Mid Term Review of DWP 19

Pulau Layang-Layang as seen from a Special Forces operator conducting an exercise in early 2019. BTDM

SHAH ALAM: The Defence Ministry today officially launched the mid-term review of the 2019 Defence White Paper. The ministry has also put up a link for the public to give their views for the mid-term review.

The link for the public comments is here

The landing page for the mid-term review of DWP 2019.

One can send in as many comments as one wants. Whether or not it will be implemented is beyond me, of course.

— Malaysian Defence.

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About Marhalim Abas 2205 Articles
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62 Comments

  1. @hulubalang
    You can use this opportunity to propose your LMS-X many more of your opinion on the public comments. This also applies to the rest of us

  2. Tujuan :

    – Menilai pencapaian semasa Kertas Putih Pertahanan;

    – Mengkaji persekitaran strategik semasa; dan

    – Menambahbaik dasar dan pelaksanaan Kertas Putih Pertahanan.

    My opinion

    – TUDM
    1) overall past 5 years is good. Need a much better plan until 2040, not too general like CAP55
    2) LCA – good. Must continue with batch 2 of FA-50
    3) Ground Radars. Would be good if it can be had much more faster.
    4) MRCA. must be implemented 2031-2040
    5) 12 more helicopters? Forget about this, buy AEW instead. Leave helicopters to PUTD. Buy additional topup used H225 to complement existing EC725 (total of 18 across 2 squadrons would be good)
    6) MERAD? Forget about this too
    7) plan for getting new long range stand-off missiles for MKM/MRCA. Used storm shadows?

    – TLDM
    1) Probably the worst implementation to date. Not totally its own fault.
    2) Just scrap the 15to5 already. New plan for just up to 2040. Don’t pretend that APMM does not exist. Concentrate on main mission, don’t buy ships that can just do constabulary patrols.
    3) complete all 6 Gowinds please
    4) forget about getting 8 LMS batch 2 corvettes. Get more submarines and larger frigates to replace kasturi and lekiu classes by 2040.
    5) leave PVs, OPVs to APMM.
    6) have proper exit plans for all the ships that has gone through OP. To PSSTLDM? APMM?
    7) Have USV,UUV,UAS properly included in future plans.

    – TDM
    1) Overall direction with Army 4NextG is good
    2) Don’t do rojak armored vehicles please. Add more of what we have (MIFV, Adnan, AV8), new or used.
    3) Concentrate on long range fires. Both the ISTAR and effector. Precision fuse for 155mm shells. More 155mm howitzers. Precision long range missiles such as GL-SDB and NSM.
    4) Give proper budget to get 12-24 used Blackhawks that PUTD needs. Cancel TUDM 12 new medium range helicopter project.
    5) Get more of what we have. More RPG-7, more Carl Gustaf, etc.
    6) Enhance GAPU with MERAD and anti-uav capability.

    @ luqman

    It will be proposed of course 👍

  3. .. – ”Add more of what we have (MIFV, Adnan, AV8), new or used.”

    Fine on paper but in reality things have changed; we need something which is better protected and is more networked than the MIFV and Adnan. Nobody’s suggesting we go for a super IFV weighting 60 tonnes but the plain fact is that MIFV and Adnan are yesterday’s IFVs.

    … – ”plan for getting new long range stand-off missiles for MKM/MRCA.”

    Realistically that’s not going to happen and you know it. Also even if we do get the likes of Storm Shadow how do we acquire targets? The Ukrainian’s benefit from being able to pass SIGINT and UAS feeds to American satellites to enable precise acquisition and targeting. How do we go about it; unless of course the target is fixed…

    … – ”Concentrate on long range fires. Both the ISTAR and effector.”

    ”Fires” is just another fancy term which appeared recently out of nowhere. Sounds grand and appealing [like ”force multipliers”; ”multi-domain”; ”potent” and ”credible”] but in our context hard to do as we don’t have much to work with to begin with – starting from scratch to use an Americanism. How many regiments can we equip with radars and can we link those radars to UASs and other things to acquire an effective strike/recce capability; as opposed to a token one? On paper or on a PowerPoint brief great but in reality? As it stands we can’t even afford to replace the short legged and fragile Model 56s which are older than the crews who operate them and our idea of improving the Royal Artillery Corps is to get a mere 18 SPHs which will be parceled out in two different locations.

    … – ”Don’t pretend that APMM does not exist.”

    Who’s ”pretending”? As it stands the RM has to shoulder much of the burden given the MMEA’s inadequacies. Not as if the RMN wants to hog the MMEA’s roles.

    … – ”don’t buy ships that can just do constabulary patrols.”

    Who on earth said there was such a plan? Has not been such a plan for years now … Can you name such a plan; the LMS Batch 1s don’t count as they were supposed to have been armed; the follow on Kedahs as laid out in the 5/15 are as dead as Elvis and they were supposed to have been armed and the LMS Batch 2s will be armed even if modestly.

    So no; the RMN has as much intention of getting ”ships that can just do constabulary patrols” [to quote you] as Ali Khamenei converting to Sunnism.

    We are talking about the Royal Malaysian Navy I would assume?

    … – ”overall past 5 years is good.”

    I wish I was as sanguine as you. We’ve belatedly done thing and in dribs and drabs.

    … – ”leave PVs, OPVs to APMM.”

    The RMN has zero plans for ‘OPVs’ and has not had such plans for years now.

    .. – ”have proper exit plans for all the ships that has gone through OP. To PSSTLDM APMM?”

    The pertinent question of whether those ships are wanted by the MMEA and whether they fit its CONOPS seems to elude you.

    … – ”Enhance GAPU with MERAD and anti-uav capability.”

    That’s the relatively easy part; the not easy part is getting stuff in the needed numbers; distributing them in a decentralised manner; networking them and having a layered capability.

    … – ”Forget about this, buy AEW instead. ”

    Two different things for two different requirements; also the costs associated with 12 rotary platforms are a bare fraction of the costs for 2 AEW platforms.

    … – ”Just scrap the 15to5 already. ”

    Like saying we should strive for world peace; the elimination of nukes or castration for all paedophiles but easier said than done. The 5/15 has gained political approval; ditching it and coming up with a new plan will be a cumbersome and tedious process. Pointless at present. What the RMN is doing is the most pragmatic approach: officially adhering to the 5/15 but making the needed tweaks.

    … – ”Must continue with batch 2 of FA-50”

    ”’Must continue” with them on schedule and they must be operated at a systems level.

    … – ”MERAD? Forget about this too”

    So you say but the RMAF can’t always rely on GAPU [its focus is the army and it’s not as if it has a surplus of hardware] and the RMAF has an existing ground based radar network which can be networked to whatever medium range SAM it may or may not get.

    … – ”It will be proposed of course ”

    Gratified to hear. As I mentioned before; you should be writing to those who actually make the decisions but then again their decisions will also be based on a host of factors that we as outsiders are not privy to or aware of; irrespective of how sound things will look on paper or an Excel sheet.

  4. >AF
    -Expedite acquisition of 2nd batch LCA.
    -make decision on kuwaiti F/A-18. If they don’t want to part with it maybe we can add additional FA-50 to at least shoulder the burden
    -AEW
    -Definitely get another batch of H225M
    -More MPA
    -More MALE UAV squadron to patrol Sulu sea and Malacca strait (and concentrate our MPA/MSA on SCS. Also as beechcraft replacement).
    -Additional long range radar to monitor Sulu Sea and Kalimantan. Sorry but I don’t trust indonesians and the flips
    -Probably divest MRSAM requirement to GAPU

    >Navy
    -effing finish the LCS
    -Expedite the acquisition of LMS2 and MRSS
    -2 more submarine
    -New ASW helicopter
    -Shore ASM battery

    >Army
    -Need to start thinking about new tracked vehicle to complement and eventually replace MIFV and adnan. For context we got our Condor and Sibmas in the 80s and by mid 2010s they were effectively replaced by Gempita
    -Either get new MBT and based them in Peninsula and transfer Pendekar to S&S keep Pendekar in peninsula and get light tank for S&S
    -Medium helo for army
    -Additional SPH regiment
    -MRSAM for GAPU

    Additionally
    -Malaysia’s own dedicated surveillance satellite
    -Another Layang2 style FOB.

  5. dundun – ”make decision on kuwaiti F/A-18. ”

    We’ve already ”made a decision” but as has been reported they haven’t. Also, gaining U.S. approval is a long process; will take years.

    dundun – ”get light tank for S&S”

    A light tank is never a substitute for a MBT. It can be used for fire support but so can IFVs fitted with direct/indirect weapons. Also a light tank is great if it meets other light tanks but not so great if it meets MBTs.

    dundun – ”Sorry but I don’t trust indon and the flips”

    Since when are we really supposed to ”trust” anyone? As for the ”flips” as you would refer to the Filipinos; they are focused on the South China Sea. The issue of Sabah is being keep alive because it’s politically expedient but apart from the Tausugs who are a minority the average Filipino doesn’t care about Sabah. It doesn’t resonate with them the way the Malvinas does with the average Argie.

    dundun – ”More MALE UAV squadron to patrol Sulu sea and Malacca strait (and concentrate our MPA/MSA on SCS.”

    The idea is to have MPAS/MSASs and UASs complementing each other …

    dundun – ”New ASW helicopter”

    I will come after the LCSs and it has to be something with the needed range, endurance and lift capacity for the time intensive business that is ASW and to carry a sonar, sonobuoys and torps.

    dundun – ”Probably divest MRSAM requirement to GAPU”

    How large is GAPU and does it have the assets/resources to also be responsible for the defence of RMAF bases? How many early warning assets does GAPU have?

  6. dundun – ”Shore ASM battery”

    Yes RMN and not army operated but the trick is to acquire a strike/recce capability. Some go gaga with what the Ukrainians have been able to achieve in the Black Sea but they have a strike/recce capability and external help. We don’t.

    dundun – ”Another Layang2 style FOB.”

    For what purpose? It’s not as if we don’t have enough real estate there and the idea is to maintain the status quo; not fuel tensions; which we would if we stared constructing a new reef. If you’re referring to enlarging the other reefs; lots of effort involved and it would raise tensions with others. What do we gain?

  7. … – ”Give proper budget to get 12-24 used Blackhawks that PUTD needs. Cancel TUDM 12 new medium range helicopter project.”

    – The Army’s Aviation Wing at the most can absorb 8-12 helis but even that’s a stretch. Manpower, infrastructure and funding is an issue; even if constantly overlooked. Yes I know you mentioned ”proper budget” but I like to stay within the realms of reality.
    – If the RMAF’s new helis are going to be cancelled and the cash is to be channeled to the army instead then why on earth get the Army’s Aviation Wing aged UH-60s? Logic dictates we get something which won’t have to be replaced in 10 years or so and something not as aged and with growth potential.
    – The most pertinent questions before assuming anything. How many air and ground crews are there; how many are inducted annually; how many leave the service or are transferred out annually and what is the Army Aviation Wing’s operational budget? Also, air and ground crews make up only one element of a squadron; there are also HQ, administrative and other elements.

    … – ”overall past 5 years is good. Need a much better plan until 2040, not too general like CAP55”

    You can have all the ”better plan” you want but counts for nothing until or unless the needed cash is allocated. As in the government puts its money where its mouth is.

    The CAP 55 is not ”too general” because it was intended for a political/public audience and explains in clear unequivocal language what the RMAF intends or hopes to achieve. Anything motte detailed won’t probably be released for public consumption.

  8. dundun – either get new MBT”

    There is a paper requirement but it’s not a priority. When the time comes – in a few years or more – we will be getting a more contemporary design with superior protection capabilities compared to the 1970’s era T-72/PT-91 which was designed for Soviet requirements; has inherent survivability issues [well known well be the war in the Ukraine] and has zero growth potential. Buying more PT-91s – as some seem to think we should – is a highly regressive move.

    In case anyone sees the need to point out; no the tank is not obsolete and the UAS and loitering munition has not made it so. No tank is invincible but it behooves us to protect the crews the best we can and the efficacy of the tank is also measured by the level of infantry and engineering support it receives

  9. Expedite acquisition of 2nd batch LCA.
    -make decision on kuwaiti F/A-18. If they don’t want to part with it maybe we can add additional FA-50 to at least shoulder the burden-dundun.
    He’s right. We need to be seen to move fast to acquire new or second hand assets! These are critical for our armed forces. And I don’t mean just these extra FA50s and ex Kuwaiti Hornets. It is the same for our ships. The army? Tell them to wait for another 10 years before the next acquisition

  10. Taib – ”He’s right.”

    On paper he is. In reality are we still interested and we need to take note that U.S. State Department and Pentagon approval is a tedious and cumbersome process.

    Another point; I know most are gaga about the Hornets but will we allocate adequate funds for their upkeep? Funds for ordnance and ground support gear [can’t assume that the Kuwaitis will be Father Christmas and throw in everything for free]? Also, will the Hornets really be an interim solution or will they be retired with no replacement? Will the pen pushers us them as an excuse to further delay the MRCA programme? Lots of things at play here; legitimate reason why the RMAF is wary; even though on paper the whole exercise looks sound.

    Taib – ”The army? Tell them to wait for another 10 years before the next acquisition”

    Everything is a gamble or trade off; making them and hoping we’re right. If we face a threat in which the RMAF and RMN are the main services then fine. If not then we’re buggered.

    Taib – ”It is the same for our ships.”

    As has been discussed in the past; we don’t want high mileage ships which are expensive to sustain and which might add to the already large logistical/support footprint. Why do you think we’ve rejected some offers in the past? The focus is on costs savings and achieving greater commonality.

  11. It’s a midterm review of a 10 year long DWP programme. They are not going to proposed anything new but rather a rearrangement of priorities for the next 5 years.

  12. Yes. There will be nothing significantly different. A continuation of our ”get a bit of everything”. Nothing beyond the little that’s already been approved for procurement and funding : no subs, ”oilers”[not that we need them]; ”large” frigates; MALE UASs; MPAs/MSAs; etc.

    Lets see what happens the next Malaysia Plan; if we actually sign for follow batches of various things.

  13. RMAF’s big decisions under DWP are or have been executed. MPA, 1st batch LCA 2nd Heli squadron, MALE drones. Unfortunately, because of delays in SuperHornet and Eurofighter deliveries to Kuwait, the operational dates are also delayed, such that Kuwait F18s will continue to fly into 2025 (maybe 2026) – they are spending spend US$1.2b to keep their Hornets flying. Recent statements suggest RMAF will shift to 2nd batch LCA within the DWP19 period – very good if can confirm 36 new fast jets by 2030. RMN unfortunately lost a sizeable portion of shipbuilding funds to the LCS program overruns (RM3b project funding plus the money to buyout BNS). Seems likely the LMS2 is the only additional big buy between now and 2030 – still good since it means 8 new combat ships confirmed. Army – maybe someone has a better feel. Overall, at least for RMN and RMAF, looks like not much adjustments required except to sign off the buys earlier rather than later – confirm the RMAF helis and RMN’s LMS2 in 2024, and confirm 2nd LCA order in 2027/2028 (once the first FA50s start arriving).

  14. It’s a midterm review of a 10 year long DWP programme. They are not going to proposed anything new but rather a rearrangement of priorities for the next 5 years.-Zaft
    I beg to differ. The midterm review of DWP is the right excuse and should be seriously considered so to dump suspect goals and buttressed existing hopes.
    For example, why should we stop at just 5 LCS hulls when we were assume we would be getting 6?
    Or, are we just stopping at a mere 18 units of FA50 LCAs, or going ahead with an additional 18 units?
    Even better, since the South Koreans are now somewhat disillusioned with the Indonesian commitment towards the KF21 Boramae JV project, and the recent drama of ‘pinched technology attempts’ by Indonesian aero-engineers at KAI, shouldn’t we include greater commitment towards closer technical ties with Korean defence houses and hitching our fortunes with them as we are doing with Turkiye? That KF21 project is a reasonable starting point.
    We can’t get out of our defence malaise if we don’t start getting out of it. We cannot start at ‘0’ but rather just say our prayers and join more capable defence players to make up for the rut that we are in for so long.
    The sooner the better.

  15. It’s continuity that counts : will we get follow batches of F/A-50s; UASs and other things as planned or will priorities shift as they tend to do? Having a plan is one thing; actually implementing it is another. A devil’s advocate will point out however that even if we get all that’s planned; still a case of small numbers; a bit of everything which results in a neither here nor there capability.

    A paragraph is a distinct segment of writing, often includes more than one sentence, and is separated from other paragraphs and text by a space.

  16. P.S. No it isn’t “still good” because not only do we need the hulls
    but we need hulls with a certain level of capability. What we’re getting are modestly armed in line with threat perceptions: policy and funding but if faced with a situation where a certain type of capability is needed then to understate things : we’ll have a bit of a problem.

    We’ve also allowed other areas to atrophy; like MCM capabilities. The good news – at least on the surface – is that we seem to be placing more focus on jointness.

  17. @Zaft
    Its a pointless review on an equally pointless policy created by the then PH Govt to show that their ‘different’ than the past 60 years Govt but under the surface nothings really changed except for going full tender policy which now seems like being Uturned by subsequent Govts including this PH Govt. Basically its just wayang ontop of a wayang.
    Wayangception.

  18. @Taib
    “That KF21 project is a reasonable starting point.”
    I beg to differ. It will be a huge financial undertaking even if the chances of success will be high and a 5th gen plane is outed. Simply said if the Indonesians see it being too expensive for them and their much larger budgets and more matured aero manufacturing than us, what more us with our puny defence budget from our shrinking economy? Lets not create another LCS in the sky, we much admit we are still in the level of a user thus its more prudent we buy a fully matured product than dabble with trying to make it.

    “What we’re getting are modestly armed in line with threat perceptions: policy and funding”
    Indeed if we are facing budget issue to even arm 96 VLS cells for 6 LCS, whatmore a such deadlier ships like Formidables with 32 cell VLS per boat plus higher end Asters?

  19. @taib
    Unfortunately all the gov from 2018 till today had promised to but never get around to actually publish the defence industrial policy.

    KFX like TFX is a great jet for a country which face high risk of a protracted warfare against a technologically challenged adversary. In those kinda cases something like the F35 is probably not something you want. The VLO & sensor fusion capabilities is a wee bit more than you realistically need and the high sustainment cost and lack of availability due to the VLO & sensor fusion actual put you in a operational disadvantage.

    If you potential adversary is somewhat technologically competence. Then maybe neither KFX nor TFX are the right answers. Because in those kind of situations the guy who detect the other guy first usually end up the winner.

  20. No lah, the Indonesians did not see the project as expensive, it is just that the decision to join the project was mooted by another administration.

  21. By the time Jokowi took over, the deal was already in the works. And it was one of those things that Jokowi had not wanted to cancel though the delays in payments and the renegotiations meant that he had clearly changed his mind.

  22. OZ surface fleet reviews comes out today. Seems like they be axing their version of LMS1 for 7-11 of their versions of LMS2 while also axing 3 of their version of LCS.

  23. those are frigates lah, unlike our LMS 2 which are basically patrol ships really and not even corvettes. The LCS is basically a corvette.

  24. I believe that they didnt fully realise how much it would really cost them, as with all those national projects proponents here, they just see the socalled benefits and national stature but ignored what sacrifices it requires from the nation & the rakyat.
    Its only after the 1st tranche of payments that they realised how much deeply they would have to sunk to see this thru and which is why they were hesitant when subsequent payments were due. Plus now the allegations of industrial espionage from this collaboration, it seems the recriminations & finger pointing on the failing JV has started a point of no return.

    We should do well to learn from it. Oh wait too late, we have LCS & OPV ady….

  25. One of the issues that got them really bothered was that originally the plan was for PTDI to assemble some of the fighters themselves for the air force and also export. But after the contract was signed it was revealed that South Korea must get permission from the US to allow for the transfer of technology for manufacturing the fighters in Indonesia. The US did not want to do so that part of the deal floundered. Since then the Indonesian government is reluctant to continue paying for the project hence the negotiations to reduce the cost of it.

  26. On the Australian Navy – Enhanced Lethality Surface
    Combatant Fleet
    https://pbs.twimg.com/media/GG0p17obwAAUooo.jpg

    The plan
    1) Optimised to operate in Australia’s immediate region aka operating in our backyard basically.
    2) To have a surface fleet of warships with greater capability in integrated air and missile defence, multi-domain strike and undersea warfare.

    The Ships
    1) 6x Hunter class frigates. These ships is actually bigger than the Hobart class Destroyers
    2) 3x Hobart Class Air Warfare Destroyers. To upgrade it to the latest AEGIS baseline 9. To build replacements when all Hunter class Frigates are complete.
    3) 6x Large Optionally Crewed Surface Vessels (LOSV). This is basically an unmanned arsenal/missile ship. Will sail together with Frigates enabling more missiles, distributed lethality.
    4) 11x New General Purpose Frigates. This will replace the ANZAC class MEKO 200 frigates now in RAN service. The shortlisted ships in the plan :
    >> Meko A-200
    >> Mogami 30FFM
    >> Daegu class FFX Batch II and III
    >> Navantia ALFA3000
    It is a pity that the Arrowhead 140 / Type 31 Frigate is not in the list, probably because of the bad experience with the UK-sourced Hunter class (which is not at all involved with the Arrowhead 140 team).

    Our Gowind, at 3100 tons displacement is considered as a large corvette in the latest scheme of things. The new Philippine navy Corvette is 3200 tons displacement. 40 years ago our kasturi class at 1850 tons displacement was considered as a large corvette/light frigate.

    Things that is not addressed in the plan (in my opinion)
    1) Logistical, sustainment support for all those ships operating far away from home during wartime. Unlike US Navy or even Royal Navy that has permanent bases or support in South East Asia, Royal Australian Navy does not have such systems.
    2) Manpower. Even the current fleet has challenges in getting enough manpower. How does this increased number of ships can be adequately manned?

    The new Australian Navy plan and the context to our (Malaysian) own maritime security measures.
    1) Plans must be regularly tweaked to cater with the latest security challenges. TLDM 15 to 5 is obsolete but there is no publicly known attempt to do a new plan. Plans should be at most for 20 years, not 30 years like 15 to 5. The New Australian Navy plan is just for a decade.
    2) Due to the near future challenges with advanced anti-ship missiles (stealth, hypersonic, ballistic etc.) more missile defence systems needs to be added to the ships, increasing its size, complexity and cost. As a small navy, we cannot afford to follow with this direction. As these RAN ships is primarily planned to operate and fight in South China Sea anyway, what we could do is to instead have ships to support the operations of these ships in our waters. At the same time, we should focus our navy lethality (and deterrence capability) with at least 6 Scorpene Evolution submarines by 2040.
    3) Day to day peacetime maritime security is not a high priority (in their overall scheme of things) for Australia, as they are so far away from anyone. Malaysia is smack in the middle of the busiest maritime route in the world, with waters claimed by many, including China. While they feel like OPVs are not important in their priority, we need to have a lot of Coast Guard operated OPVs to secure our maritime areas in most time of the year. The less aggressive stance of Coast Guards are needed to push back other nations maritime claims without it escalating into a war.
    3) Their plan is basically to have all their naval shipyards with full work for a decade at least (so now up to 2034-35). We can do the same. This is my proposal :

    LUNAS – Lumut
    Gowind – now to 2029 (6 units)
    Arrowhead 140 Batch 1 – 2030 to 2035 (2 units)
    Arrowhead 140 Batch 2 – 2036 to 2040 (2 units)

    BHIC – Sepanggar
    Scorpene 01 refit 2 – 2024 to 2025
    Scorpene 02 refit 2 – 2026 to 2027
    Scorpene 03 assy – 2028 to 2030
    Scorpene 04 assy – 2031 to 2033
    Scorpene 01 refit 3 – 2034 to 2035
    Scorpene 02 refit 3 – 2036 to 2037
    Scorpene 05 assy – 2037 to 2039
    Scorpene 06 assy – 2038 to 2040

    MMHE Pasir Gudang
    STM Fleet tanker – 2026-2030 (1 unit)
    STM Fleet tanker – 2031-2035 (1 unit)

    AMIM shipyards all over malaysia – PETRONAS Project Safina
    LMS-X – 2025-2030 (24 units)

    This does not include ships to be build for APMM.

  27. @Hulubalang

    Buy a tanker that can enable far away operation but at the same time buy FAC of a LMS that can’t go everywhere?

    @joe

    If some of their netizen is to be believe. ID problem seem to be a lack of adherence to the centralised decisions making body. Each ministry just do it own thing and just hoping that the others party play along which is not too dissimilar to our LCS issues.

  28. South Korea must get permission from the US to allow for the transfer of technology for manufacturing the fighters in Indonesia. The US did not want to do so that part of the deal floundered. (Marhalim Abas)
    Now your explanation is more believable. If this is the case for Indonesian reluctance, then perhaps we should consider just buying the said aircraft… if our government is looking in that direction!

  29. My Proposal (as per Feb 2024 anyway)

    TD (2021-35) – TUDM (2021-40) – TLDM (2021-40) – APMM (2021-40)

    Tentera Darat

    RMK 12 2021-2025 (USD1.35 bil)
    truck recapitalisation 0.05
    soldier systems 0.1
    Engineering tractors 0.05
    50 Penguin C tactical UAV 0.025 For RAD STA. 50 systems each supplied with 5x UAV (incl spares). Assigned to each Div Artillery HQ + Rocket Artillery Brigade
    1000 Skydio X10D Quadcopter UAV 0.016 For 4Div Mek, 10Para, 11GGK, Kor Risik, RAD
    2500 DJI Mavic 3 Enterprise Quadcopter UAV 0.014 For rest of RAMD,RRD, RS.
    450 Dronegun MkIV + RFPatrol 0.03 For 4Div Mek, 10Para, 11GGK
    160 AV8 Gempita 8×8 0.5 2nd Gempita Mech Inf Btn (sarawak), additional for KAD Cavalry
    350 J-LTV 0.2 KAD Cavalry (HMLTV) GP, HWC, ATGM-KARAOK, SURV-VINGTAQs, Ambulance versions
    18 Roketsan Karaok 0.01 – 18 launcher, 108 rounds
    780 Instalaza C90 0.002
    350 Carl Gustaf M4 0.05 12000 rounds
    20000 RPG-7 rounds 0.01
    42 SH-15 155mm SPH 0.1
    12 G5 155mm Howitzer 0.006 used ex Qatar Army
    40 LG1 105mm Howitzer 0.09
    120 KP-SAM Chiron manpad 0.06 70 dual launcher, 50 shoulder launcher. 600 rounds. Igla replacement
    8 AW109E Power 0.01 used 2x EMS/Medevac, 4x utility, 2x VIP
    6 MD530F 0.02 used, ex Afghan AF, thru US EDA. SF operator transport.
    Total USD 1.343 Billion

    RMK 13 2026-2030 (USD1.6 bil)
    truck recapitalisation 0.05
    soldier systems 0.1
    EW/ESM/EA 0.05
    4 VERA NG ESM system 0.04
    4 Ground Master 200 MM/C Artilery Locating Radar 0.065 – ARTHUR replacement
    150 Polaris DAGOR 0.045 10PARA
    300 KIA KLTV APC 0.05 7Bde motorized. Customised local manufacture
    30 PT-91M additional + upgrade whole fleet 0.18 – 30x additional. New powerpack. +6 additional WZT-4
    54 LG1 105mm Howitzer 0.12
    500 GL-SDB 0.1 custom pods integrated with ASTROS II launcher
    180 KIFV 0 used ex South Korea, offset KLTV project (4th MIFV/Adnan Tracked Mech Inf Btn)
    30 KIFV K263 Vulcan VADS 0 used ex South Korea, offset Chiron project. UAV defence
    70 JM167 Vulcan VADS 0 used ex japan. UAV defence
    72 Roketsan Karaok 0.04 72 launcher, 432 rounds
    22 Starstreak HVM system 0.03 HVM Systems only. 16 Install on KIFV, 6 spares
    2 NSM coastal battery 0.25 each battery 3x launcher, 1x command, 1x radar
    3 VL MICA NG battery 0.35 each battery 4x launcher, 1x command, 1x radar
    26 UH-60P Blackawk 0.1 used ex South Korea (offset FA-50 Batch 2) + upgrades
    3 CN-235 0 TUDM Transfer
    3 PC-12 NG 0.015 used – utility, liaison, Medevac, special ops
    6 P2010 0.004 training, liaison. Include simulator
    Total USD 1.589 Billion

    RMK 14 2031-2035 (USD1.6 bil)
    EW jammer 0.15
    truck recapitalisation 0.05
    soldier systems 0.1
    4 CNIM PFM pontoon bridge 0.1 To establish bridge regiment for east malaysia
    New tactical UAV 0.025
    New quadcopter UAV 0.03
    New counter drone gun system 0.05
    900 Smartshooter SMASH AD equivalent 0.025 for Mech Inf Btn, 10Para, 11GGK, GAPU
    4 Ground Master 200 MM/C Artillery Locating Radar 0.065
    24 Weibel XENTA radar 0.12 radar for VSHORAD CUAS batteries
    600 KIA KLTV APC 0.1 – 4x Motorized Inf Btn sabah/sarawak
    42 CH-901 loitering munition 0.06 intrim loitering munition system
    20000 RPG-7 rounds 0.01
    300 NLAW ATGM 0.01 additional for 10PARA and 11GGK
    2 NSM coastal battery 0.25 each battery 3x launcher, 1x command, 1x radar
    3 VL MICA NG battery 0.35 each battery 4x launcher, 1x command, 1x radar
    Total USD 1.495 Billion

    ,
    ,
    ,

    Tentera Udara Diraja Malaysia

    RMK 12 2021-2025 (USD1.6 bil)
    18 FA-50MY 0.92
    2 ATR-72 MPA 0.171
    3 ANKA MALE UAV 0.091
    1 GM400 Alpha – ground radar 0.038
    12 H225M 0.35
    Total USD 1.57 Billion

    RMK 13 2026-2030 (USD1.8 bil)
    28 TA/FA-50MY 1 – 8x FA-50MY, 20x TA-50MY
    2 ERIEYE ER Global 6000 0.24
    4 ATR-72 MPA 0.3
    12 TB3 MALE UAV 0.18
    3 GM400 Alpha – ground radar 0.11
    Total USD 1.83 billion

    RMK 14 2031-2035 (USD2.0 bil)
    12 KF-21MY 1
    2 ERIEYE ER Global 6000 0.2
    2 HAVA-SOJ Global 6000 0.24
    2 Global 6000 VIP 0.03 used – trade-in global express + falcon 900
    6 PC-24 0.07 MECU, liaison, MEDEVAC, special ops
    2 A-400M 0.2 used spa/ger allocation
    100 Storm Shadow stand-off missiles 0.16 used UK stocks
    Total USD 1.9 Billion

    RMK 15 2036-2040 (USD2.0 bil)
    12 KF-21MY 1
    50 combat drone UCAV 0.3
    SU-30MKM upgrade / 10yr OH 0.3 – to enable use till 2050
    TA-50 upgrade to FA-50 standard 0.2
    Total USD 1.8 Billion

    ,
    ,
    ,

    Tentera Laut Diraja Malaysia

    RMK 12 2021-2025 (USD2.0 bil)
    LCS Gowind 1.15 Project continue (assume balance RM5.2bil need to be budgeted in RMK12)
    LCS Gowind 0.125 Assembly cost for 6th Gowind
    13 FIC batch 2 0.03
    12 LMS-X damen FCS5009 0.4 including surface attack missile module.
    3 70-80m OSV 0.1 (used) auxillary ship, MCM mothership, SF support, SUB support, UAS support, pipeline security/surveillance
    5 AW139 MUH batch 2 0.1
    4 RQ-21A Blackjack UAV (used) 0 – 4 systems of 5 airframe each. ex USMC retired. Free US EDA
    Total USD 1.905 Billion

    RMK 13 2026-2030 (USD2.0 bil)
    1 Scorpene SSK 0.6 assembled in Sepanggar
    12 LMS-X damen FCS5009 0.4 including surface attack missile module.
    2 Fast RORO (used) 0.04 replacement for MPCSS. Similar concept to Spanish Navy Ysabel
    1 Fleet tanker 0.09 replacement of BM5, BM6. STM Turkiye fleet tanker 17,000 ton. MMHE
    top up NSM and VL MICA NG missiles 0.3
    8 SH-60J Seahawk 0.2 ex-JMSDF airframe + new avionics, radar, ASW sonar
    2 MCM modular system set 0.15
    6 ASW module for LMMS 0.12 KraitSense system / Sea Serpent system
    Total USD 1.9 Billion
    [
    RMK 14 2031-2035 (USD2.4 bil)
    1 Scorpene SSK 0.6 assembled in Sepanggar
    2 Arrowhead 140 Frigate 1 – KD Jebat and KD Lekir replacement
    1 Fleet tanker 0.09 replacement of BM5, BM6. STM Turkiye fleet tanker 17,000 ton. MMHE
    top up LMS-X surface attack module missiles 0.3
    2 MCM modular system set 0.15
    UAS, USV project 0.2
    Total USD 2.34 Billion

    RMK 15 2036-2040 (USD2.4 bil)
    2 Scorpene SSK 1.2 assembled in Sepanggar
    2 Arrowhead 140 Frigate 1 KD Lekiu and KD Kasturi replacement
    30 FIC replacement 0.1 For PASKAL SF support, replacement CB90
    Total USD 2.3 Billion

    ,
    ,
    ,

    Agensi Penguatkuasaan Maritim Malaysia (Malaysia Coast Guard)

    RMK 12 2021-2025 (USD0.5 bil)
    2 additional budget for 2x DAMEN OPV 1800 0.06
    2 Ex JCG OPV 0.02 (used) sisterships of KM Pekan
    3 OSV AHT 70-80m used 0.04
    2 ex WMEC USCG transfer 0
    30 12.5m RHFB Perkasa 0.01
    10 Penggalang FIC 0.02
    30 various RIB 0.01
    4 AW189 0.07
    Total USD 0.23 Billion

    RMK 13 2026-2030 (USD0.8 bil)
    3 Hyundai HDP-3000 Tae Pyung Yang 115m OPV 0.2
    3 60m sail patrol vessel (based on Rainbow Warrior) 0.12
    12 DAMEN FCS 4008 Patrol NGPC2 0.18
    2 ex WMEC USCG transfer 0
    2 ex Ulsan transfer (to be retire 2036-40) 0 – offset Hyundai HDP-3000 buy
    6 ex Kedah Class OPV transfer 0.04
    15 25m PC 0.05
    60 12.5m RHFB Perkasa 0.02
    10 Penggalang FIC 0.02 FIC recapitalisation
    30 8m RIB 0.006 RIB recapitalisation
    4 CN-235 MSA 0.02 Transfer TUDM
    3 AS365N3 used 0.01
    3 AW139 used 0.02
    Total USD 0.686 Billion

    RMK 14 2031-2035 (USD0.8 bil)
    3 Hyundai HDP-3000 Tae Pyung Yang 115m OPV 0.2
    3 60m sail patrol vessel (based on Rainbow Warrior) 0.12
    4 ex Keris class LMS transfer 0
    12 DAMEN FCS 4008 Patrol NGPC2 0.18
    30 25m PC 0.1
    60 12.5m RHFB Perkasa 0.02
    10 Penggalang FIC 0.02 FIC recapitalisation
    30 8m RIB 0.006 RIB recapitalisation
    12 Diamond DA62 MPP Maritime Patrol 0.06
    Total USD 0.706 Billion

    RMK 15 2036-2040 (USD0.8 bil)
    3 New OSV rescue vessel 0.09
    2 ex Lekiu class OPV transfer 0
    6 60m sail patrol vessel (based on Rainbow Warrior) 0.24
    12 DAMEN FCS 4008 Patrol NGPC2 0.18
    15 25m PC 0.05
    30 12.5m RHFB Perkasa 0.02 RHFB recapitalisation
    10 Penggalang FIC 0.02 FIC recapitalisation
    30 8m RIB 0.006 RIB recapitalisation
    6 new helicopter AS365 replacement 0.1
    Total USD 0.706 Billion

  30. – We need oilers like we do a hole in the head. Perhaps ask yourself why the RMN has no such requirement and factor in that we hardly venture far from our waters or the periphery and when we do it’s cheaper to have ship make refuelling stops.
    If we’re going to get capabilities to cover for each and every possibility there will be a long list and we’d end up with various things we hardly use. Must as well get a helicopter ship whilst we’re at it.

    – The Kasturis are what we chose to designate it. As pointed out to you on numerous occasions; not written in stone or holy writ. One can have a 9,000 tonne hull and call it a ”frigate” instead of a ”destroyer” and one can have a ”corvette” more heavily armed than a ”frigate”.

    – My question is how do we detect, acquire and hit targets in real time without a recce/strike complex? Having the sexy hardware is one thing; have the means to effectively use it is another. The Ukrainians were able to do what they did in the Black Sea and to hit targets deep in Russia’s operational depth because they have a recce/strike complex and benefit from American assistance. You will notice [since you asked a whole back whether we could do it] the LMS k of a ISR capability is a major issue for the Houthis and they have so far been unsuccessful against naval targets. Also, the U.K. has given some Storm Shadows the Ukraine and didn’t have much to begin with so I doubt if it will have “used stocks”.

    – The reality is they won’t spend anything on the Flankers beyond what’s needed to keep it flying but you’re aware of this.

    – Unless it’s for 10 Para or selected units 105mm guns are yesterday’s guns; lack the range for hitting anything beyond the distance a M1 shell will go; in turn it’s useless for counter battery and in turn it lacks the needed operational flexibility. We’ve discussed this in the past. What we can get are 120mm mortars and loitering drones which can never totally replicate a howitzer but can do some of what a howitzer does. Ultimately there is no substitute for a 155mm howitzer ….

    – ”RMN” not ”army” operated for the pertinent reason that the RMN [not the army has the assets at sea with the sensors and land based radar]. Silly to have it army operated if you look at it objectively and think it through. Also the hard part – as mentioned before – will be to get the said land bass ASM to work with UASs and other assets in order to detect, fix and hit targets in real time; targets which are moving and trying not to be detected.

    – Ro-Ro ships are one trick ponies. Meant to move stuff from A to B and the MPSS is intended to perform various roles. It offers the flexibility a Ro Ro can’t provide which is why there is zero requirement for it. A Ro Ro can supplement a MPSS but not be a complete substitute; irrespective of how much you insist or are nesmorised with the notion. A Ro Ro also has inherent poor seakeeping. Yes in case you see fit to repeat it; others have Ro Ros but they also have LPDs.

    – Army does not want more G-5s – period/full stop. As it is it wants to bin those it has – something you overlook. The G-5 is big and cumbersome; takes time to lay and disperse and no the APU is not really meant forvthat as you mentioned previously. Recent events in the Ukraine only further remind us of the vulnerabilities of towed arty; if you’ve noticed and Ukrainian losses in towed arty have been much higher compared to SPHs.

    – The MMEA will say “no thank you” to the Kedahs. The key question of whether the Kedahs suits the MMEA’s requirements seems to elude you. If you need any reminders the MMEA does not want to again be placed in a position where it gets stiff others no longer wants. Which is why I previously told you the MNEA wouldn’t touch the Laksamanas with a barge pole. Try asking a MMEA chap whdt he thinks of his organisation getting the Kedahs. My wants are more modest; rather than paper plans on whdt the MMEA should get; I would prefer a gradual improvement to its shore support infrastructure.

  31. zaft – ”KFX like TFX is a great jet for a country which face high risk of a protracted warfare against a technologically challenged adversary.”

    No… It’s a sign of the times. It’s 2024 not 1945 anymore; things have evolved. It’s about ”low observability” and networking. It’s also about having the right mix of various things working in tandem and there being no silver bullets or panacea or ‘A’ being better than ‘B’.

  32. Taib – ”I beg to differ. The midterm review of DWP is the right excuse and should be seriously considered so to dump suspect goals and buttressed existing hopes.”

    Lets see shall we ….

    Taib – ”towards closer technical ties with Korean defence houses and hitching our fortunes with them as we are doing with Turkiye? That KF21 project is a reasonable starting point.”

    The fact that Turkey is a Muslim country [albeit a secular one] plays a large part. The Koreans can offer us a lot of stuff which Turkey can’t and since the 1980’s they’ve been looking at strategic cooperation with us. We are/were the problem.

    Taib – ”That KF21 project is a reasonable starting point.”

    Since when do we think that far ahead and actually be serious about it? Also, are we ready to make the cash commitment?

    Taib – ”are we just stopping at a mere 18 units of FA50 LCAs, or going ahead with an additional 18 units?”

    Under the next Malaysia Plan we supposedly are.

    Taib – ”We can’t get out of our defence malaise if we don’t start getting out of it. ”

    You mean our longstanding highly flawed politically driven policy which benefits the industry rather than the end user and taxpayer; our inability to learn from past mistakes; the lack of seriousness placed in defence; the lack of a clear assessment of what we
    intend to achieve and what we realistically can; our tendency to buy a bit but never enough of anything and often without us getting the best value for our cash and the lack of the needed deep rooted fundamental changes which are so badly needed?

  33. – We need oilers like we do a hole in the head.

    Ans : It is to cover a capability that we have right now (BM5 and BM6) for long range convoy escort. It will also be useful to support our allies operation in South East Asia. Canada (MV Asterix) and New Zealand (HMNZS Aotearoa) uses its tankers to support other allies around south east asia, and that is what i am striving for.

    – The Kasturis are what we chose to designate it. As pointed out to you on numerous occasions; not written in stone or holy writ.

    Ans : I have no issues whatsoever with what Kasturi is called. so why do you keep hitting on that?

    – My question is how do we detect, acquire and hit targets in real time without a recce/strike complex? Also, the U.K. has given some Storm Shadows the Ukraine and didn’t have much to begin with so I doubt if it will have “used stocks”.

    Ans : There is lots of things I planned that would upgrade the existing recce/strike complex many times over, if you can find them in the list (thousands of UAVs for TD, TLDM, TUDM; radars, MPAs, AEWs, etc.). As for Storm Shadow, UK has around 700-1000 of them. They have given about 80-100 to Ukraine. Storm shadow replacement is by around 2028-2034. Around 100 units would be a good number for our stockpile. To compare, Spain bought 43 Taurus KEPD 350 for its Hornets. Qatar bought 140 Storm Shadows.

    – The reality is they won’t spend anything on the Flankers beyond what’s needed to keep it flying but you’re aware of this.

    Ans : Next decision window would be in 2032-2034 when the second 10 year overhaul is needed. IF not to spend, then it would be retired 2035-2038.

    – Unless it’s for 10 Para or selected units 105mm guns are yesterday’s guns;

    Ans : Yes i agree that there is no substitute for 155mm howitzers, but seems like RAD is not going to retire its 105mm too. In the meantime, what we could do for whatever 155mm gun that we have is to get precision fuses for the shells.

    – ”RMN” not ”army” operated for the pertinent reason that the RMN [not the army has the assets at sea with the sensors and land based radar].

    Ans : NSM is not just a ship killer. It can also be used as a land attack cruise missile, something that can be used for tentera darat offensive of defensive strikes. Even the US Army now is deploying Tomahawk and Hypersonic missiles that can be used to attack ships. A NSM regiment slots-in nicely in RAD Briged Artileri Roket (2x Astros, 1x NSM). Targeting maritime targets can be done by geosatellites, shore radar (which is included in a NSM battery), ESM, UAVs and by the missiles own internal IIR (imaging infra red) sensor. Also ships are limited by its sailing area (such as the narrow malacca straits) and its speed, so its rough location can always be determined. For example, a ship sailing at 30knots (which is max speed of most warships) will only be 55km away from its previous location 1 hour previously.

    – Ro-Ro ships are one trick ponies.

    Ans : What we need is just administrative logistics movement between west and east malaysia. We will need less in the future when more units are stood up to enable equivalent force strength in both areas. US army, for example, moves around the world on ROROs, and never by LPDs.

    – Army does not want more G-5s – period/full stop.

    Ans : Recently talked with RAD personnels, they actually wished that they have more of them. A 155mm howitzer however heavy is better than no 155mm howitzer at all. Yes it is heavier and less maneuverable than SPH, but they are less complex, less prone to break down compared to SPHs (means more operational readiness). Moving forward, yes ideally more SPH is the best, but how many could we get? Quantity has its own quality.
    https://pbs.twimg.com/media/F-YUi0jbEAAWaST.jpg

    https://en.defence-ua.com/weapon_and_tech/pros_and_cons_of_caesar_performance_on_battlefields_from_ukrainian_artillerymen_and_from_defense_ministry-9014.html

    – The MMEA will say “no thank you” to the Kedahs. The key question of whether the Kedahs suits the MMEA’s requirements seems to elude you.

    Ans : I am basing my proposal on APMM’s own Pelan Perancangan Strategik Maritim Malaysia 2040 (PPSMM 2040). In the plan, APMM wants 20 large OPV, 96 Medium PV and 228 boats 20m or smaller (FIC, RHFB, RHIB, RIB) by 2040. The Kedahs, Keris, etc. if passed to APMM in 2026-2030 would still be a ship fit for purpose (as OPV) with plenty of life left (unlike Vospers and other small ships passed to APMM previously). The oldest Kedah class (KD Kedah) would only be 20 years old in 2026, which means it still has plenty of life to operate as an OPV in APMM. If APMM is accepting 56 years old ex USCG WMECs, would it be logical that it does not want a 20 year old OPV? The operational use and sustainment of the Kedahs can be significantly reduced and simplified just by removing the CMS, 3D radar etc. and have basic electronics just like the DAMEN OPV1800.

  34. @ zaft

    ” buy FAC of a LMS that can’t go everywhere? ”

    Why do you think that it cannot go anywhere when it has operated for 93 days around Antarctic waters without going back to port for replenishment?

    It has also sailed non stop without refueling for 45 days from Netherlands to Australia. The ship is full of fuel tanks. How much range do you really need?

    My proposal for low cost LMS-X (costing around USD30 million each including surface attack missile module) as an alternative to LMS Batch 2 corvettes.
    https://pbs.twimg.com/media/F8IncFcaEAAJytG.jpg

    24x LMS-X with high speed and long range (that can operate in a task force along with Gowinds, Arrowhead 140 etc.) , enabling distributed lethality with a total of 288x Cakir 150km anti-ship and land attack missiles among them. I think that is much better proposition than the original TLDM LMS Batch 2 corvette plans.

    So my proposed TLDM fleet by 2040
    – 6x Scorpene Evolution SSK
    – 6x Gowind 3100 Frigate|
    – 4x Arrowhead 140 Frigate
    – 24x LMS-X FCS5009
    – 3x OSV 70-80m for MCM mothership, SF support, SUB tender/support, UAS support, pipeline security/surveillance
    – 2x STM Fleet Tanker
    – 30x FIC

  35. @Hulubalang

    austronesian sampan also can get them from Madagascar to hawaii.

    doesn’t mean it can do it in rough sea or be on station in a rough sea. Have enough space for radar and equipment to operate far away from the base.

  36. … – ”It is to cover a capability that we have right now (BM5 and BM6) for long range convoy escort. ”

    Again how often do we venture that far? Again, when we do it’s far cheaper to have ships stop to refuel. Again; there is a legitimate reason why the RMN has no need for ”oilers”, ”tankers” or ”hospital ships” ,,,,

    … – ” It will also be useful to support our allies operation in South East Asia. ”

    We can’t even fully support ourselves yet here you are suggesting we get something to ”support” others…

    … – ”Canada (MV Asterix) and New Zealand (HMNZS Aotearoa) uses its tankers to support other allies around south east asia, and that is what i am striving for.”

    ”Strive” for it all you want but our needs differ greatly compared to the likes of Canada and New Zealand. You also would have noticed that both those navies; which by th way call ships which refuel others at sea ”oilers”; have needs which differ greatly to ours? Or are you peddling direct comparisons again?

    … – ” I am basing my proposal on APMM’s own Pelan Perancangan Strategik Maritim Malaysia ”

    Base it on whatever you one but still take the effort to ask the pertinent questions: Do Kedahs fit into the MMEA’s CONOPS; when the time comes when the RMN is ready to handover the Kedahs will the MMEA want such aged ships; ect. Have you actually asked anyone in the MMEA what they think of your proposal?

    W
    … – ”NSM is not just a ship killer”

    Thanks for the revelation and the update but the main reason people buy it is to kill ”ships” and if you thought about it through and through you’d realise the it’s the RMN which should operate it.

    … ”hat we need is just administrative logistics movement between west and east malaysia.”

    Ro Ros can be a supplement not substitute but not a complete replacement for a MPSS which hey presto is why the RMN has a requirement for MPSSs and not Ro Ros. Also, do you need the reminder than troop movement is only of th the tasks which will be assigned to the MPSSs?

    …- ”Quantity has its own quality.”

    Thanks for the update but if that ”quantity” is not survivable then what ”quality” are you on about? Also why are you dogmatically insisting the army get more towed arty when it clearly has no desire and wants to bin its G-5s as soon as it can?

    … – ”– 2x STM Fleet Tanker”

    A ”tanker” carries fuel. An ”oiler” refuels ships at sea. Ever wondered why Petronas has ”tankers” but no ”oilirs” and why navies [including th USN and RN which pioneered RAS] makes the distinction or are you going to fall back on the Pakistan and Turk yard arguement?

    … – ”so why do you keep hitting on that?”

    ”Hinting” at what? I don’t ”hint” at anything and a designation is just that; a designation. A ”corvette” can be better armed than a ”frigate” and a ”OPV” can be better armed than a ”frigate” …

    … – ”There is lots of things I planned that would upgrade the existing recce/strike complex many times over,”

    Hurrah. Needs songs of praise or a pat on the back?

  37. … – ”Recently talked with RAD personnels, they actually wished that they have more of them.”

    Not what I hear from an acquaintance who was in the Artillery Directorate. The G-5 was designed for South African requirements; heavy and cumbersome; great for south Angola or South West Africa but not for us. Also, the APU is intended to help get the gun into position where it can be laid and to get the gun out of position where it can be linked to its prime mover; not to move it far. The fact that the army doesn’t want anymore G-5s and has a preference for non towed guns is something you overlook; as you do with things which clash with your narrative.

    … – ”If APMM is accepting 56 years old ex USCG WMECs, would it be logical that it does not want a 20 year old OPV?”

    Look at the context rather than form spurious and convenient conclusions. The MMEA as of 2024 has no choice but to accept aged ships but is it written in stone that in a few years it will be willing to accept Kedahs? You need a reminder that the MMEA already has a large footprint and that Kedahs might not be suitable for its needs? Some time ago you even suggested the Laksamanas be handed over to the MMEA.

  38. As a person that thinks corvettes/frigates designation ” not written in stone or holy writ ” (which yes i agree really), but he does care very much how tankers/oilers/replenishment ships are specifically called.

    I have said that i called it that because, that is the specific STM ship i am referring to, and that is what Pakistan Navy officially called that ship.

    https://pbs.twimg.com/media/GGR-c8vaAAEBZQO?format=jpg&name=4096×4096

    ” Hurrah. Needs songs of praise or a pat on the back? ”
    No. It is just annoying that you keep repeating your assumption that that nobody takes recce/ISRT/STA into account, when it is there.

  39. ”austronesian sampan also can get them from Madagascar to hawaii”

    Viking longships sailed from Scandinavia to North America and Africa.

  40. … – ”As a person that thinks corvettes/frigates designation ” not written in stone or holy writ ” (which yes i agree really), but he does care very much how tankers/oilers/replenishment ships are specifically called.”

    Silly… In simple unequivocal English [need another language?] was pointed out to you that ”The issue of a ”corvette” in one navy being a ”frigate” in another is wholly different to the distinction between a ‘tanker” and an ”oiler”. A ”tanker” transport fuel; an ”oiler” enables replenishment at sea – that is an irrefutable fact; there is no navy which calls a ”tanker” and ‘oiler” or vice versa.”

    Tell me why Petronas has ”tankers” but no ”oilers” and yes you told me about the Pakistani and Turkish angle are you suggesting they’ve got it right or are infallible?
    This is news to you we know but most other navies including the USN and RN make the clear distinction.

    … – ”It is just annoying that you keep repeating your assumption that that nobody takes recce/ISRT/STA into account, when it is there.”

    The ‘words ”annoying” and ”assumption” coming from you? Like I first said a long time ago : the ‘…’ pot shouldn’t be calling the Azlan kettle black …

  41. Not sure what is it about oilers and tankers when Navy didn’t ask for it and prefers to use a MRSS for fleet replenishment roles. Also nothing in the DWP or the NDP suggests a dedicated tanker is required given Navy’s assigned AOR and duties. Also if user chooses the requirements, then its clear Navy’s preference is for dedicated naval ships, not modular commercial to military conversions. Navy even prefers dedicated FFBNW ships than a non Naval ship with tons of missile. Lastly, look at RMN and RMAF’s missile inventory. There is no money and storage space to support 200+ missiles.

  42. kel – ”Not sure what is it about oilers and tankers when Navy didn’t ask for it and prefers to use a MRSS for fleet replenishment roles.”

    Well someone is convinced that we do need ”oilers” and the reasons he gave were silly/spurious; i.e. to support allies and to support ships that venture far. The fact that our ships hardly venture far [far cheaper to have ships make refueling stops]; that our ”allies” [which we don’t have] don’t need our support and that there are legitimate reasons why we don’t have such a requirement; elude him. This is similar to other spurious claims made like a Ro Ro being a direct substitute for a MPSS; the small and resource strapped Army Aviation Wing getting a fixed wing capability which it doesn’t need and when it can barely sustain the little it has; our subs surfacing in plain view of intruding Chinese ships to show that they’re there as a warning; etc. The fact remains we can’t factor in every single possibility; yes on paper there would be use for a ”oiler” but on paper there would also be use for a long list of other things; things which we’d hardly use and would not justify the expense made; i.e. hospital ship, etc.

    kel – ”Navy even prefers dedicated FFBNW ships than a non Naval ship with tons of missile.”

    The RMN certainly does not ”prefer” it; it has no choice …

    kel – ”then its clear Navy’s preference is for dedicated naval ships, not modular commercial to military conversions.”

    As a trade off the RMN; as part of the 5/15; decided to go for the modular payload approach but it was out of sheer necessity, not choice. Whilst the modular payload approach certainly has payoffs it’s not a panacea; might not work for everyone and has its penalties. Take MCM; despite all the payloads available and advances in technology people in the MCM community; not only in the RMN but other navies as well; are simply not convinced that modular payloads are the answer and it’s telling that a number of navies [including the RN which pioneered modern MCN as we know it] are still going for purpose built MCMVs.

  43. @hulubalang
    “for long range convoy escort”
    Why do we need long range convoy escort? We don’t have overseas interests nor colonies and the only time we had far away operation was commerce protection during the height of Somalian piracy, which has subsided a lot since hence we no longer see the need to be there anymore.

    Look at the role of TLDM. Its to the protection of our littoral waters and EEZ, so types like large frigates & oilers/tankers/whatever is unnecessary. Look at the MRSS, its not just purely to support the fleet but to have amphib capability to transport land assets where docks are unavailable.

  44. He’s referring to Ops Jajar; the BM5 and BM6 but conveniently overlooks the fact that Ops Fajar was a one off thing; an aberration. Ultimately it’s far cheaper for ships venturing out to stop for refueling. We simply don’t venture out far often enough to justify having an oiler on strength.

    BTW ‘…’ remember the famous ”oiler” which was sunk at the Battle of The Coral Sea? The Nesho? Her lost was felt because during that period the USN only had a handful of ”oilers” in the Pacific. Her job was to refuel ships at sea and she was designated an ”oiler”. If you ever do fly over the Melaka Straits you’d also see quite a few ”tankers” ferrying fuel from the Middle East; ”tankers” as opposed to ”oilers” which
    perform RAS or UNREP. I’m not into posting links for the sake of it so according to the USN’s Military Sealift Command ”As part of the Combat Logistics Force, Fleet Oilers are the supply line to U.S. Navy surface combatant ships at sea. They provide fuel enabling the fleet to remain at sea and combat ready for extended periods of time.”.

  45. ” it’s telling that a number of navies [including the RN which pioneered modern MCN as we know it] are still going for purpose built MCMVs ”

    RN, is not going for purpose-built MCMVs. All its MCMV will be retired and replaced with modular USV-based MCM system based on OSVs
    http://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2023/01/royal-navys-mine-hunting-mother-ship-arrives-in-plymouth/

    ” Somalian piracy, which has subsided a lot since hence we no longer see the need to be there anymore ”
    So we, as a maritime nation, which SLOC (Sea Lines Of Communication) is not an important mission to protect? How can you be sure there it will not be repeated in the future? Can you also say lahad datu incident will not be repeated in the future, so we don’t need to create a new army division in Sabah?

    Large frigates are unnecessary? So why Singapore, Indonesia is building 6,000-8,000 tons frigates then? Why are Australia building them to operate in our waters?

  46. ” The fact that the army doesn’t want anymore G-5s and has a preference for non towed guns is something you overlook ”

    Army doesn’t want anymore G-5 >>> I don’t think so

    Army prefers SPH >>> yes.

    The army does not have the budget to have 100% 155mm SPH fleet in adequate numbers for both Eastern and Western Field Army.

    Which is why it is not planning to retire the G-5s anytime soon. They need all the 155mm that they have right now. Yes they are not going to ask the government to buy more towed 155mm howitzers (which will affect their request for 155mm SPH), but if they can have more of the G-5s, their answer would be yes.

  47. @hulubalang
    “SLOC is not an important mission to protect?”
    Are we in a position to protect all the way up to the Gulf of Aden, nope. We have no resources to be part of a maritime police. We are already undersourced as it is and have our plate full trying to secure our own waters full time.

    “So why”
    Youd have to ask SG, Indonesia, & Aussie about that, as each seem to have different reasons. SG has sufficiently secured their littoral control thus their security policy now extends further outwards, this is reflected in their Formidables being a more deep sea vessel (much deeper draught) as compared to our LCS. So its natural if they go for a larger frigate policy which is simply an evolution process of their Formidables selection. We otoh has no such need yet as we yet to achieve their level of local security, whatmore having ambitions to project it further. SG may want to be SEA policeman but they have the resources & strong economy for it, we otoh should look into our backyard before dreaming.

  48. @joe

    The most impressive part about the interview with the pilot of the MKM is the link to US trade departments which identify “As with other ASEAN countries, Malaysia has territorial disputes with China and neighboring countries. The government also faces trafficking, piracy, and militants operating in the broader region. Protecting its maritime security is critical for Malaysia as a country that depends heavily on sea trade and holds offshore economic assets.”

    So in a way, yes & no as IMHO RMN are designed to support both the operation of MMEA in domestic law enforcement as well as support a certain ‘maritime police’ as none of the problems we face be it China, piracy, trafficking & militants can be solve unilaterally.

  49. … – “ Large frigates are unnecessary? So why Singapore, Indonesia is building 6,000-8,000 tons frigates then? Why are Australia building them to operate in our waters”

    You really have a knack for going over the same thing over again and only looking at things from your perspective; as well as conflating things. The RSN’s requirements differ greatly to ours … It plans to have the capability to fully operate alongside Tier 1 partners and to operate in a highly non permissive environment”. We do t. In case you need another reminder what countries but are based on operational requirements, threat perceptions and funding. We see the need for a Para Brigade; Singapore doesn’t. By your line of reasoning nobody can say the Singapore doesn’t have a need because the Malaysian army does.

    …. – “I don’t think so”

    You can think till the end of days but the fact remains that the Artillery Directorate does not want anymore G-5s for reasons which have been done to death with.

    Also, nobody said the G-5s are being retired soon, merely that the army wants to retire them as soon as it can and does nor plan to use get anymore G-5s or any other towed guns if it had a choice.

    Thanks for the update on us being a maritime nation and the importance of safeguarding SLOCs but things like Ops Fajar was a one off. We simply can’t afford to cater for each and every eventuality and as much as the voices in your head tell you so we don’t need an”oiler”. As for the reference to Ops Daulat; if you see the need to go off tangent must as well talk about the German defence of Upper Silesia in 1945. Having an”oiler” and safeguarding east Sabah are two very different things. If you thought about it through and through the possibility of a threat to east Sabah is much higher by a thousand over times compared to the possibility of us needing an “oiler”. Also as has been pointed out to you if our ships do venture far; much cheaper and practical to have them stop for refueling. It’s not as if they’ll be on extensive patrols in the North Atlantic and won’t be able to grad you shore to refuel.

  50. @Zaft
    What does “maritime security” in the context of Malaysia refers to? Does it mean we should send warships to protect cargo vessels traversing the Red Sea since its threatening our sea trade? TLDM will act to perform law enforcement in support of MMEA only because they must have a peacetime role but only within our sovereign littoral waters & EEZ. Against China, or Somalian pirates or whatever it depends as we don’t have mutual defence pact within ASEAN so we are not beholden to be the region’s maritime police. Again let me emphasise, we don’t have the spare resources for it.

  51. … – ”RN, is not going for purpose-built MCMVs. All its MCMV will be retired and replaced with modular USV-based MCM system based on OSVs”

    They will still be purpose built for MCM and the main difference is they will be autonomous.

  52. .. – ” instead i did have a lot of suggestions on how to improve on the lack of such weapons on the MKM.””

    Well hooray but without certain key enablers – which we don’t have – we simply. can’t get the most of certain types of ordnance.

    zaft – ”System integration and inventing own unique tactics due to using unique platform are stupidly expensive ”

    Makes sense if we’re buying in numbers but we don’t. We customed built a variant unique to us and paid the penalty. We even had to get Indian help because most of the manuals were in Russian and were not translated. There was also a host of documentation issues which had to be sorted out.

    … – ”About the SAP513, interestingly he rates this system highly even when compared to western systems. ”

    In ”Iran-Iraq War in the Air, 1980-1988” by Cooper [yes I like books] he mentions that one area Soviet stuff did well in the hands of the Iraqis were RWRs. As it stands however in certain operational scenarios Russian self defensive systems; including jamming pods’ have not performed as expected against certain types of Ukrainian AD systems [no doubt you’ll have an explanation.

    … – ”As for upgrades, yes they have plans to upgrade the MKM, and has a few already requested.”

    ”Plans” for an upgrade were made back as the mid-2000’s and the armed services always have plans in place to cover various things but as of 2024 the chances of a comprehensive upgrade as likely as Cinderella copulating with King Kong; the geo political situation is such and finances are such that we’d rather channel scarce resources towards other things.

    … – ” I have never praised MKM for its “long range weapons”,”

    On the contrary you did make a number of references [moons ago] to the ”long range” of the KH-31 as if it was a silver bullet and it was pointed out to you that just because a missile has a ‘X’ maximum range doesn’t mean that’s the range the target will or can be engaged at : measure of success versus measure of efficiency.

  53. ” They will still be purpose built for MCM and the main difference is they will be autonomous ”

    Those things you described is the enablers, like the current UUVs carried on MCMVs. But in the future RN will not be using dedicated MCMV ships, but OSVs deploying small UUV, USV and UAS to detect and destroy mines.
    http://www.bairdmaritime.com/work-boat-world/maritime-security-world/unmanned-systems/column-uk-royal-navy-on-course-for-fully-uncrewed-mine-countermeasures-fleet-naval-gazing/

    ” Russian self defensive systems; including jamming pods’ have not performed as expected against certain types of Ukrainian AD systems [no doubt you’ll have an explanation ”
    I don’t have any explanation, just that the user themselves rating the SAP513 systems highly, and does not think that it needs to be replaced. I would personally think, yes because of the supposedly “poor” performance of russian EW systems in Ukraine that it could be replaced with something like the new SAAB AREXIS. But that is what response i get from the user. SAP513 is one of the best EW system out there and they won’t trade it for other systems.

    As for what he prefers to fly, it is the MKM. What he wish he had, he wished that he can have the bombs that the hornet has. And i have discussed long about what kind of bombs, etc. what would be okay, what would be not etc. to be hung on the MKM. Technical and diplomatical point of view.

  54. Russian land EW performed poorly at the initial stage but as the lints stabilised there was a marked improvement. In fact EW was one of the areas where the Russians performed as expected. I was however referring to self defence systems on aircraft; against certain threats they have not performed well as the downing of several Su-30s is a result of this.

    MCM. No I’m not talking about the end let’s but the platform. Whether it’s a OSV it the Santa Maria or Pinto; they will be dedicated MCM platforms.

  55. @Hulubalang

    The thales made MCM like most others newer generations MCM solution is platform agnostic. It can be installed on a commercial ship or warship or custom made MCM ship. It’s was the politicians that decided 2 OSV to be procured at least as a gap filler and thus shouldn’t be confused with an ‘official’ plan of the RN going forwards.

    While Most European navy MCM programmes do involve putting the MCM system on a ‘OSV’ type ship the same couldn’t be said in the indo Pacific where JP,SG,PH like the US are planning or carrying the MCM equipment on a warship.

    @JoE

    If it was the Somalian pirate and not the houtis, we like a lot of other countries would be sending something already. But that’s the thing having a capability to help but doesn’t want to is different from incapable of offerings help. A navy equip with Roro,missile boat and tankers are just aren’t capable of helping anyone else.

  56. @Zaft
    “we like a lot of other countries would be sending something already”
    Ops Fajar was a politically expedient PR exercise as against nonstate actors there is lesser risk of things escalating to national proportion. Rightly or wrongly, the houthis claim the moral high ground to be fighting for Gazans and any action against them will be viewed negatively particularly in our segment of society. Plus there is a very real chance of our ships getting sunk since ours lacked CIWS protection.

    So far only US & UK are taking actions while other Western particularly NATO states are sitting out this one. Majority of shippers are also divert to rounding Africa instead of relying on the protection from genocide conspirators. So why should we get involved unless Msian lives are at stake?

  57. Joe “So why should we get involved unless Msian lives are at stake?”

    You are missing the point. Having the asset mix that enables us to get involved but doesn’t want to is different from having asset that’s make us incapable of getting involved even if we wanted to is a different thing.

  58. Recent events in the Red Sea have only further highlighted the need for. strike/recce capability. Without which have a “long range” or as some like to say “potent” missiles counts for nothing. The Houthis have UASs and short based radars but it’s still inadequate for what the need : detect, track, identify and hit in real time moving targets. It’s also apparent that Houthi success to date has been against civilian shipping but have failed against naval targets.

    Some commentators have mistakenly used the word “swarm” to describe Houthi UAS tactics but the term actually is used for a group of UAS which are networked together; working together; including avoiding colliding into each other; to hit a common target. Houthi UASs have been used in relays not “swarms”.

  59. ” Without which have a “long range” or as some like to say “potent” missiles counts for nothing ”

    The Houthis does not have advanced missiles such as NSM that has stealth features and random maneuvering terminal attack phase, or super fast hypersonic missiles that are currently in development by China and USA.

    Their missiles also failed against naval targets because of being intercepted by the advanced systems that those naval ships have – AEGIS combat systems and ESSM/Standard missiles. Such systems need large hulls to fit them, something the size of ships 3,100 tons or smaller most probably cannot have.

    Ballistic missiles has predictable flight paths, you can easily intercept it if you have the correct missiles to do so. The danger of ballistic missiles is not on short range places like in the bab al mandeeb, but in open waters when you can be hit in locations you think is too far for any missiles to reach you.

    Yes, swarming tactics has not been used (yet) by the houthis. Still we cannot discount such tactics to be used against us in the future and not prepare for it.

  60. If fail to see the relevance with NSM. Even if the Houthis had a missile which could fly at Mach 100 and a seeker able to pick up the proverbial needle from the haystack they would still need a strike/ recce complex.

    We can’t cater to every single threat. Planners do take into account various threats but the resources aren’t there to allocate the same level of attention or focus. The swarm threat is real but who ‘s to say it’s more likely than a cyber attack on our power grid or something more conventional in approach?

  61. ” they would still need a strike/ recce complex ”

    They actually have quite and advanced STA complex capable of detecting and tracking every ship around bab al mandeeb.

    Which is why they can launch missiles at warships there.

    They launched missiles at warships, those missiles reached their targets, but they are intercepted by advanced air defence systems fitted on those warships. As ships like the Arleigh Burke can do area air defence, they intercepted missiles targeting civilian ships around them too.
    https://pbs.twimg.com/media/GHQe73JW0AABWXn.jpg

    https://pbs.twimg.com/media/GG4BlpjboAIPJvB?format=jpg&name=4096×4096

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