Radio Mods For KD Rencong

KD Rencong approaching the jetty at the Kota Kinabalu naval base Dec. 28. RMN

SHAH ALAM: Radio mods for KD Rencong. In a post in January, Malaysian Defence wrote about the tender to repair/modify the radios on KD Rencong. I posted that it was likely that Rencong will have a new U/VHF radio, just like her sister ships, KD Keris; KD Sundang and KD Badik.

And this was confirmed when Eperolehan website published the announcement (no date) for the winner of the tender which was Rohde & Schwarz Malaysia Sdn Bhd. The LOA for the contract is RM498,000, some RM20,000 more than the previous ones.

KD Keris (left), KD Badik and KD Rencong at the back. Picture taken on January 28, 2022.

Again, RMN has not announced anything on the issue apart confirming that it had undertaken the work on all of the three previous ships of the class. It is interesting to note that various experts had chimed in claiming that these was due to the low quality of the China-made radio (though none of them had any proof on this but only based on it from other people reporting).
The 30 mm Single Barrel Rapid Fire Naval Gun CS/AN3 on KD Rencong. Malaysian Defence picture

Malaysian Defence had reported that the Keris class (at least Keris and Sundang) had two new communication domes installed on them (on different locations) and it is likely also both Badik and Rencong will also be soon be installed with them also.
KD Sundang coming into the National Hydrograhic Centre at Pulau Indah, in late January 2022. Note the GPS dome on the port of the quarter deck. RMN

Anyhow, there were two questions in Parliament yesterday, regarding the LCS and the FLIT/LCA tender. The answer for the LCS did not revealed anything new apart from saying that the Cabinet is still waiting for the Defence Ministry and other government agencies to prepare their report for consideration (which is also not new, really).
A mock-up of the TAI Hurjet. Daily Sabah

Meanwhile, the FLIT/LCA tender evaluation process has been completed and the final report is being completed for the ministry’s tender committee decision. I am going on a limb here to say that no decision will be made for both until the next general election (which the smart people are pegging to be held in early 2023).

— Malaysian Defence

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45 Comments

  1. Basically the chinese radios installed are to marine commercial-spec, with no capability for encrypted or radio-hopping transmissions. As it is, the marine commercial-spec radios are good enough, but everyone can hear what it talked through them with ESM. So it is replaced with a military-spec radio.

    Same goes with the SATCOM domes (marhalim described these as GPS domes before). The chinese domes are commercial-spec, with the new grey domes are military-spec.

  2. “Cabinet is still waiting for the Defence Ministry and other government agencies to prepare their report for consideration (which is also not new, really)”

    What is so hard for the cabinet to set a deadline for this report? It has been years that this project is in a limbo, admirals and menhans has come and go and still no report to the cabinet about the Gowinds?

  3. Simple, really, they simply cannot fathom spending RM3.7 billion but the first ship will only be ready, if all goes to plan, in 2025. Now with the continuing delays it is likely that date has slipped to 2026

  4. Then we need a Plan B.

    We need to give the navy the frigates that they need. Even if it meant for a totally new frigate project.

    Then every single person that contributed to the Gowind failure must be held accountable.

    Funnily even with such massive failures MINDEF and RMN KPI are 100% met all these years. What a joke.

  5. Hassan – We have a very weak and indecisive Defence Minister

    You’re not the first to make that claim. Even if we had a strong and decisive one, he doesn’t drive policy or make decisions, the cabinet does.

    Said this many times and I’ll say it again, the conditions which led to this cock up were made possible by the highly flawed, self defeating and politically driven defence policy we have. Unfortunately there is no will to revamp the policy or to learn from mistakes

    gonggok- So it is replaced with a military-spec radio

    To make them compatible with the comes on other ships and for certain features, as you lauded to, which are lacking in the Chinese ones.

  6. @Azlan

    He just needs to write a cabinet paper and present what he thinks its right….thats all. Now, he is just pretending that there is no elephant in the room.

    Meanwhile, all our neighbors are making fun of that project.

    Remember when the sulu army landed? Same indecisive defence minister. Najib replaced him with Zahid to see something done.

  7. Hasnan – ”He just needs to write a cabinet paper and present what he thinks its right….thats all. Now, he is just pretending that there is no elephant in the room.”

    Agree but can you say he hasn’t done it? Can you say for certain he’s not pushing it? I’m not suggesting he shouldn’t do more, merely that he reports to the cabinet and it’s a cabinet decision. He doesn’t drive policy or make key decisions and can also do what he can as part of the government he’s a part of. Ultimately it’s our defence policy which led us to where we are now.

    Hasnan – ”Najib replaced him with Zahid to see something done.

    He was replaced because it was politically expedient…. Not so much because of Lahad Dato but for other reasons.

  8. Singapore is creating a fourth military service.

    The Digital and Intelligence Service (DIS) – the SAF’s fourth service after the army, navy, and the air force – will be responsible for intelligence, cyber and psychological defence, as well as advancing the SAF as a networked force.

    Something very interesting to closely look into.

  9. @gonggok
    “chinese radios are marine commercial-spec”
    It appears the planners that drew up the specs were equipping these ships with the most basic of Chinese gear so that it is merely functional and seaworthy, but later on easily replacing these with Western made stuff. The radios & GPS comms are the easiest, later on prolly the deck mounted RWS (possibly together with a new CMS?).

    “totally new frigate project”
    That will put us back to square one. No way will the Govt justify spending another few billions again, not with Opposition scrutiny. The same reason why they are not willing to put money to restart LCS build when GE15 is around the corner. H2O can make all the decisions he want, but he doesn’t hold the purse strings.

  10. @gonggok
    “Something very interesting”
    Nothing new to us, we have an already very active cybertroopers scene in the metaverse. LOL

  11. Joe, “It appears the planners that drew up the specs were equipping these ships with the most basic of Chinese gear so that it is merely functional and seaworthy”

    Most likely explanation is that the radio that RMN wants cannot be exported to, and installed in China (as it is from germany). Similar corundum now with Thai sub designed with MTU engines but Germany did not approve export license for the engine to be exported to china. In a way, building ships locally could actually remove such restrictions.

    Joe, “That will put us back to square one”

    Putting us back to square one and giving RMN the frigates that they need by 2025 is better than getting none at all. Whatever the option is, more billions of ringgit need to be spent anyway, even to revive the Gowinds. If i am the opposition, i would gladly be the one that would propose for this, as going for this option will be good for the security of the nation, but will definitely kill the reputation of the incumbent menhan.

  12. Gonggok-“admirals and menhans has come and go and still no report to the cabinet about the Gowinds?”
    The option already on the table but it is already too hard to handle…nobody is willing to take the responsibility due to unstable political situation.

  13. Romeo – hard to handle…nobody is willing to take the responsibility due to unstable political situation

    No…… It’s because it raises every uncomfortable questions and it leads back to the fact that we have a highly flawed, self defeating and politically driven defence policy. If we really are committed to finding out what went wrong and how it could have been avoided, the politicians have to.ask the right questions and we have to acknowledge the defence policy is need of a fundamental and total revamp.

    The RMN has various alternative plans but none can be implemented until a final decision is made on the LCSs and the average voter doesn’t give a damn about the LCSs.

  14. “If i am the opposition, i would gladly be the one”
    If the Opposition thought like you, they would have enacted that plan when they were in power and when LCS ground to a halt. There’s a reason why neither PH, nor PN, nor BN2.0 took up that plan. Nobody can justify throwing away these partially complete ships and spending lotsa money starting all over again, with no guarantees it won’t face the same SNAFU again, and nobody will willing take the responsibility if it does happen.

  15. @Joe

    When you place the defence jndustry at a higher priority over defence of the nation otself, then all these politicians must bear responsibility. Building capacity is not an easy thing. Delays do happen all the time and of course cost escalation. Why the further dilly dally? Tue cost will further increase, never decrease. Spending 12b to get 6 ships is better than spending 6b to get zero ships.

  16. Hassan – these politicians must bear responsibility

    We have a former PM to thank for. The current defence policy in which national interests takes precedence over the needs of the armed services and taxpayer based on the premise that an actual conflict was is unlikely,was introduced under his watch.

    The politicians will not take responsibility as doing so raises various uncomfortable questions. Asking them to take responsibility is akin to expecting Laos to raise a multi duvision combined arms tank corps. It was the defence policy which enabled the LCS cockup to happen and under Najib and Zahid’s watch….

    Hasnan – delays do happen all the time and of course cost escalation

    They do happen but the LCS cockup could have been avoided if there was proper oversight and a realistic assessment of just what we were trying to achieve. Alas, there is no desire to learn, thus we’ll keep making the same mistakes and will have nobody else to blame but ourselves …

  17. @Hasnan
    Politicians prioritise survival of their own careers firstly among everything else, so when the solution relates to spending billions of RM that is not for ‘ringankan beban rakyat program & publicity’ they won’t stir the pot not when GE15 is soon coming. Even after that it depends on how politically stable the new Government will be, if they got a resounding majority, they can push thru comfortably the expenditure to resolve LCS. If its paper thin margins, the horse trading & frogging will distract everyone from doing anything that might lose them their popularity.

    Pushing thru unpopular decisions will need bipartisan vote, a very rare thing like tsunami in Malaysia, and the Opposition are ruing the last bipartisan decision they had supported.

  18. Why LCS is still stuck? The Minister of Defence already hinted a few months ago. They might give Boustead the RM3b it is asking but will stop at that. So, from 6 ships, the program is just 2 ships. How would you explain this to anyone and claim there is no major fraud and corruption? Another reason for the hesitancy? Given the shipyard’s track record, the likelihood of zero ships delivered is higher than 2 ships delivered. If that happens, even the best spinster will find it a challenge. But its election season. So the program will get funded. Workers and business owners (i.e., voters) involved in the LCS program needs to be fed to get their support. Ships get delivered or not, doesn’t matter. So many ways to justify – blame debris, blame weather, blame Covid, blame war, blame supply chain, blame floods, blame commodity prices, blame vendor, blame sanctions, etc. For all the criticism levelled at the 4 LMS purchased from China, at least there are 4 actual ships joining the fleet vs. 0 LCS. RM3 billion may get the Navy 6 LMS with bigger displacement and better weapons (using the RM1+ billion paid for 4 Chinese gunboats as the benchmark). But we need ships that can take on a helicopter. True, although its not as if the Navy has enough helicopters or have have the funds to get additional helicopters. So why bother. Navy wants actual, real, physical, tangible ships. Not something that may be delivered sometime in the future.

  19. By the way,

    Poland has chosen the Arrowhead 140 for its MIECZNIK (Swordfish) new frigate program.

    I would not bet on RMN will get any Gowinds before these polish Arrowhead are commissioned.

    As usual in malaysia, politicking is still more important than the security of our nation.

  20. @gonggok
    Politicians prioritises politics at anywhere in the world, it is their nature and their job really. Our fallacy is trusting politicians say (or not say) and do (or not do). Even when some praises certain politicians for ‘making the right noises’, if they do not put into action what they said it is still NATO. As in No Action Talk Only.

    They are just making the right noises for their pompous self-serving purposes, because if they truly had conviction on what they said then no need say anything or do press conferences or announcements in Parliamen or ceramahs, just get it done or at least put into plan what needs done and commit adequate resources for it.

    Civic societies are just as guilty of pushing their own selfish myopic agendas; we have plenty or too many pushing their voices about justice, equality, liberties, freedom, megaphoning certain parties & personas, but none are championing the security & defence of our realm. There is so much effort, time & money to push political agendas to masses, but none is created to increase awareness on the state of our defence, there are no political pressure groups or lobbies or think tanks that are pushing defence agendas and that is really sad. To say that politicians are mirroring what our society, politicians are politicking furiously because rakyat are politicking.

  21. joe, “no political pressure groups or lobbies or think tanks that are pushing defence agendas”

    how to push (positive) defence agendas when even trying to discuss and mentioning important observations are censored or deleted?

  22. Push for policies; defence posture policies, strategic policies, buy policies (with consideration to local industries), lobby for certain capabilities our warfighters to have (without specifying exact equipment or suppliers), they could push to build the image of our Forces as a professional body, akin to US Armed Forces, rather than an employer of last resort. They should push overall policies rather than detailed & likely classified stuff which invariably WILL AND SHOULD get censored (stuff like the readiness level of our Forces).

    These are the kind of things that STRIDE could do to justify their existence. Being a Government unit, their reportage can talk about more classified stuff with less risk of being censored.

  23. Given a limited budget, is it fairer to the Air Force, if the Navy losses the RM3 billion LCS funding, which is redirected to fast tracking the LCA\LIFT orders? Even if its not the Navy’s fault, it is their program, one just has to say, sorry Navy, your LCS project is massively late (by nearly 10 years) and exceeded the budget (with nothing to show for). We’re tight on funds, so the RM3 billion goes to other critical programs. Navy losses capabilities, but the blackhole of the LCS program may end up defunding other acquisition programs and damaging everything.

  24. The RM3.7 billion need to be paid really, even if they don’t continue with the project as the amount is for the things already done.

  25. @Kel
    Hang on a sec. Our Forces have an unwritten rule that each branch would take turns to make a marque buy that would eat a lion share of the budget. TUDM have ady bought the MKMs, then TLDM’s turn with the LCS (which, obviously haven’t gotten yet). So now it should be TDM’s turn to splurge, and they have a few wishlist lined up: complete the AV8 buy, wheeled 155 SPH; ie Caesar, 6×6 APC to replace Condors, recon IFVs, Landies replacement, more GB radars, the long overlooked GBAD updates.

  26. ”Hang on a sec. Our Forces have an unwritten rule that each branch would take turns to make a marque buy that would eat a lion share of the budget.”

    There is no such ”rule” – never has been… That decision is made at a political level; each service competing with each other for a slice of the funding. When it comes to obtaining and justifying funding; each service competes fiercely against each other – no such thing as an ”unwritten rule” to do otherwise or to agree to ”take turns to make a marque buy that would eat a lion share of the budget’…’

  27. Some thoughts on the Ukraine. It’s important to draw the right lessons but just as important is to not make hasty assumptions or to draw the wrong conclusions, as was done with Nargano Karbakh.

    – Russian units were only notified that they were going into action about 48 hours prior to the invasion and most units were rd that there would not be organised or determined Ukrainian resistance. This explains the low morale amongst troops and the fact that units did not enter the Ukraine utilising perscribed training and doctrine.
    – Multi domain ops are hard to conduct and making matters worse is that the Rusians were simultaneously attacking from several axes, all not mutually supportive.
    – The Ukrainians had benefited from years of Western tutelage, including tactical and operational tactics, command/control and mission command. They are also defending on their own terrain and have shorter lines of communications.
    – The Ukraine is a large country with a large army. Due to political reasons and flawed assumptions the Russians did not deploy the needed resources.
    – Friendly fire incidents. The need to set up deconfliction zones is vital. Deploying GBAD assets is one thing, having friendly air power operate safely is a very different thing.
    – The Russian air force underperformed due to various reasons, namely a lack of experience, a lack of PGMs and targeting pods, plus the inability to create an effective recce/strike complex [which it had in Syria].
    – Russia gained valuable experience in Syria and the Donbas but what it faces in the Ukraine was slightly different.
    – Russian losses in the air are expected given that the bulk of sorties are undertaken at medium to low altitude exposing aircraft to MANPADs and flak.
    – We have seen Russian tanks with their turrets separated due to internal explosions caused by the placement of unprotected ammo and charges around the turret and hull. Still too early however to know how effective Russian APSs and ERA [K-5 and Relikt] have been and whether the bulk of losses have been from Javelin and MBT LAW or legacy wire guided SACLOS systems.
    – Unlike the case in the Donbass where Russia effectively deployed UASs and created an effective recce/strike complex, for reasons uknown UASs have not been deployed as extensively or effectively at present. Same goes with EW.
    – A few Turk supplied UASs have been shot down, a reminder that UASs are very vulnerable and to date have been employed in conflicts which had permissive airspace, Nargano Karabakh included.
    – Tempting to assume that the outnumbered and outgunned Ukrainians are largely or solely relying on asymmetric tactics. Yes and no.
    – The Ukraine has traditionally held large quantaties of ammo and various other key consumables. One thing having an effective logistics system, another actually having the needed stocks in the required quantities.
    – In this day and age information warfare plays a vital role. To date the UKrainians have dominated the information war. Also, contrary to expectations Russian cyber warfare has not been as effective as previously assumed.

    Are there lessons to be learnt and can be applied in our context? Yes but just as vital is not to draw the wrong lessons and make the wrong assumptions.
    Also, in our context the possibility of an actual invasion is slim, instead it will operations along our air and maritime domains, not necessarily against China which many are fixated on but against neighboring countries over unresolved overlapping claims for which there are quite a few.

  28. @Azlan
    Which is why it is unwritten, because there are no black & white but somewhat an understanding between the branches, this is pretty much well known amongst defence circle. Not coincidental there is a pattern to large buys:
    TUDM MKM – 2007
    TLDM Scorpene – 2009
    TDM Gempita – 2014
    TUDM A400M – 2016
    TLDM LCS – 2020(supposedly)
    TDM ?

    By right next is TDM’s turn.

  29. Azlan,

    So what are the wrong conclusions made in nagorno karabakh?

    Anyway in my opinion a few lessons from ukraine (to fight a bigger country) from malaysian point of view.

    – We need to stop prioritizing to train for attacking/offensive maneuvers of conventional warfare tactics. To do more training for defensive type of scenarios.

    – ATGMs will stop and obliterate mechanised formations. Ukraine has not mobilized its armor and IFV in large scale against the russian army. To defend against an attacking armoured force, ATGMs not IFVs that matters. 6×6 IFV can be KIVed, buying more RPG7, NLAW, Raybolt should be the move forward.

    – We need to have deep stocks of ammo and missiles. Sweden for example plans for 3 months of wartime stocks before needing to ask for help.

    – software defined radios are the future, and correctly we have been prioritizing this. Russian forces using commercial walkie talkies is not what a superpower army should be doing.

    – Generally good OPSEC/PERSEC from Ukrainian forces. A few slips such as pictures in a gymnasium caused all school gymnasium around the picture geolocation to be shelled by the russian army. The whole of nation are also asked to help locating russian units by taking pictures and sending them in.

    – Ukraine unable to do more damage to the russian army convoy. If ukraine have the access to loitering missiles like Azerbaijan, the russian losses could be much more severe. We should look at converting some of our 105mm regiments with loitering missiles, even a cheap 20km ranged ones.

    – Need more UAVs for ISR and targeting. Something similar in performance to the scaneagle is needed for the army.

    – Bayraktar TB2s are inflicting havoc to russian air defence systems. Killing Osa, Buk and pantasir systems. Everyday russian forces claim killing 3-4 TB2s without any proof. So far only 1 picture of TB2 downed by russia ever released. Those TB2s still flying and killing after 3 weeks against the Russian army is nothing short of amazing. Russia so far has not been able to field anything close like the TB2 over Ukraine. Malaysia will not go wrong if we go for this system for RMAF.

    – Ukrainian navy virtually inoperable in the conflict except for the navy’s Bayraktar TB2 which is now operating over land. Its large frigate was scuttled at port to prevent from falling into russian hands. We have not seen any of the Neptune shore based anti ship missiles operating. If ukrainain navy have subs probably they could manage to wreck some havoc to the russian navy.

    – you cannot base your propaganda solely on lies. That is the problem with the russian narrative. Almost 99% based on lies. Lies about conscripts, lies about deaths, lies about losses. Difficult to project yourself as the righteous side when lies is all you have to put out.

  30. MKM was purchased in 2003, delivery 2007 which was the time when the contract for A400M was signed, the Gempita 2012; LCS technically was 2011, contract was signed in 2014. As mentioned by Azlan it got nothing to do with the services lah, it mostly the government decision though perhaps the Defence Ministry make sure all the big ticket items contract signing done on a staggered basis so as not to get criticised with newspaper headlines that said Malaysia on arms buying spree

  31. Gonggok – So what are the wrong conclusions made in nagorno karabakh

    Azerbaijan dominated the land, air and cyber domain, it prepared to fight a new war whilst its opponent was ready to fight the last, it was able to successfully deploy UASs because its opponent lacked the means to.counter them, the largely open terrain with Armenian convoys being restricted to roads made them vulnerable, the Azeris had better C3 and successfully acquired a recce/strike capability. Both sides for political reasons also did not fully deploy air power.

    I could go on but you no doubt see the picture. Lot of lessons to be learnt but has to be seen in context…

    Gonggok – Sweden for example plans for 3 months of wartime stocks

    What we should do is profoundly different from what we will actually do- look at the nuances. Sweden’s strategic calculus and threat perceptions differ greatly to ours. It’s policy and threat perceptions which drive what country’s do and it depends if things are capability or threat driven.

    Gonggok – more training for defensive type of scenarios

    As stated previously, it’s a misplaced assumption to say we train mostly for conventional warfare tactics. Just because you may see a squadron’s worth of Adnans attacking, it doesn’t mean that it’s not an ”offensive tactical move as part of a wider operational defensive approach”. One can have a ”defensive approach but also a manuverist doctrine”. Also, contrary to your assertion, quite a bit of the urban ops we do are also aimed at defending [I gave some examples of actual exercises].

    Gonggok – ATGMs will stop and obliterate mechanised formations

    A generalised assumption which is tempting to make. Depends on operational circumstances, restricted or non restricted terrain, what is the effectiveness of infantry support, etc?

    Gonggok – Something similar in performance to the scaneagle is needed

    Not the hardware but the ”systens. The need to acquire a recce/strike capability… Just to be clear it was not the Azeri UASs per see which created the impact buy how they were employed in conjunction with other assets.

    Gonggok – If ukraine have the access to loitering missiles like Azerbaijan

    Not necessarily so. As stated on previous occasions – repeatedly – UASs to date have been deployed on largely permissive airspace, whether in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Yemen and Nargano Karabakh. UASs are slow, they lack defensive means and can detected by radar and ESM. Yes should get UASs they are not a panacea and against an opponent which has a layered and integrated GBAD, including the means to counter UASs via hard and soft means, we’d have a problem.

    Gonggok – ukraine have the access to loitering missiles like Azerbaijan

    In contrast to the Donbas where the Russians successfully deployed UASs at a tactical and operational level in which the Ukrainians could not counter, this time they haven’t for reasons which are still unclear.

    Gonggok – ukrainain navy have subs

    Russia has subs in the Black Sea, it has ASW assets, mines and can target Ukrainian sub bases. As such the ability of Ukraine to successfully deploy subs has to be seen in the context of what the Russians can do in turn… Not on my would Ukraine needs subs but ”also” the means to counter Russian subs and ASW assets and the ability to work with friendly assets to search and acquire targets.

  32. Joe,

    This unwritten policy you’re referring to doesn’t exist. It’s not well known in defence circles for the reason that it didn’t exist The 3 armed services are in fierce competition for funding, the idea that they would cooperate in the manner you described is inconceivable; anathema to them.

    What we buy and who it’s for is a political decision driven by the politics and threat perceptions of the period.

  33. Those you mentioned are the right conclusions of the nagorno karabakh conflict, not the wrong ones. And those right conclusions are something that malaysia need to take into account on our own defensive posture.

    So loitering missiles/munitions, what is your conclusion on that in regards to malaysia? They are not needed? Is handheld drones that malaysian army has right now all the UAV that we need and not more? If a conflict does happen on our soil, would our airspace be totally denied to us for us to operate loitering munitions or UAVs? Loitering munitions have small RCS and slow, usually not detected by conventional air defence radars. They also does not have ballistic arc like a howitzer or mortar shell, so artillery location radars are of no use. So the user does not need to do shoot and scoot. The user also can see the target, unlike a howitzer or mortar battery that shoots to a coordinate. There is not much C-RAM capability of any forces, making loitering munitions a very effective weapon for the future.

  34. Gonggok – the right conclusions of the nagorno karabakh conflict, not the wrong

    You’ve formed the wrong conclusion on the point I was aiming at. The ”right” conclusions with regards to that conflict in line with operational conditions but the wrong conclusions with regards to us because conditions are unlikely to be replicated in our context, as some had a tendency to assume.

    Some lessons are applicable and some are not – ”obviously” you might say but not apparently. Just like how certain misplaced, simplistic and presumptuous assumptions will be made about the Ukrainian conflict it relevance to us – yes there will be factors relevant but has to be seen in context.

    Gonggok – loitering missiles/munitions, what is your conclusion on that in regards to malaysia? They are not needed?

    I’ve repeatedly stated my stand. UASs are not a panacea and don’t operate in a vacuum. Amidst all the euphoria, assumptions and cliches about them it’s vital to remember they are slow, lack defensive measures and are detectable by radar and ESM – overall they also require less resources that needed to deal with manned platforms. Yes we should get them but the ability to successfully deploy them will be dependent on various factors. Against an opponent with a layered and networked GBAD, including a anti UAS capability with soft and hard kill means, we’d have problems. Vital to look at all the nuances and also factor in the various factors at play and not just the ones which happen to fit in personal narratives.

    Before we even get into the armed UAS business [which existed way before it hit the headlines and caught popular attention at Nargano Karabakh] it would be prudent to start with the basics and concentrate on acquiring a ISR UAS capability.

    Gonggok – They are not needed? Is handheld drones that malaysian army has right now all the UAV that we need and not more?

    Sorry who aid they are ”not needed”? This area has been done to death with over the years here, including my last post, yesterday. Each service needs UASs for service centric roles but as we mature and acquire tertiary capabilities MALEs need to be operated by a joint UAS Command to maximise efficacy and avoid duplication.

    Also I’m not interested in the actual system per see as that is secondary but our ability to operate those systems in conjunction with other assets in order to fully exploit the capability. That is the real UAS lesson learnt from Nargano Karabakh.

    Gonggok – If a conflict does happen on our soil, would our airspace be totally denied to us for us to operate loitering munitions or UAVs?

    We simply can’t assume that this will not be the case or that our UASs will operate in airspace which is non restrictive or contested as in Nargano Karabakh, Syria, Libya, Iraq, Somalia, Yemen, the Donbas, Tigray and Afghanistan.

    Gonggok – making loitering munitions a very effective weapon for the future

    We are going around in circles. I will make this as conscise and easily understood as possible : nobody suggests UASs are not ”very effective” [to quote you] but their overall effectiveness, as with everything, depends on the operational context and specific circumstances.

  35. “as with everything, depends on the operational context and specific circumstances”

    Specifically talking about Malaysia isn’t specific enough context for you? Or you are just giving out excuses.

  36. Gonggok – Specifically talking about Malaysia isn’t specific enough context for you? Or you are just giving out excuses

    Touchy, touchy… First of all I don’t give out excuses; avoid making sweeping generalised misconceived assumptions and to obfuscate things. Secondly, I don’t need to give any excuses, certainly not to you of all people [try better next time]. If I disagree with something said, I will point out why based on facts – no excuses needed. Thirdly, if you care to read and try to understand what I was driving at, it would be apparent to you even if it doesn’t fit with your preconceived narrative.

  37. gonggok – you cannot base your propaganda solely on lies. That is the problem with the russian narrative

    We are not taking about things from a moral perspective here. If I wanted to I could go to a forum on religious issues rather than debate with you. I merely said that the Ukraine has dominated the information war.

    BTW both sides engage in lies. The Ukrainians claimed a few thousand Russians killed, portrayed destroyed gear as Russian, inflated civilian casualties, etc. It’s a 2 way street.

  38. Yes its a 2 way street.

    There are some inflated figures from both sides.

    Russia for example have said to shoot down multiples of Bayraktar TB2 daily, with zero pictures of downed UAVs.

    With more than 100 thousand russian troops now in Ukraine, just a few hundred killed as per Russian MOD is just too low.

    But have you read Russian MOD and Russian MFA twitter feeds? Their allegations of Ukrainian shelling own citizens, planning to attack russia etc are just batshit crazy. If the Ukrainian government has shelled their own people, Ukrainians will be the one that will fight their government, like Syrians fighting against Assad. But right now, even many Russian speaking Ukrainians are against the Russian occupation.

  39. gonggok – But have you read Russian MOD and Russian MFA twitter feeds

    I don’t. I utilise various sources, including fellow forum members in Russia but only to gain information on operational aspects of the war; lessons meant, losses, tactics, new units, etc.

    If you followed closely the 1st/2nd Chechian war; Abhkazia, Georgia and operations elsewhere it will be apparent that nothing which the Russians are doing now is new or surprising. As the ciche goes ”all big lies are based on half truths”. Propaganda by the very definition is slanted news combined with truths, half truths, fake news and exaggerations. In this case a lot of it is targeted at a Russian audience. Having been exposed to Soviet practices during decades as a Soviet republic; the Ukraine is no stranger to the value of propaganda and disinformation [Khruschev a firm proponent of propaganda and disinformation was Ukrainian]and also churns out its version of events.

  40. gonggok – An opportunity lost for MMEA or even RMN

    Given that a major priority for the RMN is to reduce its logistical/support footprint by cutting down to a bare minimum the number of different ships operated [each with different components/sub systems] and that the 5/15 is already derailed; I doubt the RMN would have been interested.

    A lot of cheap hulls are available for short to medium term solutions but the.RMN is looking at things on a longer term basis. High costs and the other resources needed for various different ships with little or no commonality is a major issue.

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