Adnan And MIFV Upgrade In RMK12

12th RMR Adnan ACV-S variant also fired its weapon at the exercise. 12th RMR.

SHAH ALAM: Adnan and MIFV Upgrade In RMK12. It appears that the Army proposal to upgrade its Kenderaan Jenis A (KJA-Type A Vehicles – armoured) – the Adnan and MIFV – have been approved and will be funded in the next RMK, starting in 2021.

One aim of the upgrade programme is the standardisation of these two variants , basically an M113 armoured vehicle of Turkey and South Korean origins. This will likely reduce the logistical footprint of the vehicles, lowering operational costs as both vehicles could be operated by a single unit. Most of the MIFV remaining in service are operated by the 14th RMR based at the Sirajudin camp in Gemas. The Adnans are mostly operated by mechanised batallions under the 4th Mechanised Brigade based in Kuantan.

Two MIFVs on parade several years back. Note the full cover on the turret. Most of the MIFV in service are operated by 14th RMR.

The programme will be funded starting from 2021, the start of RMK12, when the Gempita contract is completed. I was told that the various configurations for the upgrade are being finalised with various companies offering stand alone and turnkey solutions for the programme.

An Adnan 81mm mortar carrier with 12.7mm HMG.

This will be both a capability and life extension programme as both vehicles will have to serve until 2035.

An Adnan with the 25mm Sharpshooter turret.

An open tender is likely to be held for the new capabilities and add-ons as mandated by the programme’s office. It is likely though that Deftech facility in Pekan would be conducting the upgrade work, testing and commissioning of the vehicles. It will not make economic sense, if they want to build a new facility to do a programme that’s likely to cover two RMKs especially with the money allocated for it.

Adnans from 12th RMR with the sole 14th RMR MIFV (right).

Apart from the Adnan/MIV upgrade, the Army in RMK12 will also embark on another KJA programme but that’s for another day.

– Malaysian Defence.

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Shah Alam

59 Comments

  1. Questions

    1. What is the allocated budget for this?

    2. Will it be done by open tender?

    3. Is this basically a mid life reset, or a capability upgrade?

    4. How about the Gempita. Is the army planning, or has a requirement for a 2nd batch?

  2. I’ve long been speculating if DEFTECH and the army had any such plans; now I know. I hope that some level increased protection will be performed as part of the upgrade

  3. @ azlan

    As much as everyone hopes that they can increase the armour level of the M113 platform, the technical limitations of the platform simply wont let that happen. The 5 wheel version of M113 has GVW limit of about 14.5 tons.

    What i can foresee is that one of the upgrades is to install compatible BMS system as part of the smart soldier system to seamlessly integrate the adnan/mifv to gempita and the rest of mechanized formation.

    Hopefully those that is assigned to 11 armor could be upgraded with soucy rubber tracks to make it quiter, to be used as recce vehicles for its PT-91M pendekar.

    @ marhalim

    Anyway some of questions on this

    1. What is the proposed budget for this?

    2. Will it be an open tender?

    3. Will it be more like a reset rather than a major upgrade?

    4. Does the army has any requirement for gempita batch 2?

  4. “The programme will be funded in 2021 when the Gempita contract is completed.”
    A sign that more AV-8s won’t be purchased at least in RMK12. With 400+ units, they are in no hurry soon.

    I hope the upgrading will be comprehensive and go towards a single engine & transmission type, ditto to the tracks and running gear. Do they come with a battlefield management system? Would be good if the upgrade could standardise this as well (if they have).

  5. I speculate that the engines of both vehicles may be standardised n may even be a new more powerful unit. Secondly the fire control n detection system may be standardised n maybe made more powerful. The standard weapon now is going towards 30mm.
    The KIFV does not have a cupola. Maybe they will now be fitted with a cupola
    Then the various sights n night fighting system needs to be improved upon.
    Finally self protection systems like infra red detection system coupled wirh more modern smoke n or thermal dischargers can be fitted

  6. Naturally there will be limitations on how extensive an armoured upgrade can be; based on hull and weight limitations but it’s not as if one’s talking about up-armouring the flanks to withstand 30mm KE rounds or for the hull to be able to take a massive IED.

    An increased level of protection against shoulder fired weapons can be achieved without adding much strain on the existing engine or gearbox: whether in the form of add on panels on parts of the vehicle or “chicken wire” (of which snagging on vegetation will be a penalty vehicle crews will be happy to pay). Same goes for the MIFVs which incidentally are only protected tip to 12.7mm.

    How extensive any upgrade will be is dependent on the level of funding and how long more the army sees itself operating both types. In addition to standard stuff like replacing the wiring, rubber seals and other vitals; there will be other stuff that needs replacing; whether it’s the Turk supplied driver’s thermals, track pads, etc.

    Ultimately the ability of any IFV to perform is dependent on it avoiding destruction; thus in addition to the various changes to be made as part of an upgrade; serious consideration should also be given at looking at ways to enhance its survivability whilst taking into account whatever limiting factors they are. Bionix 2 (like Adnan based on the M113) is an indication of the importance the Sings place on survivability.

  7. @ azlan

    The Bionix FYI is not based on the M113. It has a totally different hull and suspension system. It weighs about 10 tons more than M113. It is fully welded steel construction unlike aluminium for M113.

  8. @ marhalim

    ” Apart from the Adnan/MIV upgrade, the Army in RMK12 will also embark on another KJA programme but that’s for another day ”

    Another KJ-A programme in RMK12? Why not just Gempita batch 2? Gemptia batch 2 will be in line with the governments push for closer ties with Turkish military industrial complex, while fully utilizing the manufacturing investment and knowledge spent for Gempita batch 1.

  9. I always hope the MIFV will get

    •better engines
    •fully automatic /remote turret
    •day/night optical
    •upgrade firepower

    Is it likely?

    Reply
    Yes on all

  10. zack,

    People keep asking about follow on AV-8s but the reality is that it’s a very long way off. The army has fulfilled part of its requirements for a new generation wheeled IFV (just like how it fulfilled part of its requirement for a MBT and tracked IFV) and probably wants to focus on other areas next; especially given that funds are limited.

    One thing’s for sure; the army will be busy trying our new concepts with regards to fully integrating the AV-8s into combined arms formations; ensuring the AV-8 can operate seamlessly alongside other assets – as one – in pursuit of the same objectives.

  11. @Pracxis
    “fully automatic /remote turret”
    This would be the 50 cal RWS, which is the base armed variant. Would be good if the MIFV could be rearmed with those turrets in use by AV-8; 30mm LCT30, LCT30-ATGW w/ Ingwe, 25mm Sharpshooter, and of course the 50 cal RWS.

  12. Installation of active protection system should be considered for M113 based IFV. Plus rubber tracks.

  13. Hilmi,

    Seriously? You really think we have the intention or actual funds to install APSs on the Adnans and MIFVs? It will never happen.

    People would like the army to do various things but we have to be realistic. It all boils down to funding (we don’t even know yet if the allocated budget will allow all the vehicles to be upgraded) and the army’s priority will be to do what it feels is absolutely needed; i.e. replacing time expired parts, reducing operating costs and making the IFVs slightly more capable (in line with the allocated budget) for the remainder of their service lives.

  14. @Azlan
    Forever fulfilling parts only.

    I doubt we truly have a critical mass of anything.

    @joe
    Eggshells with hammers.

  15. Why not phase out the mifv and get more Adnan from the turkey or even 2nd hand from the Turkish army ?

    Reply
    No idea why, likely its about money

  16. Chua – “Forever fulfilling parts only”

    At least we are doing it. Timely upgrades are important and so are timely servicing/overhauls of vehicles and the replacing of time expired parts.

  17. @ alex

    Both are basically the same vehicle. It is like how the royal malaysian police uses both mitsubishi lancer and proton inspira as patrol cars.

  18. Alex – “Why not phase out the mifv”

    1. No reason at all to retire them prematurely when they still are relatively “young” and have a role to okay; irrespective of the fact that they are not as armoured as Adnan and are not as well armed.

    2. Retiring them would mean that there would be a requirement for another 100 odd Adnans as replacement. In the current climate where funds are tight and cash is being spent on stuff that we urgently need; do you think the government is willing to replace vehicles that are not in urgent need of replacing?

  19. Chua – “I doubt we truly have a critical mass of anything“

    I’ve long pointed out that because of the lesser importance we place of defence compared to other areas ; as well as political factors that decide what we buy and from whom; we’ve placed ourselves in a position where we buy “a bit of everything but never enough of anything”.

    As it stands however there are exceptions; the order for 450 Condors during PERISTA was significant as was the earlier decision to order the Sabah, Keris and Kedah class (collectively designated “PCs”).Even before we received the stretched Charlies in 1995; the number of Charlies we already had was impressive for an air arm the size of the RMAF.

    Taking into account that for several decades the army consisted of lightly armed battalions whose primary duties was internal rather than external security; the 150 odd Model 56s we bought was an impressive figure. The order for 4 Lericis was a big step taking into account the overall size and capabilities of the RMN during that period and the fact that not only regional navies but also the USN then, weren’t operating any of comparable performance.

    So they are key exceptions. At certain times, we did have enough of certain assets.

  20. “So they are key exceptions. At certain times, we did have enough of certain assets.”

    Could add the number of Nuris and the number of Skyhawks to the list. A more recent example is our ordering 50 odd Ingwe Gempitas.

    “; as well as political factors that decide what we buy and from whom; we’ve placed ourselves in a position where we buy “a bit of everything but never enough of anything”. ”

    Curiously we never allocated enough funds to equip all our units with AUGs and M4, and we never bought any M203 AUGs or enough M203 M4s, despite having the political will to buy licences and establish local production lines.

    The police have also gone ahead with other rifles despite the M4 supposedly being designated the standard Malaysian rifle. (I would say another area where we’ve bought a little of everything is army’s light vehicles. We have Vamtacs, G wagens, Land Rovers, Hilux-es, Weststars.)

    Never mind rifles, even in the few units that have body armour, we still haven’t bought enough magazine pouches.

  21. AM – “ A more recent example is our ordering 50 odd Ingwe Gempitas”

    Yes. We can argue that buying Ingwe in the numbers we did was because we wanted not only to create true combined arms formations in the knowledge that they might come into contact with enemy tanks without having any friendly tanks supporting them and also because we wanted to compensate for the fact our neighbours have a numerical superiority in tanks; we wanted to even out the odds a bit.

    People tend to overlook the fact that any ATGW equipped IFV – despite it’s ability to “kill” tanks – should ideally operate as part of combines arms formations, which also includes tanks. Yes ATGW equipped IFVs can operate independently against tanks if they have to:using surprise and concealment but they shouldn’t. In this day and age everything must or should operate alongside others assets, cohesively.

    The whole idea of having a ATGW equipped IFV is so it can operate as part of combined arms units; it has the same level of mobility as other vehicles in the unit and also is afforded some level of protection. Given that high speed manoeuvre ops can’t be performed in our terrain to the extent in can say the Sinai or German plains; it’s arguable that ATGWs mounted on 4x4s (using their small size and low profile as an advantage, plus the terrain for concealment) has a role to play.

    On flat and open terrain; Chadian Toyotas fitted with MILAN wreaked havoc on Libyan
    T-54/55s in the late 1980’s. It also helped that the Libyans were incompetent and that their tank crews were unable to hit the fast moving Toyotas. In 1973 it was different; most Israeli tanks were actually killed by tank fire, not Saggers and Saggers only had some measure of success early in the conflict when the Israelis launched hasty tank attacks with no infantry support.

    AM – “despite having the political will to buy licences and establish local production lines”

    Throughout the years it produced the AUG; to the best of my knowledge SME never came out with any improvements or upgrades on the AUG.

    AM – “ we’ve bought a little of everything is army’s light vehicles”

    Plus the period we had Starburst, Igla, FN-6 and Anza – a silly situation. I’m of opinion that GAPU should operate both beam riders and heat seeker MANPADs but at the most; 2 suggest types, not more. If we ever get a wheeled SPH we’ll be in the unenviable position of having 3 different types of 155mms.

  22. There’s also someone’s famous quote that we had the largest number of Exocet missiles in the world at a time and that the UK was eager to borrow some of them during the Falklands conflict.

    I’m not sure how true it is and personally doubt both points. The quote had political motivations, the UK did not deploy Exocet against Argentina and they could have gone straight to France if they had needed missiles for their own use (although there have been instances in history when a producing state has been forced to raid its own inventory or borrow from others to supply a client in a contingency.)

    I’m open to the possibility that the British made inquiries to ensure that we did not quietly sell any to Argentina, who was urgently looking to buy any they could have found.

  23. azlan-

    sadly enough, with the budget,nation policy and oil price now maybe there wont be 2nd batch but with only 257 vehicle,i dont think it would be enough for semenanjung,sabah and sarawak..but i really hope we get another batch.

    hope a lesson for next people up there, since we are not financially well in defense,better buy off-the-shelf item.

  24. @AM
    >I’m open to the possibility that the British made inquiries to ensure that we did not quietly sell any to Argentina, who was urgently looking to buy any they could have found.

    It was indeed the case, both sides were looking at Exocet buyers, one to buy and one to interdict. So this is probably the story and we Malaysians aggrandised our role as per usual.

    @Azlan
    Some of those buys was during our heyday as a booming Asian tiger, with the huge economic gains from transitioning to a developing country.

    But now we’ve lost our momentum and our neighbours like Thailand and soon Indonesia are rapidly overtaking…

    Reply
    Not really, most of the big buy happened during early 70s and early 80s. Priorities changed after the 1989 peace agreement. After that defence purchases were mostly linked to TOT or national interest

  25. “it’s arguable that ATGWs mounted on 4x4s (using their small size and low profile as an advantage, plus the terrain for concealment) has a role to play.”

    Not only does our terrain (both urban and forested) offer good opportunities for concealment of a 4×4, there will be many instances when a 4×4 will enjoy better concealment (not only because they are smaller but also because they are harder to distinguish among other vehicles) and mobility (on roads and in tight spaces) than a tank, tracked or wheeled IFV.

    For this reason the SAF Guards incorporate Spike equipped LSVs (alongside 40mm GMG and .50BMG variants) in a scouting, raiding and screening force. Additionally they practice deploying these vehicles by helicopter and small landing craft.

    Of course, whether we buy more missile equipped IFVs or 4x4s would depend on the role and equipment of the unit operating them. If we do, it would be nice if we don’t introduce yet another new vehicle or missile in the process.

    “Yes. We can argue that buying Ingwe in the numbers we did was because we wanted not only to create true combined arms formations in the knowledge that they might come into contact with enemy tanks without having any friendly tanks supporting them and also because we wanted to compensate for the fact our neighbours have a numerical superiority in tanks; we wanted to even out the odds a bit.”

    My reading is the army took the opportunity to improve its anti tank capabilities, knowing that the Gempita project had political backing and that an MBT buy was not going to take place in the foreseeable future. Indeed if the Ingwe Gempitas have to be used in combat it will often be “without having any friendly tanks supporting them.” They won’t fill every need, but will be better than nothing.

    “Plus the period we had Starburst, Igla, FN-6 and Anza – a silly situation”

    Same could be said about light anti tank weapons- M72, CR90, RPG-7, Carl Gustav.

    “In 1973 it was different; most Israeli tanks were actually killed by tank fire, not Saggers and Saggers only had some measure of success early in the conflict when the Israelis launched hasty tank attacks with no infantry support. ”

    Going a little off topic here. Beyond the surprise factor and the Israeli’s mistaken intelligence estimates, the Egyptians have received a lot of credit for those first three days. In my opinion, it really is a matter of the Israeli army making mistakes by drawing on past experience (as all armies do) and taking time to learn how to deal with new tactics and weapons.

    While I would give more credit to the side which learned its lessons and, not the side which had accomplished its initial goals only though years of preparation by sheer task repetition, I do recognise that El Shazly had managed to accomplish what his country had asked of him and had done so with the blunt tools available.

  26. Chua – “Some of those buys was during our heyday as a booming Asian tiger”

    The purchases were made during PERISTA; driven by the need to defend the newly declared EEZ and fears that the Vietnamese might enter Thailand from Kampuchea. We were never really an “Asian Tiger” per see – that distinction belongs to the likes of South Korea and Singapore.

    Yes by the 1990’s our economy had an impressive growth rate but not to the extent that we were an “Asian Tiger”. Also. a lot of the buys I quoted was during the 1980’s when we had a modest growth rate. Various things under PERISTA were eventually cancelled due to a slowing economy.

    Chug – “like Thailand and soon Indonesia are rapidly overtaking”

    That’s a simplistic statement; when you take into account the varying threat perceptions and periods when we focused on defence and they didn’t. Indonesia is a large nation and the TNI (even after all the latest purchases) is still very overstretched – thus their buys should be seen in this context. They are rattled by China and have unresolved border issue with us.

    Thailand was forced to focus on external threats way before us; it bordered Kampuchea which was invaded by Vietnam. Today, the Thais worry less about China than we do but they’ve had border clashes with Myanmar and Cambodia is recent years and in the 1980’s had a clash with Laos. As it stands, the main security issue facing the Thais now is the insurgency in the south which is dragging on with no end in sight.

  27. @Azlan
    I suspect funds for the rifle standardisation are available if the buys are staggered throughout the years, just that for AUG there was purported issues with the rifle itself (according to TDM) which halted from fully replacing M16s. As for the M4s, the contract manufacturing only got a couple of years ago, so its still quite ‘new’. Will need a few years of staggered buys to fully adopted (it also helps SME to keep production line running for a years).
    For the M203 adoption, likely while the rifles are locally made, the grenade launcher isn’t. However Turkey do makes their indigenous underbarrel 40mm launcher, so its something to consider now we have defence relations with them.

  28. P.S.

    AM,

    An example of how rigidly the Egyptians followed Soviet doctrine was the way they went about killing tanks. The Soviets realised that their conscript tank crews were not as well trained as NATO equivalents and that NATO tanks were better protected; so their their tactics called for 3 tank sections to fire a salvo of 3 rounds each, for a total of 9 rounds; to ensure a target’s destruction. If however the target was already destroyed the section would cease firing and seek another target. The Egyptians however didn’t deviate from the script and would continue firing (the full 9 rounds) even if the target was already destroyed.

    In the Gulf War; despite being told by the Americans that the Iraqis had already vacated a certain area, Egyptian artillery would still fire on empty desert. This was because under the scripted orders they were operating under, they were not allowed to cease firing or shift fire until permission had been granted from HQ.

    joe -“ just that for AUG there was purported issues with the rifle itself (according to TDM) which halted from fully replacing M16s”

    Quality was actually good. In talks with industry people and the end user over the years I’ve never heard of technical issues with the rifle itself.

    What was bizarre was that at one point the Defence Minister announced we had a surplus of AUGs and might export them but 2 years later we ordered 24,000 for the MAF. NADI did try to export the AUG and one of the country’s approached was designated as one of the “Axis Of Evil” countries by Bush Jr. Marhalim also did a report of an attempt to export some to Burundi.

  29. AM – “there will be many instances when a 4×4 will enjoy better concealment”

    The downside is that such vehicles have zero protection against even small arms. The plus side is that crews will have better SA, their vehicle when moving emits less noise and is less visible. Ideally the vehicles will also be working alongside scout/recce elements; whether on foot, on 4x4s or on bikes.

    AM – “They won’t fill every need, but will be better than nothing”

    The danger is that circumstances might force us to use Ingwe equipped AV-8s as independent tank killers. This should never happen. Ingwe should always be used as part of combined arms formations; to provide those formations with an anti tank capability and if employed alongside friendly MBTs; used for flank protection or as a screening element.

  30. “I suspect funds for the rifle standardisation are available if the buys are staggered throughout the years.”

    Funds are not the issue, as evidenced by the police and MMEA buying various other rifles that they prefer. Refusal to standardise is the matter, as is refusal to fully equip even the army even after all the resources that went into the venture. There are units that were passed over by the AUG and which still have M-16s.

    Other issues are why the M4 was picked (you would think the army prefers a piston design like the HK416) and if there was at all a need to replace the AUG.

  31. @Azlan

    Yes you’re quite right and I agree. I was thinking of the economic situation and my mind wandered that way, when I said Thai and Indonesia are rapidly overtaking (or already have).

    Yes we’re not a real tiger, we were considered only a “tiger cub” at best and in the end not really.

    Ah so PERISTA was driven by fears of a Communist invasion. So the Govt really did take that seriously. I thought it was only the fears of the common folk.

    AV8 Ingwe is supposed to fill the under-armour ATGM vehicle role for mechanised units. The infantry battalions need another ATGM for themselves – like a detachable firing post version mounted on a Humvee. Yes its not armoured but light infantry aren’t anyway.

    @AM
    HK416 is expensive. M4 is compact and light (which is why the US Army picked it) and range disadvantage is not a problem for us in jungles and urbans.

  32. AM -“if there was at all a need to replace the AUG”

    As you’re aware there was no need from an operational perspective but because the arrangement between Steyr and SME went ratshit. From the very start the M4 was intended to fitted with various accessories but years and years after it was ordered; the needed accessories are nowhere in sight, apart from the small numbers of optics we bought.

    The biggest irony is that after using a rifle with optics, troops had to revert to iron sights….. To be expected, just like plans to export the AUG, plans to export the M4 were never realised. After paying royalties to Colt, its a major mystery how we expected our M4s to be competitive for the export …..

  33. AM,

    The Egyptians to a certain extent learned from their mistakes in 1967 and for 1973 they trained intensively for one purpose : to cross the canal and create a bridgehead. That in turn would lead to the Israelis negotiating and returning the Sinai.

    The problem started when the Egyptians (to ease the pressure off the Syrians) began deviating from the script and ventured beyond their bridgehead – Sadat approved this despite the advice of his generals. This played into the hands of the Israelis who could manoeuvre and perform combined arms combat in a way the Egyptians couldn’t. Egyptian strategic planning was actually pretty good but they were let down by the poor tactical performance of their units (a common problem with Arab armies).

    It was not a question of the lack of tools or incompetent senior officers but the fact that at a tactical level Egyptian units didn’t know how to manoeuvre, lacked initiative and aggressiveness; were not trained to react to unexpected scenarios, operated under centralised control and had poor marksmanship. They were simply outclassed by the Israelis.

    In addition to the common misconception that ATGWs played a decisive role in the conflict is the misconception that Egyptian defeat was due to Soviet doctrine. In the worlds of Kenneth Pollack (author of “Arabs At War” and “Armies Of Sand”) the Egyptians simply took good Soviet doctrine and make it bad. Soviet doctrine was not as rigid as some believe; it did take into account that changing circumstances called for a change in approach but the Egyptians couldn’t improvise.

  34. The main reason why they refuse to standardize?

    The mini napoleon syndrome and the need to give to different parties.

    For example MMEA, Bomba and PDRM all uses AW139. But they are bought from different middlemens. Probably if the M4 by SME can be sold to the police by their favoured middlemen, we can standardize to M4 carbine.

    Will the new government be any different? Hopefully yes but i really doubt so.

    Reply
    There is no middleman anymore for the M4 as SMEO is already acting as one. You are correct about the little Napoleons though a

  35. “In the Gulf War; despite being told by the Americans that the Iraqis had already vacated a certain area, Egyptian artillery would still fire on empty desert. This was because under the scripted orders they were operating under, they were not allowed to cease firing or shift fire until permission had been granted from HQ.”

    I presume you read this in “Arabs at War” which details numerous other failings in the various Arab armies.

    As the story continues, after the preparatory bombardment you mentioned, the Egyptians advance began late, proceeded slowly and stopped again when it was fired on by Iraqi artillery. The Egyptians refused to conduct counter battery fire on the excuse that they had reached their allotted ammunition expenditure for the day. Eventually, the Egyptians met almost no resistance in their sector but never reached their objectives before the end of hostilities.

    “An example of how rigidly the Egyptians followed Soviet doctrine ”

    In general, the Arabs have a lot of personality traits not going for them. One reason officers don’t take initiative is to avoid blame in case of failure. Rigidly sticking to orders and doctrine, even if it also leads to failure, is seen as the safer choice.

    If one fails then one delays or avoids reporting one’s failure upwards, and tries to blames someone else. Which leads to things like in 1973, Egyptian high command relying on intercepted Israeli transmissions over the reports of their own commanders.

    Such things are often observed when Arabs and their work ethic are present. What more in armies where political influence is high and where undeserving people are given high positions. To some extent their generals deserve sympathy because the issue is out of their control.

    “Quality was actually good. In talks with industry people and the end user over the years I’ve never heard of technical issues with the rifle itself. ”

    I didn’t ask if the AUGs have issues but most examples I’ve seen and held at events aren’t in good shape. The soft skin that covers the lower receiver is often broken. Fit wasn’t good and there was a lot of rattle.

  36. @ marhalim

    There is no middleman anymore for the M4 as SMEO is already acting as one.

    Exactly.

    If there could be a middlemen between police and SMEO, probably it would work! Refer my AW139 example, different middlemen, but actually all through Leonardo Malaysia.

  37. “The problem started when the Egyptians (to ease the pressure off the Syrians) began deviating from the script and ventured beyond their bridgehead – Sadat approved this despite the advice of his generals.”

    All things considered, it’s likely that even if the Egyptians had stayed entrenched at the 10km mark, the Israelis would have adapted and still defeated them. Within the original Egyptian plan, the expectation that they would have held their positions, under SAM and air cover, and that the Israelis would have been defeated and forced to negotiate was a very bold assumption.

    That said, El Shazly did accomplish the task given to him. He had achieved suprise even at the tactical level, crossed the canal and breached the line of forts there, which was thinly held and with Israeli reserves far away and advanced quickly to his target. Maybe the most surprising part of all this is the few casualties suffered. All of which isn’t an easy feat with an Arab army, which he knew and as a result had his units train exclusively on their tasks for an extended period. As we know, the Syrians never achieved anywhere near the same level of success at the time.

    I did not say he achieved any more than he was asked to prepare for years in advance which, knowing the Egyptian army, was a necessity.

  38. “The mini napoleon syndrome and the need to give to different parties … Probably if the M4 by SME can be sold to the police by their favoured middlemen, we can standardize to M4 carbine.”

    In theory this can be blocked at the government level, funding can be denied. Or can it?

    Reply
    Yes but not many people have that kind of influence. I know only one actually though I must admit there could be others as well

  39. AM – “To some extent their generals deserve sympathy because the issue is out of their control”

    Depends on the generals. Some were competent but some were the main part of the problem. Saddam actually haf some competent generals who achieved success when they were allowed to do things their way. The Libyans on the other hand had bad generals and bad junior officers.

    In “Armies Of Sand” the author does a detailed comparison between Arab armies and others who were also governed by authoritarian regimes (South Vietnam) and which employed Soviet doctrine (Cuba and North Korea) – the comparisons are not flattering for the Arabs.

    AM – “I presume you read this in “Arabs at War”

    Pollack also mentions this in “Armies Of Sand”.

    AM – “I didn’t ask if the AUGs have issues but most examples”

    No you didn’t and what I wrote was in reference to something “joe” said.

  40. @Azlan
    “Quality was actually good.”
    Not really sure. As mentioned, TDM had given a “technicality” excuse which reasoned why they switched from AUG to M4. It may or may not be a quality issue. It probably could be due to SMEO dispute with Steyr that was the true reason but for me, personally, switching to M4 was the best option.

    As for why M4 and not HK416, same reason why the US Army continued to buy more M4s even after evaluating the HK416. Commonality, adaptability, ease of production, ease of servicing, cost, and familiarity with the rifle (our boys would have trained with them when US comes for exercises). Though most likely reason is licensed production.

  41. Chua – “when I said Thai and Indonesia are rapidly overtaking (or already have).”

    What both have going against them is that both are heavily politicised organisations. The TNI in recent years has become less politicised but still is nonetheless.
    The militaries of Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei are probably the only regional ones that have never actively been involved in politics; whether by coups or other means.

    For me, what would really signify that Thailand and Indonesia have generally overtaken us is not what they buy or in what quantities but factors like their ability to conduct and sustain high intensity ops; dependent not only on the hardware but factors such as tri service cooperation, command and control; logistics, networking, etc.

    As it stands, despite all the recent purchases both the Thai and Indonesian armed forces are still mainly geared towards low intensity state on state conflict and internal security. Because they are heavily politicised; both are also busy doing other things apart from their core military responsibilities.

  42. @Azlan
    I’m getting Armies of Sand ASAP. Wow it’s only published this year, how did you come across it? Any other books you can recommend?

    Yes the ineffectiveness of Arab armies is well known. What disturbs me, from a performance viewpoint, is the similarities between Arab culture and ours…

  43. @Azlan
    I was talking about them in economic area not military, sorry I wasnt clear. It’s scary how developed they are now. And Vietnam too. The internal economy is staggering especially the massive Indonesian one, and if they can successfully turn that power into tapping the industrial export market, boom goes our economic bread and butter. We will take the place of the Thailand that we derided back in the 90s.

    But that’s off topic. Sorry.

  44. “I’m getting Armies of Sand ASAP.”

    You’d do well to. Arabs at War is a great book, broad yet granular and very entertaining reading. Practically tells you everything you could want to know.

  45. “The internal economy is staggering especially the massive Indonesian one, and if they can successfully turn that power into tapping the industrial export market, boom goes our economic bread and butter.”

    Already happening, and IMO the main reason incomes here are stagnant. We don’t offer very much in the way of low input costs or quality manpower.

  46. joe – “Not really sure. As mentioned, TDM had given a “technicality” excuse which reasoned why they switched from AUG to M4.”

    Quality control with the rifle was not an issue. All the equipment needed was sourced from Austria and to be fair SME did maintain QC. Over the years I heard complains about our ammo, about the decision to get cheaper Japanese optics, complains about the lack of a selector and about initial difficulties troops had converting to a bullpup but I’ve never heard complains about quality issues. Perhaps others have but not me.

    The army never gave a reason behind the M4. The Defence Minister did, saying it was “better”. What he didn’t say is that the M4 is only “better” if fitted with the various accessories it was designed to be used with.

    joe – “It may or may not be a quality issue. It probably could be due to SMEO dispute with”

    Of course it was because the partnership with Steyr went ratshit.

    Let’s get one thing clear : us going for the M4 was not because of unhappiness with the AUG.

    joe – “Though most likely reason is licensed production”

    The only reason we selected the AUG was because of licensed production. Colt wasn’t eager to allow the same with the M16A2 which was the army’s preference. Similarly the only reason we went for the M4 (no trials were conducted on other designs) was because of licensed production. Colt was more than happy to give us that.

  47. Chua,

    You can get “Armies Of Sand” from the Book Depository. Free shipping.

    You asked me what I’d recommend –

    – “Transforming Command: The Pursuit of Mission Command in the U.S., British, and Israeli Armies” (Shamir)
    – “Logistics in the Falklands War”
    (Privratsky)
    – “The Dictator’s Army: Battlefield Effectiveness in Authoritarian Regimes” (Talmadge)
    – “Fleet Tactics: Theory and Practice” (Hughes)
    – “The Art Of Manoeuvre” Leonhard)
    – “A War of Logistics: Parachutes and Porters in Indochina” (Shrader)

  48. @Azlan
    “M16A2 which was the army’s preference. Similarly the only reason we went for the M4”
    So TDM finally got what they wanted (in a updated form) thru a roundabout way. At least that’s something positive out of this.

    You’re right about our chronic problems of enhancing the M4s for effective usage but the gist is at least now they have a proper weapons platform (M4/AR15) that has huge mass-market variety for aftermarket enhancement parts (scopes, pointers, etc, down to the rifle part itself; barrel, handguard, bolt, buttstock, mag). Even many US Army personnel would buy these aftermarket enhanced parts for their service rifle.

  49. Another good read

    https://c4i.org/unrestricted.pdf

    Future fighting concepts to take on a bigger adversary. In depth look on how china plans its conflict engagement with others. It is not limited to just defence forces but to financial institutions, media, internet etc.

  50. “at least now they have a proper weapons platform (M4/AR15) that has huge mass-market variety for aftermarket enhancement parts (scopes, pointers, etc, down to the rifle part itself; barrel, handguard, bolt, buttstock, mag). Even many US Army personnel would buy these aftermarket enhanced parts for their service rifle.”

    Theoretically true but meaningless in practice. It’s like saying we have this wonderful CMS on the Gowinds that can support Aster 30 and BMD radar, when in reality we’ll never get them and will switch to another incompatible system down the road.

    Another problem with your statement is that these accessories are not M4 specific. They can fit any rifle that has rails, including the AUG if we had elected to so configure it.

  51. @AM
    The platform is there, buying all these enhancements just needs political will, and for sure the financial barrier threshold is lower as compared to fully arming Kedahs. (PS Gowind is a lousy comparison since its a fully fitted out frigate).

    “including the AUG if we had elected to so configure it.”
    Meaning for AUGs there are 2 hurdles, buying & fitting the Picatinny rails then the add-ons. For the M4s the rails are already there so there is one less hurdle. Bear in mind, our AUGs would either require extensive modifications (ala Aussie F88s) or get AUG specific gear which would be expensive. Either way, the types of addons are far limited compared to M4/AR15 platform. Mostly are plug and play on this platform. Not just from US but in market there are also cheaper 3rd parties which could be just as good. Local vendors could also get in the action as Picatinny mount is an open standard.

  52. @ joe

    On the AUGs

    Seriously what are you talking about? Most of malaysian army M4 has no Picatinny rails too (only those who has FSS got the rails). So no matter if it is an M4, or AUG, you will have the same 2 hurdle. I am with AM on this.

  53. @joe

    “MIFV could be rearmed with those turrets in use by AV-8; 30mm LCT30, LCT30-ATGW w/ Ingwe, 25mm Sharpshooter, and of course the 50 cal RWS”

    i think its a brilliant idea if all of the 12.7 variant could be upgraded to LCT30 and 25mm Sharpshooter.

  54. “Either way, the types of addons are far limited compared to M4/AR15 platform. Mostly are plug and play on this platform. ”

    The sights, lights and lasers- you name it- are universal and do not come in separate variants. If they will fit on the rails, they will work on the AUG and the M4 alike.

    When we bought the licence to produce the AUG locally, we also made the decision not to produce the variant of the upper receiver that had rails. We did not correct this decision- instead, we ditched the investment and paid for the licence to an entirely separate weapon. Oh, and we again decided not to produce the M4 with handguards that have rails or can mount rails.

    “for sure the financial barrier threshold is lower as compared to fully arming Kedahs.”

    It’s fitting that you mentioned the Kedahs. That’s another case of us paying for the licence to a design, not developing it to its potential and then ditching what we’ve paid for in favour of something new.

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