The Joneses… Pohang class corvette

A Pohang class corvette while still in service in South Korean navy. South Korean MND

SHAH ALAM: The Joneses…Pohang class corvette. IT appears that the South Korean Pohang class corvette has or will become the standard type of these vessels for Asean navies, with three already in service with Vietnam (two) and the Philippines which already has one with another to be transferred soon.

Indonesian Navy will become the third operator of the Pohang class as media reports in the last week or so suggested that it will receive three corvettes within the next few years. South Korean media however reported only one will be transferred though. As there is still seven Pohang class ships with South Korean navy it is likely more will be transferred to other navies. At the moment, apart from the Asean navies, Peru (2), Colombia and Egyptian navies also operate the same ships.

Two Pohang class corvettes. South Korean MND

From Wikipedia:

The Pohang-class PCC (Patrol Combat Corvette) is the low-end complement of the high-low mix domestic naval construction plan of the Republic of Korea Navy under the 1st Yulgok Project (1974-1986) for the Republic of Korea Armed Forces. It was originally planned as a Batch II production of Donghae-class corvette, but many changes on overall design, notably applying the hull design of Ulsan-class frigate, reclassified the ship to its own class. The ship is designed for patrolling maritime border, including the Northern Limit Line, protecting the littoral zone, and combating the North Korean vessels.

Since 1984, a total of 24 Pohang-class corvettes commissioned in the Republic of Korea Navy. The decommission of the class started in 2009, and is being replaced with series of FFX program. As of 2022, 7 remain in service in the ROKN, and 7 were transferred to other navies.

PN BRP Coronado Yap, the first Pohang class corvette transferred to the Philippines sailed together with BRP Jose Rizal, built by HHI of South Korea. Philippine Navy.

What this got to do with RMN then? Nothing much really but RMN may have been the first operator of the Pohang class corvette in Asean as South Korea offered one of the ships, if we decided to buy the Dokdo LHD back in 2012.
Dokdo LHD. South Korean MND.

Of course that did not happened as the government then finally decided not to buy the LHD from South Korea. As of the moment, I have not heard of any new offer to transfer the corvette to Malaysia. To be honest, I am not sure whether RMN would accept it bearing in mind its long held skepticism of gas turbines, after its difficulties with Rahmat and Tuah. The Pohang class corvettes are equipped with a single GE LM2500 gas turbine and two MTU diesel engines.

— Malaysian Defence

If you like this post, buy me an espresso. Paypal Payment

Share
About Marhalim Abas 1674 Articles
Shah Alam

37 Comments

  1. We are so lacking in hulls currently buying these second hand ships from Korea n having them refurbished may not be a bad idea. Just to illustrate , we need at least 10 hulls in East Malaysia but how many have we got there?. Even with the 4 new LMS , there is hardly 10 hulls over there. With 10 hulls we can ma8ntain 4 on constant patrols . With less we now need to flog the existing ships n skip maintenance. With the government not in the mood to buy new hulls the RMN had no choice but forced to deep maintenance taken and renew the old hulls. But these are still old hulls n maintenance would be more often n expensive. The gov has no question when it from to maintenance n repair. The gov will approve no questions asked but once request for new hulls goes in questioning will come.

  2. Those pohangs would be a good addition to MMEA OPV fleet.

    Those gas turbines can just be monthballed and not used. with diesels only it can still push 15 knots.

    the advantage of getting those pohangs is the 2x 76mm gun and 2x DARDO 40mm fitted on those ships. Can be later transferred to our future frigates to get the cost down.

    Right now, need to stop buying expensive weak patrol vessels for RMN, and get more petrol vesssels for MMEA instead.

    Stop gap vessels that would be good to quickly beef up MMEA patrol fleet :

    1) Pohang class corvettes
    2) Ex Oil and Gas AHTS/OSV (there will be more instances of Winposh Rampart incident in the future, and MMEA need to own ships that can tackle that issue, in addition to doing patrols and presences)
    3) Ex New Zealand Navy 55m IPV (lake class, 4 available)
    4) more 38.2m Bay Class OPV from Australia (now 2 already donated by Australia to MMEA, 4 more available)

  3. Lee – ”We are so lacking in hulls currently buying these second hand ships from Korea n having them refurbished may not be a bad idea. Just to illustrate”

    It’s a Catch 22 situation; introducing into service a ship with zero commonality with what we currently have leads to news problems as people have to be trained to operate and maintain the different radars, ESMs, CMS, gearboxes, engines, etc, etc, all this adds a strain on existing manpower/support/logistical resources and in turns leads to more costs. Achieving greater commonality and lowering the extensive shore support training/support footprint is a major priority for the RMN.

    Lee – ”Even with the 4 new LMS , there is hardly 10 hulls over there.”

    The 6 Kedahs; FACs, LMSs and other ships which are not permanently based there but deploy there on rotations.

    Lee – ”The gov has no question when it from to maintenance n repair”

    Apologies but this is incorrect. Funding for refits and deep maintenance is often delayed; the pen pushing bureaucrats often complaining and asking why it consumes so much resources. Why do you think the government was so receptive to the 5/15? Because the RMN pointed out that long term savings could be gained by retiring aged and high maintenance hulls; those funds in turn could be used to fund newer less maintenance extensive and cheaper to operate hulls.

  4. gonggok – ”need to stop buying expensive weak patrol vessels for RMN”

    There is no intention to do so. The intention is to get a batch of 8 fully fitted out LMSs.

  5. GE LM2500 gas turbines are not for the faint hearted or light in pocket. It runs reliably provided it follows a strict maintenance and replacement program. Gas turbines are preferred for sustaining high speeds (30+ knots) and rapid combat maneuvers but not really suitable for long range patrols due to its huge consumption of fuel, much like a jet engine. These gas turbine ships/fleet would usually have supporting oiler accompanying it. If we cannot afford to run it, better don’t.

  6. azlan – The intention is to get a batch of 8 fully fitted out LMS

    What can 8 fully fitted out LMS does in the defence of malaysian waters against any future adversary? If at most it can perform as a glorified OPV, then why not buy a proper, cheaper OPV instead?

    Can those LMS even be taken seriously by the chinese Aircraft Carrier Task Force in their list of threats?

    What can realistically RMN deploy to give some sort of fear factor to the chinese fleet?

    How does other smaller countries successfully stand up to bigger adversaries?

  7. There’s no way RMN can take on the Chinese fleet without any external support from major powers. Simply talking about the numbers alone, the CCG has probably twice the amount of hulls both the RMN and MMEA combined. One scenario I could think of is China would just simply use the CCG to overwhelm our fleet with its numbers then send the PLAN to do the moping up.

    There’s really nothing in the RMN inventory provides any fear factor to the PLAN. Even SG would be hard pressed to go one-on-one with China. The only realistic option IMO is to form a military alliance within ASEAN as well as ANZAC and Japan.

  8. gonggok – ”can 8 fully fitted out LMS does in the defence of malaysian waters against any future adversary?”

    Put things in context; what type of adversary and in what type of conflict? In an earlier post you mentioned that the RMN needs ”to stop buying expensive weak patrol vessels for RMN” – I pointed out that that was not the case. Now you’re claiming that LMSs have no utility and that OPVs are better…. What is this; comedy or fan boy hour?

    gonggok – ”then why not buy a proper, cheaper OPV instead?”

    Define ”proper”? A OPV in what context; fully fitted out? To perform what roles exactly? A OPV doesn’t necessarily have to be better suited for the task at hand compared to a LMS; contrary to the impression you have…

    The LMSs are intended to perform duties not required by larger combatants and if performing duties in scenarios which are demanding; will operate alongside other assets…. – period/full stop. Not hard to fathom.

    gonggok – ”LMS even be taken seriously by the chinese Aircraft Carrier Task Force in their list of threats?”

    You must as well start talking about the tooth fairy or the flying monkey with fangs…. For one; the LMSs are not intended to go against a ”chinese Aircraft Carrier Task Force’ [that is not what LMSs are for] and even if we had a force structure of 25 frigates we would still not be able to go head to head against the PLAN. It’s as silly as suggesting that a AV-8 can’t go head to head against a Leo 2A6.

    gonggok – ”realistically RMN deploy to give some sort of fear factor to the chinese fleet?”

    What sort of question and statement is that? The PLAN does not hesitate to go head to head against the likes of the USN and JSDMF; you seriously think there’s anything we can do to install the ”fear factor” [I quote you] in the PLAN? Seriously?

    A reminder; not only does the PLAN have the ability to strike at us even before we can detect its ships on radar; it has the EW and cyber means to disrupt our radars, GPSs, radios, SATCOMs, CMS, cell phones, etc, not to mention the various types of assets – in numbers – it can deploy. Yet you’d seriously talk about us and the ”fear factor” and claim the LMS are useless against a ”chinese Aircraft Carrier Task Force”?

    Fantasies aside; what we can do and what has long been our policy is to acquire a deterrent level in line with out actual capabilities and resources to deal with the threats we are likely to face; those threats by the way do not include a conflict with a nuclear armed country with a major qualitative and numerical edge over us and one which spends much much more on defence.

    You are not the first and won’t be the last to believe that we actually have a chance against the PLAN or that being in conflict with China is on our list of scenarios. If indeed we are ever in conflict with China; it will be alongside Tier 1 militaries and the RMN will play a periphery role.

  9. ASM – ”One scenario I could think of is China would just simply use the CCG to overwhelm our fleet with its numbers then send the PLAN to do the moping up.”

    We simply are not a concern for China – let’s not flatter ourselves. China is focused on the likes of the U.S. and Japan. Forget the kinetic means; even before a missile starts flying imagine what would happen if our radar network was jammed; followed by our radios, GPPs and SATCOM? Even if the national phone grid or internet network was hit by a cyber attack; this would have an effect on the MAF.

    ASM – ”there’s really nothing in the RMN inventory provides any fear factor”

    Indeed. It’s gaga cloud cuckoo land wishful delusional thinking to assume we can.

    China has a population of a billion; it has the largest economy; it has a manufacturing/industrial base larger than almost the rest of the world combined; it spends trillions on defence and it planning cycles and force structure is centered on the possibility of conflict with the U.S, Japan, Australia an other countries which have Tier 1 militaries. Also, what China spends on cyber warfare is 3-4 times larger than our defence budget; plus the fact which many overlook; our economy is hugely tied to China’s. A conflict with China would ruin the Malaysian economy.

  10. Azlan – What is this; comedy or fan boy hour?

    Comedy is wasting money equipping and buying expensive brand new stuff for RMN to do a coast guard role when we have MMEA. I am talking about using the same budget to buy MMEA more proper OPVs instead of RMN getting LMS which realistically can only survive when operated only as an OPV.

    Azlan – A reminder; not only does the PLAN have the ability to strike at us even before we can detect its ships on radar;

    A reminder of exactly why even fully armed LMS for RMN is a useless boat, as it can easily be blown out of the water, and buying more OPVs for MMEA with that money is better. RMN needs stuff that would be hard to detect by PLAN.

    Azlan – our policy is to acquire a deterrent level in line with out actual capabilities and resources to deal with the threats we are likely to face;

    So tell me what is the threat RMN is going to face in the future.

    Azlan – It’s gaga cloud cuckoo land wishful delusional thinking to assume we can

    We can. By having a strong MMEA for peacetime maritime security. And a lean RMN with difficult to detect assets like more submarines.

    Vietnam is doing such, expanding rapidly its coast guard, while having a lean navy prioritizing its underwater deterrence with 6 latest Kilo 636 class submarines.

  11. GONGGOK – ”Comedy is wasting money equipping and buying expensive brand new stuff for RMN to do a coast guard role when we have MMEA. ‘

    You didn’t get it the first few times but I’ll try again : the LMSs are intended to perform certain roles either by themselves or in conjunction with other assets. Again the 8 LMSs are intended to be fully fitted out and are not intended to perform constabulary type duties; thus your repeated mantra about them and the MMEA should not arise.

    gonggok – ”buying more OPVs for MMEA with that money is better. ”

    You are conflating things…. None is better as both are for different roles…

    gonggok – ”So tell me what is the threat RMN is going to face in the future.”

    I like it when people say ”tell me” as I’m always happy to oblige even when the answer is obvious. All militaries plan for a variety of scenarios but they can only focus on a few and are able to realistically deal with a few. Contrary to the mistaken impression you have; we do not plan for a conflict with China. If you have been observing things for a while it would be plainly obvious to you [or maybe not] that we plan for the eventuality of minor conflicts with neighbours over unresolved overlapping claims, That has been our traditional area of concern.

    gonggok – ”We can.”

    Poppycock. In your world maybe we can but in actual reality we can’t. When you get the chance; ask those in uniform whether they agree with you about whether ”we can”….

    The PLAN doesn’t hesitate to go up against the likes of the USN and JSDMF; yet you’d have us believe there are things we can do for the RMN to instill the ”fear factor”. That is ”comedy”; of a delusional wishful thing sort.

    gongook – ” By having a strong MMEA for peacetime maritime security. And a lean RMN with difficult to detect assets like more submarines.”

    Do you actually know what you’re talking about? A strong MMEA does not instill a ”fear factor”…. As for submarines take the time to understand how they operate and their limitations before assuming things and seeing things that aren’t there – they are not a panacea. China too has subs BTW and like everything else subs do not operate in a vacuum; their successful use depends on various factors. Subs are also hard to detect in certain conditions and they have to be placed in areas where they have the advantage. I’ve had discussions of this nature with someone else here before; against a Chinese surface group protected by a surface ASW screen and back by airborne ASW assets and even subs; the chances of a sub getting near it would be slim. It would probably be spending most of its time evading detection and surviving, rather than hunting targets….

    gonggok – ”as it can easily be blown out of the water,”

    You’ve become the king of generalising and making statements without looking at the context have you? Even a 6,000 tonne destroyer can be ”blown out of the water”….

    gonggok – ”with 6 latest Kilo 636 class submarines.”

    First of all; they are not the ”latest”… Secondly Vietnam is taking a different approach; doesn’t mean it’s better, it’s what it feels suits its requirements and preferences.

    gonggok – ”RMN needs stuff that would be hard to detect by PLAN.”

    That is your take. My take is that the RMN does not plan for trouble with the PLAN and that it’s desired force structure is a for a variety of assets in order to have a balanced force; one which is fully networked; one intended to deal with the types of threats likely to be faced and able to be handled in line with the RMN’s strengths and limitations.

  12. Reading exchanges between Gonggok and Azlan made me realize how insignificant and unremarkable our deterrence capabilities compared to a great power is and even we go all out it’s all useless. If they attack, we should just kill ourselves and don’t fight.We useless. Now I really think the only best way going forward is an ASEAN NATO/SEATO.

  13. The Dokdo LHD piqued my interest about the actual requirements for MRSS, like if it were specced to have amphib landing capabilities ie LHD type well deck for landing crafts or RORO type where vehicles will embark/disembark to an existing pier. If Dokdo were under consideration 10 years ago, does it mean the MRSS requirements is already finalised? Interesting to know what they are.

  14. The LHD was what the politicians wanted in 2008 and 2012 and the end user quietly approved of what was offered to them. The current one is basically something like the Makassar class though something more sophisticated and with different silhouette, would be greatly appreciated

  15. Azlan – You didn’t get it the first few times but I’ll try again : the LMSs are intended to perform certain roles either by themselves or in conjunction with other assets. Again the 8 LMSs are intended to be fully fitted out and are not intended to perform constabulary type duties;

    Fully fitted out LMS to fight against what threat specifically? Why on earth are we still planning for fully fitted out LMS to fight indonesia and Philippines when the major obvious maritime security risk is from china?

    If everybody in charge of malaysian maritime security thinks like this, we are royally f#@ked.

    This is what is obvious

    1) China is our major maritime security threat

    2) We need to stop planning our future RMN structure still with the cold war mentality to fight our smaller neighbors like indonesia and Philippines.

    3) Of course we cannot fight head to head with PLAN. What we need is the most difficult thing for PLAN to destroy and something that could trouble PLAN surface fleet in a conflict.

    4) Maritime security is not all about war. 99% of maritime security is about securing our seas in peacetime. The oft repeated mantra of “MMEA is still not ready and RMN need to help” is bull#&@t when right now we are pouring money into RMN to buy brand new assets specifically to do peacetime patrol duties. If MMEA is underresourced, plough more assets and resources into MMEA instead, not into RMN.

    5) The best way forward for our maritime security is to prioritize resorces for the expansion of MMEA, and downsizing RMN while getting only the best high end frigates and submarines for RMN.

  16. joe – ”does it mean the MRSS requirements is already finalised? Interesting to know what they are.”

    3-4 years ago I was told that preference was for a Makassar type design with landing spots for 3 helos. Around that time there was also as report [in Janes?] which quoted PT PAL people as saying that the RMN had expressed an interest in a slightly stretched version and with a point defence missile.

  17. gonggok – ”If MMEA is underresourced, plough more assets and resources into MMEA instead, not into RMN.”

    Sounds simple doesn’t it? Like many things. It is a political decision however and one does not equate to being more vital [despite whatever ones personal preferences are] than the other as both do different jobs in different operational circumstances. As it stands; although it apparently takes some effort to grasp, the MMEA is simply not in a position to do all it’s supposed to.

    khairul – ” even we go all out it’s all useless. If they attack, we should just kill ourselves and don’t fight.”

    I’m surprised you’re surprised…. Even the likes of Britain or France would struggle if going against China alone. China in its planning factors in conflicts with the U.S. and other tier one militaries. Is it a revelation that a country of about 30 million and which spends what it does on defence would be powerless against China? like I’m fond of saying; even before the kinetic stuff starts China can jam our radars, GPSs, radios, SATCOMs, CMSs, internet grid, power grid, etc. How do we exercise command/control? Even before we’re in range to detect a PLAN surface group with radar it can hit us from extreme ranges. If we sink a couple of PLAN ships they’ll merely send another 4.

  18. At last somebody speaks out the hard truth.

    Fully armed LMS are sitting ducks in a world of real time satellite visuals.

    We really need a bigger and stronger coast guard, not a navy full of patrol boats.

    But we have politicians that have no time to think about the country, and defence leaders busy being little Napoleon’s.

  19. Azlan – both do different jobs in different operational circumstances

    Yes obviously the RMN should have different operational circumstances than MMEA. So why is it so hard to grasp that the RMN should not be a fleet full of patrol boats?

    Even now, most of RMN operational shadowing and intercepts are of the chinese coast guard (CCG) by Kedah class OPVs and our new ironically chinese built LMS. Correct ships for the task but should be by our own MMEA instead.

    Azlan – Is it a revelation that a country of about 30 million and which spends what it does on defence would be powerless against China?

    In all out war, yes maybe we are powerless agaist chinese might. But in scenarios other than war, in normal peacetime situations backed by the law of the sea (UNCLOS), a big and strong MMEA could keep tab of any attempts by china CCG to disturb any malaysian economic activity at sea. If we prioritise use our budgets and resources towards important things, it is something that is totally achievable.

  20. Azlan,
    I think I would agree with Gonggok. Strengthen the MMEA is much more important.

    For the navy, since it’s useless to face alone against them in case they went irrational. I think the best is to plan a navy that work as an integrated navy with other maritime nations of SEA. Working in tandem with our neighbor instead of planning against them might give all the nation in maritime SEA a fighting chance.

  21. @Khairul
    Your quite right but not for want of trying;
    1511 – Portuguese conquer Melaka. Portugal was a then superpower.
    1641 – Dutch takeover of Melaka. Holland was a then superpower.
    1791 – Kedah lost Penang to English. England was a then superpower.
    1941 – Japanese invasion. Japan was a then superpower.

    On an odds of 4-0, we must be daft to think we could do a Vietnam War so why bother to even try? It would be better not to be in such a situation and rather it be more prudent to maintain a diplomatic stance in engagements with any superpowers in a way that events do not escalate to such threat levels.

  22. Khairul – ”Strengthen the MMEA is much more important.”

    It isn’t important because the MMEA and RMN are both intended to do different things; both complementing each other. thus the idea that one is ”more important” than the other is a wishful fallacy….

    Understand the contrary to gonggok’s repeated assertion; nobody is disputing the fact plainly obvious fact that it is the MMEA which is the main agency to handle peacetime constabulary type missions; including safeguarding the EEZ. Nobody is disputing that If gonggok cares to recall this issue has also been done to death with here on numerous occasions and in length.
    The issue is that until the MMEA has the needed assets and shore support infrastructure; the RMN is the only one able to help fill the void.

    khairul – ” I think the best is to plan a navy that work as an integrated navy with other maritime nations of SEA.”

    What on earth do you think is the reason we have long had deep defence ties with the U.S abnd Australia; bilateral exercises with neighbours; participation in the FPDA; participation in RIMPAC and other multilateral exercises including sub rescue ones and engagements/dialogues such as the ADMM, Shangri La Dialogue and others? Why do you think the RMN’s sub rescue ship is certified to perform rescues on USN SSNs?

    Khairul – ”instead of planning against them ”

    Understand that China is a concern but things have never gone ”hot” with it. Things however have gone nearly gone ”hot” on various occasions with certain neighbours over longstanding overlapping claims. It’s not a ”cold war mentality” as gonggok so simplistically, inaccurately and confidently claims ….

    kenyalang – ”At last somebody speaks out the hard truth.”

    Is it actually a ”hard truth” or a sweeping general statement which fails to put things in context?

    kenyalang – ”Fully armed LMS are sitting ducks in a world of real time satellite visuals.”

    Full fitted out LMSs are intended to perform niche roles either by themselves or n tandem with other assets. If they have no utility then other navies wouldn’t have them and the RMN would not require them. The issue of them being a ”sitting duck” is silly as they ae not intended to be used in circumstances where they aren’t suitable; just like how one would never deploy a squadron of IFVs against a troop of MBTS or a Little Birds against a Tigre. In the right circumstances even a 7,000 tonne frigare with a 64 VLS cell and an area defence capability would be a ”sitting duck”..

  23. ”we must be daft to think we could do a Vietnam War”

    Indeed. The circumstances present during that war are unlikely to be replicated again; strict U.S. ROEs which prevented them from hitting Haiphong [the main port of entry for Soviet and other stuff], MiG bases and other key targets in North Vietnam; a long and porous border with Cambodia and Laos; the ability of the National Liberation Front to use North Vietnam as a base for rest, training and organisation; U.S. fears of escalating things and getting the Soviets involved; etc.

    Our planners and strategists actually have a pretty good idea [even if many in the public assume otherwise] of what the MAF is capable of based on national resources and what’s it’s not. They also fully understand the role the MAF plays in parallel with our foreign policy and in line with other efforts to maintain peace, spread goodwill and create confidence in the region.

    An often overlooked fact is that the economy will go rat shit of there’s trouble with China [we trade heavily with China which is also the largest FDI here] and if we can’t access international shipping lanes for our imports/exports. The economy would be the main worry; rather than us deploying a single SSK in the SCS and it being unable to operate because of being hunted by strong PLAN surface and airborne ASW units and having to contend with smart mines and underwater sensors. The MAF also is neither structured nor trained for a conflict with the likes of China – it also does not stock up on large stocks on munitions and has to rely on imports for almost everything. We can and do make certain contingency plans but in totality our means are extremely limited; even if we get so call ”hard to detect” assets.

    If troubles starts; it isn’t holy writ that we will be involved; especially if China does not block us access to the seas and the reefs we occupy and claim. If we do get involved it will be as part of a coalition and only as minor supporting player on the periphery as we can’t bring much to the party and would only be a hindrance.

    ”to maintain a diplomatic stance in engagements with any superpowers in a way that events do not escalate to such threat levels.”

    Which is what we did during the Cold War and what we’ve long been doing in the post Cold War period; a hedging strategy. Despite our so called non aligned/neutral status it’s telling however that we train more extensively and regularly with Australia and the U.S. We’ve only had a few token exercises with China to date.

  24. @gonggok
    TLDM has to have a low threat peacetime role as well. It cannot be a smallish purely offensive force just sitting around waiting for when things escalate in order to be called upon. And let’s face it, no matter how much money or resources we pump into MMEA, it will never have capabilities to achieve parity with CCG, since your adamant its main purpose is to counter CCG after all, as it can never justify a frigate sized ship class to face off CCG’s biggest boats nor have enough of them in order not to be outnumbered during a disputed stand off. Just face reality, neither TLDM nor MMEA can face off its Chinese counterparts on equal terms so why even try.

  25. ”TLDM has to have a low threat peacetime role as well. It cannot be a smallish purely offensive force just sitting around waiting for when things escalate in order to be called upon.”

    In times of peace it has to be ready to reinforce the MMEA should a need arise and in periods of tension it also has to be able to operate effective in a gray zone’ environment. . In times of actual war [when the MMEA comes under RMN command] it requires a balanced fleet [comprising frigates, LMSs, LPDs, subs, etc] all able to perform niche roles and all working together to maximise effectiveness and to limit weaknesses; all networked. This is the RMN’s ultimate goal. If LMSs had zero utility; other navies would not have or require them….. Neither LMSs or frigates operate in a vacuum and any hypothetical discussions on the effectiveness has to take this into account.

    ”neither TLDM nor MMEA can face off its Chinese counterparts on equal terms so why even try.”

    If things persist; in the coming years even the USN and JSDMF will have issues maintaining the qualitative edge they’ve long enjoyed over the PLAN.

    Ultimately both the RMN and MMEA are separate organisations; both intended for different tasks and both supplementing each other. The very notion that one is more vital than the other or should receive more funding displays a lack of understanding and a lot of wishful thinking. It’s long become a cliche for some to claim that there are certain things we can do or buy that will rattle the Chinse; this unrealistic assumption ignores the fact if the PLAN does not hesitate to play rough with the likes of the USN and JSDMF; would it actually be concerned with anything we do?

  26. Pinoy finally signed the deal for Brahmos
    https://www.thestar.com.my/aseanplus/aseanplus-news/2022/01/30/supersonic-anti-ship-missiles-purchased-from-india

    Interestingly, that missile was developed with a 500km range but export version are detuned to below 300 (actual 290km) due to international laws. It would also be interesting if India could sell upgrade kits (as a separate item) which could retune these back to their original 500km limit to bypass those laws.

  27. 2 questions remain to be answered.

    – Why the need to have both the PN and PA equipped with Brahmos? For different mission sets or is it due to political service rivalry issues?
    – How the PN will create a strike/recce complex comprising Brahmos and ISR assets, plus the need for OTHT.

  28. Why is it that we are stuck in the position that we can’t post a deterrent to the PLAN? Alone maybe not but for sure in a military alliance with other countries. Again, we must think of an asymmetric war and not limit our naval assets to just surface combatants. For example, maritime patrol planes should be under the navy. Same with the MALE UAS.

  29. Because some 30 years someone became PM and think war or conflict will never happened. His acolytes remained in place and no matter what happened and evidence to the contrary they still believed what he preached

  30. Hasnan – ”Why is it that we are stuck in the position that we can’t post a deterrent to the PLA’

    Have you need read anything which has been discussed in this thread? We can acquire some level of deterrence but the level of deterrence we acquire will be in line with our resources and will not be enough to deter China. If the likes of the U.S, Australia, Japan and others are not enough to deter China; you figure we can do something which will?

    Hasnan – ”Again, we must think of an asymmetric war”

    Sounds great on paper by opponents can also conduct their version of asymmetric war. Opponents fully know the limitations we operate under and the actual resources we have. China can also conduct grey zone ops like jamming our radars, GPSs, SATCOM, INSs, CMSs, cell phone and internet network – all before even going kinetic. What do we do then; when we can’t exercise basic command/control?

    Hasnan – ”maritime patrol planes should be under the navy. Same with the MALE UAS.”

    This discussion has been done to death. Ideally yes but the RMN has neither the resources or the infrastructure to operate MPAs. Also, service rivalry is an issue; you really think the RMN will readily hand over the role? The best we can hope for is mix RMAF/RMN crewing – perhaps RMAF flight crews buy RMN sensor operators. The issue is that the RMAF might complain that it’s paying for the MPAs but it’s the RMN benefiting. A good start was the RMAF’s announcement some years ago that the RMN would have a say or would be consulted on the MPA requirement.

    MALE UASs for a start should be operated by the RMAF and as time progresses and as we mature as a UAS operator; we should look at a tri service UAS Command.

  31. Possibly for PN will be shipborne version, likely for their new frigates on order, and PA will be using land-based version. They have not yet focused on the ‘seeing’ part of what they could potentially hit at range but no doubts with assistance from USA, Israel, even Singapore, with the right assets they could sooner than later setup a workable platform and build on that.

  32. Speaking of recent Chinese naval developments, a few days ago it was reported on NHK that the CCG is in process of receiving around 12 ex-PLAN frigates – minus missiles but with the fire control radar and main gun intact. It wouldn’t be much of a stretch that in the future the CCG would be equipped with anti-ship missiles; not a new idea as USCG cutters used to be equipped with Harpoons back in the Cold War days.

    It would be interesting how Japan and Taiwan would react to the increasingly militarised CCG, Taiwan in particular in view of its proximity to China.

  33. joe – ”Possibly for PN will be shipborne version, likely for their new frigates on order,”

    Doubt anything they have on order or plan to order in the near term will be large enough to accommodate Brahmos.

    joe – ”right assets they could sooner than later setup a workable platform and build on that.”

    No doubt nut even with assistance establishing a strike/recce complex with the needed assets and enablers like C3 will take time.

  34. Brahmos NG is slightly bigger than Harpoon so if a ship was designed to carry Harpoon it might just be able to fit in Brahmos launchers.

  35. ”so if a ship was designed to carry Harpoon it might just be able to fit in Brahmos launchers.”

    That may solve one problem but leaves another major one : integration/certification to the ship’s sensors, trackers and CMS.

    Anyhow the intention is for Brahmos to be land based.

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published.


*