitch on the Russian EW gear but that’s not what I meant.